Chapter 2 Literature Review - Extradition and the Political Offense Exception
2.4 Political Extradition Cases
2.4.1 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran
A great example of international relations issues related to extradition was the Iranian revolution and the downfall of Iran-US diplomatic relations. Although United States never granted political asylum to the Iranian Shah and that he was requested to leave the country, the admittance of the Shah to the country and refusal to extradite him were enough to trigger the break of diplomatic relations and later animosity between them.
Looking at the disturbing history between Iran and US, one can easily notice the controversies that can arise out of denying an extradition request regardless of the legality and formality an actual request should have. The implications that were seen in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in regards to security and diplomatic relations represent an important study for the development of this work.
When the Iranian revolution broke, the Shah escaped to Egypt on January 16, 1979. Just two days after his escape on January 18, President Carter, in a press conference, acknowledged the situation in Iran and openly said that his administration supports the new government. He also added that the Shah will go to the US, but stressed the hope of the US government to maintain good relationships with Iran.73
As defiance to Carter’s statement of support for the new regime, the Shah moved to Morocco on January 22 instead of the US, where he the King hosted him in a palace near Rabat.
73 “A Transcript of President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters; Opening Statement,” The New York Times, January 18, 1979.
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On February 18, 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini informally notified Morocco that he will demand the extradition of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to face trial before a revolutionary tribunal for “crimes against the Iranian people.”74 Sources said the King will refuse to hand over the Shah and will ask him to find asylum elsewhere.75
The Shah then traveled to the Bahamas and Mexico before being granted permission to enter the United States to seek medical treatment. Iran threatened Mexico with deteriorating diplomatic relations, but since there were any special economic or security relations between the two countries, or diplomatic representation in Tehran, Iran had little leverage on Mexico. All of this time, ongoing pressure from high political figures in Washington had pushed to allow the Shah into the United States, a man who had been a staunch ally to that country for more than 30 years. However, Washington resisted, thinking about the possible implications such a move would entail for the United States. The US embassy in Tehran had been attacked in several occasions that year, compromising the security of diplomatic personnel. However, due to the critical health condition of the Shah, he was allowed in for humanitarian reasons on October 22, 1979. In less than two weeks, on November 4, the embassy was seized by a group of revolutionary students with no opposition from the government. Sixty-one embassy personnel were taken as hostages.76 Khomeini used the opportunity to request the extradition of the Shah in return for the release of the hostages.77
74 “Iran Likely to Demand Extradition of the Shah”, The New York Times, February 17, 1979.
75 “Iran Seeks to Extradite Shah,” The Washington Post, February 18, 1979.
76 Lyn Boyd, “A King’s Exile: The Shah of Iran and Moral Considerations in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Institute for the Study of Diplomacy of Georgetown University, (2000): 1-12
77 Peter L. Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 74.
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In the months following the revolution, the new Iranian regime had made it clear their intentions to prosecute the Shah, to get revenge for what they considered a brutal dictator. They had already notified Morocco and severed relations with Egypt for their support to the Shah. In such situation, the United Kingdom felt uneasy with the presence of the deposed Shah in The Bahamas for a possible retaliation. Mexico, for example, received threats from Iran. It was a risky move for the United States to make. Washington had already contemplated the implications and foreseen the possible seizure of the embassy. The New York Times reported that prior accepting the Shah into the United States, President Carter had consulted with Iranian officials in Tehran and thought they had secured protection for the embassy.78
Prior demonstrations against the embassy were fueled by the perception that the United States might plan and support another similar coup as it has in 1953 to restore the Shah back to power. At “The Great Aban 13th Exhibition,” in what used to be the US Embassy in Tehran, walls are full-covered with posters naming the embassy a spying nest. Privileges given to American citizen during the Shah regime were another reason for the demonstrations. he acceptance of the Shah into the United States was not the only reason for the crisis, but it was the one that exacerbated the problem. The United States lost all chances to build confidence with and gain trust from the Islamic government in order to establish fresh diplomatic relations. It is not possible to say that if the United States had not accepted the Shah’s request to seek medical treatment in New York, both countries would have normalized diplomatic and security relations.
Suffice is to stay that it could have at least prevented the hostage crisis.
78 “Why Carter Admitted the Shah,” The New York Times, May 17, 1981.
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Regarding the extradition as a legal process, several factors would have made it impossible for the United States to extradite the Shah to Iran. The United States did not have an extradition treaty with Iran,79 and therefore was not obliged to proceed with the request. The United States has a long policy of not extraditing in the absence of a treaty. In addition, there was never a formal written extradition request in which the Iranian government provided documents supporting the crimes he was accused of. At “The Great Aban 13th Exhibition,” the personnel explain to the public that Ayatollah Khomeini sent a letter to the United States requesting the extradition of the Shah before the hostage crisis took place.80 However, no record of the existence of such letter is available nor has the author been able to find it. The only statement came on from the Oil Workers Union October 28, threatening to impose an oil embargo to exports to the United States unless the Shah is extradited to Iran.81
The extradition of the Shah represented many challenges to the United States. One of the challenges was the domestic laws of the United States, and another one its reputation. Even in the presence of a treaty, a request for the extradition of Shah would have been undeniably denied by any court in the United States for humanitarian reasons and the political offense exception. It was clear that if the Shah was extradited to Iran, he was going to be executed as many members of his monarchy were, without a fair trial and as a form of political oppression.
Exactly a month after the seizure of the embassy, Mardom, the newspaper of the Communist Tudeh Party in Iran, reported that the Khomeini-led Revolutionary council was divided, that it had no foreign policy, and that it was not giving the country any direction. The
79List of Extradition Treaties of the United States up to 2002. US Department of State.
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70138.htm.
80 Author’s personal visit to the museum in April of 2017.
81 “The Iran Hostage Crisis a Chronology of Daily Developments,” Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, (March, 1981), 35.
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Tudeh party had supported Khomeini on most issues in the past, raising the possibility that Tudeh, and perhaps other leftist elements, might be drawing away from Khomeini.82 The new government did not only lose its credibility with the international community, but also with elements within Iran. More than using the legal channels available, the Iranian radicals thought they could use the hostages in a kind of swap similar to those of prisoners of war. Requesting the extradition of the Shah was also a tactical political move from Khomeini to deflect the problems of the government he was trying to establish in Iran without having any prior experience in the state.
Perhaps, the new regime in Iran could have been more successful in trying to punish the Shah with a different approach and through different channels, for example the principle aut dedere aut judicare. This could have been possible if the UN Commission of Inquiry had been
successful in the investigation they conducted about the crimes allegedly committed by the Shah, following the hostage crisis. However, the Shah was forced to leave the United States in December bound to Panama and then to Egypt. In order to prosecute the Shah, since he was no longer in the United States, Iran would have had to make such request to Panama or Egypt. In fact, the Iranian government demanded the arrest of the Shah in Panama with an extradition request, but did not provided documents supporting the charges of torture, murder, and embezzlement on time.83
Khomeini had no experience running a country, and his religious-base type of government had little to do with governing outside of aspects confined within Islam. The way Iran tried to get the Shah extradited and then how it handled the hostage crisis reflects the lack of
82 “The Iran Hostage Crisis a Chronology of Daily Developments,” 64.
83 Boyd, A King’s Exile, 12-14.
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experience. As a result, Khomeini severely damaged his image in the world and Iran’s reputation into a country of hostilities. Even in the case of the extradition request to Panama, the Iranian government had more than a year to prepare a thorough case against the Shah, reflecting again the inefficiencies of the government.
The whole mess of the Shah’s extradition led to the final break of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran. In the eyes of Mr. Khomeini, the US’s reluctance to extradite the Shah, when it had the chance, sent a clear message to the Iranian people it did not have the intentions to amend its support for what they considered a ruthless dictator. Regarding the security relations, it also made clear that the US and Iran were willing to sacrifice the alliance between the two over the Shah.
Domestic pressures in both the United States and Iran plagued the extradition request of the Shah. The international community also played a role in trying to secure the release of the hostages, but did not interfere in the name of Iran. Even the taken of the hostages did not give enough leverage to Tehran to persuade the United States to extradite, or in other words swap the Shah for them. Collaboration failed and the Shah was never prosecuted.
Finally, the Shah’s extradition case mirrors other problems between the relationship of Iran and the United States. The lack of interdependence in other areas such as the economy and security at the time blinded the Iranian leaders. For them, Iran did not need the United States for its survival, while the animosity with the United States boosted the Ayatollah’s image in the country. The pursuit of self-interest in the case of Iran with its revolution led to very poor outcomes after the release of the hostages. This was reflected in the support from the United
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States to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, Iran isolation afterwards, and the economic sanctions that followed.