「這是上帝的貓」？：論《少年Pi的奇幻漂流》中同伴物種之倫理 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學英國語文學系碩士論文. 指導教授：邱彥彬博士 Advisor: Dr. Yen-Bin Chiou. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 「這是上帝的貓」？：論《少年 Pi 的奇幻漂流》中同伴物種之倫理. ‧. “This is God’s Cat”?: On Ethics of Companion Species in Life of Pi. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. 研究生：簡滋儀 Name: Tzu-Yi Chien 中華民國 105 年 6 月 June 2016. v.

(2) “THIS IS GOD’S CAT”?: ON ETHICS OF COMPANION SPECIES IN LIFE OF PI. 政治大 Presented to. A Master Thesis. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Department of English,. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. y. ‧. National Chengchi University. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts. by Tzu-Yi Chien June 2016.

(3) Acknowledgements Sincerest gratitude is extended to my advisor, Professor Yen-bin Chiou, who spent mornings struggling with my last-minute drafts and shaky arguments. Without his patience and guidance, I would not have accomplished this thesis. Besides his constructive suggestions on my writing, I also thank him for his insightful opinions about various animal issues in our society. The café meetings with him helped clear. 政治大. up many of my own questions and doubts. For that, I am immensely grateful.. 立. I owe a debt of gratitude to my committee members: Professor Chiu-hua Su at. ‧ 國. 學. SCU and Yih-dau Wu at NCCU. They are both intelligent and careful readers who gave me pertinent suggestions. I feel lucky to meet Professor Su before the. ‧. completion of my study. And I cannot thank Professor Wu enough for his kindness. y. Nat. io. sit. and help in the past year.. n. al. er. Gratitude is also extended to those who helped and encouraged me during my. i n U. v. MA program. I would like to acknowledge the course “Western Literary Classics and. Ch. engchi. Humanistic Traditions” co-conducted by a group of amazing teachers in English Department of NCCU. As one of the teaching assistants in this course, I have met great teachers, friends and students. I especially thank Professor Chih-hsin Lin and Professor Tsui-fen Jiang for their concern and advice on my academic career and personal life. I also thank other teaching assistants, Susan, Wen-lin and Cecilia, who were wonderful “comrades-in-arms” in those endless hours of conducting discussions, correcting homework, and grading exams. Their help and encouragement have been greatly appreciated. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Sun-chieh Liang at NTNU. His iii.

(4) seminar “Ethics and Animality Studies” prepared me for writing this thesis. His smiles and lucid lectures made arduous reading tasks a lot more interesting and understandable. Besides our academic performance, he also showed concerns for our mental health and gave advice on coping with pressures. I also feel grateful to Professor Amie Parry and Professor Jonathan Yeh at NCU for their thought-provoking seminars. The seminars aroused my interests in theories and oriented me to reading. 政治大. theories and literary works critically. I thank my classmates at NCCU—in particular. 立. Chantal, Jamie, and Ken—for their friendship and understanding. It is always good to. ‧ 國. 學. have people who share similar dreams and understand your situations in your life. I give my warmest thanks to my family. I am much obliged to my parents and. ‧. aunts for their spiritual and financial support. I thank my brother Joe, my sister Gina,. y. Nat. io. sit. my cousins Ciao-jing and Wei-yi for being my best friends since the days we met each. n. al. er. other. Though they do not quite understand what I have been studying and pursuing,. Ch. i n U. v. they are always there whenever I feel like to whine about my life.. engchi. Finally, I would like to say thanks to my companion species: my beloved Pon-Pon, London and A-Tsai. They have been very tolerant and warm. Pon-Pon put up with the disorderly piles in our bedroom and endless nights with the light on when I was writing the thesis. London and A-Tsai put aside their work and came lean against my legs every time I showed up. They not only kept me company but also taught me how to live a life of “becoming-with.” Their companionship have helped me muster the courage to finish this thesis and will always be my anchor when I face the difficulties in my life.. iv.

(5) Table of Contents. Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................iii Chinese Abstract..........................................................................................................vii English Abstract............................................................................................................ix Chapter 1. Introduction........................................................................................................1 Literature Review...........................................................................................5. 政治大. Methodology.................................................................................................13. 立. Chapter Organization...................................................................................15. ‧ 國. 學. 2. In the Same Boat: Companion Species and Life of Pi......................................19 Seeing Real Animals....................................................................................21. ‧. Relationality..................................................................................................25. y. Nat. io. sit. Historical Specificity....................................................................................33. n. al. er. Becoming with the Tiger..............................................................................38. Ch. i n U. v. 3. The Greatest Show on Earth: The Act of Respect............................................51. engchi. Looking back again at Companion and Species...........................................54 The Act of Respect.......................................................................................58 4. The Better Story: Anthropomorphism and Companion Species......................73 Two Kinds of Anthropomorphism................................................................75 The Second Story..........................................................................................80 The First Story, or the Better Story...............................................................81 5. Conclusion........................................................................................................87 Works Cited..................................................................................................................91. v.

(6) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. vi. i n U. v.

(7) 國立政治大學英國語文學系碩士班碩士論文提要論文名稱：「這是上帝的貓」？：論《少年 Pi 的奇幻漂流》中同伴物種之倫理指導教授：邱彥彬博士研究生：簡滋儀論文提要內容：. 立. 政治大. 本論文旨在重新思考人與動物之間的倫理關係，企圖擺脫西方哲學傳統之. ‧ 國. 學. 下人類中心的立場。透過哈洛威《同伴物種宣言》與《當物種相遇》中同伴物種的概念來閱讀馬泰爾的《少年 Pi 的奇幻漂流》，這樣的倫理關係得以透過建基於. ‧. 「關係性」上而實現，而非以西方哲學傳統下的人／動物之二元對立為基礎。在. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. 這樣的倫理關係中，人與動物在會面時透過「回視」達到溝通。也在會面中，人. n. 與動物與彼此「成為共在」，並且共同形塑彼此的主體性。此外，《少年 Pi 的奇. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 幻漂流》中可見擬人化的口吻敘述老虎理查‧帕克的故事，本文將解釋在這種擬人化中可以看見同伴物種倫理的實踐。本論文由五個章節組成。第一章包含《少年 Pi 的奇幻漂流》相關評論，並回顧西方哲學傳統之下人與動物的關係。第二章意圖闡明在哈洛威脈絡之中同伴物種的概念，尤其是「關係性」和「成為共在」。透過檢視 Pi 和理查‧帕克在救生船上的種種細節，本文認為 Pi 和理查‧帕克的關係可被視為同伴物種的關係。第三章聚焦在「回視」的動作，作為同伴物種間建立雙向溝通的方式。本文也將透過「回視」深入分析 Pi 和理查‧帕克溝通上的（不）可能性。第四章將《少. vii.

(8) 年 Pi 的奇幻漂流》中兩個版本的故事讀為兩種動物敘事的並置。兩者皆從擬人化的角度去敘事，但是其中一個版本透露出同伴物種倫理的實踐，另一個版本則回歸到傳統人類中心式的解讀。第五章為本文之總結，主張蘊含同伴物種倫理的動物敘事能夠幫助我們理解如何透過關注生活中真實存在的動物去重新思考人與動物之間的關係。. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 關鍵字：楊‧馬泰爾、《少年 Pi 的奇幻漂流》、唐娜‧哈洛威、同伴物種、關係性、成為共在、回視、擬人化 viii.

(9) Abstract The thesis aims to rethink an ethical relationship between humans and animals that is separated from the anthropocentric stance in the Western philosophical traditions. Reading Yann Martel’s Life of Pi in light of the ethics of companion species in Donna Haraway’s The Companion Manifesto and When Species Meet, I would like to contend that this ethical relationship take shape while it is founded on relationality,. 政治大. instead of the human/animal dichotomy. Acts of respect need to be exerted by human. 立. and animal participants when they meet. And in the meeting, they become with each. ‧ 國. 學. other in the relationship in which their subjectivities are co-constituted by each other. The narrative of Pi living with Richard Parker employs a kind of anthropomorphism. ‧. endowed with ethics of companion species.. y. Nat. io. sit. This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter One is a review of research on. n. al. er. criticism of Life of Pi and discussions of human/animal relationships in the Western. Ch. i n U. v. philosophical framework. Chapter Two aims to elucidate the concepts of companion. engchi. species in Haraway’s context, including relationality and becoming-with. By examining the details in Pi and Richard Parker’s life on the lifeboat, I argue that they are in a companion-species relationship. Chapter Three focuses on the act of respect, the practice for the companion species to evoke mutual responses. The (im)possible communication between Pi and Richard Parker will be analyzed. Chapter Four reads the two versions of the story of Life of Pi as a juxtaposition of two kinds of animal narratives. Both told from anthropomorphic perspective, the story with the animals is registered with ethics of companion species while the story without animal returns to the traditional anthropocentric interpretation. Finally in Chapter Five, I conclude that ix.

(10) animal narrative that is entailed with ethics of companion species enables us to rethink the human/animal relationship by attending to real animals which are physically beside us.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Keywords: Yann Martel, Life of Pi, Donna Haraway, companion species, relationality, become with, respect, anthropomorphism x.

(11) Chapter One Introduction. Yann Martel’s Life of Pi is “a story that will make you believe in God” (x). Divided into three parts, Pi Patel’s story illustrates the three phases of a faithful soul—the formation of faith, the sufferings and the rewarded life. His most. 政治大. well-known experience is that he survives after spending 227 days with an adult. 立. Bengal Tiger in a lifeboat on the Pacific Ocean. Fascinated by the wonders of the. ‧ 國. 學. adventure, the fictional writer sets forth to Pi’s current residence in Toronto. And he eventually compiles the interviews with Pi without which this novel is impossible.. ‧. The novel begins with “Author’s Notes” and ends with the verbatim transcript of Pi’s. y. Nat. sit. conversation with the two Japanese investigators. The rest of the story is told from the. n. al. er. io. first-person perspective because, according to the narrator, “It seemed natural that Mr.. i n U. v. Patel’s story should be told mostly in the first person—in his voice and through his eyes” (xi-xii).. Ch. engchi. That Pi’s story will make you believe in God(s) is because of Richard Parker, the Bengal Tiger. In Pi’s life, animals play roles as vital as God(s). To him, God(s) and animals not only relate to each other as the Creator(s) and the creations but also contain each other. In God(s), he sees animals and in animals, he sees God(s). Besides, fathered by the owner of the Pondicherry zoo, Pi spends his childhood with many rare animals and learns to appreciate varied forms of life. His life with the animals guarantees that he acquires knowledge of animal habitual nature and of the zoo business. Pi’s story interweaves God(s) with animals. They are not only parts of his 1.

(12) life; they flood his life. There are various God(s) and animals in Life of Pi. In “Part One: Toronto and Pondicherry,” Yann Martel amplifies Pi’s encounters with God(s) and animals in his earlier life. Unlike most religious devotees, Pi embraces three religions at the same time. He believes wholeheartedly in Hinduism, Christianity and Islam. The juxtaposition of three seemingly incompatible beliefs seems to echo the situations of. 政治大. the animals. In Life of Pi, animals that are not supposed to live together are called to. 立. meet each other, constituting ecosystems that are “decidedly baffling” (122). The zoo. ‧ 國. 學. is a baffling ecosystem, providing dwellings for animals from tropical to frigid zones. The lifeboat is a baffling ecosystem, besieging Pi, Richard Parker, the hyena, the. ‧. orang-utan and the zebra. The confrontation between the hyena and the orang-utan is. y. Nat. io. sit. worth noting for one is from Africa and the other from Borneo. They need time to get. n. al. er. along and observe each other before they act. Because of these baffling ecosystems,. Ch. i n U. v. Life of Pi consists of the atlas that collects the routes of various moving beings and the. engchi. annals that record the histories of these lives.. God(s) and animals are also Pi’s companions in his sufferings. Besides praying to God(s), Pi cannot make it through the sufferings without the company of Richard Parker. After Richard Parker eats the hyena, Pi and Richard Parker turn out to be the only living things on the lifeboat. Pi sees clearly that he must live with Richard Parker because killing the tiger is beyond his power. He then programs feeding and training plans for Richard Parker to prevent Richard Parker from eating him up. Richard Parker indeed keeps Pi alive. His company helps Pi combat loneliness on the ocean. His daily needs keep Pi busy. His every movement diverts Pi’s attention from 2.

(13) hopelessness to the beauty of a tiger. He even saves Pi by devouring the man from another lifeboat who intends to eat Pi. Richard Parker’s company means a lot to Pi but it is not always comforting. Since Pi was a child, his father exhorts him that animals are animals; they must be kept at a distance from humans. Once he gets too close, the price would be his life. Living with a tiger, Pi is haunted by the fear of being eaten. During the days on the. 政治大. Pacific Ocean, if he does not want to lose his life, he must offer up other lives as. 立. scapegoats. Hence, though a vegetarian since he was born, Pi consciously kills other. ‧ 國. 學. living beings for the first time in his life. Gradually, killing lives and preparing food for Richard Parker and himself become his daily routine. Pi and Richard Parker. ‧. become messmates. Life of Pi is a story about how to eat with animals.. y. Nat. io. sit. Although Pi’s story seems reasonable, the Japanese investigators still doubt that. n. al. er. it is a true story. Their reasons are those baffling ecosystems in the lifeboat. The. Ch. i n U. v. meetings on the Pacific are not all illogical, but it seems too coincident to believe that. engchi. they all have happened to Pi in one journey. Feeling slightly hurt, Pi tells them a second story, in which God(s) are still in his heart but animals are gone. In this story, all humans, except for Pi, on the lifeboat die before long after the shipwreck. Throughout the journey at the sea, all Pi can do is keep praying till the day he is saved. It turns out to be a story about survival of the fittest who kills and eats his human companions. There is no animal but animality, the ugly nature included in and excluded from humanity. However, despite the fact that Pi is faithful and prays a lot in both stories, he does not explain how God(s) helped him get through the difficult days on the Pacific 3.

(14) Ocean. With or without animals, we see that Pi physically does all the works, for example, refitting the lifeboat, preparing foods, training Richard Parker or killing the French cook. No divine miracles have befallen and helped Pi through hard times. Florence Stratton gathers that the story with the animals is the story “that will make you believe in God” because when Mr. Okamoto answers Pi that “The story with the animals is the better story,” Pi replies “Thank you. And so it goes with God” (qtd. in. 政治大. Stratton 5). But when Pi points to the animal castaway, Richard Parker, yelling “THIS. 立. IS GOD’S CAT!” in order to elevate himself in the helpless situation, Richard Parker. ‧ 國. 學. remains the animal that “was a constant danger” (209). The title “God’s cat” seems to be given to Richard Parker with no valid argument. As Stratton points out, for Martel,. ‧. “God’s existence . . . is a matter neither of fact nor of faith, but rather is a better story. y. Nat. sit. than the one told by those who doubt or deny God’s existence” (Stratton 6). If that is. n. al. er. io. the case, what does it mean when Richard Parker is called “God’s cat”? While the. Ch. i n U. v. animals seem to project on the animal natures of humans in the second story, what do. engchi. the animals, especially Richard Parker, in the first story stand for? Both stories in Life of Pi touches the notions of “humans” and “animals” and their relations. The relationship between Pi and Richard Parker inspires me with the following questions that are registered with concerns for ethical human/animal relationahips. How do we live with the animals in baffling ecosystems, where unlikely beings live together as described in Life of Pi? What are the human responsibilities in the ethical human/animal relationships? How do we rethink human/animal relationships by reading the two stories—one with and the other without animals—in Life of Pi? These questions provoke this thesis. I wish to have a thoughtful discussion 4.

(15) and acquire some constructive answers through researches into the relationship between Pi and Richard Parker in Life of Pi.. Literature Review In Life of Pi, the animal protagonist, Richard Parker, is often read as a representation of something for humans’ sake, instead of an actual living tiger. In. 政治大. “The Intertwining of Incommensurables: Yann Martel’s Life of Pi,” James R. Mensch. 立. holds that Richard Parker is the projection of animality which is at the same time. ‧ 國. 學. included in and excluded from humans in the process of defining humanity. Richard Parker’s training is “a training of Pi’s own animal nature” (Mensch 48). It is an. ‧. important question of humans’ survival. Humans need to repress their animality to. y. Nat. sit. live on in the society. Besides Richard Parker, Mensch thinks that God is also a. n. al. er. io. projection of humans’ divinity (Mensch 54). So Pi’s odyssey on the Pacific Ocean can. i n U. v. be seen as “a journey into the depths of these questions, the hidden reaches where our. Ch. engchi. relations to our animality and divinity are deeply entangled” (Mensch 44). Mensch’s essay concludes that “there is no common measure—no ration—linking [man] either to his animality or to divinity” and Pi is “in his being made up of incommensurables” (Mensch 55). Florence Stratton in “‘Hollow at the Core’: Deconstructing Yann Martel’s Life of Pi” notices that Richard Parker is on one hand described by Pi in great details of “his physical appearance and habitual behaviour—sleeping, eating, defecating, growing” and on the other hand depicted as a being that throws “the spark of life” that seems full of symbolic meanings (Stratton 10). Stratton sees deconstructing powers in Richard Parker for he represents a blend of manners of 5.

(16) realism and aestheticism. Mensch and Stratton’s readings focus on Richard Parker’s literary significance. Mensch discusses the significance of animality in the process of humans’ self-making while Stratton argues that Richard Parker is registered with deconstructing powers. But since my concern is the human/animal relationship, my reading will have to focus on the Richard Parker in flesh in order to delve into his relationship with Pi.. 政治大. In “Believing in Tigers: Anthropomorphism and Incredulity in Yann Martel’s. 立. Life of Pi,” Stewart Cole contests that anthropomorphism indicates humans’ attempt. ‧ 國. 學. “to glean the greatest meaning from the world around us” (Cole 30) and through anthropomorphism “we see ourselves everywhere” (Cole 35). Though Pi sees Richard. ‧. Parker as an actual tiger and warns the readers not to see the animals through human. y. Nat. io. sit. eyes—because animals are animals—he cannot avoid anthropomorphizing Richard. n. al. er. Parker during the journey in the Pacific Ocean. From the viewpoint of agnosticism, it. Ch. i n U. v. seems unavoidable that we know and talk about animals through human eyes. The. engchi. ontological differences prevent us from efficacious communication with animals. However, whether we can “revise” our anthropomorphic exposition of the animals we meet might be a start to seek a way out of the predicament. My hope is that through observing, caring and training animals, we may be able to move away a little from the human-centered perspectives. We may also proceed to reflect on an ethical human/animal relationship. On issues of animals, it is impossible not to refer to the philosophical divisions between humans and animals in the Western context. The ideas of animals are understood as non-humans so any discussion about animals inevitably touches (or 6.

(17) threatens) the ideas of humans. J. M. Coetzee depicts how difficult it is to talk about animals without alluding to the human/animal hierarchy in The Lives of the Animals. In the novel, the fictive writer Elizabeth Costello discomforts her audience with the parallel between the Jews of the concentration camps and the animals of meat industry. Her parallel provokes a large backlash that accuses her of “[insulting] the memory of the dead” and “[trading] on the horrors of the camps in a cheap way” (Coetzee 50).. 政治大. She is thought to deliberately ignore the divinity of humans who have God’s image. 立. and exceed all other creatures in reason. Reason, the godlike endowment, the. ‧ 國. 學. foundation of the humans’ thinking is revoked. What distinguishes humans from animals is disqualified and the status of humans in this world is at stake. Costello’s. ‧. care for animal sufferings and her implication that humans tend to rationalize the. y. Nat. sit. sufferings caused by them turn her into an irrational writer with “delicate sensibilities”. n. al. er. io. (16) whose opinions on animals are “jejune and sentimental” (17) in front of a group of humanistic scholars.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In biblical traditions, man is made in the image of God and is granted dominion over all living creatures on earth. According to St. Augustine, what makes man godlike and nobler are “sensation” and “reason” (Augustine Book 1:20). He explains that the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” is addressed only to man: we do not understand this [commandment] of the plants, since they have no sensation, nor of the irrational animals . . . since they are disassociated from us by their want of reason, and are therefore by the just appointment of the Creator subjected to us to kill or keep alive for our own uses. (Augustine Book 1:20) 7.

(18) Because of reason, man is the rightful ruler of plants and animals. There is no such question as whether it is a sin to kill animals. Killing is only sinful when it is executed on man. Therefore, Costello’s parallel between the Jews and the animals is on one hand an insult to her rational audience and on the other hand a false accusation against humans who have the right to make use of animals as what they will. René Descartes compares animals to automata. Though they can perform some. 政治大. tasks better than humans do, they achieve those tasks “not through knowledge, but. 立. only through the disposition of their organs” (Descartes 72). Descartes thinks that “the. ‧ 國. 學. disposition of their organs” are like the design of machines that can bring to success the particular tasks set to them but would fail to do other tasks. He argues that animals. ‧. are automata produced by Nature (Descartes 297). Based on Descartes’ thinking,. y. Nat. io. sit. animals do not have consciousness. They might cry out with pain but they do not. n. al. er. necessarily experience the pain. Humans do not need to be guilty when they take animals’ lives.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Though humans do not have responsibilities for animals’ lives and sufferings, Immanuel Kant proposes that humans should treat animals with kindness for humans’ own sake. He argues that animals exist as “an analogue of humanity” to help “cultivate our duties to humanity” (Kant 212). Animals are “means” and humans are “the end” (Kant 212). How one treats animals reflects how one treats one’s own kind. Humans need to devote themselves to “observing animals and their behaviour” and “seeing how greatly they care for their young” to learn how to take care of their fellow humans (Kant 212). Though Kant’s ethics requires humans to see and care for animals, it inherits the anthropocentric view in the Western philosophical traditions. 8.

(19) Not that the lives of animals matter but that the great humanity needs to be cultivated. Jeremy Bentham, another Enlightenment thinker, is the first one to think from the animal side. In a footnote in “Limits between Private Ethics and the Art of Legislation,” he holds that animals are mistreated like the slaves. They live under humans’ tyranny. He questions that if reason is what gives humans immunity from responsibilities for animals, bringing in human infants and those who suffer from. 政治大. mental deficiency into the discussion should not cause any controversy or difficulty in. 立. ethics. Yet it is not so. Bentham points out that “the question is not, Can they reason?. ‧ 國. 學. nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (Bentham 236).. Apparently, animal suffering is an issue that cannot be ignored in the discourses. ‧. on animal ethics. Due to the dogmatic slash between the human and the animal, we. y. Nat. io. sit. are used to seeing and treating animals as non-humans, who by no means deserve. n. al. er. parity of respect with humans. The anthropomorphic perspective often justifies our. i n U. v. exploitation of animals for humans’ ends, including that in meat industry, clothing. Ch. engchi. industry, entertainment industry, scientific research, and rescue teams to name a few. The subsequent developments of human societies, however, are often at the expense of the lives of the animals. Cruelty to animals also seems natural or amoral. Humans are appointed as the masters of animals and can treat animals whatever ways they like. It looks like being animals in this world is being fatalistic. Animal ethics is derived from this sense of inequality and is enacted by certain people who—despite being on the top of the human/animal hierarchy—care about animals’ (suffering) situations and are willing to re-envision a human/animal relationship that fits in certain principles of their own, such as fairness or justice. 9.

(20) In Have you ever heard of speciesism?, a leaflet of Animal Ethics, Inc., the organization appeals for a more humane way of treating animals. They maintain that we should respect and do no harm to not only other people and dogs and cats but also all animals. That animals are not our kind is not an ample reason to harm them. The leaflet writes, many humans have lesser intellectual capacities, due to disease, accidents. 政治大. or congenital reasons. It’s clear to most of us that we shouldn’t. 立. discriminate against or harm those humans. This shows that . . . what. ‧ 國. 學. matters is not intelligence or mere species membership. (Have you ever heard of speciesism, 2).. ‧. Animals may not be less intelligent than humans but they feel pains as we do.. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. speciesism, 2).. sit. Therefore, “Intelligence is not what matters: suffering is” (Have you ever heard of. Ch. i n U. v. The contemporary philosopher Tom Regan further brings forwards that, instead. engchi. of the capacity for reason, “rights are trump” (Regan 80). He reasons that since we believe in human rights that one should be treated equally “regardless of our race, gender, religious belief, comparative wealth, intelligence, or date or place of birth” (Regan 80), we ought not emphasize the differences between humans and animals and remain indifferent to animal rights. Instead, we need to focus on the “fundamental similarities” (Regan 81). Ragan considers that the most important thing to both humans and animals is being “subjects-of-a-life” (Regan 81). Humans and animals are all living in and aware of the world and “what happens to us matters to us because it makes a difference to the quality as well as the duration of our life” (Regan 82). “As 10.

(21) subjects-of-a-life, we are all morally the same—all morally equal” (Regan 82). The significance of the term “subjects-of-a-life” is Regan’s effort to change humans’ view on animals. It is one step to change the way of thinking from that in the Western traditions in which animals are usually categorized into “non-humans” before the discussions. Nevertheless, Ragan’s advocacy of animal rights is still articulated in the frame of the Western philosophy. He asks in his essay,. 政治大. Are any other-than-human animals subjects-of-a-life? Yes, of course. All. 立. mammals, at least. All birds, at least. All fish, at least. Why? Because. ‧ 國. 學. these beings satisfy the conditions of the kind of subjectivity in question. (Regan 82). ‧. The phrase “at least” implies that there are gradations between animals. The questions. y. Nat. io. sit. of animals are discussed in the logic of the great chain of being in which the. n. al. er. philosophical divisions still exist.. i n U. v. J. M. Coetzee is aware of that the “philosophical language” limits the. Ch. engchi. discussions to discrimination “between mortal and immortal souls, or between rights and duties” (Coetzee 22). In The Lives of the Animals, the fictive writer Elizabeth Costello says that reason is actually more like “the being of one tendency in human thought” (Coetzee 23). Noticing that humans have held reason too tightly as the mastery of the world, she deems it necessary to disarm reason at first in order to open more rooms for those who are thought to have no access to reason. She brings forward the “sympathetic imagination” used by the poets to “[show] us how to bring the living body [of the animal] into being with ourselves” (Coetzee 53). According to Costello, sympathetic imagination is the ability to imagine what is it like to be in another body 11.

(22) and to embrace the currents of life at the moment of meeting the animal. She emphasizes that the animal is not invited into this meeting because sympathy has everything to do with the subject but nothing with the object. It is a better way than the philosophical discussion about animals because it is boundless—it is open to any kinds of forms of life without class gradations. Yet it seems too open. The difficulty in introducing sympathetic imagination is that it seems an easy. 政治大. way to represent all lives of animals in the name of the power of literature. While the. 立. philosophers fail to talk about animals because they only talk about humans, Costello. ‧ 國. 學. fails too because she only talks about all animals, animals in general. Many questions are brought up to challenge her. How far can one’s imagination travel? How do we. ‧. measure the authenticity of the imagined death of the animals? How do we know that. y. Nat. io. sit. the poets are not wasting their affections at the moments they engage in the lives of. n. al. er. the animals? How do we use poetry to urge people to do something for animals? All. Ch. i n U. v. these questions are brought up to embarrass her and her naïve theories of sympathetic. engchi. imagination. This is where I think Haraway’s thoughts can be helpful because with them we can see that one important link is not recognized in Costello’s sympathetic imagination: the concern for the real encounters with the animals. Costello and Haraway both refuses the gradations between humans and animals. They both resort to a kind of interaction with the animals which only happens at the moment of the meeting. And any party of the meeting does not come to the meeting with expectations of any specific outcome. Haraway describes that in the meeting with the companion species, “There is no teleological warrant here, no assured happy or unhappy ending, socially, ecologically, or scientifically. There is only that chance 12.

(23) for getting on together with some grace” (When Species Meet, 15). If the real encounter between the human (the poet) and the animal can be taken into consideration, Costello’s sympathetic imagination might be exempt from the doubts that it is too boundless to provide a new way to think about animals.. Methodology. 政治大. Donna Haraway’s The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and. 立. Significant Otherness and When Species Meet provide the theoretical bases for my. ‧ 國. 學. thesis. Her thinking on how we can learn to live intersectionally with companion species is a good approach to rethinking the human/animal relationship of which the. ‧. discussions have long been screened by anthropocentric views inherited from the. y. Nat. sit. Western philosophical traditions. My use of the term “companion species” is also. n. al. er. io. heavily indebted to Haraway’s deliberations about the connotations of the words. i n U. v. “companion” and “species” and their combination “companion species.”. Ch. engchi. In The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness, companions are, as the title suggests, the dogs that cement relationships with humans. Haraway commences her thinking from the sense of “companion animals” whose stories are always intertwined with their human partners in an “obligatory, constitutive, historical, protean relationship” (Manifesto, 12). Three factors are emphasized in this relationship: first, there are at least two partners, in this case, the dogs and the humans; second, there is no inevitable consequences; third, the partners do not exist before the relating. There is no presumption of hierarchy in the relationship. Only “Historical specificity and contingent mutability” are noted (Manifesto, 12). 13.

(24) In When Species Meet, Haraway grasps the word “companion” from its Latin etymology—“cum panis, ‘with bread’”—to which the word “messmate” is alluded to (When Species Meet, 17). Companions are whom we share the dining-table with. The notions of “companion” outlines the relationship between “the dog people” and the dogs in Haraway’s books as well as the relationship between Pi and Richard Parker in Life of Pi. The relationship between messmates even preliminarily points the way of. 政治大. dealing with problems concerning eating or eating with animals in the life boat. The. 立. relating of the partners is the smallest unit for us to think about their relationship. The. ‧ 國. 學. histories can help us understand how they live with each other based on their inborn knowledge or memory, especially in an ecosystem where they are not native to. Their. ‧. messmate-ship suggests that it is a matter of life and death. When we eat with our. y. Nat. io. sit. messmates, we also eat other animals. What to eat with and what to eat are questions. n. al. er. that must be answered. Ethics of companion species must be pondered over.. i n U. v. In When Species Meet, Haraway probes into the mixed meanings of “species.”. Ch. engchi. One can also scent that life and death matter to one species from the saying of “endangered species” that, according to Haraway, reminds us of “colonial representations of the always vanishing indigene” (When Species Meet, 18). The word “species” demonstrates the crux of the society dominated by “rational man” in which all other minor groups are drawn together as “species” and known as “Others to rational man” (When Species Meet, 18). Haraway elaborates these kinds of exclusion in the society and brings forward her hope in “companion species,” Species reeks of race and sex; and where and when species meet, that heritage must be united and better knots of companion species attempted 14.

(25) within and across differences. Loosening the grip of analogies that issue in the collapse of all of man’s others into one another, companion species must instead learn to live intersectionally. (When Species Meet, 18) Aiming to erase the hierarchy that exalts rational man and the presumed divisions between species, Haraway deems it advisable to “live intersectionally” in the meeting (When Species Meet, 18). One way that companion species can learn to live. 政治大. intersectionally may be respecere, “the act of respect” (When Species Meet, 19). The. 立. act of respect—“to hold in regard, to respond, to look back reciprocally, to notice, to. ‧ 國. 學. pay attention, to have courteous regard for, to esteem”—requires mutual eye-contact in encounter and creates a possibility of an other-worlding different from that dictated. ‧. by rational man (When Species Meet, 19-20). Respecting and responding will be my. y. Nat. sit. tools to examine the interaction between Pi and Richard Parker, especially Richard. n. al. er. io. Parker’s training program which I consider an important way of building up mutual communication.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In Life of Pi, whether the story with animals told by Pi is true or not bothers the Japanese investigators. The risk is that if it is not true, it appears trilling because the animals project the ugliest and darkest parts of human nature that are classified as animality. As a result, Mr. Okamoto chooses to accept the story with animals and agrees that it is “the better story” (Martel 317). The predicament we face here is that the actual animals disappear in our text because from now on they either represent or shun the dark sides of human natures. They are no longer animals. The stories are reduced to the story of humans only. Based on our discussion on the “companion species,” I contend that the first story (the story with the animals) is registered with 15.

(26) ethics of companion species while the second story (the one without animals) represents a traditional way of reading animal narratives in which the meanings of “animals” and “animality” are mixed and interchangeable. This would be an anthropocentric reading since its main concern is the nature of human beings.. Chapter Organization. 政治大. Besides Chapter One and Chapter Five, respectively the introduction and the. 立. conclusion, the body of the thesis is divided into three chapters. In general, the thesis. ‧ 國. 學. will first elaborate the ideas of “companion species” in Haraway’s context and explain how they can be applied to my literary analysis. Then, the thesis will discuss in detail. ‧. how Life of Pi is registered with ethics of companion species.. y. Nat. io. sit. The second chapter discusses how an ethical relationship between humans and. n. al. er. animals that does not take an anthropocentric stance becomes thinkable by. i n U. v. accentuating the idea of relationality. Mapping out Haraway’s thinking on. Ch. engchi. “companion species,” I point out that the purpose of thinking “companion species” is to cross or eliminate the boundary between humans and animals. The first demand in a companion-species relationship is to see the real animals, to be aware of that there is a great gap between animals in literatures and animals in reality. The false impressions of animals gained from the former can be harmful to the later and our relationship with them. Then I will go through Haraway’s thinking process on pondering over the term “companion species.” I think reading closely into the rich meanings and images comprised in the term would help us to have an “impression” of what companion species is about—the gist of “companion species”—even if we are 16.

(27) not to use all the meanings and images. I will emphasize “relationality” which is essential to a companion-species relationship and illustrate how in Haraway’s sense the partners in relating can “become with” each other and co-constitute their subjectivities. To illustrate the importance of analyzing a human/animal relationship from the idea of “relationality” instead of the human/animal dichotomy, I will discuss how. 政治大. animals and humans live together in the zoo and in the lifeboat in Life of Pi. In both. 立. contexts, the humans and the animals are called to meetings where they must grasp. ‧ 國. 學. how to interact by taking all details and histories of each participants in encounter into consideration. It is in the encounters that their relationships take shape. However, the. ‧. conditions in the lifeboat cultivate better companion-species relationship because. y. Nat. io. sit. there is no physical bar between the humans and animals. If a safe distance is needed,. n. al. er. the humans and animals on the lifeboat must endeavor to keep the distance depending. Ch. i n U. v. on how they get along with the other. I will analyze how Pi and Richard Park manage. engchi. to live together for 227 days on the lifeboat.. The third chapter explains how the humans and animals in encounter can build up a mutual communication through acts of respect in a companion-species relationship. I will follow Haraway to “look back” at the words “companion” and “species” from their Latin roots. The word “companion” suggests a messmate-ship between the companion species. The word “species” has multiple connotations. It means “see” etymologically. It also has an undertone of the less-human and non-human in our society dominated by the so-called rational man. Haraway thinks that we need to practice this sort of looking back and thinking back in order to see 17.

(28) again, to pay attention, to hold in regard so we will not get lost in our philosophical thinking and never look back at the real animals beside us. I will examine how Pi and Richard Parker become more and more communicative through the changes in their eyes. I will also show how the training program designed by Pi cannot work unilaterally from Pi’s side. He needs to draw Richard Parker’s attention to complete the training.. 政治大. The fourth chapter addresses the problem of animal narrative that usually. 立. resorts to anthropomorphism and argues that the story of Pi and Richard Parker. ‧ 國. 學. employs a kind of anthropomorphic narrative endowed with ethics of companion species. In Life of Pi, there are two versions of “the story.” The first one is the story of. ‧. Pi and Richard Parker that consists most of the novel. The second story is told by Pi. y. Nat. io. sit. after the Japanese investigators refuse to believe in the first story. This story has no. n. al. er. animals. The human castaways fight against each other on the lifeboat and eventually. Ch. i n U. v. Pi stays alive on his own after he kills the cook, who kills his mother. The Japanese. engchi. investigators detect great similarities between the behaviors of the humans in the second story and that of the animals in the first story. To read the two stories, I will introduce two kinds of anthropomorphism referring to Giorgio Agamben’s discussion on humanity and animality and Sarah Stebbins’ “Anthropomorphism” supported by a biological foundation. Comparing the two kinds of anthropomorphism, I will illustrate how anthropomorphism in the first story is registered with ethics of companion species while the second story presents an anthropocentric reading of animals in the context of the Western philosophical traditions. 18.

(29) Chapter Two In the Same Boat: Companion Species and Life of Pi. Recounting a symbiotic relationship between an Indian boy and a Bengal tiger, Life of Pi inevitably touches on issues concerning the human/animal relationship. While drifting on the Pacific Ocean, Pi Patel discovers that Richard Parker’s company. 政治大. saves him from fear. This fact leads him to “[realize] this necessity” to “tame [Richard. 立. Parker]” (164). Pi remarks, “It was not a question of him or me, but of him and me.. ‧ 國. 學. We were, literally and figuratively, in the same boat. We would live—or we would die—together” (164; emphasis in original). James R. Mensch regards this relationship. ‧. between Pi and Richard Parker as an inquiry about Pi’s humanity. Mensch sees. y. Nat. sit. Richard Parker as the projection of Pi’s animality. He argues that Pi’s claim that he. n. al. er. io. and Richard Parker must both live is actually “a concealed acceptance of his own. i n U. v. animality” (Mensch 48). Mensch takes this necessity of taming Richard Parker as the. Ch. engchi. necessity of taming Pi’s animal nature represented by the Bengal tiger. Pi’s training for Richard Parker suggests that animality is part of our humanity but in order to live we must restrain it. However, with the length of the specific descriptions of Richard Parker in the novel—his past, shapes, habits, reactions, etc.—I believe that, referring to the relationship between Pi and Richard Parker, these details need to be taken into consideration before we jump to the conclusion that Richard Parker only serves as the representation of man’s animality. In Mensch’s interpretation as well as in the Western philosophical traditions, the real animal is often left out when talking about the 19.

(30) human/animal relationship in literary works. Is there a way for us to see the animals as they really are, i.e., in the flesh? How can this way of thinking help us when we encounter animals in our life as Pi meets Richard Parker? And how would it change the way we think about humans and define ourselves? These are questions I intend to probe into departing from Mensch’s interpretation and the anthropocentric viewpoint of the Western philosophical traditions.. 政治大. Delving into the relationship between Pi and Richard Parker, this chapter. 立. proceeds with the assumption that Richard Parker is literally a Bengal tiger and had. ‧ 國. 學. literally kept Pi company on the Pacific for 227 days. Taming Richard Parker, in my opinion, is not merely subduing him, but a way of living together that requires mutual. ‧. involvement. In the following pages, I will first point out the importance of seeing. y. Nat. sit. real animals since they are our main concerns. Next, I will elucidate Haraway’s. n. al. er. io. deliberations on “companion species.” The term “companion species” draws on many. Ch. i n U. v. thinkers and terms that influence Haraway. I will elaborates them in details in order to. engchi. clarify the idea of “relationality,” which is the gist of a companion-species relationship. Relationality is about how the human, the animal and the details in their life are related. The zoo stories in Life of Pi manifest how humans and animals can get along with each other by taking their living environments into account. Among the details, I single out the histories of the human and animal participants in an independent subsection. “Historical specificity” enables us to see how the baffling ecosystems are formed on Pi’s lifeboat and in our life. Eventually, I will illustrate how Pi and Richard Parker “become with” each other in the context of Haraway’s “companion species.” I would like to suggest that the relationship between Pi and 20.

(31) Richard Parker is a companion-species relationship in which the human and animal co-constitute their subjects through relating. Reading Life of Pi and Haraway’s two books on companion species together, the thesis endeavors to rethink the human/animal relationship that is not rooted in the Western philosophical traditions—more specifically, a human/animal relationship that has no presumptions of human/animal distinctions before a human and an animal. 政治大. become related to one another. In doing so, I wish to come up with an ethical way of. 立. thinking and living with the animals that we encounter in our life.. ‧ 國. 學. Seeing Real Animals. ‧. Donna Haraway’s thinking on “companion species” begins with a real dog. The. y. Nat. sit. Companion Species Manifesto starts with an excerpt from her “Notes of a Sport. n. al. er. io. Writer’s Daughter” that keeps account of the symbiotic relationship between the. Ch. i n U. v. writer and her dog, Ms. Cayenne Pepper. Despite immeasurable differences in. engchi. physical structures, taxonomic systems, social classes, etc., the human and the animal manage to play with each other in the team sport called agility (Manifesto, 2). Seeing that their respective histories, biology and naturecultures allocate them characteristics so different yet some so similar, the players team up for a game of great complexity (Manifesto, 2). Haraway describes the relationship, We [she and her dog] have had forbidden conversation; we have had oral intercourse; we are bound in telling story upon story with nothing but the facts. We are training each other in acts of communication we barely understand. We are, constitutively, companion species. (Manifesto, 2) 21.

(32) As companion species, their “forbidden conversation” (Manifesto, 2) seems to suggest that they are able to establish a relationship surmounting the philosophical divisions between humans and animals. The philosophical divisions inherited from the biblical traditions have granted humans the most sacred status among the living beings but made it extremely difficult for themselves to talk about animals. In Coetzee’s The Lives of the Animals, the same philosophical divisions have caused Elizabeth Costello. 政治大. emotional and moral distress and forced her to inquire another way of talking about. 立. animals other than. ‧ 國. 學. a philosophical language in which we can discuss and debate what kind of souls animals have, whether they reason or on the contrary act as. ‧. biological automatons, whether they have rights in respect of us or. y. Nat. sit. whether we merely have duties in respect of them. (Coetzee 22). n. al. er. io. The dog in Haraway’s “Notes of a Sport Writer’s Daughter” is not a philosophical. Ch. i n U. v. subject to be discussed about. It and its human are both interlocutors in the. engchi. conversation who are fully aware of the other in front of them. They have physical contact and “oral intercourse” (Manifesto, 2). They communicate with each other—though in ways “we barely understand” (Manifesto, 2)—and tell stories together. When Haraway speaks about dogs in The Companion Species Manifesto, she refers to the actual dogs, “not a projection, nor the realization of an intention, nor the telos of anything” (Manifesto, 11). With the actual animal on the scene, it is possible for us to talk about animals or human/animal relationship without the presumptions in philosophical traditions. The term “companion species” entails seeing real animals—neither subjects in philosophy nor representations in literature. 22.

(33) In Life of Pi, the importance of seeing real animals is presented by differentiating real animals from animals in human imaginations. Despite the fact that the Patel family live in the Pondicherry Zoo and basically see living animals every day, Pi’s zookeeper father persists in demonstrating the serious consequences of not seeing real animals. Pi’s father is deeply convinced that “Animalus anthropomorphicus, the animal as seen through human eyes,” (31; emphasis in. 政治大. original) is the most dangerous animal in the world, and knowing it is not enough. He. 立. feels the need to engrave this fact in his sons’ minds even if the lesson might. ‧ 國. 學. traumatize them. Animalus anthropomorphicus is not rare; it is the most loving and the most fearful species that exists everywhere in our life. Yann Martel writes,. ‧. [Animalus anthropomorphicus] is an animal that is “cute,” “friendly,”. y. Nat. sit. “loving,” “devoted,” “merry,” “understanding.” These animals lie in. n. al. er. io. ambush in every toy store and children’s zoo. Countless stories are told of. i n U. v. them. They are the pendants of those “vicious,” “bloodthirsty,”. Ch. engchi. “depraved” animals that inflame the ire of the maniacs [Pi has] just mentioned, who vent their spite on them with walking sticks and umbrellas. In both cases we look at an animal and see a mirror. The obsession with putting ourselves at the centre of everything is the bane not only of theologians but also of zoologists. (31) Those adjectives personify animals. Different animals are characterized by traits perceivable in human characters. When people speak of animals, they look at the reflections of their fellow humans. Animalus anthropomorphicus could be harmful to animals in real life. We have been told in Life of Pi that many animals in the 23.

(34) Pondicherry Zoo have been hurt by visitors because of their misconceptions about animals. But it can also be harmful to people themselves. That is why Pi’s father is eager to deliver the lesson. It is common knowledge that animals can be very dangerous, especially the huge, heavy, carnivorous and venomous ones. Yet the lesson must be taught. It would be too late if one had to learn it from his/her experience; one could lose his/her life.. 政治大. The lesson is called “Tigers are very dangerous” (34; emphasis in original). Pi’s father. 立. admonishes his sons with a no-nonsense tone, “I want you to understand that you are. ‧ 國. 學. never—under any circumstances—to touch a tiger, to pet a tiger, to put your hands through the bars of a cage, even to get close to a cage” (34; emphasis in original). Pi. ‧. admits that he “may have anthropomorphized the animals” in his heart but he “never. y. Nat. sit. deluded [himself] as to the real nature of [his animal] playmates” (34). His exact. n. al. er. io. words are, “my poking nose had more sense than that” (34). Nonetheless, a goat is. Ch. i n U. v. ready—reluctantly, of course—to show him and his brother how dangerous a tiger is.. engchi. Babu, the keep of the big cats, takes the goat in front of the tiger Mahisha and opens the trapdoor between the two animals. At the moment the trapdoor is wide open, “A streak of black and orange flowed from one cage to the next” (35). Marhisha’s snarl and the goat’s bleating stop abruptly. The goat is dead or will be dead in a minute. It happens so quick that Pi does not remember if he sees any blood. “Better the goat than [Pi], no?” says Pi’s father (36). Seeing real animals is presented as a matter of life and death in Life of Pi. Pi says that he “learned the lesson that an animal is an animal, essentially and practically removed from us, twice: once with Father and once with Richard Parker” 24.

(35) (31). The second time happens when he and Richard Parker are stuck in the lifeboat after the shipwreck. Ever since Richard Parker comes on board, Pi cannot relax for one second. He is haunted by the fear of being eaten. He thinks in distress, “Truly I was to be the next goat. I had a wet, trembling, half-drowned, heaving and coughing three-year-old adult Bengal tiger in my lifeboat” (99). Surely he is sometimes drawn by the beauty of Richard Parker but he never forgets that tigers are very dangerous. To. 政治大. live with Richard Parker on the lifeboat, the first thing Pi does is to see Richard. 立. Parker as a real tiger which is capable of devouring him like Mahisha devouring the. ‧ 國. 學. goat, especially when it is hungry. Richard Parker is not the kind of companion that you can touch, pet or even snuggle up to. Thus, seeing real animals not through. ‧. human eyes is the prerequisite for getting along with animals we encounter, even. y. Nat. io. sit. though they are our companion species1. With animalus anthropomorphicus in our. n. al. er. minds, thinking ethics of companion species is not possible.. Relationality. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Accentuated the term “companion species” is the idea of relationality. As the full title of The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness suggests, the companion species in the book refers to dogs and people. Typical of the category “companion animals,” dogs are commonly seen to be kept by humans as companions and have closer relationships with them. In the game of agility, dogs inspire Haraway to think how to relate the experience of meeting them and how 1. Though Haraway’s thinking on “companion species” starts with her dog, it is arguable that Richard Parker is counted Pi’s companion species. “Companion species” is a category bigger than companion animals. It includes all that have certain relations with humans. This point will be clarify in the following sections.. 25.

(36) to understand the relationships with them. Thus, “companion species” at first refers to companion animals. However, it is not limited to companion animals. It is relationality that Haraway aims to emphasize by the term “companion species.” In the game of agility, Haraway has been tasked with communicating with her dogs and is soon confronted with a dilemma: they have no shared language. Meeting her dogs and logging how they get along make Haraway aware that she and her dogs. 政治大. are writing co-history in an incomprehensible way. It is incomprehensible because. 立. there are neither language nor common knowledge between them. Instead, there are. ‧ 國. 學. only their physical bodies and states of being alive in the world. As companion species, dogs have formed certain relationships with humans which have yet to be. ‧. described.. y. Nat. io. sit. Borrowing terms from other thinkers, Haraway explains how she thinks about. n. al. er. the relationship between dogs and humans as companion species in The Companion. i n U. v. Species Manifesto. First, meeting with one’s companion species registers what Alfred. Ch. engchi. Whitehead called “the concrete,” which means “a concrescence of prehesions” or “an actual occasion” (Manifesto, 6). Haraway expounds her appropriation here, Reality is an active verb, and the nouns all seem to be gerunds with more appendages than an octopus. Through their reaching into each other, through their “prehensions” or graspings, beings constitute each other and themselves. Beings do not preexist their relatings. “Prehesions” have consequences. The world is a knot in motion. (Manifesto, 6; emphasis added) “Reality” indicates (a) a state of things as they are and (b) a fact known to exist or 26.

(37) have happened. The reality is that the beings actually meet each other in the flesh. No ready presumptions such as the Great Divides or the cultural and biological determinism are proven reliable. Reality is also a fact that the beings get along together in the meeting. Their subjects are constituted by and with each other. No one side can do it without the other. And I understand what Haraway calls “the nouns” as the details involved in the meeting, such as the shared environments, other beings. 政治大. they encounter, daily necessities, foods, tools, equipment and so on. The beings and. 立. all the details are parts that make a whole: the meeting, the actual occasion. The. ‧ 國. 學. beings dedicate themselves to approaching and trying to understand each other through practices in daily life. There is no certain consequence for the meeting. ‧. because it is contingent upon the beings and “the nouns.”. y. Nat. sit. Second, in the meeting, Haraway finds that what Helen Varren identifies. n. al. er. io. “emergent ontologies” helps explain what/who the companion species are (Manifesto,. Ch. i n U. v. 7). Emergent ontologies are manifested in the difficulties in getting on together with. engchi. those whose existing knowledge is vastly different. Varren’s concerns are: How can people rooted in different knowledge practices “get on together,” especially when an all-too-easy cultural relativism is not an option, either politically, epistemologically, or morally? How can general knowledge be nurtured in postcolonial worlds committed to taking difference seriously? (qtd. in Manifestos, 7) Companion species are like those whose rooted knowledge is different. In fact, companion species are even more qualified to illustrate “emergent ontologies” since the differences across species should make it more difficult to get on with each other. 27.

(38) Companion species do not have fixed identities. Their ontologies can vary in how they get on together by resorting to “emergent practices” (Manifesto, 7). In the meeting, they take action to do “vulnerable, on-the-ground work that cobbles together non-harmonious agencies and ways of living” in an attempt to create the “barely possible but absolutely necessary joint futures” (Manifesto, 7). By “vulnerable, on-the-ground work,” the importance of the actual occasions—the reality, the details. 政治大. in life—is emphasized once again. Emergent ontologies indicate that companion. 立. species are not individuals; they are who they are with their companion species, and. ‧ 國. 學. they try to find a way to be with each other through emergent practices in the meeting. Third, Haraway uses Charis (Cussins) Thompson’s term “ontological. ‧. choreographies” (Manifesto, 8) to paraphrase the process in which the companion. y. Nat. sit. species try to make it possible to get along together. The choreographies are “more. n. al. er. io. than a metaphor” (Manifesto, 8); they are collective works taken on by the companion. Ch. i n U. v. species through their human and non-human bodies. Based on their inherited. engchi. knowledge, biology and histories, the companion species physically do movements—sometimes walk away and sometimes come close—and redefine who they are in the process. It helps us to rethink animal ethics that takes physical participation of humans and animals, which is not influenced by “humanist or organicist ideology” (Manifesto, 8). Lastly, Marilyn Strathern lends a perspective to the relationship between animals and humans other than seeing them as beings in “polar oppositions,” such as beings of “nature” versus that of “culture” (Manifesto, 8). Instead, she reflects on an alternative topology built on “relationality” (Manifesto, 8). Haraway draws in “partial 28.

(39) connections”—meaning “patterns within which the players are neither wholes nor parts” (8)—to describe the relationship between companion species. Haraway calls the connections “the relations of significant otherness” (Manifesto, 8). Companion species are not individuals. They are always in connection with their companion species, their partner(s), their significant other(s) in this meeting. The companion species are who they are when they are with each other. When one is referred to, one’s. 政治大. significant other(s) and their companion-species relationship are also considered. One. 立. is not one without one’s companion species.. ‧ 國. 學. “Companion species” is all about relations, the kind that Haraway and her dog have, the kind in which one and one’s significant other(s) become possible thanks to a. ‧. concrescence of prehensions and ontological choreographies. Termed companion. y. Nat. io. sit. species by Haraway, dogs are. n. al. er. a species in obligatory, constitutive, historical, protean relationship with. Ch. i n U. v. human beings. The relationship is string but not always harmonious; it is. engchi. full of waste, cruelty, indifference, ignorance, and loss, as well as joy, invention, labor, intelligence, and play. (Manifesto, 12) They may be categorized into companion animals, but that kind of relation is also possible between humans and other beings. Companion species embraces more: humans, animals, organic beings, and all of that have relations that make one become with one’s significant other(s). Meeting the companion species is not always pleasant. But it enables us to think animal ethics another way—one that might shake off anthropocentric perspectives a little, if not completely—through experiences of getting along with real animals. In addition, it enables us to envision more 29.

(40) possibilities of living in the world. In Life of Pi, Yann Martel explores these possibilities by telling stories of the zoo, where species thought to be incompatible with each other are put together. A zoo accommodates a wide variety of animals in terms of their characteristics, species and habitats: animals from small sizes to great sizes, from the mild to the ferocious, from the frigid zones to the torrid zones, from the earth to the sky. Pi compares these. 政治大. animals to the worst guests in a hotel, “Consider: the guests never leave their rooms;. 立. they expect not only lodging but full board; they receive a constant flow of visitors,. ‧ 國. 學. some of whom are noisy and unruly” (13). The ontological differences of the animals prevent them from “acting appropriately” to other human and animal dwellers. To live. ‧. together, the messes need to be cleaned up and the conflicts be resolved. Here is. y. Nat. io. sit. where a concrescence of prehensions starts.. n. al. er. Meeting with the animals in the zoo takes practical experience of getting along. i n U. v. with them2. The humans and the animals grasp each other and adjust their own. Ch. engchi. movements in the meeting. The zookeepers need to first take care of the basic needs of the animals. Pi says that they create a home for the animals, “In a zoo, we do for animals what we have done for ourselves with houses: we bring together in a small place what in the wild is spread out” (19). A home is a place tailored to its residents. The zookeepers arrange the fittest environments that conforms to the animals’ natures and habits and meet their everyday needs. Once the animals find themselves well provided with shelters and foods, they do not need to wage a turf war or hunt for 2. “Meeting” here means an occasion where beings—human or non-human—come together, not an action people take when they see and greet each other. So it is the zookeepers and those who live in the zoo (like the Patel family) who meet the animals, not the visitors of the zoo. That is to say, the zookeepers, the Patels and the animals are companion species.. 30.

(41) foods and endanger other dwellers. According to Pi, if a zoo runs well, it is home to the animals, the best place an animal can ask for3. Besides, the zookeepers keep an eye on every subtle aberration of the animals in order to maintain the restful life in the zoo. Every small detail is crucial to the meeting and the participants. They would suddenly start bustling around only “because a stork is not standing where it usually stands” (17).When an animal does. 政治大. not behave the way it usually does, the zookeepers launch a thorough investigation.. 立. Every small detail is seriously inspected. It could be something as small as “A coiled. ‧ 國. 學. hose left out by a keeper has made a menacing impression. A puddle has formed that bothers the animal. A ladder is making a shadow” or as serious as a symptom which. ‧. calls for medical care or more inspections of the keepers’ agenda (17). The meeting. y. Nat. io. sit. requires emergent practices every day—the participants constantly grasping, testing. n. al. er. and adjusting how to act or react. It is a world-making process always in motion in. Ch. i n U. v. which the participants and details in their life all make contributions.. engchi. The animals can be companion species for those who work and live in the zoo. Their knowledge of each other evolves from their physical interactions with each other. The interactions might not all be amiable, but a more amiable joint future is gradually taking shape by them. At the Pondicherry Zoo, Pi and the animals realize a. 3. There are contentious views on whether the existence of a zoo can be rationalized by saying that freedom is the minimum price the animals have to pay for better shelters, but this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis. In Life of Pi, Pi seems to thoroughly approve of restricting freedom of animals as long as all their needs are fulfilled. He defends for zoos, “I have heard nearly as much nonsense about zoos as I have about God and religion. Well-meaning but misinformed people think animals in the wild are ‘happy’ because they are ‘free’ . . .. Animals in the wild lead lives of compulsion and necessity within an unforgiving social hierarchy in an environment where the supply of fear is high and the supply of food low and where territory must constantly be defended and parasites forever endured. What is the meaning of freedom in such context?” (15-16).. 31.

(42) new form of life together, despite the disparity between their inherited bodies and knowledge. Every morning, Pi wakes up in “a pride of lions” as his alarm clock, starts his breakfast with the reminder of “the shrieks and cries of howler monkeys, hill mynahs and Moluccan ockatoos,” and goes to school “under the benevolent gaze not only of Mother but also of bright-eyed otters and burly American bison and stretching and yawning orang-utans (14). After school, an elephant would “search [Pi’s] clothes. 政治大. in the friendly hope of finding in hidden nut, or an orang-utan pick through [his] hair. 立. for tick snacks” (15). He and his companion species know each other and come up. ‧ 國. 學. with a way of living together through bodily interaction. The memories with them constitute Pi’s childhood. When Pi recalls, he says, “It was a huge zoo . . .. Now it’s. ‧. so small if it fits my head” (12). Living with the animals in the zoo is a memory. y. Nat. sit. depicted as part of his body and thus part of who he is. This joint life is a re-work of. n. al. er. io. Pi and the animals’ life histories; it is a collective work which is revised by them and. Ch. i n U. v. at the same time revises them. This is similar to what Haraway calls ontological choreography of the companion species.. engchi. In Life of Pi, the relationship between Pi and the animals is presented before us in their encounters: how they grasp, react to, and get along with each other. His relationship with them is not founded on the premises that humans are the masters of animals (so we can make use of them as we will), that animals are means of being human (so we should treat them with kindness to cultivate our humanity as Kant suggests), or that animals can feel pain (so we should not harm them). Between Pi and the animals, the human/animal dichotomy is slackened. They are merely species differ from each other who try to live together in harmony. It is when they meet, they work 32.

(43) things out together and become significant others to each other. Martel’s descriptions of the zoo portray how Pi and the animals are related just like how the companion species would be related.. Historical Specificity Thinking companion species is thinking an ethical way of living with beings. 政治大. which are so different from us that it sometimes seems almost impossible. On one. 立. hand, we try to reconcile different lifestyles by taking care of their needs and all. ‧ 國. 學. details involved and investing in emergent practices in the meeting. On the other hand, we try to understand the differences between us and them by showing interests in their. ‧. histories.. y. Nat. io. sit. Historical specificity matters not only because it gives us further understanding. n. al. er. of our companion species, but also because it prompts us to think what obligations we. Ch. i n U. v. have when we meet our companion species. Companion species are beings in relating.. engchi. None of them comprises the relating alone; “there have to be at least two to make one” (Manifesto, 12). They do not pre-exit the relating and “the relating is never done once and for all” (Manifesto, 12). According to Haraway, “Historical specificity and contingent mutability rule all the way down” (Manifesto, 12). That is why she tells dog stories from many aspects—evolution stories, love stories, training stories, etc.—to think how dogs and people relate to each other while living together with the entangled histories inherited in their flesh. Since the relationship of companion species are contingent on the partners, their histories matter. The histories help cast light on what we have encountered. In Haraway’s stories, they enable us to know 33.