Chapter 1 Introduction
1.3 Theoretical Framework
This thesis analyses the extradition of Fethullah Gülen through the lenses of Cooperation Theory developed by Robert Axelrod in his famous book “The Evolution of Cooperation.”
Axelrod first question to his theory was “under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without a central authority?10 He observes that a basic problem of cooperation
10 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 3.
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occurs when the pursuit of self-interest individuals (states) lead to poor outcomes for all.11 His theory is based upon an investigation of individuals who pursue their own self-interest without a central authority (anarchy) that will force them to cooperate with each other.12 Furthermore, he believes that when in a conflict, mutually rewarding actions and advantages will ultimately lead to cooperation.13 He also stress that iteration is a reason for cooperation.
His main argument was that in order for cooperation to emerge under such conditions, it is important that individuals (states) expect future interactions among them, or in his own words,
“the shadow of the future.” As a long as the interaction is not iterated, cooperation is very difficult. In order to promote cooperation, therefore, it is important to arrange that the same individuals (states) will meet each other again, or in other words, enlarging the shadow of the future.14 In addition, for cooperation to be stable it must be relevant and important in the present.15 The interactions must be durable and frequent.16 Finally, cooperation theory believes that knowing the reputation of the other party is important, as it will allow you to know something about what strategy they use even before you have to make your first choice.17
Robert Koahane (1984) defines cooperation as “when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.”18 In extradition, the anticipated preference is no other than the return of the alleged criminal.
Cooperation theory is compatible with extradition due to the iterated characteristic of this process that by itself enlarges the expectations of future interaction and the promotion of
11 Ibid.7.
18 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 51.
cooperation. Depending on the influx of criminals among the states, the necessity for cooperation can take place anytime. The probability of repetition is extremely high, but most importantly is not control by the states. They never know how frequent extradition can be.
However, the anarchical nature that characterizes the international legal system today affects the extradition process. Extradition falls into the view of anarchy as the central condition of international politics. As described by Kenneth Oye (1985) “nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for not central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests.”19 This is view in the absence of a central authority (international court) who decides on extradition cases to avoid conflict among them. Sovereignty is a sensitive issue each state takes seriously in the pursuit of their individual interests and the supremacy of their domestic laws. States frown heavily on pressures by foreign states to take actions in their favor. The nation who makes the extradition requests has a clear interest in punishing the alleged criminal, but when the requested state has an interest in protecting the fugitive, the recognition of their laws, and its reputation, this leads to a conflict of interests. Conflict is defined by Helen Miler (1992) as “goal-seeking behavior that strives to reduce the gains available to others or to impede their want-satisfaction.”20
As extradition can easily lead to conflict, countries have agreed to sign extradition treaties in order to reduce the negative consequences of a possible denial, and guarantee the return of the alleged criminal. Extradition treaties, as a form of cooperation, have become extremely important. When countries enter into extradition treaties or agreements, they understand that such action is mutually rewarding. The requested state is expected to be more cooperative as it
19 Kenneth Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy, Vol. 38 (World Politics, 1985), 1.
20 Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation: Strengths and Weaknesses,” Vol. 44 (World Politics – Cambridge University Press, 1992) 468.
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might find itself in the position of the requesting state in the future. Treaties are definitely the best option as it makes cooperation in criminal matters more stable. In most cases, the reasons to grant or refuse an extradition requests have been agreed by the states and are stipulated in the treaties. However, it seems that this has not been enough as conflicts continue to occur. With the definition of conflict by Milner, it is possible to determine that conflict will occur in extradition matters when the decision to deny the extradition will reduce the gains of the requesting state and impede its want-satisfaction: punish the criminal, apply its own criminal law, and use the punishment as retribution to the victims and deterrence for possible similar actions.
Finally, cooperation theory not only provides for a good foundation to extradition, but also to security relations as a whole. In security matters, the existence of well-established security alliances is extremely important as it makes cooperation among the states durable, stable, and frequent. A history previous conflict and current ones in which the allies are involved make the alliance relevant and important, while at the same time, enlarge the expectations of future interactions. The existence of common threats that are not resolved yet provides for the incentives for future cooperation. Other factor, such as dependency and sales of military equipment from one ally to another also makes their interactions more frequent.