Chapter 3 – Political Events and data cross-analysis
3.2 Presidential elections from 1996 to 2016
3.2.4 Fourth Presidential election in 2008
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Taiwan Identity DPP KMT Samples
Low 17.4% 82.6% 219
Medium 34.2% 65.8% 406
High 80.5% 19.5% 625
Total 54.4% 45.6% 1,250
Table 1 ↑
3.2.4 Fourth Presidential election in 2008
Before the Presidential election in 2008, the PRC’s military power was way ahead Taiwan, plus the KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, who was favored by Beijing and had the biggest chance to win, hence, the PRC was more confident, it decided not to send aggressive threats but wait patiently for the outcome.
Without Beijing’s blatant intervention, the DPP had no choice but promoting its pro-Taiwan identity by attacking Ma’s royalty for pro-Taiwan. KMT did not play the national identity game with the DPP, instead, Ma focus on his goals in achieving economic growth and the peaceful relationship with Beijing.
DPP’s Taiwan Identity Strategy
President Chen’s reputation was extremely low, and his pro-independence policies not only hurt the mutual trust between the DPP and Washington, but also caused the impasse in cross-strait relation. The situation was unfavorable for the DPP, in order to consolidate its base-voters (voters with high Taiwan identity), its candidate, Hsieh Chang-ting had been attacking Ma’s Green card (US permanent residence) and “One China Market”
issues to build Ma’s unpatriotic image.
During the campaign, Hsieh questioned Ma’s possession of Green card, at first Ma denied yet later he held a press release explaining that he obtained Green card in 1977 but he
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renounced the US permanent residence twenty years ago. Ma’s reworded statement was used against him as the proof of his ethics and honesty issues72.
Hsieh heavily criticized Ma’s “cross-strait Common Market” policy and called it “One-China market” during the campaign. Hsieh questioned Ma’s policy including introducing Chinese labors and agricultural products would harm Taiwan’s economy. In fact, Hsieh’s goal was to build Ma’s disloyalty to Taiwan by discussing the validity of Ma’s Green card, Hsieh further labeled Ma as someone selling out Taiwan by questioning Ma’s One-China market. DPP’s was promoting itself as the protector of Taiwan73.
In 2008, DPP’s strategy was to make the voters to choose between China and Taiwan, which was DPP’s usual tactic in all the Presidential elections.
However, Hsieh’s strategies were ineffective, even he received support from 58.7% of high Taiwan identity voters, he received nearly no recognition from moderate voters74. Although using the identity issue as the main campaign strategy helped DPP to solidify its base but also distanced itself from the moderate voters, failing to predict what voters wanted was the reason for DPP’s huge setback in 200875.
KMT’s Centrism
In 2007, 43.7% of Taiwanese identified themselves as Taiwanese, and 44.7% of Taiwanese identified themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese. KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, knew that he’s background as a second-generation mainlander might be his disadvantage and the voters would question his allegiance for Taiwan. Therefore, KMT’s
72 馬英九改口 坦承曾有綠卡, 自由時報, January 29th, 2008, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/185779
73 謝批馬一中市場 誓言守護台灣, 自由時報, March 18th, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/196836
74 Same as above
75 藍打經濟牌 攻克南台灣, 自由時報, March 23rd, 2008, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/198200
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Taiwan, where DPP usually wins, Ma started his “Long Stay” project in July, 2007. He also made comments in Taiwanese quite often during this campaign, his strategies showed that he, just like most people on this island, identified with Taiwan.To further show his love for Taiwan, Ma declared loudly and clearly his Taiwanese identity (“I am Taiwanese”), and asserted Taiwan’s sovereignty and its independence as the Republic of China76. He also committed himself to defending Taiwan’s sovereignty, and pledged that Taiwan’s future could be decided only by Taiwan’s 23 million citizens77. Then Ma reaffirmed his willingness to maintain the status quo with China, promising not to pursue unification in the short or medium term and not to embark on any negotiations on the subject during his term of office. Lastly, he took a firm stand on democracy as the core value of Taiwanese society, setting the democratization of China as the precondition for any future unification78.
At the same time, Ma adopted a friendlier attitude toward economic cooperation with Beijing, aiming at improving the economic downturn, so Taiwan can be benefited from PRC’s rapid economic growth.
Based on the social condition and public opinion, Ma proposed a cross-strait policy that aimed at attracting swing voters, his “Centrism” focused on four principles including recognizing the 92 Consensus that implies “One China, respective interpretation”;
maintaining the status quo with the PRC, that was “no Taiwan independence, no force invention”; enabling bilateral conversation, trade cooperation and easing the tension;
76 Mo Yan-chih and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Defend Taiwan’s Sovereignty, Says Ma,” Taipei Times, 15 March, 2008
77 馬︰台灣前途 台灣人說了算, 自由時報, March 15th, 2008, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/196049
78 Muyard, Frank, “Taiwan Elections 2008: Ma Ying-jeou’s Victory and the KMT’s Return to Power”, China Perspectives, 2008
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achieving win-win by promoting mutual cultural interaction; making diplomatic break-through based on “variable diplomacy”. These four principles were also the common denominator of less aggressive pan-blue and pan-green voters79.
Taiwan's Referendums on the United Nations
On the same day of the Presidential election, two important referendums for Taiwan’s international relations were held. The first, held by the DPP, appealed joining the UN under the name of Taiwan. The second, held by the KMT, proposed that Taiwan should return to the UN under the name of the Republic of China (ROC) or any other acceptable name.
Even the both referendums were opposed by the United States and the People’s Republic of China80, both the DPP and the KMT were still persistent about it. The DPP called for yes votes in both referendums to make sure that at least one would succeed, however for KMT, the purpose of having its referendum was merely to compete with the DPP on the identity issue, not to anger the U.S. or the PRC, therefore, the KMT decided to actively boycott the DPP proposal and support its own without urging supporters to vote. With a mere 36% turnout for each of the referendums, both were invalided.
The outcome of this election was considered “doomed” at the beginning when many voters were dissatisfied with Chen Shui-bian and the DPP government, and had the desire for a change after two terms under the green party. DPP’s attempt of playing the national identity card was not successful, Hsieh’s campaign did rally the grassroots of the Pan-Green camp, but it did not convince swing voters or stimulate a higher turnout.
KMT, on the other hand, learnt from its two failures and recognized the importance of Taiwan identity, adopted strategies that closely followed the mainstream. Ma Ying-jeou ran the campaign with his programme for closer economic interactions with the PRC and
79 李永枝：如何應對馬英九新中間主義路線, 南窗風, May 5th, 2007, http://www.nfcmag.com/article/315.html
80 Rice reiterates U.S. opposition to "referendum" on Taiwan's UN membership, Xinhua Agency, February 26th, 2008, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t410157.htm
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for maintaining the political status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Ma’s strategies eventually gained huge support from swing voters.
From the 2008 Presidential election, we can see that even nearly 50% of citizens identified themselves as Taiwanese, and the pro-independence rate has been raising, but most people prefer maintaining the status quo with the PRC. Voters’ weariness of the tension between two sides of the Strait and the desire of being economic benefited from the economic cooperation with the PRC were the two main reasons brining the KMT back to power.
KMT candidate’s declaration of his Taiwanese identity and his commitment of Taiwan’s future shall be decided by Taiwan’s 23 million citizens and the referendums held by both parties showed that Taiwan identity still influenced Taiwan’s Presidential elections.81 However, Taiwan has been struggling in the global financial crisis since 2007, therefore, the ability to improve the economy was the first consideration for voters. KMT winning the election showed that most voters believed they would be benefited by working with Beijing.