Chapter 4 Fethullah Gülen's Extradition from the United States
4.2 Fethullah Gülen and his relationship with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
As a result of the soft coup in 1997, the crackdown on the conservative Islamic political leaders continued. The Constitutional Court dissolved the Welfare Party of Erbakan in January of 1998 for anti- secular activities. Two other parties emerged from the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party- banned in 2001 and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.180Erdoğan himself experienced attacks from the military and was sentenced to ten months imprisonment for a speech he gave in the city of Siirt, and later disqualified to continue
178Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 202.
179Harrington, Wrestling with Free Speech, 87-117.
180Aksin, Turkey, 308.
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his position as mayor of Istanbul in 1998. Four years later in 2002, the High Electoral Council declared him as not able to lead the AKP or run for office in the following elections.181
The attacks by the military and the Kemalist elite, as well as the common views on Islam, brought Erdoğan and Gülen together. Gülen tried to avoid close participation in politics, but during the elections of 2002, his business network, including the powerful media network, supported the AKP, which captured 365 seats out of 550 in Parliament.182 The victory in the elections made the AKP the most powerful political party in Turkey. Gülen’s support for the AKP paid off as members of his movement rose through the lines of the judiciary and police, positions that were previously denied to them by the Kemalist.183 The AKP victory reflected dissatisfaction with the secular Kemalist establishment. However, knowing the negative repercussions this might cause to the AKP, Erdoğan first attitude was to establish a party that fits Turkish politics- not trying to make any radical religious change and working together with the other political actors, primarily the military. The party was seen as having a secret agenda to undo the secularist nature of the state and undermine the Kemalist establishment;184 The AKP portrayed itself as a supporter of democracy, secularism, and Turkey’s membership in the EU.185
One of the major forms of support that demonstrated the strong alliance was during the Ergenekon cases. The Gülen movement was linked to the investigations since early 2003. This case brought to light plans to overthrow the AKP government and Erdoğan by members of the military and the judiciary. It was said that the investigations were allegedly started for the
181Ibid. 308-309
182Harrington, Wrestling with Free Speech, 175.
183Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring, 177.
184Yalcin Akdogan, “The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity” in The Emergence of a new Turkey, ed. Yavuz, 53.
185Ahmet T. Kuru, “Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and Development Party” in The Emergence of a New Turkey, ed. Yavuz, 141.
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purpose of cracking down on political dissidents of Erdoğan. The media network affiliated to Gülen first reported on the cases, while his supporters in the police and the judiciary led the investigations.186 The investigations led to the resignation in July 2011 of the Chief of Staff and the commanders of the army, navy, and air force.187 The AKP, and most importantly Erdoğan, have faced strong opposition from the military and the other actors in the Turkey, forcing them to be alert and use any support they can get from other actors in order to consolidate their power.
The Gülen movement became a strategic ally of Erdoğan as part of the Islamic conservative bloc against the forces of the military and the powerful Kemalist establishment present in the other opposition parties of which the AKP was still vulnerable to.188 During the 2007 presidential elections, the AKP presented as candidate Abdullah Gül. The pro-Islamic identity of the party and that of the candidate triggered a boycott of the first round of elections by the secularist camp because its selection was against the constitutional mandate that the president must be a secular person. Likewise, the army also issued a memorandum on its website warning that it won’t tolerate any actions against secularism in Turkey.189 He was still elected as president in the third round and received support from the Gülen movement. As a move of defiance, the AKP introduced a referendum to amend the constitution. The constitutional referendum of 2007 changed the original provision in which the president of Turkey has to be elected by the Parliament to a direct vote system elected by the people. This constitutional amendment was to be put in practice for the next presidential election.
186Günter Seufert, “Is the Fethullah Gülen Movement Overstretching Itself? A Turkish Religious Community as a National and International Player,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, No. 2 (January 2014): 17-18.
187Finkel, Turkey, 130-134.
188Tugal, The Fall of the Turkish Model, 88.
189Pelin Ayan Musil, Authoritarian Party Structures and Democratic Political Setting in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 93-94.
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As early as 2008, some scholars were already discussing the Islamic roots of the AKP and their secret agenda to change the constitution and eliminate the challenges posed by the military and the Kemalist elite as seen in both the Ergenekon investigations and the opposition to elect Abdullah Gül.190 The same year, the AKP was almost closed by the Constitutional Court for allegedly seeking to undermine the secular nature of the Turkish State.191 Consequently, Erdoğan, faced with many challenges, reformed the constitution again in 2010, this time to get more power to make appointments to the judiciary. The changes included increasing the numbers of judges in the Constitutional Court and thus reducing the risk of being closed by the same court.
Gülen supported this constitutional reform.192
Ariel Cohen (2013) pointed out another major constitutional change in which Erdoğan brought under his control the military. The referendum gave the government the power to bring to trial members of the armed forces to civilian courts, which previously had exclusive jurisdiction. All these major changes “weakened the separation of powers, diluted checks and balances, further defanged the army, and undermined Turkey’s pillars of secularism.” According to Cohen, Erdoğan wanted to establish a solid base for this plan of changing the whole constitution to make an executive presidential system rather than a parliamentarian one, but his plans were halted, as the AKP did not obtain the majority it needed in parliament in the following elections.193
Notwithstanding the strong connection between the two groups, several conflicts in the following years will destroy the solid friendship they have built in the first decade of the AKP in
190Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner, 16.
191Albright, “US-Turkey Relations,” 21.
192Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring, 175.
193Cohen, Obama’s Best Friend? 14-15.
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power. The first conflict between Erdoğan and Gülen arose during the Mavi Marmara incident.
Gülen considered Erdoğan’s actions unnecessary and provocative. Similarly, the Ergenekon investigations were also another point of conflict. While AKP officials sought to work with the elements of the military power and Kemalist alike, the Hizmet members sought with more determination the identification of their involvement.194 These two incidents brought the two sides against each other, but not as much as the Gezi Park riots and the corruption scandal of members of the AKP, both in 2013.
The Gezi Park riots of 2013 were the breaking point in the relationship between Erdoğan and Gülen. The riots were caused by a construction plan in Taksim Square, the main square in Istanbul. The protests continued and were exacerbated by dissatisfactions with the AKP and Erdoğan over issues of freedom of expression, religion, and secularism. Thousands of people protested, some of which were killed or injured. At the time, Prime Minister Erdoğan downplayed the protests and did not pay attention to their claims, leading opposition groups to call for his resignation. Strains with Gülen occurred when he criticized Erdoğan’s rhetorical and authoritarian behavior.195 The Gezi protests were the first main national challenge to the AKP and Erdoğan. For him, all of those involved, including those from which his actions drew criticizing, were against him.
At the end of 2013, a major corruption scandal, targeting members of his family and party, hoarded all public attention on him. A tape in which Erdoğan and his son could be heard planning to hide millions of dollars started circulating the in the media. The police detained high-level politicians, including four government ministers, their families, and other important
194 Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring, 182-183.
195 Ibid. 171-174
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business people in Turkey. Millions of dollars were confiscated from bribery, fraud, and money laundering. Erdoğan responses to the scandal were the immediate change of most of his cabinet, as well as a purge in the police and judiciary of those that could be involved in the investigations.
Because of the scandal, Erdoğan accused the Gülen movement of trying to destroy the AKP. He also expressed that the investigations were politically motivated because his followers carried out the investigations.196 He also accused the United States and Israel of trying to mount a coup against him.197
Since the corruption scandal, the Hizmet movement, including TUKSON, suffered major losses. Followers of the movement in the military, police, and judiciary were transferred or fired.
The majority of the schools and universities were close, the government took the Bank of Asya, and the media network including the most successful newspaper in Turkey, the Zaman, was harassed and eventually close after the failed coup on July 15 of 2016. Rumors of a possible extradition request from the United States started circulating in the media since 2014.198