Chapter 3. Background information
3.1 Sea Lanes of Communication & Non Traditional Security Threats
3.1.3 Political instability in oil producer countries is the third important threat that
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and Alternatives Routes), the alternative routes to obtain oil, its own endogenous oil
production, along with some other factors, lead to the conclusion that China does not
need to have its own tanker fleet to increase its energy security and to provide them
with military protection, due to a perfect or effective blockade will not be feasible
unless the blockade is an energy denial (Collins & William, 2008). Furthermore, an
energy denial means attacking Chinese refineries, pump stations, and transportation
routes in the mainland, something that will be complicate as China possess the new
S-300/S-400 surface to air missiles (Shlapak, 2012), as well as it has developed in
recent years ballistic missiles that can coerce the enemy or create access denial zones,
zones where hostile armies cannot enter in, due to the high possibilities of been
attacked and destroyed by massive missiles attacks (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2011a).
This implies that pressures on Beijing to make concessions in a specific issue, could
lead to a military conflict with China, an outcome that cannot justify the blockade and
will not be supported by the international community (Collins & William, 2008).
3.1.3 Political instability in oil producer countries is the third important threat that
can interrupt the oil supply coming through SLOCs from its source of origin. During
2011, around 75% of Chinese oil imports mainly came from African and Arabs
countries, with Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran, Oman, Iraq, and Sudan as principal
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suppliers (EIA, 2012). The disruption of the flow of oil from these countries due to
political instabilities and wars will produce a tremendous impact on Chinese economy,
on its politics, and in its military. In 2008 Angola organized legislative elections, won
by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which at present
rules Angola but is seen as authoritarian regime in which several anti-governmental
demonstrations have been held after the Arab Revolution wave, and, according to
Angolan government, some of them promoted by Western intelligence services (De
Morais, 2012). In Oman, during 2011, protesters marched against corruption and
raising prices, demanding better distribution of the oil wealth (Worrall, 2012), in
Egypt president Mubarak was toppled down (Reuters, 2011) to be substituted for a
short period of time by a Islamist party considered extremist (Dailymail, 2012). In
Libya the civil war also overturned Gaddafi (Reuters, 2011), and other civil war is
still ongoing in Syria (BBC, 2014c). At present, there is unrest and turmoil in these
regions, and therefore, the possibility of new conflicts to emerge interrupting the oil
supply are still a concern for many countries. China, which companies were very
active in Libya before the revolution, will probably have more difficulties to access
Libyan oil after the end of Gaddafi regime (Erian, 2012). Moreover, the imposition of
sanctions to oil producer countries can also affect a country’s long term productive
capacity, as for instance happened in Iran and recently in Syria, affecting the supplies
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to its mains importers countries (Darbouche & Fattouh, 2011), therefore, China will
normally oppose to UN sanctions to countries in which it has interest in, as for
instance with Iran and its oil exports (Downs & Maloney, 2011).
China and oil export countries’ political instability
As we mentioned in the previous section, political instability in oil producer countries
can also cut the flux of Chinese imports in case of serious issues like a civil war in
African and Arabs countries. But what can China do to solve political instability
problems if they happen in its oil supply countries? Chinese Five Principles of Non
Interference shapes Beijing influence on other foreign countries’ domestic politics
(Taylor, 2006), making difficult that China tries to manage other’s countries domestic
issues directly by itself. However, It can give support to regimes (e.g. selling weapons)
to smash the revolution/civil war down, or it can support actions in the United Nations
Security Council to tackle the situation, but only if it does not harm Chinese interests
in that country. The decision will probably depend on the kind of previous
relationship that China had with the country and the benefits its can get in each
situation, but as long as there is turmoil in the country, the risk of oil shortages will be
high due to the decrease of investments to raise production (Darbouche & Fattouh,
2011). Both options, giving support to the regime or acting through the UN do not
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need a huge increase of military capabilities, just the export of weapons in the first
case, or taking part in peacekeeping/peacebuilding forces, which implies sharing the
cost (and also the future benefits) of the intervention with other countries. For
instance, Chinese economic contribution in peacekeeping operations for the years
2010-2012 was 3.93% of the total of international contribution from countries to UN
Peacekeeping Forces, with an expending of 308 million dollars approximately
(calculated from UN, 2012). This quantity is less than half the price of one of the
Chinese Sovremenny-class destroyers, around 750 million dollars (Global Security,
2012c), but, as we will see, taking part in peacekeeping operations can bring more
benefits from the different regions in which these forces are deployed, while, at the
same time, they can protect Chinese energy interests in oil producer countries.
For instance, Chinese peacekeeping operations’ main interest in Africa is the strategic
security and stability of a region in which China has made important investments,
and is crucial to cover its energy needs, like in Sudan (Mariani, 2012). In fact, in 2007
the biggest contingent of Chinese peacekeeper were deployed in Africa with 1316
personnel, which shows the great interest in a region important from a diplomatic,
economic, and military perspective. The reason is that there are several benefits for
China when deploying its personnel in this region (Roger, 2007):
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1- Helps China to be seen as responsible stakeholder in the international
community
2- Creates a good image for China in Africa as future partner of
“unconditional foreign aid”
3- Increases its influence in regional institutions (e.g. African Union)
4- Gains experience overseas in operational practices and methods of
foreign military forces, as well as operational deploying in Africa
5- Chinese peacekeepers gain experience in extreme environments
Therefore, China does not need to develop military capabilities in order to secure
political stability in its main oil producer allies. As we have explained, it just needs to
support measures in the UN Security Council and use its peacekeeping personnel to
get benefits from the situation (like in Africa). On the other hand, if UN measures are
not for its benefit, China can act unilaterally to support and stabilize those regimes
that provide China with the resources it needs.
In sum, all these arguments support the idea that to avoid a great disruption of
Chinese oil supply, China do not need to develop a huge military capability projection
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that will protect its imports and oil tankers, as it possess capabilities to defend itself
against energy denial attacks that will be also seen unmoral by the international
community, it takes part in military cooperation in the Gulf of Aden to tackle low
effectiveness piracy attacks, and is using its position in the UN Security Council to
support peacekeeping operations, or to veto resolutions against its interest in oil
producer countries.