Chapter 4 Fethullah Gülen's Extradition from the United States
4.1 Fethullah Gülen and his Movement
4.1.2 Fethullah Gülen in Turkey's Politics
Fethullah Gülen has been involved in politics since the beginning of his time as a Muslim imam. Most of his involvement has caused him many confrontations with the state, particularly the military who is the protector of the secular Turkish state. According to him, his political views are not in divergence with the state and the military. He is against the politicization of Islam, but considers that religion is compatible with democracy. He has tried to portray himself as a moderate Muslim, but his actions say otherwise. His long participation in Turkey‘s public platform has the intention to provide an alternative for political Islam in a country that has long neglected and put aside its religious identity.
Gülen’s first conflict with the state occurred in 1971 because of a military coup. He was arrested on charges of article 3 of the Turkish Criminal Code for “carrying propaganda that undermine the secular Turkish state to replace it with a religious one.” After spending six months in prison, Gülen was released and went back to his job. A year later in 1972, he was convicted by the Izmir Military Court, but the excessive and inequitable harsh punishment of 3 years in prison and a ban from civil service for the same time set him free of charges by the Military Court of Appeals in October of 1973.164
163 Ibid. 160.
164James C. Harrington, Wrestling with Free Speech, Religious Freedom, and Democracy in Turkey: The political trials and times of Fethullah Gülen. (Lanham, MD: United Press of America, 2011) 97-98.
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Because of the previous encounters with the military and judiciary’s determination to crackdown on Islamic movements, Gülen supported the military coup in 1980. He was again detained and questioned for his movement’s activities.165 His support translated into a favorable view from the military as they considered that his ideas now excluded religion from the state structure. During this period, he developed close ties with Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Özal who started a political liberalization benefiting religious groups.166 The support provided him with legitimacy to expand his movement. Likewise, his close ties with Özal helped him get away from another judicial prosecution in 1986. Prime Minister Özal saw a strategic opportunity with Gülen in order to combat the extremist ideas of other Islamic groups in Turkey.167
The immediate consequences of the military coup in Turkey were the ban of political parties related to Islam. In that matter, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was banned from politics and his party the Justice Party was suppressed. Similarly, previous Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was also banned from politics and his party, the National Salvation Party, was closed down. Other politics, such as Mustafa Bülent Ecevit was incarcerated. At the time, Bülent Ecevit was the leader of Republican People’s Party that was in coalition with the National Salvation Party to form a government.168
They all came back to politics. Erbakan formed another party known as the Welfare Party.
It was in this party that Erdoğan became famous in Turkey. In 1994, he won the metropolitan elections in Istanbul. During his time as mayor of Istanbul, both panic and euphoria were felt in
165Joshua D. Hendrick, Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World. (New York: New York University Press, 2013) 5.
166Koyuncu, “Globalization,”156.
167M. Hakan Yavuz, “The Gülen Movement: The Turkish Puritans” in Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003) 37-38.
168Scott W. Hibbard and David Little, Islamic Activism and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Washington D.C.: United Stated Institute of Peace, 1997), 82.
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the city as explained by Cihan Tugal (2016). He introduced several reforms seeking to tighten alcohol consumption and to bring Islam back to the inhabitants of the metropolis. He reintroduced Islamic symbols in public places and prayer rooms in municipal buildings.169
The Welfare Party also won parliamentary elections in December of 1995. This was the first time in Turkish history that a party so far from secularist views gained the largest number of votes.170 He was not able to form a government until his alliance with Tansu Çiller of the True Path Party in July of 1996. This was considered Turkey’s first-ever Islamist-led government but only lasted till 1997.171 Erbakan received opposition from President Süleyman Demirel and the National Security Council for his anti-secular activities and anti-West stance, especially due to his rhetoric against the United States and his relationship with legally banned religious groups.172 In February 1997, the National Security Council issued a call for Islam to be kept out of public life and made clear that the government must work harder to contain such activities and to prosecute those who violate the laws protecting secularism.173 The military intervention did not need the use of force to oust Erbakan, as he resigned himself. His resignation was known as a soft coup. The military in Turkey has always played the role of protecting the secularism and considers it fundamental for the future of the Turkish Republic. Any renunciation to this policy of the military will have long consequences in Turkey as the West considers Turkey’s secular government a model for the region.
169Cihan Tugal, The Fall of the Turkish Model: How Arab Uprising Brought Down Islamic Liberalism (London: VERSO, 2016)71.
170Hibbard, Islamic Activism, 82.
171Ibid. 83
172Building for Security & Peace in the Middle East: An American Agenda, Report of the Presidential Study Group. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 1997. 72.
173Hibbard, Islamic Activism, 84.
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In regards to Gülen, he tried to intervene but in order to avoid conflicts for his own movement, he supported the military intervention.174 The support provided did not help much as his image as a moderate Islamic figure was damaged by the release in the Turkish media, supposedly orchestrated by the military, of a conversation he had with his followers. In the conversation, he said:
“You must move in the arteries of the system, without anyone noticing your existence, until you reach all the power centers…You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institutions in Turkey…Until that time, any step taken would be too early – like breaking an egg without waiting the full forty days for it to hatch. It would be like killing the chick inside. The world to be done is [in] confronting the world. Now, I have expressed my feeling and thought to your all- in confidence…
trusting your loyalty and sensitivity to secrecy. I know that when you leave here-[just]
as you discard your empty juice boxes you must discard the thoughts and feelings expressed here.”175
The military had already considered him a threat to secularism and the state. For them and the Kemalist elite, Gülen’s followers have penetrated state institutions to change the secular and democratic order into an Islamic one. Military officials associated with his movement were forced to resign and the business network was brought under great scrutiny.176
Following the release of the video, several accusations were made against Gülen. He did not face any of the charges as he moved to the United States, allegedly seeking medical treatment. Graham E. Fuller (2014) considers that it was in fact to escape the prosecutions.177 The State Security Court Prosecutor Nuh Mete Yüksel led the accusations. His accusations were made on the assumption that Gülen had tried to change the nature of the secular state by infiltrating member of his movement in the police and the military. Yüksel sought an arrest
174Koyuncu, “Globalization,”158.
175Hendrick, Gülen, 5-6.
176Koyuncu, “Globalization,”159.
177Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring, 157.
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warrant against Gülen for charges under Turkish Criminal Code Law No. 765, Articles 312 and 313, and the Anti-Terror Law No. 3713, claiming that Gülen was part of an organization that provoked hatred and enmity between people on the basis of religious, ethnic, and regional differences. The first arrest warrants were rejected, prompting General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, the Chief of the General Staff, to point out that it was because Gülen had supporters in the civil service.178 In 2006, Gülen was acquitted due to lack of evidence supporting the original claims.
Several other appeals and prosecutions followed. All of them were declined.179
The investigations against Gülen illustrate the difficult environment in Turkey for religious affairs and the role of the military in protecting the secular nature of the state. It also shows the decline of the Kemalist elite who have long governed Turkey, while the Islamic leadership is on the rise. The military considers that their survival is at risk with the conservative Islamic leaders who are engaging more and more in politics with the formation of several political parties.