Chapter 3 – Political Events and data cross-analysis
3.2 Presidential elections from 1996 to 2016
3.2.6 Fifth Presidential election in 2016
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Program twenty days before the election95, the U.S.’s behavior successfully promoted Ma and helped him to win the second term.
2012 election was an election regarding the ability and the ideology of the candidates, Tsai Yin-wen, as DPP’s candidate, was given a great chance to win since more than 50%
of people on the island identified themselves as Taiwanese and Ma Ying-jeou lost a lot of support due to his poor performance in his first tenure.
However, the fact that Ma Ying-jeou received major support when Taiwan identity dominated the society showed that most of Taiwanese wished to maintain the status-quo, so Taiwan could keep its sovereignty while being benefited from the PRC’s economic growth.
Ma Ying-jeou caught the trend, he continued his “Taiwan first” strategy to attract voters with Taiwan identity, promoted the Republic of China to gain support from voters who bonded with the Republic of China. Ma’s emphasize on Taiwan/ROC identity attracted swing voters, even pan-green voters and his commitment to the 92 Consensus consolidated pan-blue voters, the strategies eventually helped the KMT winning the election.
The image and strategies of both candidates were similar, hence the national identity issue was not paid too much attention to, however, no candidate was dare to challenge it, either.
Although Taiwan identity did not show much influence, it did not mean it had no impact on this election.
3.2.6 Fifth Presidential election in 2016
Several mass-demonstrations such as the Sunflower Movement and the White Shirt Army (a mass protest following the death of army conscript Hung Chung-chu) took place since
95 Taiwan Nominated to the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, American Institute in Taiwan, December 22nd, 2011, https://www.ait.org.tw/en/pressrelease-pr1170.html
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2013, these demonstrations were mainly organized by young generation with the purpose of pursuing greater justice in various aspects.
Having demonstration is a good way for the citizens to express their discontent toward the government, and normally, the opposite parties would support the demonstrations for two purposes, first, to take down the ruling government and second, gain support from the demonstrators for the future elections.
The anti-KMT emotion was accumulated since 2013, and reached the peak in Sun Flower movement that took place in 2014, which caused the disastrous failure of KMT in nine-in-one local elections96 and later again in the Presidential election in 2016.
DPP’s effort in supporting these demonstrations was paid back in the 2014 local election and the 2016 Presidential election, with the overwhelming anti-China sentiment and strong distrust toward the KMT, the DPP led all the way in the Presidential campaign.
Although all the candidates avoided direct mention the national identity during the campaign, the Chou Tzu-yu incident which inspired half millions of young citizens to vote on January 16th, 201697 still made Taiwan identity a critical issue in the election.
Sun Flower movement in 2014
The profitable economic prospect promised by Ma administration by signing ECFA with Beijing did not meet with people’s expectation, Taiwanese started to realize that over-depending on the PRC’s economy was dangerous. Beijing’s intention of “promoting unification by economic cooperation” ( 以 經 促 統 ) and Ma government’s passive resistance were widely sensed by Taiwan citizen, especially the young generation.
96 Taiwan’s Changing Political Landscape: The KMT’s Landslide Defeat in the Nine-in-One Elections, The Brookings Institution, November 8th, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-changing-political-landscape-the-kmts-landslide-defeat-in-the-nine-in-one-elections/
97 TVBS 民調：周子瑜至少催出 50 萬票, TVBS, January 20th, 2016, http://news.tvbs.com.tw/politics/636079
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Under such background, when the government tried to pass the Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a bill aimed at liberalizing trade in service industries between two sides, in a way that lacked of transparency, the public’s indignation was expected.
Thus, on March 18th, 2014, a demonstration organized mainly by students took place to fight against the pass of CSSTA bill. The anti-CSSTA movement protested against the KMT leadership’s undemocratic way of negotiating and passing the bill. The protest received a lot of attention from both home and abroad.
The students had four demands: review and renegotiate the trade services pact in the legislature; implement an oversight bill; pass that oversight mechanism before the services deal is reviewed; and hold a citizens’ constitutional assembly98.
As the protest went on there appeared to be two different views held by the student protesters. Some students claimed that they were protesting against the undemocratic handling of the bill, they called the process “black-box”. This group was not fundamentally against the trade deal, they only demanded to first establish a bill to ensure that members of the parliament can directly review the trade pact and the people can directly participate in its process, and conduct the review afterwards.
The “anti-black box” group, much like the student demonstrators of the past generation, was aiming to strengthen the democratic process in Taiwan’s legislature.
As the protests continued, there was another group insisted that the CSSTA must be revoked. For this group, contention lied not only with the undemocratic way by which the bill was passed, but also the bill itself. This “anti-CSSTA” group appeared to be more ideological and seemed to oppose the bill either due to feelings of odium towards President Ma and the KMT, or a discretion of any agreement with Beijing.
98 《 凱道集會》林飛帆：馬總統，請接受人民指揮！, 自由時報, March 30th, 2014, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/978654
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The anti-KMT and anti-PRC sentiment grew stronger among the society at that time, anything related to these two parties antagonized the public, indeed a poll carried out by Liberty Times showed that while 80.23% of respondents do not have sufficient knowledge about the pact, 46.21% opposed the CSSTA99. The poll sent a message to the KMT that working with the PRC was no longer its panacea.
The movement was a declaration made by the youth generation. The fact President Ma was elected for two times showed that most Taiwanese expected a stable cross-strait relations and their distrust towards the DPP’s ideology in dealing with Beijing. We can say that pursuing Taiwan independence was not the priority for most of the residents on this island, however, the Sun Flower Movement indicated one thing, that even most of Taiwanese was not looking for an immediate independence, they would definitely not accept the unification with the PRC.
The protest became the most important collective memory of the young generation, in fact, they’ve been accumulating the collect memory since Da Pu case (大埔案), Hung Chung Chu incident (洪仲秋案), and eventually, the Sun Flower generation.
They knew the cross-strait interaction would seriously influence their future, they also realized the current leader would try his best to achieve his historical legacy since it was his last tenure and the KMT was the parliamentary majority, therefore, they needed to use their civil rights to protect themselves and this country.
The movement itself was not about fighting against certain politician or party, but to urge for a more democratic society in which every citizen would be respected and the sovereignty of the country could be protected.
A survey conducted by New Brain Trust four months after the movement showed a new development regarding national identity and independence/unification attitude among young citizens. First, 60.4% of interviewees identified themselves as Taiwanese, 4.5%
99 服貿協議 民眾「八成」不知 本報民調：二成三民眾贊成 四成六反對, 自由時報, March 13th, 2014, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/761732
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identified as Chinese and 32.6% identifies as both, however, if the interviewees could only choose between Taiwanese and Chinese, the figure for Taiwan identity was 88.2%
and 8.3% for China identity. The result was more or less the same over the past few surveys, yet one thing worth mentioning was that 97.2% of people from age 20 to 29 identified themselves as Taiwanese, and 90.8% of people from age 30 to 39 identifies themselves as Taiwanese, both figures showed that the young generation had a very strong Taiwan identity.
For independence/unification attitude, the pro-independence rate of citizens between age 20 to 29 raised to 44.1% from the 31.8% before the movement. The growth indicted that the Sun Flower Movement encouraged more young people to support Taiwan independence, and in a survey conducted in June, 69.7% of people between age 20 to 29 disliked the PRC. The result of the survey served as an important reference for parties during the cross-strait policy making100.
Plenty of DPP politicians were active in the demonstration, certainly, the DPP was fearful that if the KMT’s China policy was successful it would endanger the DPP’s hope of returning to power, and DPP’s effort was paid off in the 2014 municipal election in which it gained a landslide victory and again in the Presidential election in 2016.
Tsai Ing Wen’s promise of maintaining the status-quo
On June 3rd, 2015, the DPP Presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, gave a speech in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In her speech, she said the maintenance of the status quo was the broad consensus in Taiwan and therefore she promised that she would push for the peaceful and stable development of Cross-strait relations in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people and the existing constitutional order of the Republic of China101.
100太陽花學運後呈現的統獨意識變化, 新台灣智庫, August 26th, 2014, http://www.braintrust.tw/article_detail/1964
101 蔡英文於 CSIS 演說：台灣迎向挑戰—打造亞洲新價值的典範, 民主進步黨, June 4th, 2015, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?sn=7911
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Tsai knew the national identity and the ethnic issue would only narrow down her chance of winning, therefore, she promised to maintain the status-quo without specifying the definition of the status quo to keep her strategies flexible.
Although the Taiwan identity was the mainstream, most Taiwanese preferred the status quo, therefore, Tsai’s promise of maintaining the status-quo diminished most voters’
concern about the cross-strait relationship might be deteriorated should Tsai got elected.
Tsai’s moderate move eventually gained favor of the voters, especially the young ones.
KMT replaced its pro-unification candidate
The KMT’s supporting rate dropped drastically after the disastrous defeat in the nine-in-one election in 2014, with the little chance of winning the Presidential election, no senior members were interested in running for the President, meanwhile, then vice Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Hung Hsiu-chu, became the first member to register for the party's primary for its 2016 presidential candidate, Hung said her intention was only to prompt the other KMT heavyweights to run.
Hung unexpectedlypassed the 30 percent threshold in the ruling (KMT) three presidential primary polls on Sunday June 14th, with an average approval rating of 46.203 percent.
The KMT officially named Hung Hsiu-chu as its candidate for the January 2016 presidential election at its national party congress on July 19th, 2015102.
However, Hung's approval ratings were lagging far behind those of the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen partly because she advocated stronger ties with China when some Taiwanese voters are wary about the island becoming too close to Beijing.
Hung called Taiwan a “model province” of China, and on one occasion characterized reunification with China as inevitable, calling for Taiwanese to take the initiative and self-integrate with the mainland. Her pro-unification preference distanced herself from
102 國民黨全代會通過提名洪秀柱競選總統, BBC 中文網, July 19th, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2015/07/150719_taiwan_election_kmt
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many Taiwanese voters which made her polling rate below 20% while the DPP candidate for president, Tsai Ing-wen, was polling above 40 percent103.
Hung’s pro-unification proposal was not accepted by the majority, and her low supporting rate led many people in the KMT to worry that the party would lose not only the Presidency but its majority in the parliament during the legislative race which would be held at the same time.
On October 7th, 2015, at an emergency congress, KMT members voted overwhelmingly to drop Hung Hsiu-chu for her poor ratings in opinion polls. She was replaced by the party's chairman, Eric Chu ten days later104.
Hung Hsiu-chu got ditched for her unpopular pro-unification campaign strategy which showed the KMT was well aware of the fact that most voters identified themselves as Taiwanese, and unification was not supported by the public. KMT’s replacement of its presidential candidate was also regarded as the primary reason for the KMT’s loss since many pan-blue voters refused to vote for a divided KMT.
Chou Tzu-yu Incident in 2016
On January 8th, 2016, Huang An accused Chou Tzu-yu, a Taiwanese K-POP girl group member, as a pro-Taiwan independence activist because she held ROC flag on Korean TV show and mentioned several times that she was from Taiwan. Chou’s performance in the PRC was cancelled several days later, her group was banned in the PRC which caused a great loss of her company, JPY.
103 Laskai, Lorand C., Taiwan’s Ruling Party Just Booted Its Own Sarah Palin Off the Ticket, Foreign Policy, October 19th, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/19/china-taiwan-election-kmt-dpp-democracy-hung-mainland/
104 Taiwan's KMT party ditches Hung Hsiu-chu as candidate, BBC News, October 17th, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34559238
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On January 14th, JYP made a public announcement that the “Chou Tzu-yu supports and respects the “One China Policy”105, the company also changed Chou’s place of birth into
“China Taiwan”106.
The night before the election, Chou's company forced her to apologize publicly, the video of her apology dominated the news in Taiwan and stoked widespread sympathy for Chou and anti-PRC sentiment which were widely credited with benefiting the DPP 107.
The PRC’s suppression on Chou arouse Taiwanese’ nationalism, a lot people took Beijing’s hostility as a threat toward Taiwan’s sovereignty, therefore, young people with strong Taiwan identity chose to punish the pro-Beijing KMT by voting the DPP in the Presidential election the next day.
Since more than half of citizens identified themselves as Taiwanese in 2015, the gap between different identities was so narrow that both parties did not take national identity issue as their main campaign strategy, we can even notice that both candidates tend to avoid to discuss the national identity issue or the cross-strait relations.
The voters were well-aware of the consequence if the China-wary opposition party DPP regains power, Taiwan’s trade, tourism and other exchanges might suffer. Whereas a KMT victory could bring more economic integration which might facilitate mutual trust and even reach a lasting peace, but it might also violate Taiwan's sovereignty.
Many were uncomfortable with having the KMT, which supported the idea of “One China”, continue to negotiate deals and develop relations with Beijing, hence these people voted for the opposition the DPP108.
105周子瑜被指台獨 JYP 聲明：她支持一中, 中央通訊社,January 15th,2016, http://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201601150007-1.aspx
106周子瑜事件持續發酵 兩岸三地反應強烈, BBC 中文網, January 16th, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2016/01/160116_taiwan_chou_tzu_yu
107 ELECTIONS: Singer’s ‘forced apology’ angers nation, Taipei Times, January 17th, 2016, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/01/17/2003637387
108 An election battle for the identity of Taiwan, BBC, January 1st, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35192142
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KMT’s two victories made it seem like people cared more about the economy than sovereignty, yet since 2014, the public’s attitude towards Beijing has changed. People started to realized that Taiwan worked with Beijing for economic reasons, but Beijing worked with Taiwan for political purposes, therefore, being economically over-dependent on the PRC might cost Taiwan’s independence one day.
Nationalist sentiment is usually stirred up when objects facing sovereignty crisis, and at the end, Taiwan identity still played a significant role in the 2016 Presidential election.
This election indicated a fundamental change of Taiwan politics and the sign of the change was shown for the first time in the Sun Flower Movement in 2014, and the first impact it brought was the landslide defeat of the KMT in the nine-in-one local election at the end of 2014. The trigger for this change was the sense of crisis generated from the over-dependence on the PRC during the eight years of Ma Ying-jeou’s administration.
In Ma’s second term, he expected to leave a historic legacy by building an irreversible close relationship with Beijing. Such urge facilitated many agreements being signed, and pushed the pass of the Cross-strait Service and Trade Agreement (CSSTA).
As mentioned, the hasty pass was called “black box”, it stirred a huge discontent of the young population. The meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jin-ping on November 7th, 2015 was another evident that Beijing factor has been very influential in Taiwan’s politics.
The public’s antipathy against Beijing government was the major reason causing a fundamental change in the domestic politics.
Young voters do not vote according to their party preferences, but for the parties’ ability in solving social issues like income inequality, pension reform, food safety and education.
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