政治引渡及其對雙邊安全關係的影響 : Fethullah Gülen的引渡 - 政大學術集成

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(1)National Chengchi University International Master’s Program in International Studies 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. Political Extraditions and Their治 Impact on Bilateral Security 政 Relations: The Extradition of Fethullah Gülen 大. 立. 學. Fethullah Gülen 的引渡. ‧. ‧ 國. 政治引渡及其對雙邊安全關係的影響:. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Felix Jose Poleo 費力克 Advisor: Dr.Yeh-Chung Lu 盧業中博士. September, 2017. 1.

(2) Abstract This thesis aims at augmenting and contributing to the study of political extraditions and Turkey-US bilateral security relations through the lenses of Cooperation Theory proposed by Robert Axelrod. Regarding extradition, most researches have focused on the legal implications. Contrarily, this thesis focuses on the implications on bilateral security relations. Moreover, the domestic political pressures of Turkey are also included to depict the real motives behind the extradition request of Fethullah Gülen, which is the case subject of study. This thesis investigates the bilateral security relations since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey came into power from 2002 to September of 2017.. 政治大. The analysis of the security relations shows that negative impact the possible denial of. 立. this extradition is caused due to the instability and fragility of what was once called a strategic. ‧ 國. 學. partnership. Despite the negative impact of a possible denial of Turkey’s request to extradite Fethullah Gülen from the United States and the perception by different interlocutors of TurkeyUS security relations that it can lead to a break of diplomatic relations, this thesis argues that. ‧. their security relationship will continue based on the expectations of future interactions. Both,. y. Nat. the iterated characteristic of extraditions and the still existence of interdependence in security. sit. matters provide for incentives to continue their cooperation. In addition, the extradition requests. al. er. io. of the Iranian Shah and that of the members of the Irish Insurgency are also examined to provide. n. iv n C the break of diplomatic relations and one Moreover, hthat i U in regards to the analysis of the e ndidgnot. h c domestic pressures that motivated Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his government to aggressively a comparison of conflict of interests between the requesting and requested states, one that led to. seek the extradition of Fehtullah Gülen in the aftermath of July 15, 2016 coup d’état, it shows why he can be protected under the political offense exception. Furthermore, it shows that the threats to the United States have been used to manipulate the extradition process and for political expediency. In order to avoid impunity and the continuance of animosity, the application of the principle Aut Dedere Aut Judicare is recommended if Gülen is found guilty of crimes also punishable in the United States. The author is aware that this is a tentative analysis since a decision on the matter has yet to be made. Key Words: Extradition, Security, Cooperation, Fethulllah Gülen, Turkey, United States. I.

(3) 摘要本論文旨在通過運用羅伯特·阿克塞爾德（Robert Axelrod）提出的合作理論，對政治引渡和土耳其與美國的雙邊安全關係的研究做深入探討。至今，關於引渡的學術研究大部分都聚焦在其法律影響上。與此相反，本論文則側重於引渡對雙邊安全關係的影響。除此之外，本論文也將土耳其的國內政治壓力納入研究，用以解釋本論文研究案例之法圖拉·葛蘭（Fethullah Gülen）引渡請求背後隱藏的真正動機。本論文對土耳其正義發展黨（AKP）於 2002 年上臺後至 2017 年 9 月期間的雙邊安全關係進行詳細研究。. 政治大響是由所謂的戰略夥伴關係的不穩定和脆弱性造成的。然而，儘管該負面影響以及土美安立. 對安全關係的分析表明，美國可能拒絕土耳其對法圖拉·葛蘭這一引渡請求的負面影. ‧ 國. 學. 全關係的對話雙方對該事件的不同感知有導致外交關係斷絕的可能，本論文的觀點是土美安全關係會因為對兩國未來相互作用的期待而繼續保持。引渡的後果反覆運算特性和兩國. ‧. 在安全事項中依然存在相互依存關係也激勵兩國繼續合作。另外，本文也通過分析對伊朗國王以及愛爾蘭叛亂成員的引渡請求——前者導致外交關係斷絕而後者沒有——來比較請. Nat. sit. y. 求國與被請求國間的利益衝突。此外，對土耳其總理雷傑普·塔伊普·埃爾多安（Recep. al. er. io. Tayyip Erdoğan）及其政府在 2016 年 7 月 15 日政變之後咄咄逼人地尋求引渡法圖拉·葛蘭. n. 所倚仗的國內壓力的分析也展現了法圖拉·葛蘭能夠獲得政治罪犯庇護的原因。同時，這. Ch. i n U. v. 也表明了對美國的威脅被用於操控引渡程式，並被用作政治權宜之計。為了避免有罪不罰. engchi. 現象以及仇恨的延續，本文作者建議應用 Aut Dedere Aut Judicare 原則來避免當葛蘭根據美國法律被判有罪而逃避懲罰的情況發生。作者知道，這只是一個嘗試性的分析，因為關於這個事件的決定還沒有出臺.. 關鍵詞：引渡，安全，合作，法圖拉·葛蘭（Fethullah Gülen)，土耳其，美國。. II.

(4) Acknowledgments This thesis would not have been possible without the help and support of many people. First and foremost, I would like to thank God who has guided me and provided me with the strength I needed during the course of this thesis. I would also like express my immense gratitude to my thesis advisor, Dr. Yeh-Chung Lu (盧業中), for believing in me since the beginning and for his advices. I am forever grateful for your support.. 政治大. Thanks to the committee members Dr. Ariel Ko and Dr. Andrea Pei-Shan Kao for their comments and advises.. 立. To my mother Mildred Del Pilar Infante, my two siblings Felix and Elvira, and all my. ‧ 國. 學. family back in the Dominican Republic for keeping me in their prayers and their unconditional love.. ‧. Special thanks to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Taiwan for. y. Nat. awarding me with the MOFA scholarship and financial means to further my studies. Living in. n. al. er. io. remember forever.. sit. Taiwan has been the most formative experience of my life. It has been an adventure I will. Ch. i n U. v. Thanks to Daniel Kuppel for giving me the last push and support when I needed it the most.. engchi. Finally, thanks to all of my friends who accompanied me in this amazing journey.. III.

(5) Table of Contents Chapter 1 Introduction ······················································································ 1 1.1 Research Background ····················································································· 1 1.2 Research Motivation and Purpose ······································································· 4 1.3 Theoretical Framework ··················································································· 6 1.4 Research Questions ························································································ 9 1.5 Research Approach and Methods ······································································ 11 Chapter 2 Literature Review - Extradition and the Political Offense Exception ·············· 13 2.1 Definition and Origins of Extradition ·································································· 17 2.2 The Political Offense Exception ······································································· 20 2.2.1 The Problems of the Political Offense Exception ·················································· 23 2.3 Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute ··································································· 27 2.4 Political Extradition Cases ·············································································· 32 2.4.1 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran ····························································· 32 2.4.2 The Irish Insurgency ··················································································· 38 2.4.3 Hissène Habré, Former President of the Republic of Chad ······································ 41. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. Chapter 3 Turkey–United States Security Relations ················································· 43 3.1 Turkey and the United States in the 21st Century–AKP Government ····························· 45 3.2 Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East–Israel, Syria and Iran ······························· 46 3.3 The 2003 American Invasion of Iraq ·································································· 51 3.5 Relations under the Obama Administration··························································· 55 3.6 The Arab Spring and the Kurdish Issue ······························································· 57 3.7 The Expectations of Future Interactions ······························································· 64. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Chapter 4 Fethullah Gülen's Extradition from the United States ································· 66 4.1 Fethullah Gülen and his Movement ···································································· 66 4.1.2 Fethullah Gülen in Turkey's Politics ································································· 68 4.2 Fethullah Gülen and his relationship with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ································ 72 4.3 July 15 Military Coup and Gülen's Extradition Request ············································ 77 4.4 Analysis ···································································································· 86 4.4.1 Comparative Analysis ················································································· 94. Chapter 5 Conclusion ······················································································· 97. Bibliography ································································································ 103 IV.

(6) List of Abbreviations African Union. AU. Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States. ECOWAS. Democratic Union of Syria. PYD. European Union. EU. Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization. FETÖ. Foreign Military Sales. FMS. Free-Trade Agreement International Court of Justice. 立. 政治大. Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). n. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Northern Watch. sit. io. al. er. Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan). Ch. engchi U. v ni. IS AKP. y. Nat. Kurdish Regional Government. IRA. ‧. ‧ 國. Islamic State. ICJ. 學. Irish Republican Army. FTA. KRG PKK NATO ONW. People's Protection Units. YPG. Provisional Irish Republican Army. PIRA. United Kingdom. UK. United Nations. UN. United States of America. US. Syrian Democratic Forces. SDF. Soviet Union. USSR V.

(7) List of Figures Figure 1 Thesis'Variables.............................................................................................................. 12 Figure 2 US and NATO Military Bases in Turkey ....................................................................... 44 Figure 3 NATO Members’ Military Personnel in Thousands ...................................................... 82 Figure 4 Political Extraditions Comparative Table ...................................................................... 94. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. VI.

(8) Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Research Background Bilateral security relations, in the form of alliances, have the purpose of bringing stability and peace when used as deterrence in the presence of a common threat. It is then understood that common security concerns will bring these countries together in order to achieve the balance of power they seek through their cooperation, despite the existence of disagreements. When. 政治大. maintaining these security alliances alive is vital and still relevant for the interests of the. 立. countries involved, it is expected from them to make rational choices to maintain the alliance. ‧ 國. 學. even if there is a clash of interests over other minor issues.. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the world witnessed the formation of. ‧. security alliances, mainly siding with one of the great powers that emerged from the conflict.. Nat. sit. y. The United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) embarked on a race to expand their sphere. n. al. er. io. of influence in order to achieve global supremacy. Consequently, the United States formed the. i n U. v. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact.. Ch. engchi. First, NATO was created under the perception of a possible Soviet invasion and then of a Warsaw Pact attack. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO members reassessed the importance for the continuity of the alliance. The breakup of Yugoslavia, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the 9-11 attacks with the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and finally the Arab Spring that exacerbated the political and security instability in the Arab world with the presence of terrorist groups such as Al- Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), further reinforced the. 1.

(9) relevance for the continuity of NATO as those conflicts posed a threat to the interests and security of one or more of its members. Turkey, in particular, represents an important point of security discourse within the organization and more specifically with its strategic partnership with the US. During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis directly affected Turkey who even questioned how reliable was the United States as an ally. 1 Furthermore, the Cyprus conflict brought Turkey into the spotlight within the organization and represented many strains on its relationship with the United States.. 政治大 to Turkey shall it invade Cyprus. 立After Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 to protect the Turkish. The famous “Johnson letter” 2 undermined NATO and the United States’ security commitments 3. ‧ 國. 學. minority, the United States imposed an arm embargo without expecting retaliation with the closure of American operations in the country. 4 Both situations affected the stability of the. ‧. organization and the countries’ military readiness.. y. Nat. sit. Moreover, during the Cold War, NATO threats came from the Soviet Union, but after its. n. al. er. io. collapse, most of the threats were on Turkey’s borders. 5 Turkey became a liability for the. i n U. v. organization, but the US, still relying on Turkey for its own interests, considered Turkey 1. Ch. engchi. William Hale, “Turkey,” in The Cold War and the Middle East, eds. Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1997), 259; Richard H. Solomon and Nigel Quinney, American Negotiating Behavior: Wheeler-dealers, Legal Eagles, Bullies, and Preachers (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 215. 2 During the escalation of conflicts between Greeks and Turkish Cypriots in 1964, Mustafa İsmet İnönü, then Prime Minister of Turkey, threatened to invade Cyprus militarily to protect the Turkish minority. US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to İnönü on June 5, 1964 warning Turkey that they could not use American weapons to invade Cypriots. Furthermore, Johnson informed İnönü that in a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union, NATO and the United States would not intervene to protect Turkey without first obtaining approval from the allies. See the complete letter at: U.S Department of State, Office of The Historian. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, June 5, 1964, [Telegram]. For access to the full letter visit : https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d54 3 Michael Szaz, “NATO, Turkey and U.S. Strategy,” in NATO, Turkey and the United States Interests (Washington D.C.: American Foreign Policy Institute- Studies on NATO Defense Policies, 1978), 5. 4 Murat Karagöz, "US Arms Embargo against Turkey - after 30 Years: An Institutional Approach towards US Policy Making", Center for Strategic Research (SAM), (Winter 2004 – 2005):113- 114; Hale, “Turkey,”264; Tareq Ismael, and Mustafa Aydin, eds., Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politic (Burlington: ASHGATE, 2003),30; Lyman L. Lemnitzer, “The Defense of NATO‘s Southeastern Flank and the Turkish Arm Embargo,” in NATO, Turkey and the United States Interests (Washington D.C.: American Foreign Policy Institute- Studies on NATO Defense Policies, 1978), 29-31. 5 Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, F, and Stephen Larrabee, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations- Toward a Strategic Plan (Santa Monica: Center of Middle East Public Policy, 2000), 3-22.. 2.

(10) important while praising its secular and democratic values as an example for the region. For instance, the United States dragged Turkey into the first Gulf War due to its geostrategic location, military capabilities, and perhaps its Muslim identity, proving to be invaluable tools for the victory. However, the war against Iraq affected Turkey’s economy greatly, becoming the second economic victim of the war, 6 while at the same time it threatened its territorial integrity as the war aggravated the Kurdish problem. 7 This situation led to Turkey’s rejection to support the United States during the second invasion of Iraq in 2003.. 政治大 The conflicts with the Kurdish rebellion 立 has continued and now constitutes the major contentious. At the bilateral level, United States relationship with Turkey has been very problematic.. ‧ 國. 學. issue between them, precluding any meaningful cooperation over how to handle the crisis in Syria and the spread of terrorism in the region. Both countries have been able to cooperate. ‧. successfully in Korea, 8 Afghanistan, and to some extent in Iraq, but as they have now sided with. sit. y. Nat. different non- state actors in Syria, their priorities and preferences are in a clear divergence.. n. al. er. io. More recently, the problem over the extradition of Fethullah Gülen is threatening their. i n U. v. security alliance further. Gülen, who Turkey blames as the mastermind of an attempted coup. Ch. engchi. d'état in July of 2016, has been living for more than a decade in a self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania. Disagreements related to the legal extradition process against him and the lack of a clear stance from Washington to whether they support Turkey’s claims of his participation in the coup are the main drivers of the existing animosity between them over this issue. This thesis. 6Sina. Aksin, Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to present (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 294-295. 7 Gengiz Candar, “Some Turkish Perspectives on the United States and American Policy toward Turkey” in Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy, ed. Morton Abramowitz (New York: Century Foundation Book, 2000),140, 8 Normal Haley, “The Role of Turkey as a NATO Partner” in NATO, Turkey and the United States Interests (Washington D.C.: American Foreign Policy Institute- Studies on NATO Defense Policies. 1978) 10; Szaz, “NATO,” 3.. 3.

(11) will focus on this extradition case, which is the latest strain in the relationship between Turkey and the United States. In order to provide a comprehensive study of the situation, the extradition process, the security alliance and the domestic political problems of Turkey during the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government will be covered in the following chapters. Why is it important to look at security relations and domestic issues when trying to explain cooperation in the presence of an extradition conflict? According to Christine Van Den Wijngaert (1983), the ultimate decision to extradite a fugitive might be plagued by domestic. 政治大 requesting state. Even though 立 the legal procedure is extremely important during an extradition pressures, international pressure, political considerations, but also the security ties with the 9. ‧ 國. 學. process, when they threaten the bilateral relationship, the security ties can help us find the motives how the countries can move forward, continue the exiting cooperation among them, and. ‧. put this difference aside. This is of course relevant in countries where security ties are the main. y. sit. io. 1.2 Research Motivation and a Purpose. er. Nat. driver of their relationship and outweigh the interests resulting from domestic pressures.. n. iv l C n hengchi U Perhaps, completing the requirements of a master’s program is in itself motivational. enough for any student. For the author, it is also an opportunity to explore new areas of knowledge and put in practice what has been learned. Furthermore, it is challenging, exciting, and more importantly, has an impact on our desires to succeed in new academic endeavors.. 9 Christine Van Den Wijngaert, “The Political Offense Exception to Extradition: Defining the Issues and Searching a Feasible Alternative,” Report presented at the International Seminar on Extradition, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, (June, 1983):749-750.. 4.

(12) The purpose of this thesis is to examine the controversial political extradition of Fethullah Gülen and its implications on the bilateral security relationship between Turkey and the United States through the lenses of Cooperation Theory proposed by Robert Axelrod. This thesis concentrates on three aspects: (1) extradition as a component of international cooperation, (2) Turkey-US security relations, and (3) the domestic aspects of the current political situation in Turkey that led to the extradition request. Security cooperation has been the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship between. 政治大 complicated in recent years due立 to many security strategy divergences, and right now Turkey’s. Turkey and the United States for more than 6 decades. Cooperation has become extremely. ‧ 國. 學. request of Gülen to be extradited from the United States poses a threat to the already shaky relationship. In that vein, this thesis seeks to verify whether this extradition case will actually. ‧. have a negative impact in their security alliance or a possible break of diplomatic relations as. sit. y. Nat. suggested by different interlocutors of Turkey-US relationship after considering different factors. al. er. io. of cooperation. The author argues that extradition requires a high degree of cooperation, but. iv n C h e the concerns, in countries where this has been i U for collaboration, will bring these n gmain c hreason n. when it is possible that high-profile extradition requests could be denied, common security. countries together. Likewise, cooperation will be taken into consideration when the requested state sees that its acceptance to extradite a criminal to the requesting state will be reciprocated if it finds itself in the position of the requesting state. Political extraditions frequently create controversies in both domestic and international levels. When a political extradition request is denied, it can both draw protesters to the streets and create hostilities between the states involved. With the increase of international crime, 5.

(13) crimes with political aims, the involvement of political figures in crime, and the ease on travel restrictions in some regions of the world, the means to repress crime and assure justice become an important aspect of international relations that deserves to be studied. Extraditions can cause an impact on bilateral relations, but the reasons for continuing cooperating and maintaining their diplomatic relations, be these security or economic relations, are sometimes undermined or used to manipulate the other party to comply with the request. By studying the conditions under which extradition can and cannot be pursued, this thesis also seeks. 政治大. to bring attention about why conflict arises out of denying extradition requests. Extraditions. 立. related to political offenses seem to be a major obstacle to international cooperation in criminal. ‧ 國. 學. matters as it creates a platform that fuels nationalist sentiments, a great deal of government’s involvement, and impunity to the offender. The problem of political extraditions and their impact. ‧. on security relations have not been covered yet. This work could perhaps augment the research. Nat. sit. y. of political extraditions and also take into consideration when trying to analyze similar high-. n. al. er. io. profile cases other factors such as the security dimensions and domestic pressures.. 1.3 Theoretical Framework. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. This thesis analyses the extradition of Fethullah Gülen through the lenses of Cooperation Theory developed by Robert Axelrod in his famous book “The Evolution of Cooperation.” Axelrod first question to his theory was “under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without a central authority? 10 He observes that a basic problem of cooperation. 10. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 3.. 6.

(14) occurs when the pursuit of self-interest individuals (states) lead to poor outcomes for all. 11 His theory is based upon an investigation of individuals who pursue their own self-interest without a central authority (anarchy) that will force them to cooperate with each other. 12 Furthermore, he believes that when in a conflict, mutually rewarding actions and advantages will ultimately lead to cooperation. 13 He also stress that iteration is a reason for cooperation. His main argument was that in order for cooperation to emerge under such conditions, it is important that individuals (states) expect future interactions among them, or in his own words,. 治政 difficult. In order to promote cooperation, therefore, it is 大 important to arrange that the same 立. “the shadow of the future.” As a long as the interaction is not iterated, cooperation is very. individuals (states) will meet each other again, or in other words, enlarging the shadow of the. ‧ 國. 學. future. 14 In addition, for cooperation to be stable it must be relevant and important in the. ‧. present.15 The interactions must be durable and frequent. 16 Finally, cooperation theory believes that knowing the reputation of the other party is important, as it will allow you to know. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. something about what strategy they use even before you have to make your first choice. 17. iv n C U of policy coordination.” h e nthrough of others, g c hai process. n. Robert Koahane (1984) defines cooperation as “when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences. 18. In. extradition, the anticipated preference is no other than the return of the alleged criminal. Cooperation theory is compatible with extradition due to the iterated characteristic of this process that by itself enlarges the expectations of future interaction and the promotion of 11. Ibid.7. Ibid. 6. 13 Ibid. 5 14 Ibid. 124-125. 15 Ibid. 126. 16 Ibid.129. 17 Ibid. 151. 18 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 51. 12. 7.

(15) cooperation. Depending on the influx of criminals among the states, the necessity for cooperation can take place anytime. The probability of repetition is extremely high, but most importantly is not control by the states. They never know how frequent extradition can be. However, the anarchical nature that characterizes the international legal system today affects the extradition process. Extradition falls into the view of anarchy as the central condition of international politics. As described by Kenneth Oye (1985) “nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for not central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests.” 19 This is. 政治大 to avoid conflict among them. 立 Sovereignty is a sensitive issue each state takes seriously in the. view in the absence of a central authority (international court) who decides on extradition cases. ‧ 國. 學. pursuit of their individual interests and the supremacy of their domestic laws. States frown heavily on pressures by foreign states to take actions in their favor. The nation who makes the. ‧. extradition requests has a clear interest in punishing the alleged criminal, but when the requested. sit. y. Nat. state has an interest in protecting the fugitive, the recognition of their laws, and its reputation,. al. er. io. this leads to a conflict of interests. Conflict is defined by Helen Miler (1992) as “goal-seeking. v. n. behavior that strives to reduce the gains available to others or to impede their wantsatisfaction.” 20. Ch. engchi. i n U. As extradition can easily lead to conflict, countries have agreed to sign extradition treaties in order to reduce the negative consequences of a possible denial, and guarantee the return of the alleged criminal. Extradition treaties, as a form of cooperation, have become extremely important. When countries enter into extradition treaties or agreements, they understand that such action is mutually rewarding. The requested state is expected to be more cooperative as it 19. Kenneth Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy, Vol. 38 (World Politics, 1985), 1. Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation: Strengths and Weaknesses,” Vol. 44 (World Politics – Cambridge University Press, 1992) 468. 20. 8.

(16) might find itself in the position of the requesting state in the future. Treaties are definitely the best option as it makes cooperation in criminal matters more stable. In most cases, the reasons to grant or refuse an extradition requests have been agreed by the states and are stipulated in the treaties. However, it seems that this has not been enough as conflicts continue to occur. With the definition of conflict by Milner, it is possible to determine that conflict will occur in extradition matters when the decision to deny the extradition will reduce the gains of the requesting state and impede its want-satisfaction: punish the criminal, apply its own criminal law, and use the. 政治大 Finally, cooperation theory立 not only provides for a good foundation to extradition, but also. punishment as retribution to the victims and deterrence for possible similar actions.. ‧ 國. 學. to security relations as a whole. In security matters, the existence of well-established security alliances is extremely important as it makes cooperation among the states durable, stable, and. ‧. frequent. A history previous conflict and current ones in which the allies are involved make the. sit. y. Nat. alliance relevant and important, while at the same time, enlarge the expectations of future. al. er. io. interactions. The existence of common threats that are not resolved yet provides for the. iv n C equipment from one ally to another alsoh makes e ntheir h i U more frequent. g cinteractions n. incentives for future cooperation. Other factor, such as dependency and sales of military. 1.4 Research Questions The author’s main concern is the possible outcome of the current situation in the relationship between the US and Turkey over the extradition request of Mr. Gülen. Gülen is confident that the United States will not extradite him because it will tarnish America’s. 9.

(17) reputation, 21 as all the indications that the extradition request will be used for political oppression are present. Due to this fact, the United States has tried to limit the scale of problem to the legal foundations of extradition, which should be resolved in a court of law. Turkey, however, disregards the legal process and expects the United States to extradite him regardless. If the extradition request is denied, Turkey might consider such action as a tacit support to an enemy of the state, thus leading to conflict with the United States and damaging the existing cooperation among them. Neither the United States nor will Turkey benefit if they decide not to. 政治大. cooperate. On one hand, the United States can damage its security alliance with Turkey by. 立. denying the extradition request and risk its ability to exercise power in the greater Middle East. ‧ 國. 學. and the possibility of getting important criminals (terrorists) captured in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey could expel US forces from Turkish territory and cooperate even more with. ‧. opposing forces against the United States in Syria. Likewise, Turkey might put itself at risk by. Nat. sit. y. losing US support and protection in the fight against terrorism if it decides to make an irrational. al. n. Washington.. er. io. choice to damage, downgrade, or break its diplomatic relations and security cooperation with. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. This thesis aims at answering the following main research questions: 1. Why extradition causes conflict? 2. Will cooperation between Turkey and the United States in security matters continue if Gülen’s extradition is denied? Other important questions to answer are: 1. How Turkey and the United States perceive the situation? 21. Exclusive – “Interview with exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen,” Interview conducted by Philip Crowther and Leela Jacinto. France 24 English [Youtube-Online], July 18, 2017.. 10.

(18) 2. Will Turkey grant any important extradition request to the United States in the near future? 3. Will Turkey’s quest for extradition be satisfied if the United States at least prosecutes Gülen? 4. If Washington does not extradite Gülen, will Turkey risk its security alliance with the United States?. 1.5 Research Approach and Methods While many scholars have addressed the issues involving extradition and its implications on diplomatic relations from a legal perspective, this thesis does not intend as its primary. 政治大. objective to question the legal procedure of extradition. Bassiouni (1995) pointed out in his book. 立. “Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law” one. ‧ 國. 學. difficulty has been that extradition is subject to whatever restrictions the law of the requested state imposes. These may include the political offense exception, the requirement of a treaty, and. ‧. the rule against non-extradition of nationals.22 Therefore, it is difficult to put aside completely. Nat. sit. y. the legal elements of extradition, so the author will focus on the interests of states to agree on. n. al. er. io. those legal provisions that allow extradition and prosecution of criminals to happen.. Ch. i n U. v. The study of extradition by Wijngaert (1983) points out different variables that are. engchi. necessary to understand the problems of politically motivated extraditions. This thesis has selected two of these variables, namely security relations and domestic pressures, to understand what are the real incentives and preferences behind the extradition request of Fethullah Gülen. That being said, the incentives for both the requesting and requested state for cooperation need to be addressed. In this matter, the security relationship between Turkey and the United States serve to provide for these incentives. 22 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Edward Martin Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law (Dordrecht and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 44.. 11.

(19) The organization of the thesis variables is the following:. Independent Variable. Intervening Variable. Dependent Variable. Political Extradition of Fethullah Gülen. Turkey’s Domestic Pressures. Turkey-US Security Relations. Figure 1 Thesis'Variables. Regarding the method employed, this thesis is developed on a single empirical case study of the extradition of Mr. Gülen. In the second chapter, several extradition cases are cautiously. 政治大. selected to show the problems of political extraditions and the considerations taken by countries. 立. to extradite, refuse to extradite, or engage in the process. Since this extradition represents a. ‧ 國. 學. problem to the current political party, which governs Turkey today, and its implications threaten the bilateral security relations with the United States, a coherent period of study will cover the. ‧. period of the security relations from the time the AKP came to power in 2002 to September of. Nat. sit. y. 2017. In order to gather relevant information on the topic and to answer the research questions,. al. er. io. this study uses qualitative information. The information obtained comes mostly from secondary. n. iv n C U information, for example the and some official publications. In this h high-profile e n g ccase, h i primary. literature. It also uses doctrinal legal research, jurisprudence analysis, news articles, speeches,. extradition request made by Turkey to the United States, is not available. The United States has a policy of not disclosing such information during the course of an ongoing extradition process. For this case study, the author conducted a research in different libraries of Istanbul and Ankara in the spring semester of 2017 for the purpose of collecting insightful information. Traveling Turkey was extremely helpful as it helped to arrive at a closer conclusion of the real implications while experiencing in loco the domestic political developments. 12.

(20) Chapter 2 Literature Review - Extradition and the Political Offense Exception Extradition law was born with the need to prosecute fugitives who have escaped to a country other than their own. To the common public, extradition may seem simple and straightforward; once a fugitive is found, (s) he is then apprehended and sent back to be put on trial. However, without first understanding its due process, one cannot fully comprehend the. 政治大. complexity involved in extradition cases.. 立. Without cooperation between states, crime detection and prosecution would not be. ‧ 國. 學. attainable as the foreign state would hold legal authority over those residing or found within its territory. When a criminal cross over into foreign ground, jurisdiction authority is handed over to. ‧. the state where the fugitive has fled to. Mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and. Nat. io. sit. y. extradition has become invaluable tools in international cooperation for the repression of crime.. n. al. er. Cooperation comes in various forms such as international treaties, bilateral treaties, or. Ch. i n U. v. simply through reciprocity that help overcome the barriers many criminals and fugitives use in. engchi. their advantage to avoid justice, some of which may include: sovereignty, trust, lack of bilateral relations, the differences in the countries’ legal systems, and or the definition of which crimes should be extraditable. Bassiouni (1995) explains the practice of extradition is readily explicable in terms of the self-interest of states. Each state has an interest in getting back fugitives from its own law who flee to a foreign country. However, to secure their return on a regular basis, a state is likely to have to agree to extradite in its own turn. This is the main motive for concluding extradition 13.

(21) treaties.23 The existence of many extraditions treaties implies the willingness for cooperation, but the many challenges in the process create the dilemma that extradition requests will not always be granted regardless the seriousness of crime committed or how interested the country that makes request is in getting the alleged criminal back. When states enter into extraditions treaties, they are aware of the gains they can get from committing to such treaties. States also agree to extradite as a matter of comity, trust, and to increase their image as reliable signatories. Today, many defects deprive extradition of much of its potential effectiveness.. 政治大. Prosecutors and law enforcement officers find themselves unable to act due to the excessive. 立. procedural requirements, the rigidity of the treaties’ clauses, and in some cases, the absence of. ‧ 國. 學. extradition treaties. 24 Extradition is also limited due to a wide range of principles. One of them, and perhaps the more problematic, is the principle of neutrality, which has taken form as an. ‧. exception to extradite political offenders. The problem appears when states have different. Nat. sit. y. definitions of what constitutes a political crime. These shortcomings have slowed down and. n. al. er. io. impeded many extraditions around the world, causing tensions between the states involved.. Ch. i n U. v. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned problems, the lack of a universal authority leaves. engchi. the community of states with limited legal ways to prosecute criminals and obtain justice as extradition treaties become partially unenforceable in comparison to domestic laws. This reality, in contrast to other means and alternatives to get rid of unwanted people or get them to be punished such as abduction, deportation, expulsions, luring, or simply by denying visas and passports, 25 place extradition as the most comprehensive and legal available procedure with the. 23. Ibid, 37. Ivan Anthony Shearer, Extradition in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971), 2. 25 David P. Warner, “Challenges to International Law Enforcement Cooperation for the United States in the Middle East and North Africa: Extradition and Its Alternatives,” Villalona Law Review, Vol. 50, no. 3 (2005): 479-508. 24. 14.

(22) capacity to enhance international cooperation against transnational crime and criminals found in other jurisdictions. Regarding the aims of extradition, it is easy to identify the interests and preferences of the requesting state. Bassiouni correctly addresses the interests of the requesting state when he wrote that “the ends to be served by the return of fugitives are precisely the same as those that are supposed to be served by its criminal law generally: retribution, deterrence, and so forth.” 26 But the interests of the requested state are not necessarily the same. Why will another state engage in. 政治大. extradition? It becomes justifiable that a state wants to cooperate with another state as it might in. 立. the future request to that same state the return of a fugitive and therefore expects that state to. ‧ 國. 學. reciprocate. It might also do it to rid itself from criminals or unwanted people.. ‧. When conflict arises out of a denial of an extradition request, states should look at the possibility of future interactions. Robert Axelrod (1984) developed this idea and he attributes the. y. Nat. io. sit. reason of emergence of cooperation between self-interested states to the “shadow of the. n. al. er. future.” 27 Extradition, for example, is a repeated process. Extradition requests can happen at any. Ch. i n U. v. time and on multiple occasions, creating the incentives for building up a reputation of being. engchi. trustworthy partners. Extraditing a fugitive now, and thus establishing a history of collaboration, will be necessary for future requests. In the same vein, extradition is a repeated process because no request is necessary the last one. How many times a country can make an extradition request is not controlled by them; it will depend on the influx of criminals between the two countries and their ability to escape to them. Therefore, extradition has an infinite probability of repetition. The requested country should always consider that its decision today might have an effect in future 26 27. Bassiouni, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, 26. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 124.. 15.

(23) interactions. In that sense, countries will tend to be more cooperative in extradition matters. If the requested state expects no future interaction with the requesting state, it then can decide to deny the request. No expecting future interactions mean that there are no reasons for building a longterm relationship. A response from that state that expects no future interactions and considers the other state as a purported friend could translate into the refusal of the extradition requests as form of punishment. On the contrary, if there are expectations of future interactions, the requested state should do everything it could to assist the requesting state.. 政治大. Extradition then becomes a game of cooperation where states agree to participate based. 立. on their own interests. This process is limited to whatever the law of each state imposes on it.. ‧ 國. 學. Furthermore, when the limitations and defects of the current legal regime of extradition leads to the refusal of the request, the affected state may consider that the other state does not want to. ‧. cooperate with it, does not trust it, or that it supports and is harboring one of its enemies.. y. Nat. io. sit. Moreover, extradition has evolved and continues to evolve until today. It is considered. n. al. er. the oldest method of international cooperation in the repression of crime. Nevertheless, as a. Ch. i n U. v. component of international cooperation it has been unable to create a platform where states can. engchi. be neutral to whatever the decision might be. This can be attributed to the lack of an independent or supra-national- international- court that decides which cases should be extraditable, replacing the state-centric system of extradition and interpretation of the law. As a result, the denial of an extradition request can lead to the deterioration or break of bilateral relations.28. 28. For example, the case between Iran and the United States for the extradition of the Shah. In addition, the US requested the Taliban government in Afghanistan to extradite Osama Bin Laden, but the request was denied. This led to the US invasion in 2001.. 16.

(24) Most of the problems are present when the crimes or offenses can be deemed as politically motivated. Political offenses were the main factor for the development of extradition law, but today they constitute an exception to the rule. Claimed by Christine Van Den Wijngaert (1983), the controversies around the political offense exception “mainly result from its paradoxical character, which lies in it being both the most universally accepted and one of the most universally contested rules of international law.” 29 This reality is very unlikely to change in the near future in a state-centric Westphalian system as we have today.. 政治大 the political offense exception,立 and a list of political extradition cases that will show how the. In this chapter, the problems of extraditions will be delineated, starting with its origins,. ‧ 國. 學. problem manifests. It is important to point out that this chapter is not a strict legal analysis or interpretation of extradition law. It is meant to be guidance for the readers and a liaison between. ‧. sit. io. 2.1 Definition and Originsaof Extradition. er. Nat. four.. y. the topic and the extradition case of Fethulllah Gülen that will be subject of analysis in chapter. n. iv l C n hengchi U John Basset More (1911) defines extradition as “an act by which one nation delivers up. an individual, accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory to another nation which demands him, and which is competent to try and punish him.” 30 The state requesting extradition may claim its competence and jurisdiction for several reasons including territoriality, nationality, national security, and/ or universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity.. 31. In. 29. Van Den Wijngaert, “The Political Offense Exception,” 741. John Bassett Moore, “The Difficulties of Extradition,” The Academy of Political Science Vol. 1, No. 4, (July, 1911): 627. 31 Arvinder Sambei, and John R.W.D. Jones, Extradition Law Handbook, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1-2. 30. 17.

(25) other words, extradition is an agreement designed exclusively for the purpose of preventing putative wrongdoers from escaping justice by simply fleeing to another country. No civilized community, which has agreed on the rules of coexistence, wants to live in a world of chaos where crime goes unpunished. Therefore, it is in their highest interest to bring criminals to justice wherever they are found. Consequently, states shall provide each other with the necessary assistance by facilitating the return of fugitives. In doing so, they are not only promoting friendly relations with other states but also protecting their own citizens, vulnerable to. 政治大. the presence of dangerous individuals in their territory. 32. 立. The first examples of extradition arrangements were concerned on the delivery of. ‧ 國. 學. political enemies rather than ordinary criminals. 33 In early times, it was the normal practice,. ‧. within the discretion of an individual ruler, for a state to give asylum to refugees from another state. The granting of asylum to a foreign national was an expression of state sovereignty: his. y. Nat. io. sit. surrender (extradition) therefore required a degree of formality, usually a treaty, making the. al. er. exception to the rule 34 by giving up jurisdiction authority to the requesting state.. n. iv n C In the peace treaty between Rameses U the Hittite prince Hattusili III (c. h e nIIgofcEgypt h i and. between 1284 and 1269 BC), a provision was made for the return of the criminals of one party who fled and were found in the territory of the other. 35 It is considered the first international treaty dealing with extradition, and was intended to establish eternal peace and good brotherhood between them. Besides, there are allegations that a much older extradition treaty existed between. 32. Henry Chartres Biron and Kenneth E. Chalmers, The Law and Practice of Extradition (Littleton, CO: F.B. Rothman.1981), 2. Biron, The Law and Practice of Extradition, 11. 34 Ivor Standbrook and Clive Standbrook, Extradition Law and Practice, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3. 35 Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 5. 33. 18.

(26) Ancient Rome and Syria, which provided for the enforced return of Hannibal. 36 Extradition was intended for political offenders who wanted to change the regime or government, in contrast with common crimes who did not pose a direct threat to the state. It was not until the early stages of the eighteenth century that what it is considered today of extradition was developed. Most extradition treaties were based on the principle of reciprocity, mutual assistance, and in the interest of the state to further their foreign relations. A willingness to deliver up the criminals of the other party was just one of a number of gestures of friendship and cooperation. 37. 立. 政治大. Continuing on, the 18th century was a turning point in the development of extradition. ‧ 國. 學. agreements. The constant wars and political struggle, taking place in Europe, paved the ground. ‧. for much of the extradition treaties. Many monarchies feared political dissidents, but the spirit of neutrality prevailed. It is in that sense what at the beginning was the reason for signing. y. Nat. io. sit. extradition treaties, in the following treaties will become an exception. Political offenses, as a. n. al. Belgium was the first. er. result, were excluded from the majority of extradition treaties at the time.. iv n C country a igeneral U extradition h eto nenact gch. law after gaining. independence from the Netherlands in 1833. It was the first general extradition treaty where the political offense (délit politique) was excluded from the crimes for which under the treaty there was an obligation to extradite. 38 Another example was the extradition treaty concluded between France and the US in 1843, which included a provision exempting from extradition persons accused of any crime or offense of a purely political character. This provision appeared again in 36 Sir Edward Clarke. The Treatise on the Law of Extradition and the Practice Thereunder (4th edition, London, 1903) Quoted in Standbrook, Extradition Law and Practice, 3. 37 Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 6. 38 Standbrook, Extradition Law and Practice, 5.. 19.

(27) the treaty with Switzerland of 1850 and with the two Sicilies in 1855, but omitted from the treaty with Prussia in 1852. 39All these major treaties gave France the leading role in extradition of the eighteenth and the end of the nineteenth centuries; the political offense exception finds it beginnings in treaties negotiated by France. 40 Today, the growth of international crime and interdependence between nations has created the appropriate environment for strengthening international cooperation in legal and criminal matters. Almost all nations, if not all, are part of a bilateral or multilateral treaty. 政治大. concerning extradition. Despite the many regional treaties such as the Inter-American. 立. Convention on Extradition, the European Convention on Extradition and the Arab League. ‧ 國. 學. agreements of 1952 and 1983 with the aim of standardizing and simplifying the process of extradition, the final decision is left to the interpretations of each national judicial system where. ‧. the accused is found. In other words, extradition is prerogative of the state. Extradition in general. Nat. sit. y. has a complex approach to the solution of crime as it concerns not only the acts of the fugitive,. n. al. 2.2. er. io. but also the possible conduct of the states.. i n C hengchi U The Political Offense Exception. v. The surrender of political offenders can be traced to the origins of extradition itself (Biron and Chalmers, 1981). The exception of the political offenders as an express limitation on extradition first appeared in international practice in the treaty between France and Belgium in 1833. 41 While these two countries were limiting the scope of extradition, in 1843 a treaty. 39. Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 15-16. Ibid, 17. 41 Ibid, 1-8. 40. 20.

(28) between Austria, Prussia and Russia engaged the parties to deliver up persons guilty of high treason, lèse-majesté, armed rebellion or acts against the security of the throne or government. 42 Shearer (1971) considered that policy towards the prohibition of the surrender of political offenders was due to the recognition of the interdependence of nations and the motives of international cooperation, which inspired extradition and necessarily precluded the idea of surrendering political offenders. 43 It was also a tool to ensure extradition was not used for political oppression. 44 The idea behind is that states should take a neutral stance in regards to the. 政治大. internal and political conflicts other states are facing, because in some cases, extraditing political. 立. offenders was seen as a way to favor the actions and claims of the requesting state.. ‧ 國. 學. Generally speaking, the political offender is against the government and through his act wants to change the current regime or the situation he is fighting for. For the offender, the legal. ‧. system is incapable of resolving the issue and therefore does not consider his actions. y. Nat. io. sit. blameworthy. 45 In 1891, a court ruling known as Castioni in the United States, Justice Mill. n. al. er. suggested the following definition: “any offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil. i n U. v. war, insurrection, or political commotion.” 46 The political offense is an act against the security of the state. 47. Ch. engchi. According to the type of offense, they can be considered either as “pure political offenses” or as “relative political offenses.” The “pure” political offense is customarily directed 42. Ibid, 166. Ibid. 44 Clive Nicholls, Clare Montgomery, and Julian Knowles, The Law of Extradition and Mutual Assistance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 75. 45 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offense Exception in Extradition - A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem” DePaul Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1969):228. 46 Divisional Court. In Re Castioni. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149. http://uniset.ca/other/cs4/18911QB149.html 47 Manuel Garcia-Mora, “The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 7 (1962): 1226. 43. 21.

(29) against the government. It has been described by one authority as constituting “a subjective threat to a political ideology or its supporting structures without any of the elements of a common crime.” It is labeled a crime because the interest sought to be protected is the sovereign. 48 Offenses like treason, espionage, sedition, sabotage and subversion are known as pure political offenses, and have rarely been made extraditable in the past. 49 Regarding the “relative" political offense, it is characterized by the presence of one or more common crimes which are related to a political goal of the offender. 50 This type of political. 政治大 as a political one. The degree of立 closeness between the common crime and political objective is. crime has traditionally caused the most problems for the courts in their attempt to define the act. ‧ 國. 學. subject to the interpretation of the domestic courts of each nation. 51. The interpretations of the crimes, whether political or not, depend on which approach is. ‧. used, subjective or objective. The subjective approach focuses on the intentions, in contrast to. y. Nat. io. sit. the objective approach that focuses on the act. Focusing on the act, the United States applies the. n. al. er. “incident test theory” which explains that any crime should be incidental to a political struggle.. Ch. i n U. v. If not connection to the political struggle is established, the crime will be considered nonpolitical.52. engchi. 48. Bassiouni, “Ideologically Motivated Offenses,”4-5. Standbrook, Extradition Law and Practice, 69. 50 Bassiouni, “Ideologically Motivated Offenses,”4-5. 51 Charles L. Cantrell, “The Political Offense Exemption in International Extradition: A Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland,” Marquette Law Review, Vol. 60, No.3 (1977): 780. 52 Van Den Wijngaert, “The Political Offense Exception,”746. 49. 22.

(30) 2.2.1 The Problems of the Political Offense Exception The political offense exception is perhaps one of the least used exceptions in extradition, but undoubtedly a very problematic one. It is problematic because the level of state’s involvement, lack of a universal consensus of what exactly a political offense is, and which offenses will enter into that category (Garcia-Mora, 1956; Biron and Chalmers, 1981). The suspected conduct of the requesting state, the lack of a concrete definition, the wide-ranging area of applicability, and the judicial interpretation, represent the major challenges of this international norm.. 立. 政治大. The first problem of the political offense exception is circumscribed in the fact that this. ‧ 國. 學. exception is more concerned with the possible actions taken by the state rather than the crimes or. ‧. the criminals. It is concerned more with the state because it seeks the protection of political opponents from unfair or unjust trials, inhuman treatment, or the inability of the requesting state. y. Nat. er. io. sit. to provide security to the accused. Likewise, it is more concerned on the side of the state because the crime was directed at the government and it might want to seek revenge by punishing the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. fugitive. Human rights concerns, therefore, justify the existence of this exception when a. engchi. possible violation or breach of international laws is considered. As a result, it is unlikely that a state will extradite a fugitive when the indications of an illegitimate prosecution are present, but nonetheless this exception does not deny the existence of crime. On the other hand, extradition of political offenders does not serve the mutual interests of the interested states. Common criminals are extradited because they are a threat to all nations and extradition thus serves the interests of both the requesting and the requested state. In contrast, the authentic political offender is a threat only to his own government, whose existence or form he 23.

(31) opposes. Because the political offender threatens only his home government, the requested state is seen to have no interest in his extradition. 53 The political offense exception has been claimed in numerous cases for different types of crimes and political situations. Revolutionists, war criminals, separatists, drug offenders, economic criminals, religious offenders, political ideologists (communists, fascists, etc.), terrorists, murders, and/or people escaping oppression and totalitarianism have claimed it. 54 Due to the wide-ranging areas of applicability where this exception can be invoked, it has been. 政治大. impossible to arrive at a universal conclusion or interpretation of this exception.. 立. Political offenses are indefinable for two reasons. First, extradition law and treaties never. ‧ 國. 學. define the term political offense; and second, each state decides unilaterally which offense merits be considered a political one. 55 Defining what constitutes a political offense is a state’s. ‧. prerogative, which will lead to each country to have its own different definition. The situation is. y. Nat. al. er. io. crime in another.. sit. the following: a common crime in one country, correspondingly, can be considered a political. n. iv n C As an exception, it is not completely from other exceptions such as the one h e n exempt gchi U. known as clause d’attentat. The clause d’attentat has been adopted in several extradition treaties, bilateral and multilateral. It appears in the extradition treaty between Turkey and the United States as “any offense committed or attempted against a Head of State or a Head of Government. 53 Kenneth S. Sternberg and David L. Skelding, “State Department Determinations of Political Offenses: Death Knell for the Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1983): 138-139. 54 Van Den Wijngaert, “The Political Offense Exception,”743; 55 Ibid. 744.. 24.