Chapter 2. Research Design and Methodology 2.1. Introduction
U. S.S.R Cooperate Defect
2.4 Research Limitations
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These previous findings in the game theory literature are taken into account during
this research in chapter 4 in order to create the theoretical framework that shapes the
rules of the game for SLOCs cooperation in SCS. The stag-hunt model is the one we
consider at present best fits to the SLOCs security cooperation, due to its cooperative
strategy can provide more safety for the SLOCs than individual actions from each
player, this mean that it allows to expand the pie, increasing the payoffs of all
stakeholders, something that cannot be easily done with the resources and sovereignty
issues, which respond better to prisoners’ dilemma or chicken games in which
cooperation is more difficult to attain.
2.4 Research Limitations
In order to estimate the possibility of China cooperating with other SCS countries on
SLOCs protection, we have chosen rational choice from a realist standpoint to analyze
and give an answer to this question. When choosing one specific theory, we are better
in analyzing some aspects of the issue, but at the same time we put limits in others not
considered or that are less important for the chosen theory.
It is not possible to use all the known theories and apply them into a case study to
make an accurate prediction of what is going to happen in the future. If you consider
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all the known theories at the same time to try to encompass everything, eventually,
you are saying nothing. Thus, in order to have a concise and clear picture of the
situation, we have to establish our preferences, be specific, and concentrate our
research on one theory (in this study the game theory), as well as determining those
factors that can influence the rational decision of the stakeholders involved in the
dispute.
We applied the stag-hunt model to provide a simplification of the SLOCs cooperation
initiative in reality, thus, it does not reflect completely the real situation. Moreover, it
is important to take into account the evolution of the SLOCs situation and countries’
relationships in the SCS, due to they can change its characteristics and structure over
time making that other theoretical models will fit better. In fact, for different kind of
issues, like those involved with relative gains (e.g. resources and sovereignty), other
games will be more adequate as they provide different case descriptions, different
actors’ strategies, and different payoffs, which respond better to nature of those
situations, and thus explain the possibility of cooperation in a more proper way.
In our initiative for SLOCs security cooperation, several countries with different
military, economic, and institutional characteristics are involved, therefore all of them
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cannot make equal contributions to improve maritime security. This point can cause
difficulties when initiating the project due to some countries will have to provide
more resources than others, and the gains in maritime security are supposed to be
similar for all the participants because all of them can freely use the more secured
SLOCs. However, the real gains on safety will be proportional to the number of
vessels each country use in maritime trade and energy imports, and thus those
countries with economies based on trade and energy imports by sea (e.g. China, Japan,
Singapore, etc.) will obtain more benefits, which will decrease concerns about
distributions of relative gains due to the balance before and after the initiative will be
kept.
Other research limitation is the actor we use to promote SLOCs security cooperation
in SCS. We use Taiwan for different reasons, but the main is it has not been as
assertive and aggressive in its claims as other actors in the region, and thus can be
seen as a more trustful stakeholder than others. However, it is not officially
recognized by other states, is not so military-economically powerful as China or US,
and the sovereignty issue with China can difficult its participation in initiatives with
other countries in the region, thus, its contribution to the issue may be not so
determinant as those of other countries.
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One possibility to solve the previous problem is to use Japan as initiator of the
cooperation, due to it will be a more powerful actor that can facilitate the
implementation of the initiative, or US, who also have interests in the region, and as
superpower can foster military, economical, or institutional cooperation. The problem
is that, in the present situation, Japan is involved in sovereignty disputes with China in
the East China Sea, US is not welcome by China due to its alliances with Japan and
the Philippines, and because both countries are not SCS states. Thus, at present will
be more difficult for China to accept these countries as promoters of initiatives in the
SCS region, but in the middle-long term, if Chinese relationships with these two
countries improve, it will be possible to implement joint initiatives from US and
Japan.
Concerning the factors this study focus on to try to understand Chinese behavior in
the region, we mainly consider the oil factor, sovereignty, Chinese military
development, previous joint maritime patrols, non-traditional security cooperation,
and the Code of Conduct (COC) for SCS. In our case we do not focus on economic
relations between China and other ASEAN countries, nor in individual actors’ values
and believes as for instance presidents of the countries involved in the disputes. We
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believe that they are important, however in order to produce a research with specific
answers, and to delimitate the scope of the research, we must focus on those factors
that, after have done the literature review, we consider are the most determinant for
the SCS issue.
In spite of this, it is not sure that all these factors applied in one theory, can describe,
explain, and predict future developments in the issue. Therefore, in order to overcome
this handicap, it is necessary to reproduce the research using different theories and/or
factors to test if the results are the same or are different as those in our study.
Moreover, it is also important to determine in which one we obtain results that fit
better to the reality, or that provide with better tools to describe and predict the future
development of the situation, as well as to overcome the gap between the theoretical
desired framework and the real situation in SCS. As the scope of this study does not
cover all these designs, they will be taken into account in future investigations on the
same topic.
Lastly, there is a personal limitation related with the understanding and use of game
theory. We are using simple models to explain behavior and rational choices, thus I
am confident that, although at present I do not have a comprehensive understanding of
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this theory, I am sure that with the help of my professors, the academic literature, and
other educational material available on the Internet, I will be able to overcome it.
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