Chapter 3 – Political Events and data cross-analysis
3.2 Presidential elections from 1996 to 2016
3.2.5 Fifth Presidential election in 2012
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for maintaining the political status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Ma’s strategies eventually gained huge support from swing voters.
From the 2008 Presidential election, we can see that even nearly 50% of citizens identified themselves as Taiwanese, and the pro-independence rate has been raising, but most people prefer maintaining the status quo with the PRC. Voters’ weariness of the tension between two sides of the Strait and the desire of being economic benefited from the economic cooperation with the PRC were the two main reasons brining the KMT back to power.
KMT candidate’s declaration of his Taiwanese identity and his commitment of Taiwan’s future shall be decided by Taiwan’s 23 million citizens and the referendums held by both parties showed that Taiwan identity still influenced Taiwan’s Presidential elections.81 However, Taiwan has been struggling in the global financial crisis since 2007, therefore, the ability to improve the economy was the first consideration for voters. KMT winning the election showed that most voters believed they would be benefited by working with Beijing.
3.2.5 Fifth Presidential election in 2012
Beijing’s ways of intervening Taiwan’s Presidential elections have evolved over the past decade with the very same goal of preventing the DPP candidates to be elected. Beijing knows that currently it does not have the ability to appoint the President for Taiwan, but it hopes to have the veto power on this matter. The chance for the PRC to have the veto power was given for the first time when then KMT chairperson, Lien Chan, had a meeting with then CCP chairperson, Hu Jing Tao, in the People’s Republic of China in 2005.
PRC’s veto power started to get real after Ma Ying-jeou was elected as the President in 2008, Beijing had more chances to insert its influence since the KMT became the ruling party again. Beijing was satisfied with President Ma’s recognition of the 92 Consensus,
81陳陸輝, 耿曙, 王德育,〈兩岸關係與 2008 年台灣總統大選:認同 利益 威脅與選民投票取向〉，陳 陸輝等(主編)，《2008年總統選舉—論二次政黨輪替之關鍵選舉》，台北：五南出版社, 2009
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and the practice of “Diplomatic truce”（外交休兵）, therefore, it offered numerous economic incentives such as cross-strait direct flights, unrestricted tourism for the PRC tourists to visit Taiwan and the signing of Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).
President Ma took every chance to show his accomplishment under the 92 Consensus in his first turn, and the 92 Consensus therefore became the most critical issue in the 2012 Presidential election. It was also the first time that the KMT used the 92 Consensus as its main strategy in Presidential elections.
The so-called 92 Consensus was a verbal agreement made by Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) in 199282. For the PRC, the 92 Consensus means both regimes agree the principle of “One China”, for the ROC it means “One China, respective interpretations”. Both side did not recognize nor deny each other’s claims, and by doing so, two sides could engage in negotiations and walk on the path to the future reconciliation.
To counter President Ma’s strategy, Tsai Yin-wen, as the DPP presidential candidate, brought up the idea of “Taiwan Consensus”. Two candidates’ attitude toward the cross-strait issues was critical in this election, and once again, the national identity played a major role in the Presidential election.
KMT’s recognition of the 92 Consensus
After Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, the relationship between Taiwan and Beijing has improved based on the foundation of the 92 Consensus which showed that the significance of the 92 Consensus. The KMT assumed Tsai Yin-wen from the DPP would adopt a more flexible China policy to attract swing voters so Ma Ying-jeou had to come up with a strategy that was more flexible than Tsai Yin-wen’s to save his poor popularity.
82 Yen, Chen-shen, “Taiwan’s presidential election: a referendum on the 1992 Consensus”, East Asia Forum, February 14th, 2012, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/02/14/taiwan-s-presidential-election-a-referendum-on-the-1992-consensus/
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Therefore, Ma Ying-jeou made a good use of the 92 Consensus under his framework of no unification and no independence.
Based on Ma’s strategy, if he could persuade the voters that the 92 Consensus is the key to maintain the status-quo and improve the cross-strait relationship, he could receive more support from the swing voters. On the other hand, it would be very difficult for Tsai Yin-wen to gain recognition from the swing voters if she did not face the 92 Consensus.
Therefore, the KMT took the cross-strait issue as its key to victory, and its 92 Consensus strategy managed to diminish the DPP’s hope of receiving support from the swing voters.
King Pu-tsung, the executive director of Ma Ying-jeou's re-election campaign office, appointed two young people without election-running experience as the spokespersons to create the image that KMT valued the young generation83. In order to attract voters with both national identity, King kept the KMT’s “Taiwan First” strategy in 2008, and widely used the R.O.C. image including national anthem and the national flag in the campaign84. On October 17th, 2011, in the fifth press conference of “Golden Decade, nation’s prospect”, President Ma raised an idea of signing the “Cross-strait Peace Agreement”
with Beijing under the circumstance when the country needs it, the people support it and the Congress supervises it85.
Ma’s proposal of signing the Cross-strait Peace Agreement upset many citizens, and his supporting rate dropped86, therefore an emergent press conference was held by Ma Ying-jeou in the Presidential Hall on October 20th. Ma reiterated that there would be no timetable for the signing of the agreement, and the agreement would only be considered when the country needs it, the people support it and the Congress supervises it. Ma also
86 Narrowing, Economist, November 19th, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21538792
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promised a referendum would be held first87. Obviously, for the Taiwan society at that time, Beijing’s intention was still suspicious.
Tsai Yin Wen’s Taiwan Consensus
On August 23rd, 2011, Tsai Yin-wen published the cross-strait policy under the Ten-Year Policy Platform88. The Ten-Year Policy Platform was Tsai’s policies regarding Taiwan’s future for the following ten years, and the cross-strait policy adopted the stable centrism based on DPP’s Resolution on Taiwan’s Future that issued in 1991.
However, Tsai’s denial of the existence of the 92 Consensus made it the focus of the election since then on. Tsai’s campaign team did not expect Beijing to accept their cross-strait policy, they only wanted it to be accepted by most voters in Taiwan.
On October 8th, Tsai said “Taiwan is the Republic of China, the Republic of China is Taiwan”89, and she further moving toward to the center on October 9th by saying that
“the Republic of China has be integrated with the land and the people of Taiwan, the government of the Republic of China is the government of Taiwan”.
Even her moderate idea was criticized by deep-green supporters, Tsai received a lot of support within the party. In responding Tsai’s comment, Ma Ying-jeou oriented the relationship of the Republic of China and Taiwan as “the Republic of China is my country and Taiwan is my home”90.
87 馬英九稱兩岸和平協議將先經公投, BBC 中文網, October 20th, 2011,
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese_news/2011/10/111020_taiwan_maying-jeou.shtml
88 〈十年政綱-兩岸篇〉, 民主進步黨, 2011 http://iing10.blogspot.tw/2011/08/blog-post_21.html
89 蔡英文：中華民國就是台灣, 中央通訊社, October 8th, 2011 http://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201110080060-1.aspx
90 馬英九：中華民國是國家，台灣是家園, 今日新聞, October 12th,2011, http://www.nownews.com/n/2011/10/12/474655
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Tsai wanted to replace the 92 Consensus with her Taiwan Consensus, but she did not provide specific details about the concept, only promised that she would gather the domestic consensus through democratic procedures after being elected91.
Tsai Yin Wen made Ma Ying-jeou as an extreme unificationist which was the same strategy Hsieh Chang-ting adopted in 2008. Some of the swing voters were worried about Ma pushing the cross-strait interaction too fast, so Tsai should have had more chances to gain support from the swing voters, however, because Tsai was too caught up by the 92 Consensus to provide her own convincing cross-strait policy that could diminish the doubts raised by domestic and international audiences, most swing voters chose to vote for Ma Ying-jeou instead92.
Interference from Outside
The PRC sent messages through the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council by stating that the 92 Consensus is the foundation of the cross-strait interaction, unrecognizing it would discontinue the future cooperation and jeopardize the interests of the compatriots on both sides93. Beijing’s statement not only warned the DPP but also showed its support to Ma Ying-jeou.
The United States did not want to see another cross-strait crisis taking place, hence it meddled in the election by openly doubted Tsai’s Taiwan Consensus, complimented Ma Ying-jeou’s promise on the 92 Consensus, and his achievement in maintaining the peace status quo with the PRC94. The U.S. further nominated Taiwan to the U.S. Visa Waiver
91 蔡英文：「台灣共識」就是我們要走的路, 民主進步黨, September 18th, 2011, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?sn=5365
92小笠原欣幸, 〈2012 年台灣總統選舉：選戰過程與決定性因素〉, IDE-JETRO 亞洲經濟研究院, 2012
93 台辦發言人就蔡英文公布「十年政綱」答記者問, 中華人民共和國中央人民政府, August 24th, 2011, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-08/24/content_1932049.htm
94 美前駐台官員表態肯定九二共識, BBC 中文網, January 13th, 2012,
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world/2012/01/120113_taiwan_election.shtml
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Program twenty days before the election95, the U.S.’s behavior successfully promoted Ma and helped him to win the second term.
2012 election was an election regarding the ability and the ideology of the candidates, Tsai Yin-wen, as DPP’s candidate, was given a great chance to win since more than 50%
of people on the island identified themselves as Taiwanese and Ma Ying-jeou lost a lot of support due to his poor performance in his first tenure.
However, the fact that Ma Ying-jeou received major support when Taiwan identity dominated the society showed that most of Taiwanese wished to maintain the status-quo, so Taiwan could keep its sovereignty while being benefited from the PRC’s economic growth.
Ma Ying-jeou caught the trend, he continued his “Taiwan first” strategy to attract voters with Taiwan identity, promoted the Republic of China to gain support from voters who bonded with the Republic of China. Ma’s emphasize on Taiwan/ROC identity attracted swing voters, even pan-green voters and his commitment to the 92 Consensus consolidated pan-blue voters, the strategies eventually helped the KMT winning the election.
The image and strategies of both candidates were similar, hence the national identity issue was not paid too much attention to, however, no candidate was dare to challenge it, either.
Although Taiwan identity did not show much influence, it did not mean it had no impact on this election.