Chapter 3 Turkey–United States Security Relations
3.3 The 2003 American Invasion of Iraq
The successes of Turkish Strategic Depth Doctrine in regards to its neighbors did not have the same fate with Iraq. Bilateral relations were curtailed by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The war brought new economic and security issues for Turkey the US did not take into account due to it remoteness to the region. The US government had normally taken for granted Turkey’s support in its incursions in the Middle East. This support that was expected again in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks, but the negative experience the first Gulf War left to the Turks hindered such plans.
In its first military incursion post 9-11, Turkey was one of the first NATO members to declare its full support to the US in its war on terrorism after article 5 (collective defense clause) was invoked. Ankara gave permission to all American and coalition member’s planes to use the Turkish air space in frame of the “Operation Enduring Freedom” against the Taliban forces in
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Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda.112 Turkey was pivotal for the success of the first stages of the invasion, as well as for the stabilizing forces and the peacekeeping missions under NATO supervision that will remain in the country until 2019.113 It was easier for Turkish soldiers to carry certain missions, as their shared Muslim identity was more appealing within the Afghan population. As a member of NATO, the Muslim identity of the Turkish soldiers became an invaluable tool, also shown during the Balkan wars, 114for future missions.
Pertaining to Iraq, Turkey did not extend the same support to the United States. In the beginning of the conflict, the Turkish Armed Forces foresaw Turkey’s involvement in a possible invasion in Iraq but did not give Washington signs of support. Fort them, Turkey could not escape to be involve for two valid reasons: first, the protection of its alliance with Washington;
and second, the opportunity to crackdown on any Kurdish insurgency in Northern Iraq.115 However, the decision was in the hands of the Parliament, which reminded of the negative security, political and economic consequences of the first Gulf War, refused on March 1 of 2003 by only three votes,116to participate in the war. The concerns were the same: Turkey’s territorial integrity, the economic losses, and a possible retaliation from Saddam Hussein. The March parliament refusal seriously injured the bilateral relations. Washington counted on Turkey to form a strong front in Iraq’s north from where it could strike easily the Saddam forces. As the invasion became imminent, Ankara had no choice but to find a way to support Washington as it has during the invasion of Afghanistan. As a result, the government passed two resolutions on
112 Ismael, Turkey’s Foreign Policy, 37; Giray Sadik, American Image in Turkey: U.S. Foreign Policy Dimensions (Lahnham:
Lexington Books, 2009), 11.
113 “Turkey extends its NATO mission in Afghanistan” Anadolu Agency, January 3, 2017.
114Amikam Nachmani, Turkey: facing a new millennium- Coping with intertwined conflicts (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) 144.
115 Gareth Jenkins, “Symbols and Shadow Play: Military-JDP Relations, 2002-2004” in The Emergence of a New Turkey:
Democracy and the AK Party, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006), 195-196.
116Christiane Amanpour , “Turkey rejects U.S. troop proposal”, CNN, March 2, 2003
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March 20 and June 24 that allowed the US led coalition to use Turkish air space and the use of Incirlik Air Base and the nearby port of Mersin for logistical support.117
In the same vein, Prime Minister Erdoğan unsuccessfully tried to put troops in Iraq as peacekeeping forces. The deployment never happened because the Bush administration acquiesced with the Kurds and the Iraqi Ruling Council objection of their presence as the troops were meant to be stationed in sensitive areas for the Kurds (Dohuk, Kirkuk, and Tikirt).118 The acceptance by the Bush administration came as a response to the absence of Turkey during the invasion, situation that allowed for the establishment of relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Shortly after, Washington relations with Ankara experienced a bitter moment when on July 4, US intersected and arrested 11 Turkish Special Forces in Northern Iraq with bags over their heads, claiming that they were an assassination squad targeting a local Kurdish governor.119
In fact, Turkey’s fears of a Kurdish rebellion materialized over the years. Just in 2006, over 600 people, many of them Turkish security forces were killed in PKK-related violence. The PKK had been able to gain strengths from its stronghold in US protected northern Iraq from where they engineered their attacks. Despite Turkey’s calls to the United States to help them eliminate the PKK threat, the Bush administration was reluctant to push too hard the Iraqi Kurds or the KRG, as they were essential for Washington’s plans to keep Iraq as a unified state.120 This is the same attitude the US had just a decade ago over Turkey’s call for support in Syria against
117 Aslan, “Performing Turkey,” 377.
118 Nur Bilge Criss, “Turkish Perceptions of the United States,” in What they think of US: International Perceptions of the United States since 9/11, ed. David Farber (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) 65.
119 Andrew Finkel, Turkey: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 82.
120 Larrabee, Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner, 8.
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PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.121 The protection of Northern Iraq by the United States prevented Turkey from taking any unilateral action to protect itself.
Just before the November 2007 Bush-Erdoğan summit, 13 Turkish soldiers were killed in the border. Consequently, during the summit, Erdoğan sought permission to attack PKK bases in Iraq. The United States provided Turkey with intelligence and permission to attack PKK targets on the Qandil Mountains.122Washington more effective cooperation with Ankara also tried to avoid antagonizing the KRG. “The more precise Turkish attacks, minimized Kurdish civilian casualties and therefore KRG complaints.”123
Without a doubt, the Kurdish issue accentuated the strains in their bilateral relationship.
Since Washington was in an ambivalent position and decided not to engage with the fight against the PKK, Ankara had no choice but to change its approach and play along with the actors in Iraq.
In the years after the invasion, the Kurdish issue and the PKK attacks have increased. Initially focused on a largely unilateral military effort to stop the trans-border activities of Kurdish violent groups, Ankara pursued engagement with the KRG as a more promising way to confront the PKK threat and to prevent the rise of a hostile neighboring Kurdish state more broadly.124
Turkish rapprochement with the Iraqi Kurds was in line with its zero problems with neighbor’s policy. Ankara wanted to ensure that leaders that would consider Turkey’s economic and especial security interests govern Iraqi Kurdistan.125 Since the United States was in control of Iraq, it did not oppose bilateral trade with Iraq as it has with Iran. In contrast, it encouraged
121Ibid, 147.
122Rebuilding a Partnership, TÜSİAD, 54.
123Weitz, “Turkey’s New Regional Security Role, 50;
124Alessandri, “Turkey and the United States,” 47.
125Weitz, “Turkey’s New Regional Security Role, 48.
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Turkey to expand its presence in Iraq. For Americans, Turkish business activities generate economic growth and jobs in Iraq, helping the country recover from decades of war and civil strife. By 2011, bilateral trade peaked US$ 12 billion, making Iraq Turkey’s second largest trading partner with much of this trade involving the KRG.126 Furthermore, many American leaders still see Turkey’s Islamic-influenced, but essentially secular political system as a model for Iraq, with its large Sunni minority and secular tradition, or at least as offering a superior alternative to that of an Iranian-style Shiite autocracy.127
Immediate economic gains as well as cooperation for its own security concerns in regards to the PKK motivated Turkey to change its approach. US policy towards Iraq was in convergence with Ankara in that both wanted to maintain Iraq united. Establishing relations with the KRG helped reconcile some differences with Washington and to obtain its endorsement for building closer economic agreements over the energy sector, extremely important for Turkey.
For Washington, it also meant an opportunity to reduce Ankara’s dependence on energy resources from Tehran as it happened in 2012 with the reduction of 20 percent on Turkish imports from that country.