ASEAN Player 1
3- Blockade to oil Imports. Some Scholars argue that a perfect or effective
4.5 South China Sea Peace Island Initiative
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goods, and cruise ships crossing the region.
4.5 South China Sea Peace Island Initiative
After have determined which factors will influence the implementation of joint patrols
in SCS, we are going to present possible actors that can initiate the SLOCs
cooperation game that we previously described.
The possible actors for the implementation of this proposal, named “South China Sea
Peace Island Initiative” are: US, Japan, ASEAN countries, or Taiwan.
The involvement of US in SCS disputes is not welcome by Chinese government, as it
considers SCS as a regional affair. In fact, when Hillary Clinton stated US’s position
on the issue and its interests on freedom of navigation in the region, Chinese Foreign
Minister Yang Jiechi, remarked that the issue should not be internationalized (Truong,
2011). More recently Chinese president Xi Jingping stated that Asian states
strengthening military alliances with external actors (a clear reference to US and its
alliance with the Philippines and Japan ) will not maintain common security in the
region (Reuters, 2014). Thus, we consider that our proposal for joint patrols for
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SLOCs protection in SCS should be initiated by other actor who already belongs to
the region.
As we mention previously, Japan was the ReCAAP original architect, which gives
him a lot of credit for his support to maritime security in SCS. However, as its
maintains disputes with China in the East China Sea causing the rise of tensions
between the two countries, as well as the recent remarks stated by Japanese prime
minister of providing technical assistance to ASEAN countries, as for instance patrol
ships to the Philippines and Vietnam to confront China in the SCS, thus, we consider
that is not the proper time for Japan to initiate our proposal due to its interest are focus
on containing China rather than cooperating with it.
ASEAN countries could initiate this joint cooperation on SLOCs protection, however,
recent incidents between Vietnam and China about the oil rig in disputed waters, the
Philippines’ initiative to take the SCS issue to an arbitration tribunal, as well as
Indonesia’s decision to become a disputant in the issue because Chinese overlapping
claims over Natuna sea waters, make us to believe that is more difficult for these
countries to use ASEAN in order to initiate cooperation with China under the present
circumstances.
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Our last option to support the SLOCs protection in SCS is Taiwan. The reasons why
we consider it will be a better initiator in the present situation are the followings:
1- Taiwan is occupying the biggest habitable Island in the Spratly Archipelago,
Taiping Island (or Itu Aba for Vietnam).
2- Despite the plans to upgrade military presence in Taiping Island due to some
threats by Vietnamese patrol boats in 2012, Taiwan has been not as assertive as
other countries in SCS. It has just issued statements of condemnation and
diplomatic protest without military actions to push back other disputants when
occupying reefs and islands. Moreover, in 1999, it decided to withdraw its marine
corps and cede the role to Coast Guard Administration to reduce tensions in the
zone (Liu, 2013).
3- Compared to other countries’ occupied islands, Taiwan possesses quite developed
and adequate facilities in Taiping Island, including a hospital, and an airstrip. At
present, is building a new port to accommodate bigger navy and coastguard ships
(Taipei, Times, 2014).
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4- Taiwan facilities in Taiping Island, as well as its coast guards ships, can be used to
initiate these joint patrols together with other SCS stakeholders, as a way to
promote new confidence buildings that can reduce tensions, coordinate other joint
patrols in the region, and combat more efficiently piracy.
5- Due to its presence in the Spratly Archipelago, Taiwan will be an important ally to
combat piracy if it had a more active role in sharing information with the
ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC).
6- According to United Nations Guidelines for Effective Meditation (2012), in order
to have a durable solution in any dispute, it is important to have inclusivity during
the negotiations, which means that the views and needs of all parties and
stakeholders are addressed in the process and in its outcome, thus, facilitating the
agreement legitimacy, its implementation, and avoiding excluding actors than can
undermine the process and its outcomes. Therefore, Taiwan participation in the
joint patrols will be for the benefit of a more balanced and durable solution to the
issue, due to it will include Taiwan’s views and needs during the process.
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The new port in Taiping Island can be used to deploy military vessels or coast guard
ships. Although Taiwan is interested on keeping the sovereignty in Taiping Island, it is
also concern with playing a more active role in the SCS to defend its interest by
increasing its military capabilities and presence in the Island (Liu, 2013). We consider
that this is a necessary measure to maintain the status quo in the zone, however, from
our point of view, if Taiwan wants to play a more interactive role in SCS, but it only
focus on building its military in the Spratly, it will lose the opportunity of leading a
SCS joint patrol initiative based on, and coordinated from, Taiping Island, which can
be used as a CBM among the actors in the region, it will help to de-escalate tensions,
to combat non-traditional security in SCS, and, eventually, can provide support for the
implementation of the SCS COC. Therefore, Taiwan could promote an agreement for
the Joint patrols in SCS as follows:
1-Providing its port as a main base for the joint patrols, as well as necessary
supplies for the ships.
2-Deploying its coast guard ships instead of its military ships, which will help to
avoid misperceptions as well as issues related with Taiwan’s legitimate
participation.
3- Agree with other actors about the composition of the crews taking part in the
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patrols, as well as the SCS routes they will follow. For instance, under general
consensus, they can jointly navigate a long SCS disputed islands, reefs, and
rocks, or across zones where piracy attacks rates are high. Previous joint patrols
in the region will be useful to arrange this.
If Taiwan just focuses on military buildup, it will not make any new contribution for
the resolution of the dispute; it just will follow the same behavior as other states in the
region have. However, if it decides to use Taiping Island as a platform for cooperation
on joint patrols in SCS, it will have the opportunity to get involve more directly in the
issue, and even more important, provide an escape valvule for the tensions
accumulated due to recent incidents between Vietnam and China with the Chinese oil
rig, and the compulsory arbitration of the SCS issue initiated by the Philippines.
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Chapter 5. Conclusions
This research has presented the South China Sea (SCS) issue based on Chinese
development on military affairs, energy policies, and relations with other regional
countries. We have applied the stag-hunt model in the dispute, in order to find those
strategies and factors that will lead stakeholders to cooperate on joint protection of the
sea lines of communication. Following, we present the findings, the discussion about
them, and the policy implications suggested.
5.1 Findings
The findings extracted from this research are: