Research Background

Bilateral security relations, in the form of alliances, have the purpose of bringing stability and peace when used as deterrence in the presence of a common threat. It is then understood that common security concerns will bring these countries together in order to achieve the balance of power they seek through their cooperation, despite the existence of disagreements. When maintaining these security alliances alive is vital and still relevant for the interests of the countries involved, it is expected from them to make rational choices to maintain the alliance even if there is a clash of interests over other minor issues.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the world witnessed the formation of security alliances, mainly siding with one of the great powers that emerged from the conflict.

The United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) embarked on a race to expand their sphere of influence in order to achieve global supremacy. Consequently, the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact.

First, NATO was created under the perception of a possible Soviet invasion and then of a Warsaw Pact attack. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO members reassessed the importance for the continuity of the alliance. The breakup of Yugoslavia, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the 9-11 attacks with the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and finally the Arab Spring that exacerbated the political and security instability in the Arab world with the presence of terrorist groups such as Al- Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), further reinforced the

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relevance for the continuity of NATO as those conflicts posed a threat to the interests and security of one or more of its members.

Turkey, in particular, represents an important point of security discourse within the organization and more specifically with its strategic partnership with the US. During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis directly affected Turkey who even questioned how reliable was the United States as an ally.¹ Furthermore, the Cyprus conflict brought Turkey into the spotlight within the organization and represented many strains on its relationship with the United States.

The famous “Johnson letter”² undermined NATO and the United States’ security commitments to Turkey shall it invade Cyprus.³ After Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 to protect the Turkish minority, the United States imposed an arm embargo without expecting retaliation with the closure of American operations in the country.⁴ Both situations affected the stability of the organization and the countries’ military readiness.

Moreover, during the Cold War, NATO threats came from the Soviet Union, but after its collapse, most of the threats were on Turkey’s borders.⁵ Turkey became a liability for the organization, but the US, still relying on Turkey for its own interests, considered Turkey

1 William Hale, “Turkey,” in The Cold War and the Middle East, eds. Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1997), 259; Richard H. Solomon and Nigel Quinney, American Negotiating Behavior: Wheeler-dealers, Legal Eagles, Bullies, and Preachers (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 215.

2 During the escalation of conflicts between Greeks and Turkish Cypriots in 1964, Mustafa İsmet İnönü, then Prime Minister of Turkey, threatened to invade Cyprus militarily to protect the Turkish minority. US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to İnönü on June 5, 1964 warning Turkey that they could not use American weapons to invade Cypriots. Furthermore, Johnson informed İnönü that in a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union, NATO and the United States would not intervene to protect Turkey without first obtaining approval from the allies. See the complete letter at: U.S Department of State, Office of The Historian. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, June 5, 1964, [Telegram]. For access to the full letter visit : https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d54

3 Michael Szaz, “NATO, Turkey and U.S. Strategy,” in NATO, Turkey and the United States Interests (Washington D.C.:

American Foreign Policy Institute- Studies on NATO Defense Policies, 1978), 5.

4 Murat Karagöz, "US Arms Embargo against Turkey - after 30 Years: An Institutional Approach towards US Policy Making", Center for Strategic Research (SAM), (Winter 2004 – 2005):113- 114; Hale, “Turkey,”264; Tareq Ismael, and Mustafa Aydin, eds., Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21^st Century: A Changing Role in World Politic (Burlington: ASHGATE, 2003),30; Lyman L. Lemnitzer, “The Defense of NATO‘s Southeastern Flank and the Turkish Arm Embargo,” in NATO, Turkey and the United States Interests (Washington D.C.: American Foreign Policy Institute- Studies on NATO Defense Policies, 1978), 29-31.

5 Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, F, and Stephen Larrabee, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations- Toward a Strategic Plan (Santa Monica: Center of Middle East Public Policy, 2000), 3-22.

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important while praising its secular and democratic values as an example for the region. For instance, the United States dragged Turkey into the first Gulf War due to its geostrategic location, military capabilities, and perhaps its Muslim identity, proving to be invaluable tools for the victory. However, the war against Iraq affected Turkey’s economy greatly, becoming the second economic victim of the war, ⁶ while at the same time it threatened its territorial integrity as the war aggravated the Kurdish problem.⁷ This situation led to Turkey’s rejection to support the United States during the second invasion of Iraq in 2003.

At the bilateral level, United States relationship with Turkey has been very problematic.

The conflicts with the Kurdish rebellion has continued and now constitutes the major contentious issue between them, precluding any meaningful cooperation over how to handle the crisis in Syria and the spread of terrorism in the region. Both countries have been able to cooperate successfully in Korea,⁸ Afghanistan, and to some extent in Iraq, but as they have now sided with different non- state actors in Syria, their priorities and preferences are in a clear divergence.

More recently, the problem over the extradition of Fethullah Gülen is threatening their security alliance further. Gülen, who Turkey blames as the mastermind of an attempted coup d'état in July of 2016, has been living for more than a decade in a self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania. Disagreements related to the legal extradition process against him and the lack of a clear stance from Washington to whether they support Turkey’s claims of his participation in the coup are the main drivers of the existing animosity between them over this issue. This thesis

6Sina Aksin, Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to present (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 294-295.

7Gengiz Candar, “Some Turkish Perspectives on the United States and American Policy toward Turkey” in Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy, ed. Morton Abramowitz (New York: Century Foundation Book, 2000),140,

8 Normal Haley, “The Role of Turkey as a NATO Partner” in NATO, Turkey and the United States Interests (Washington D.C.:

American Foreign Policy Institute- Studies on NATO Defense Policies. 1978) 10; Szaz, “NATO,” 3.

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will focus on this extradition case, which is the latest strain in the relationship between Turkey and the United States. In order to provide a comprehensive study of the situation, the extradition process, the security alliance and the domestic political problems of Turkey during the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government will be covered in the following chapters.

Why is it important to look at security relations and domestic issues when trying to explain cooperation in the presence of an extradition conflict? According to Christine Van Den Wijngaert (1983), the ultimate decision to extradite a fugitive might be plagued by domestic pressures, international pressure, political considerations, but also the security ties with the requesting state.⁹ Even though the legal procedure is extremely important during an extradition process, when they threaten the bilateral relationship, the security ties can help us find the motives how the countries can move forward, continue the exiting cooperation among them, and put this difference aside. This is of course relevant in countries where security ties are the main driver of their relationship and outweigh the interests resulting from domestic pressures.