汝應識己而後愛人:論《瑪喬芮．坎普之書》中的自我形象 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學英國語文學系碩士論文. 指導教授: 林質心 Adviser: Dr. Chih-Hsin Lin. 汝應識己而後愛人:論《瑪喬芮．坎普之書》中的自我形象. Know Thyself and Thou Shalt Love: Self-image in The Book of Margery Kempe. 研究生：張景翔撰 Name: Ken Chin-Hsiang Chang 中華民國 108 年 7 月 July 2019. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(2) Know Thyself and Thou Shalt Love: Self-image in The Book of Margery Kempe. A Master Thesis Presented to Department of English, National Chengchi University. In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts. by Chin-Hsiang, Chang July 2019. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(3) To every soul curling in the darkest corner 獻給蜷縮在黑暗角落的靈魂們. iii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(4) iv. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(5) Acknowledgment My wholehearted thanks go to my adviser, Dr. Cynthia Chih-hsin Lin, for she always churns my muddy brain, helps me figure out what I think and what I really want to communicate, and points out the way when I wallow in my self-accusation and keep questioning my own ability and endurance to finish my thesis. I also want to thank Dr. Sophia Ya-Shih Liu for warmly pointing out my chaotic writing habit in my proposal exam, and Professor Denise Ming-yueh Wang for showing her care for my health and progress whenever we met in conferences or symposiums and providing insightful comments in my oral defense. I especially thank Dr. Thomas Sellari for reading my manuscripts in the form of a proposal and thesis and offering helpful suggestions both in my proposal exam and oral defense. I would like to thank my family. Although they keep complaining about my low productivity and hilariously mistook my proposal exam as my oral defense, they always give me their support whenever I need it. I am also grateful to have Winnie Shen and Wenny Chang in the counseling center at NCCU, who take care of my mental health and point out my cognitive dissonance that precludes me from taking my responsibility for my life. I also thank my besties, Agnes and Ruby, whose tender frankness always directs me to contemplate on my flaws without being hurt. I am also glad to have met Chantal, my evil twin sister at NCCU, without whom, my school life would be so bleak, without any color, and I appreciate her for knowing the right moment to be an angel to subdue my evilness. I would want to extend my thank to Red, for discussing philosophical issues and debating the meaning of school life in the MA program, though I often fell into blankness when he passionately praised Nietzsche. I would like to thank Amber and Lucas for always being so patient, v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(6) listening to my perennial whining and complaint. My sister Lucas also brought me back to the church and relentlessly watching whether I attended the church every week when my faith was not that strong. I would also thank students who took The Introduction to Western Literature in Fall, 2017. Their dedication and company enriched the last days of my school life with freshness, and my thank especially goes to Mandy Liao, who always encourages me before deadlines and shares her teaching experiences and techniques with me. I would like to thank Dr. Cynthia Lin here again for giving me the chance to be a teaching assistant. Without her incisive remark, which pointed out the crux of my hesitation, I would never have enjoyed sharing my learning experiences with these freshmen and would never have believed that I could gradually triumph over my fear, which limited my life choices most of the time. Finally, I would like to thank God for sending me all those precious and beautiful souls to help me in my struggles, witness how a life with You can become so meaningful and full of hope, and show me that You are indeed the One who makes impossible possible.. vi. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(7) Table of Contents. Dedication Page……………………………………………………………………iii Acknowledgment……………………………………………………………………iv Chinese Abstract……………………………………………………………………vii English Abstract……………………………………………………………………ix Chapter I: Introduction………………………………………………………………1 Chapter II: “For they do not know what they are doing:” Margery’s Self-knowledge as a Sinner……………………………………………………………………17 Chapter III: “I am Black but Beautiful:” Margery’s Self-image as God’s Lover... ...39 Chapter IV: “Because She was the Mother of All Living:” Loving as a Mother... ...59 Chapter V: Conclusion………………………………………………………………85 Works Cited…………………………………………………………………………88. vii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(8) viii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(9) 國立政治大學英國語文學系碩士班碩士論文摘要. 論文名稱：汝應識己而後愛人:論《瑪喬芮．坎普之書》中的自我形象指導教授：林質心教授研究生：張景翔論文提要內容：評論家咸認為瑪喬芮的奇特行止係由於其不具有自我認識的能力又或者其自我形象並未忠實反映其自我認識。本論文意圖將《瑪喬芮．坎普之書》放在神祕主義傳統中解讀，並以齊克果的論述來檢視瑪喬芮如何檢視自我認識之來源是否妥適，並依據真實自我認識融合相關的自我形象來活出真實的自我。第二章將透過檢視瑪喬芮如何運用辯靈傳統來辨認所獲得的靈啟是否來自上帝以追溯坎普如何獲得自我認識。此外也將探討瑪喬芮的驕傲如何阻礙她獲得自我認識。最後本章將檢視瑪喬芮如何成為夠格的人來檢證自我知識的來源並在遭遇困惑時仍清楚思考。第三章將探討為何瑪喬芮知悉自我認識的來源為神之後，仍無法接受那個自己或成就那真實的自我形象，此章將分析坎普的朝聖旅程如何幫助坎普轉變罪人的自我形象，成為神的愛人，並確立自己的確是為神所愛。此外，這章會以辨靈與神祕新婦的傳統來檢視與神的婚禮前後瑪喬芮身體的感覺如何成為神愛的證據並成為瑪喬芮在各種困境中挺立的支柱。第四章將檢視瑪喬芮如何延伸神 ix. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(10) 愛人的自我形象並透過母親的悲慟來建立屬靈社群。此章中將會運用齊克果的《愛之工》，此書指出由神點燃之愛不能沉潛而必得有外在表現以觸及人群。此一想法正可用以解釋瑪喬芮和神獨一的愛如何轉向成為包容兼緒的愛。結論將點出坎普如何階段性呈現瑪喬芮的靈性旅程來展現她如何獲取正確的自我認識並完整體現因此一認識，開展出的其生命潛力。. 關鍵字：瑪喬芮坎普，自我認識，自我形象，分辨諸靈的恩賜，基督新婦. x. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(11) Abstract Margery’s peculiar life has been considered by critics as a sign of her madness with no solid self-knowledge or a performance/disguise. This thesis rereads The Book of Margery Kempe in the context of the mystical tradition and Kierkegaardian discourse to explore what effort Margery makes to verify the sources of her self-knowledge and live her true self by presenting various self-images built upon her verified selfknowledge. The second chapter aims to trace how Kempe acquires her selfknowledge. Her effort will be studied as an application of the tradition of discretio spirituum, which helps her to verify whether her spiritual visions are from God or the devil. Furthermore, Margery’s pride will be examined as an obstacle to her understanding of herself. Finally, the chapter will explore how Margery can even be qualified to verify the sources of her self-knowledge and still keep a clear head in face of confusing messages about her true self. The third chapter examines why even with the right kind of self-knowledge from God, she may still have difficulty in accepting this self or living out a self-image accordingly. This chapter analyzes how Kempe presents Margery’s pilgrimage and shows that her self-image transforms from a sinner to God’s lover after knowing that God indeed loves her. Margery’s bodily feelings as God’s token of love before and after her wedding with the Godhead (1.35) will again be examined in the traditions of discretio spirituum and bridal mysticism to understand how Margery decides to be God’s lover against adversity. The fourth chapter examines how Kempe extends her self-image as God’s lover and forms a spiritual community though her maternal sorrow. Here Kierkegaard’s Works of Love can help understand this expansion of love as he argues that one’s strong love ignited by God cannot remain dormant but needs to be expressed and reach others. The xi. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(12) conclusion presents how Kempe stages Margery’s spiritual journey to show how to acquire self-knowledge and how to embody fully the potential of her self-knowledge.. Keywords: Margery Kempe, Self-knowledge, Self-image, discretio spirituum, Bridal mysticism. xii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(13) Let us make man in our image, in our likeness (Gen 1:26) Since you have taken off your old self with its practices and have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge in the image of its Creator. (Col 3:9-10). Chapter One Introduction. Before the sole manuscript was uncovered in 1934, the editor of the reprinted edition of Pepwell’s anthology confessed their limited knowledge about Margery Kempe and called her “a much more mysterious personage” than any other authors in the same anthology (xix). A morsel of knowledge about Margery Kempe derives from Henry Pepwell’s misleading title to her, “a devoute ancress” (xx), in his 1521 edition. After the rediscovery of the manuscript, Margery was known to be a secular bourgeois mother, and her new image totally defies critics’ expectation. I follow the scholarly tradition established by Staley to refer the author as Kempe, and the character as Margery, though I do not agree with Staley that Margery is purely Kempe’s fictional product (3).The mystery about who Margery Kempe may very well be the question Kempe asks herself in the text, and the thesis will focus on how she finds, defines, and builds a self. When an individual thinks or examines himself or herself as an object, this object becomes the self. Reinecke explains William James’ idea of the complexity of the self: “Whenever two people meet, there are really six 1. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(14) people present. There is each man as he sees himself, each man as the other person sees him, and each man as he really is” (Reinecke). More scholarly term for “each man as he sees himself” is one’s self-knowledge, “each man as the other person sees him” is one’s self-image, and “each man as he really is” is the self. The Book of Margery Kempe shows the complexity of such a self. To consolidate such a self, Kempe presents life story to her amanuensis. Kempe tells him what she knows about herself, her self-knowledge, explains how she builds her self-image accordingly, and the amanuensis then presents an image of Kempe as he perceived it. The amanuensis’ initial struggle to believe Kempe’s life story captures the problem that there is usually a gap between one’s self-knowledge and one’s self-image, especially when perceived by an skeptical eye. Studying such a self in The Book of Margery Kempe as an autobiography is even more complicated: critics, like Gusdorf, have argued that “autobiography is the mirror in which the individual reflects his own image” (33) “At the edge of modern times, the physical and material appeal of the reflection in the mirror bolsters and strengthens the tradition of self-examination of Christian asceticism” (33). The autobiographical self as the reflection in the mirror cannot reproduce exactly the selves who lives for it is constructed through the writing process of the autobiography, which is already an representation. Friedman questions Gusdorf’s assertion by pointing out that for Gusdorf the autobiographical self is premised on the self as an “isolated being” (73), emphasizing a self that aroused by its curiosity to find meanings for him/herself without the circumference of the society. She argues that Gusdorf’s 2. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(15) individualistic paradigms of the self “ignore the role of collective and relational identities in the individuation process of women” (72), because the inter-relatedness between self and other is significant for women’s self-creation. Instead of considering the autobiographical self as a replica of a living self, Friedman proposes to see these two selves as “an interdependent existence” to bestow meaning to each other (73). In this thesis, then, it is necessary to study how Kempe presents the story of Margery to first understand herself then help others understand themselves by comparing their own experiences with her story. Some modern psychologists further propose that one’s self-concept is composed of one’s self-image, self-esteem, and ideal-self (Gross 607-09). They define the unknown part of the self to be one’s potential and examine how one strives to attain one’s ideal-self and how this attainment influences one’s self-esteem. They share with Plato the same presupposition that if one knows that certain action is the best for him/herself, one would choose this action rather than others (Protagoras 358d). They believe if one knows oneself more fully, one would know what action is the most propitious and fulfilling for oneself and will strive to rebuild a self-image accordingly. They also argue that the relationships among these three components are dynamic. For example, when there is a distinct discrepancy between one’s self-image and one’s ideal-self, one may have a low self-esteem, but at the time one attains one’s ideal-self and imagines a new ideal-self for oneself, the attained ideal-self at that moment would then become one’s self-image. Psychologists then imagine a person in an endless pursuit of one’s ideal self. Margery’s spiritual crisis after her childbirth (1.1) might be 3. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(16) seen as the result of such an unresolved tension among her self-image and ideal-self, and her self-mutilation (1.1) might be the result of her low self-esteem. Foucault shares the same presupposition that a person’s pursuit of ideal self is endless, but he criticizes Christianity for conjuring an ideal self that cannot be attained in this life. He suggests that after Christianity takes over the “hermeneutics of the self” it has been “confused with theologies of the soul—concupiscence, sin, and the fall from grace” (17). For Foucault, once a person realizes that s/he cannot attain this ideal self during this life, s/he would forsake their own responsibility and autonomy. He specifically compares askesis in Stoicism to self-renunciation in Christian asceticism to show his preference. For Foucault, askesis, an effort to discipline one’s desire, in Stoicism “means not renunciation but the progressive consideration of self” (35). Foucault argues that it is not reasonable to renounce oneself when the purpose of gaining self-knowledge in the framework of epimelesthai sautou, that is “to take care of yourself,” or “the concern with self” (19). If so, can we still read Margery’s self-mutilation as an effort to build herself a proper self-image? Charles Taylor does not find such a pursuit of the ideal self meaningless; on the contrary, he believes such pursuit leads an understanding of one’s ontological self. Instead of observing how people effect “a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being so as to transform themselves” as Foucault (18), he suggests that one’s moral evaluation of their certain responses to the respectable or the abominable reflect one’s “moral instinct” (7), and such moral instinct is what Augustine calls the se nosse, implicit self-knowledge or 4. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(17) self-awareness, which is the most fundamental image of God in the human soul. He here sees human beings as a moral agent as Augustine does in his De Trinitate Book 10 Chapter 12. If Foucault helps point out the danger of pursuing an ideal self, Taylor shows the necessity of gaining such knowledge for one’s moral reflection. A study of Margery Kempe’s pursuit of an ideal self involves a study of how Margery decides which self-knowledge she can safely accepts in order to evaluate her actions and modify them to build her self-image without losing herself. In modern psychology, what complicates the issue is that one’s actions are not only a way to shape one’s self-image but also a way to build one’s identity. Such an identity, scholars claim, “locates the individual within society” and signifies his/her “social bond” and “membership” in the certain group (Descombes 12). That is, the self-image one builds also needs to help one build a social bond. Kempe modifies her actions to shape a self-image, we also need to examine how she manages to live with the new identity the modification brings. might be seen as her disloyalty to her original group, her family members or people in the same merchant enterprise. Such an identity problem is actually more prominent than the problems of finding true self-knowledge or shaping an appropriate self-image. That is, to understand how the first reaction of critics who read the Book for first time may be similar to John Kempe’s to Margery Kempe: “[Margery is] no good wyfe” (1.11.722), because Margery does not act like an ordinary medieval wife. Kempe records how Margery decides to live a life different from an ordinary medieval wife after her recovery from her mental disorder (1.1) and her ensuing struggles to build a 5. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(18) self-image embodying her anomalous new knowledge about herself. Critics provide multifarious answers to make sense of her eccentric decisions, to live chastely (1.3), to go pilgrimage without her husband (1.11), to love God with her abundant tears and loud crying (1.28), and to attend a heresy trial as a suspect (1.52). Such eccentricity probably was never aspired to by any medieval wife. Critics examine Margery’s life in the medieval society to find reasons and motives behind such peculiarity. For example, Myers traces the decline of the merchant class in Lynn to explain that Margery’s anxiety over the social status pushes her to abandon worldly pursuits, which she could not afford after the downfall of her family, and to start a spiritual journey, which helps divert her from the loss of the secular identity (378). Such a historical study ignores the fact that Kempe persistently presents herself as “this creatur” right from the beginning of The Book of Margery Kempe. By calling Margery “this creatur,” the author Kempe and her amanuensis want to highlight her relationship with God, since she ceaselessly foregrounds God as her creator. Not until chapter eleven is her name “Margery” casually revealed by her husband (1.11.712), and her family background is not disclosed until chapter forty-five when the bishop of Worcester addresses her as “John of Burnamys dowtyr of Lynne” (1.45.3617). Obviously Kempe does not see her social status, a middle-class merchant, as the central part of her identity. To recover the historical Margery Kempe is to re-clothe her in a self-image Kempe wants to take off in her Book, considering especially how often Kempe and her amanuensis choose to present Margery as a “synful caytyf” drawn by God’s love along her life. 6. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(19) Subordinating Margery as God’s creature, Kempe shows that Margery’s understanding of herself cannot be separated from her relationship with God. Throughout the Book, Kempe presents Margery to be “this creatur” who brings her anxiety and worry before God and pleads for comfort and resolution. A self-knowledge built upon such a relationship with God can be shaky: Kempe describes many times Margery’s fear of receiving illusory and deceitful from her spiritual enemies and presents how Margery is tricked by devil’s lie and falls into despair (1.1). In order to discern the source of her self-knowledge, Margery seeks instructions and guidance from various authorities. This process demonstrates how the Johari window works as described in the modern psychology, how one can unveil more the terrain of one’s unknown self through frequent counsel with others (Luft 177). Her understanding of herself thus becomes a much more complex issue, dependent upon the validity of such authorities. Even when the source of her self-knowledge has been verified, her ability to interpret it may be another question. Kempe often shows God “kallyd hir fro the pride and vanyte of the wretthyd world” (1.2.316-7), which prevents Margery from really understanding the instruction (1.2) and distorts her self-knowledge. She also often feels anxious about whether she is qualified to follow such a call and build a self-image accordingly. To understand how Kempe believes true self-knowledge can be acquired to build a corresponding self-image, it is necessary to understand not only which source of self-knowledge can be trusted but also how Margery learns to verify various sources and define her relationships with God and with various authorities to build a unified self-image. 7. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(20) Literature Review Many critics do not think Kempe can really understand or build such a complex self. Some believe Margery’s anomalous life choices are the results of her mental disorder. Freeman, for example, argues that Margery’s “cyclical disorder, perhaps mania and melancholia” (184), not only distorts her self-knowledge but also “stimulate[s] her imagination” (185) to conceive herself in a “self-inflated manner” without clear knowledge of her ability (186). If so, there must be some difficulty in Kempe’s presentation of a consistent development of her self-image. However, Kempe does consistently connect in retrospect Margery’s life experiences with her later development. For instance, she points out that Margery’s pride and vainglory hinder her from accepting God’s illumination and later shows how her humility brings her a true understanding of herself (1.2.253). Through Kempe’s presentation, Margery’s self-knowledge is more and more consistently demonstrated by her self-image. Even so, some critics still suggest that Kempe is not showing how Margery builds a self-image according to her self-knowledge, although they do not question her ability to acquire her self-knowledge. They believe Kempe presents a self-image to gain something. For Staley, the Book is not a record of Margery Kempe’s mystical experiences but a fiction with a political agenda to resist the oppression of women by society (71). Goodman and Partner believe that Margery’s self-image as a mystic helps her enjoy the hidden desire, to re-experience her struggle with parents in her 8. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(21) interaction with clerical superiors (Goodman 352) and to satisfy her forbidden love for her father (Partner 258), without the danger of ever being caught. For them, Margery’s worship and devotion become like a shield defending her from the external pressure and internal guilt against her disobedience. Goodman argues that Margery’s spiritual pursuit as a mystic, “carried to extremes of perfection, assuaged her guilt at failing the conventional expectations of her father, husband and kinsfolk” (353). He then suggests that Margery’s struggles with her confessors and priests are experienced by her as a re-embodiment of her “long-past family drama” (352) and “failed kinship relations” (353), that she is re-experiencing the life of a disobedient daughter. Partner further suggests that Kempe is the daughter who secretly possessed the taboo desire for her father, and her forbidden desire incurred her guilt. She argues that Kempe fakes her spiritual pursuit as a mystic in order to “secretly enjoy this prohibited desire” (258), that for Margery, intimacy with God is experienced as a substitute for this forbidden love (258). These critics do not explain, however, why Margery is willing to undergo difficult situations, neighbor’s slander and a heresy trial, if her only goal is to find an easy way out. Such willingness is better explained by critics who compare Margery with model saints in the mystical tradition. They believe that Margery willingly follows her knowledge about these saints to build her self-image but they often find Margery insufficient in following her chosen models. Knowles proposes that Julian of Norwich in her Revelations shows more her “in-depth perception” and “wisdom of spiritual doctrine” than Margery (139). Collis argues that Margery is too ambitious in her 9. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(22) attempt to “surpass” St Bridget in holiness and fame (139), trying to prove that her visions are superior to St Bridget’s through the mouth of God. Collis thinks that Margery Kempe has no other vocation “except to prove herself a saint” (140), but fails to reach St.Bridget’s standard. She even implies that Margery fails to instruct her children well owing to the fact that none of Margery’s daughters enter the convent as one of St. Bridge’s daughters did (141). Craun also shows that Kempe’s description of Margery’s bold chastisement over misdeeds like swearing and luxurious clothes corresponds to the “well-established and legitimating tradition of fraternal correction” (192). Margery’s loud crying and other emotional expressions are also observed by Dickman as a way to help Margery “fit into the complex mosaic of late medieval pious women” and participate in the tradition of affective piety practiced by the continental beguines (152). These critics do help explain some of Margery’s peculiarity and examine her identity in relation to various traditions, but they fail to notice that Kempe herself knows that her experience is still peculiar when situated in these traditions: [S]che herd nevyr boke, neythyr Hyltons boke, ne Bridis boke, ne Stimulus Amorys, ne Incendium Amoris, ne non other that evyr sche herd redyn that spak so hyly of lofe of God but that sche felt as hyly in werkyng in hir sowle yf sche cowd or ellys mygth a schewyd as sche felt. (1.17.1257-61) These critics may simply see such differences between Margery’s experiences and other mystics’ as an indication that Kempe is unable to be the mystic she wants to be; they do not see Kempe’s effort to understand such differences to get a hold on who 10. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(23) she is. By showing her struggle and effort, Kempe wants to encourage her readers that they need to examine the false self-knowledge gained by consulting authorities and observing models to live more like their real selves. For her, the differences remind her that she needs to further develop her autonomy, not her inability to find herself. For those critics who accept that Margery gradually becomes more herself and starts to have stronger personal autonomy as the Book develops. The problem is what kind of autonomy is built and how. Many still argue about whether she succeeds in building her autonomy. Beckwith even argues that Kempe in her writing praises femininity, such as virtues of humility, subordination and obedience, and reinforces the male dominance (54), while Traub warns against the feminist goal to “render adequately the complexity and alterity of early modern sexuality” to see “nuns, virgins, Amazons, lesbians, and female friends” as women who “resist the imperative to marry and reproduce” (493). More specifically, critics sometimes think that the Book represents a female subject’s struggle against clerical control. McAvoy argues that Margery suffers after her first childbirth not just for her post-partum disorder but also the oppression from the privileged male and priestly authority (36). She and others use Foucault’s theory to argue that “the confessor is no neutral ear, but the authority who requires and assesses the confession,” for them, and Margery and her scribe priest are also bound by this confessor/confessed relationship (Dillon 134). McAvoy and Dillon suggest that Margery’s verified self-knowledge may be distorted by the spiritual authorities, so they denies that Margery’s confession as a feasible way to acquire her self-knowledge. 11. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(24) Other critics follow such a critical trend to foreground Margery’s effort to fight against clerical control and build her personal autonomy in the compulsory confession. Vaillancourt for example argues that Kempe deliberately situates her book on the cusp of Lollard persecution to examine secular and spiritual authority and show how she “decenters clerical power” (57). Lipton also argues that Kempe enlists sacramental marriage as a tool to rebel against clerical control: she contends that Kempe “use[s] the contradictions in clerical ideology of marriage to undermine clerical authority” (129). Accordingly, Lipton suggests that the dominant self-image Kempe wants to present is the “bourgeois woman and aspiring saint” (130) and finds it unfortunate that the “hagiographical model” sought for by Kempe demands the “depiction of sexual oppression in marriage,” which is at odds with its “bourgeois portrait of relative autonomy and equality in marriage” (132). Margery needs to use her “sacramental marriage” with God to “reconcile her spiritual ambitions with her bourgeois values” (Lipton 130), and Lucas similarly argues that because one cannot “fulfill social expectations” of a saint and a wife at the same time (295). Critics are certainly have a reason to highlight the conflict between bourgeois values and hagiographical models as Kempe herself probably feels such a conflict. However, it is still problematic not to explore why Kempe thinks or believes sacramental marriage will solve the problem. Lipton seems to take Margery Kempe’s choice of God as her husband for granted just because God is a better husband than John Kempe. She does not further examine how Kempe shapes her womanhood in such a sacramental marriage. It seems more likely that despite her struggle with clerical authority, Kempe 12. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(25) here is following the tradition of bridal mysticism to see herself married to God. To understand Kempe’s journey to know herself and live herself according to her self-knowledge, we need to study more the mystic tradition she is situated in and maybe struggle with and study more her anxiety about the authenticity of her visions than that about clerical control. It may be true that medieval clerical order extends their control by the tradition of discretio spirituum (Yoshikawa 64), since the writings of discretio spirituum propose feminine virtues, such as humility and obedience, but Kempe herself stages “pride” as her sin before her conversion to follow God (1.2.263). She probably would follow the discretio tradition established by mystics like Bernard of Clarivaux in believing that a proud person forgets the fact that one’s goodness is bequeathed by God (31). To understand her struggle, we should rather focus on how she uses the discretio tradition to find her true self without being misled by whatever social pressures and situates herself in the tradition of bridal mysticism to gain a transformative power to live her true self-image.. Chapter Organization and Methodology The main body of this thesis consists of three chapters. The second chapter aims to trace how Kempe acquires her self-knowledge. Her effort will be studied in comparison to that of other mystics who adopt the tradition of discretio spirituum to verify whether their spiritual visions are from God or the devil. Without confirming the authenticity of her visions, Kempe cannot gain any self-knowledge and start to think how to live that self-knowledge. In this chapter, Margery’s pride will be 13. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(26) examined as an obstacle to her understanding of herself. Jean Gerson’s “Distinguishing True from False Revelations” will be used to understand Kempe’s use of the discretio tradition. To examine how Margery can even be qualified to verify the sources of her self-knowledge and still keeps a clear head in face of confusing messages about her true self, Søren Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death may also help: he argues that life devoid of the relationship with God is meaningless, and if one does not acknowledge one’s relationships with God, one denies the possibility of knowing him/herself. His discussion can help provide some insight about why Margery think it is necessary to acquire self-knowledge from God. Kierkegaard’s argument that one’s unwillingness to be oneself or willingness to accept a [false] self is a defiance against God (375) also helps explain that why, even with the right kind of self-knowledge from God, one may still not love this self or refuse to live out that self-image. Such reluctance and hesitation are the focus of the third chapter, which discusses how Kempe presents Margery’s pilgrimage and shows that her self-image changes from a sinner to God’s lover after knowing that God indeed loves her. Margery’s bodily feelings, felt after her wedding with the Godhead and seen by her as God’s token of love will again be compared to those discussed in the tradition of discretio spirituum. In this chapter, William of Thierry’s Exposition on the Song of Songs, written in the tradition of bridal mysticism, helps understand how Margery decides to be God’s lover against so many adversity. Rolle’s The Fire of Love, a book read to her by a friendly priest (1.17), his description of bodily feelings accompanying the 14. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(27) presence of the Holy Spirit is very similar to Kempe’s triggered by God’s love. His readings of the Song of Songs as the wedding-hymn between Christ and the soul are also strongly colored by a sense of the unworthiness of the soul, reflecting what Margery feels in the beginning. The fourth chapter examines how Kempe extends her self-image as God’s lover and forms a community though her maternal sorrow, how Margery is shown to imitate Virgin’s sorrow and participate in the emotional community with members connected by maternal compassion and sorrow. Here Kierkegaard’s Works of Love can help understand this expansion of love as he argues that one’s strong love ignited by God cannot remain dormant but will show in outward expression to reach others. The conclusion presents how Kempe stages Margery’s spiritual journey to show how to acquire self-knowledge and how to embody fully the potential of her self-knowledge.. 15. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(28) 16. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(29) For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known. (1 Corinthian 13:12) If a person is not aware of a lack, he cannot desire the thing which he is not aware of lacking. (Plato, Symposium). Chapter Two “For they do not know what they are doing:” Margery’s Self-knowledge as a Sinner. Passages of The Book of Margery Kempe were reprinted in Henry Pepwell’s devotional compilation The Cell of Self-Knowledge in 1521, hinting that The Book was read as a guidebook for acquiring self-knowledge (Zimbalist 1). The four texts following Margery’s in this compilation are Walter Hilton’s Song of Angels and three works associated with the author of The Cloud of Unknowing: The Epistle of Prayer, The Epistle of Discretion in Stirrings of the Soul, and A Devout Treatise on the Discerning of Spirits. Judging from Pepwell’s arrangement of the texts, Kempe’s contemporary readers probably read The Book as a guidebook helping readers to seek God in contemplative devotion and teach them to follow the tradition of discretio spirituum to distinguish God’s voices from the devil’s. The tenet in the tradition of discretio spirituum presupposes that the lowest faculties, sensibility and imagination, 17. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(30) in the human soul are “at variance with its superior powers,” intellect and will, after the Fall, and there are four kinds of spirits, the Divine, the angelic, the human, and the diabolic, exerting influence on the human soul. The bad spirits deter human from the true and the good, and the good ones lead human soul back and to “the observance of the moral law” (Debuchy). Discretio spirituum is then “the judgment whereby it is possible to determine from what spirit the impulses of the soul emanate, and it is easy to understand the importance of this judgment both for self-direction and the direction of others” (Debuchy). The judgment may be formed in two ways, the first is made by “the gift of God,” and the second is “obtained through study and reflection” (Debuchy). By engaging herself in the tradition of discretio spirituum, Margery takes a route very different from what modern readers imagine to know herself. The first modern edition of The Book actually captured this confusion modern readers might have. The editor, William Butler-Bowden, relocates many of Christ’s extended monologues from the text to an appendix (Meech and Allen xxxviii): either he thinks that God’s teachings are too long to be aesthetically acceptable, or he believes that God’s relationship with Kempe is not important for an understanding of Kempe’s attempt to know and build herself.. Kempe, however, may be presenting the confusion about one’s identity without God in the very beginning of The Book. Here she describes a series of changes in Margery’s identity. Margery is first a damsel in her “xx er of age,” a wife, and then a mother (1.1.175-77). These changes are retold succinctly in three lines to show that Margery might be very confused about who she really is, since these different 18. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(31) identities draw her commitment and loyalty to different groups and persons. Kempe reflects on her past self by showing Margery’s struggles to understand her true self, her self-stated madness (1.1), her business failure (1.2), her spiritual pride (1.4), and her sinfulness that devastates her to the degree of self-denial and self-destruction. Her sinfulness particularly traps her in the fear that any visions she has may be either from the devil or misinterpreted. Her madness seems to be proof that she is too sinful to really be instructed by God to know herself. Kempe particularly has Margery state that pride is her primary sin, preventing her from understanding God’s messages that tell her who she is after her recovery (1.2.255). In the beginning of The Book Kempe outlines how the acquisition of true self-knowledge may be obstructed by pride. Learning to be humble and understand God’s messages then becomes important issues for knowing oneself. In the story, Kempe shows several visions as the sources of her self-knowledge, such as God’s appearance to her in her madness. To understand these visions, Margery also has to seek spiritual authorities to know whether the self-knowledge from these visions is reliable. The problem then is whether the spiritual authorities are dependable and whether she is being defined by others if she learns about who she is from them. Many critics agree that Margery can only have distorted self-knowledge not because of her sinfulness, but because of her mental disorders. Drucker argues that Margery is a “neurotic woman,” who “unconsciously reject[s] the whole experience of motherhood” (2911). He also thinks that Margery evidently “never recover[s] fully” from her “physical and psychological traumas” after giving her first birth 19. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(32) (2911). Similarly, Lawes diagnoses that Margery suffers from “temporal lobe epilepsy” (230) and thus has no ability to acquire self-knowledge: he believes that the devils she sees are just her “visual hallucination” (229), the threatening of devils, her “auditory hallucination” (229), and even God’s assurance in bodily stirrings, the sweet smell, melodies, and white flecks, her “hallucinatory sensations” (230). They think Margery’s distorted experiences “puzzled” her to the extent that she resorts to the “discourse of discretio spirituum” to anchor her self-knowledge in the reality (232). Lawes further suggests that Margery’s dread about the received feelings in the last chapter of the Book One is the evidence that discretio spirituum does not help much and Margery’s mental disorder prevents her from ever getting true self-knowledge (233). Both Drucker and Lawes neglect that Kempe states that Margery is “stabelyd in hir wyttys and in hir reson” after God’s miraculous appearance (1.1.237-38), and Lawes simply disregards Kempe’s claim that this dread is God’s reminder, which makes her not only “ful meke” (1.89.7412) but also “mor myty and mor strong” (1.89.7414). Lawes’ argument highlights the uncertainty before discretio, but he does not see how this uncertainty teaches Margery to be meek and humble. Kempe points out that Margery feels the dread and uncertainty because of her pride, which hinders her from accepting God’s illumination. She explains that Margery “wold not leevyn hir pride ne hir pompows aray” though she knows that she is “bowndyn to God,” who makes her “comen ageyn to hir mende” (1.2.253-56). Before investigating how Margery examines the source of her visions and revelations, it is necessary to understand how medieval mystics though of and dealt with their pride in their search 20. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(33) for self-knowledge. For this purpose, The Steps of Humility from Bernard of Clairvaux is useful for such an understanding, being a widely read book that explains the procedures for the devout to humble their pride and receive God’s guidance about how to have a proper understanding of oneself. Another relevant text is Gerson’s “Distinguishing True from False Revelations,” which emphasizes the importance of humility in discretio, examines two strategies to build humility: he believes one needs to be “prepared to be subjected to the superior’s judgment” in the examination of spirits (342) and to acknowledge one’s tendency in “incorrigible elevation of self” (354).These texts help us see how medieval mystics cultivated humility to clear off false self-perception brought about by pride, Margery’s primary sin in the beginning of the Book and understand how Margery’s discretio leads her to a lesson about humility. Feminist critics often see such discretio tradition as a measure for clerical control, accusing Gerson of misogyny. Yoshikawa even speculates that Thomas Netter, the provincial prior of the English Carmelites and one of the attendee at the council of Constance, prohibited Alan of Lynn to keep in touch with Margery after his return from the council (124). Jean Gerson, one of the most prominent theologians who also attended the council, told a story about how a praiseworthy cleric nearly fell into the snare of corporeal passion through his friendship with a religious virgin and warned that priests should be aware of the danger of being seduced by alleged female mystic (357-58). Yoshikawa’s speculation, though, might have exaggerated the case. McGuire studies Gerson’s letters and writings and concludes that Gerson does 21. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(34) consider “other people in their physical reality as a source of temptation,” but he “admit[s] a need for affective bonds” (173). In other words, Gerson at worst is an over-protective eldest brother rather than a misogynist. Gerson is just too concerned about the human inability to resist such temptations. To understand Margery’s concern about human pride, then, it is necessary to see how she situates herself in a tradition that is overly aware of human weakness and finds strength in it to build herself, simply dismissing the tradition does not help. When studying how Margery builds her autonomy in such a tradition, some critics believe the tradition of discretio spirituum is only Margery’s device to “repudiat[e] the clerical institution” rather than examine how humility enables Margery to verify her source of self-knowledge (Miller 56). Miller cites Margery’s reluctance in deciding to follow the social convention or God as the evidence that she was pitting these two authorities against each other to acquire autonomous “space” for herself (56). Miller’s observation is only correct when God’s command is contrary to the social convention, like His demand that Margery should wear white clothes. Margery does not hesitate to follow the counsel if the suggestions from the authorities are in accordance with God’s command (1.18). Miller’s argument positions Margery and the clerics as enemies, but their relationship is not fixed in the text, and often Margery shapes her relationship with the clerics with a new understanding of herself as she gets closer to God and understands His messages better (57). To examine how Margery understands herself in this relationship among herself, God, and the clerical authorities, it is not enough to study the tension between her and the clerical 22. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(35) authorities. Here Kierkegaard’s discourse may help: he argues that self-knowledge needs to be complemented by the second personal aspect, and only by forming a relationship with the other can self-knowledge becomes “complete” (Lippitt 221) He explains that the first (I) and third (other) personal aspect of self-knowledge are not enough, because I and other only see from their specific perspectives, and they want to find allies to support their specific perspectives, losing their ability to really work together to gain a fuller picture (Lippitt 221). For him, God provides the necessary second-person perspective. He believes that once the individual acknowledges that he/she is “standing before God, he/she can sincerely reveal him/herself, because he/she knows any disguise is useless before God (Lippitt 221). A study of such a second-person perspective may help understand how Margery faces the tension, while acquiring self-knowledge,by following the tradition of discretio spirituum, managing her own pride, and negotiating with her spiritual authorities. That is, a study of Kierkegaard’s theory about the three-way relationship helps explain how in the Book, Margery learns her position in the spiritual world as assigned by God by actively engaging herself in such a relationship.. Self-knowledge Distorted by Pride By focusing on Margery’s mental disorder, critics like Drucker easily neglect that Kempe frames her initial spiritual crisis through staging Margery’s pride. In the very beginning of the Book, Margery’s pride leads her to believe the devils’ lie, which feeds her the false self-knowledge that she “nedyd no confessyon” (1.1.184). Kempe 23. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(36) first shows how Margery’s belief that she is in “good heele” leads her to delay her confession (1.1.184) and how Margery maintains her confidence in her spiritual health with her self-willed and seemingly pious practices, such as “greet penawns in fastyng bred and watyr” and “other dedys of almes wyth devowt preyers” (1.1.186-88). Although Kempe shows how much the unconfessed sin disturbs Margery’s mental equilibrium by describing how the devil says “in her mende that sche schuld be dampnyd” whenever she is “seke or dysesyd” (1.1.189-90). Margery does not face this spiritual problem until her illness following the parturition makes her think “sche mygth not levyn” (1.1.180). Her pride in thinking she has the ability to make up for her sin brings her confusion and anxiety. Pride not only delays Margery’s confession but also prevents her from understanding properly her confessor’s instruction about who she is. Kempe comments that Margery’s confessor is “a lytyl to hastye and gan scharply to undyrnemyn hir” before Margery can fully disclose her long concealed sin (1.1.195-96). Critics often argue that here Kempe is condemning the clerical control imposed on her. Huber for example argues that “the intervention of spiritual authority drives Margery . . . deeply into madness/despair/sinfulness” (189) and suggests that for Kempe the dread caused by the devil’s threats of damnation and by the confessor’s sharp words are “remarkably similar” (210). Huber further points out that the confessor “limits the relationship the sinner has with God” because the confessor “has power to mandate morals, actions, and thoughts” in his role as a spiritual guide (211). It does seem that Kempe is at least complaining about the inadequacy of her 24. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(37) confessor. Ideally, a confessor should help the confessee remedy his/her sin and turn toward God again. In his advice for the confessor “On Hearing Confession,” Gerson also teaches that the confessor should remember that “sins are sought out not so that they may be revealed or that accusation be made but in order to avoid them, make amends for them” (368). Kempe’s description of the confessor’s “scharp reprevyng” intimidating her indeed suggests she thinks that the confessor does not help her remedy her sin properly.1Her confessor’s “scharp reprevyng” aggravates her fear about the damnation, and his severity brings her to focus on her own sinfulness alone. Weissman argues that Margery’s “experience demonstrates vividly what could happen when an overzealous clergyman wielded the club of official righteousness” (206). It seems that the confessor only distances Margery from God with his harshness and immobilizes Margery with dread, as Margery not only cannot confess her sin but also sinks into despair and becomes the prey of devils. However, in retrospect, Kempe also shows that the confessor’s harshness is useful in turning her to God: And, dowtyr, thu schalt blissyn me wythowtyn ende that evyr I gaf the so trewe a gostly fadyr, for, thow he hath be scharp to the sumtyme, it hath ben gretly to thy profyte, for thu woldist ellys an had to gret affeccyon to hys persone. And, whan he was scharp to the, than thu ronne wyth al thy mynde to me, seying, ‘Lord, ther is no trost but in the alone.’ (1.88.7301-08) Margery later asks Thomas Arundel the right of “chesyng hyr confessowr” (1.16.1160), and Huber suggests this might be “her effort to avoid the incompetence of her earlier confessor” (212). 1. 25. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(38) Kempe’s focus here is not how unfairly dominant or insufficient the clerical authority is: she sees from a second-person perspective how to reconcile the tension between her and her confessor. First, by detailing Margery’s madness following the failed confession, Kempe points out it is her pride that brings confusion and anxiety on herself and separates her from God (1.2), and leads her into the sin of despair, of losing all hope of clearly articulating her own condition, not the confessor’s lack of strategy or power control game. Ross points out that “[s]in ruptures human’s ability to perceive the loving God, alienating humans from their proper end” (50). By recounting a series of Margery’s denials of herself, Kempe presents how she is pushed away more and more from God and from her original self by sin: Margery first obeys the devil’s bid to “forsake hir Cyrstendam and feyth” and to “denyin hir God hys modyr, alle the seyntys in hevyn” when she was mad (1.1.207-09). Her denial corresponds to the description of wanhope: “The theological error or sin of insufficient faith in God’s mercy, despair that denies the promise of salvation and divine forgiveness” (MED). Goodich explains the sin of despair or loss of hope, “whereby the victim is seized by the Devil and doubts the possibility of divine mercy and salvation” (79). Interestingly, Kempe does not use despair or wanhope to categorize her denial of God’s saving power and interceding power of Mary and other saints. By comparing this scene to other passages that Kempe chooses despair to describe her fear of God’s absence, Kempe might want to show her anger to God, Mary and other saints through her denial, since their power seems to be ineffective in saving her, and may imply her struggle to accept who she really is. By describing how 26. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(39) Margery denies herself, feels despair, and falls into madness, Kempe probably is implying that Margery is refusing to accept the self-knowledge that she was sinful beyond redemption. As explained by Kierkegaard “no despair is entirely without defiance: in fact defiance is implied in the very expression, not to will to be” oneself (Sickness 330). Margery sinks into deeper despair, because she is not willing to face her sinful self. Ironically, Kempe seems to imply the more she refuses such knowledge, the moreshe shows a distorted self. Kempe shows when Margery in the end has to admit her sinfulness, she starts to deny the value of “hyr goode werkys” and “alle good vertues” (1.1.209). As Huber argues, such “incapab[ility] of maintaining good moral behavior” may be another manifestation of despair (Huber 196). Kierkegaard similarly points out that “despair is precisely self-consuming,” an “impotent self-consumption which is not able to do what it wills” (Sickness 278). Denying “her owyn self” to the utmost, Margery shows her self-destructive tendency by scratching so violently herself with her nails to “roof hir skyn” and states that she would kill herself if she had instruments (1.1.209-19). She also “wold a fordon hirself many a tyme” (1.1.214). In the end, it seems Margery even accepts that her existence is as degenerated as the devil’s and she is worthy to be “damnyd” with the devils in hell. Interestingly, the despair, being an indication that Margery refuses to accept who she is and as a result loses herself, can then be seen in later chapters as force that pushes her to improve her relationship with God. In the later chapters, whenever Margery fears that God hides Himself from her, her feeling is described as despair: 27. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(40) The devyl put in hir mende that God had forsakyn hir, and ellys schuld sche not so ben temptyd. She levyd the develys suasyons and gan to consentyn for because sche cowde thynkyn no good thowt [. . .] therfore wend sche that [God] had forsakyn hir and durst not trostyn to hys mercy, but was labowrd wyth horrybyl temptacyons of lettherye and of dyspeyr (1.4.446-49, 479-82). She even admits that she is troubled by “temptacyons of dyspeyr as sche was befor” (1.4. 485-86). The complex description of her anxiety suggests that she feels vulnerable to devils’ lies when she cannot feel her connection with God. It should then be natural that Margery seeks to confirm her relationship with God to protect herself against such a distorted understanding of herself from the devil. It is not, however, Margery who tries to reconfirm her relationship with God: God miraculously appears and comforts her through his words, “Dowtyr, why hast thow forsakyn me, and I forsoke nevyr the” (1.1.232). God’s comforting words provides a key in understanding Margery’s self-perception here, for God’s words hint that Margery is the one who actively forsakes God and cut off their relationship and that is why she starts to have a distorted self-knowledge. Margery cannot seek God’s help even though she knows that she needs God, and she chooses to push God away, thus losing an opportunity to know herself. Her pride sinks her in despair while her despair shows her the need to return to God to gain the true self-knowledge. Margery’s pride continues to distort her self-knowledge even after she recovers from her despair by God’s comfort. Kempe first hints that Margery attempts to bail 28. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(41) herself out by asserting that evil spirits “temptyd hir” to deny her God and faith against her will (1.1.213-14). For Bernard, this excuse is self-justification; when he talks about the eighth step of pride, he predicts that once “he is proved to be guilty, like Adam and Eve were, then he tries to excuse himself on the ground that he was tempted by somebody else” (62). Kempe points out that Margery’s pride precludes her from following God’s “drawt” (1.1.252) and continues to confuse her about her true self. The word “drawt” in Middle English actually also suggests a collaboration between each other, hence with an understanding between two sides. The modernized version often render “drawt” as “draught,” and this rendition fails to “takes in both the exterior action of the divine Other and the interior response of the creature” by stressing “draught” as the force pulling the object to the intended direction (Colon 285). When pride distorts Margery’s self-perception, Margery thinks that she can rely on herself instead of God. Kempe shows how Margery immediately disobeys God’s “drawt” (1.1.252) by presenting that Margery “wold not leevyn hir pride ne hir pompows aray that she had usyd befortym” (1.2.255-56), even though Margery “thowt sche was bowndyn to God” and “wold ben his servawnt” (1.2.254-55). Her disobedience is predictable, for without sensing how her pride has distorted her self-perception, she relies on her own power and does “penawns be hirself aloone” (1.1.184-85). Long argues that Margery’s mercantile enterprises “do show her considerable energy and self-confidence” because she does not wait “a savior for rescue” but “actively participates in the construction of her own life and destiny” (92). Long neglects that Kempe actually sees these business failure as God’s reminder that 29. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(42) “clepyd and kallyd hir fro the pride and vanyte of the wretthyd world” (1.2.316-17). Long does not see that “self-confidence” is presented by Kempe as over-confidence. Neither does she see that Kempe shows such pride should be dispelled if one wants to understand one’s true self. Kempe herself admits that Margery takes on her business adventures “for pure coveytyse and for to maynten hir pride” (1.2.275). Kempe here agrees with Bernard that “if pride has a grip on [one’s] mind [one] will not be able to see [oneself] as [one] really is” (31). Here Margery’s business adventures clearly indicate that she has been blinded by pride to take worldly possession as her goal of life. Kempe further shows Margery is unable to see her true self because pride leads her to mistake the respect she earns from her business adventures as her glory. Stanton emphasizes that “a vital component of Margery’s proud behavior here is snobbery, or excessive care for worship,” and “worship denotes an impious concern with the opinion and visible respect of others” (189). Margery adheres to her self-knowledge that “sche was comyn of worthy kenred” (1.2.265), so she should “ben arayd so wel” and “to be worshepd” by people (1.2.270-71). Bernard of Clairvaux identifies such pride as “levity of mind,” with which one “look[s] up to some people as his betters and will look down on others as his inferiors” (56). To put it more simply, Bernard of Clairvaux explains pride is “the appreciation of one’s own goodness” that does not really exist (31). In other words, pride falsifies man’s self-knowledge, and if one insists on believing this inflated vision as the true self, one is actually deceiving oneself and will be trapped by the false self-knowledge distorted by pride. Margery in 30. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(43) the beginning of the story is obsessed with her social status, because she desires others to appreciate her imagined goodness, not her real goodness. Kempe then shows more how forceful Margery’s pride pulls Margery away from self-knowledge. Even after Margery realizes that God castigates her for her pride through this business failure, her promise to “amend that sche had trespasyd wyth good wyl” is soon forgotten (1.2.288-89). She knows “hir pride and synne was cause of alle her punschyng,” but she soon is seized by another fit of enthusiasm over another business adventure (1.2.287-88). This time Kempe details how Margery’s horse has refused to be drawn by the horseman. Maybe Kempe considers herself like that stubborn horse refusing to draw the mill: she admits that “sche knew not veryli the drawt of owyr Lord” (1.1.252). Kierkegaard’s discourse helps understand why a person who wants to know oneself may not want to follow God and prefer to follow one’s own will without the help from God: he explains that this unwillingness to follow God results from the sense of “humiliation of having to accept help unconditionally,” especially “the humiliation of becoming nothing in the hand of the Helper for whom all things are possible” (367). This unwillingness to accept help is for St. Bernard the lack of humility; “the ability of a person to see himself as he really is and so discover his own unworthiness” (20). Kierkegaard also points out if a person does not recognize his/her unworthiness and powerlessness, s/her cannot accept help sincerely, so the defiance in not accepting God’s help suggests the reluctance to accept oneself (Sickness 340). In this defiance, men refuses to accept guidance from God about the true self and continue to imagine a worthier self, with which it becomes 31. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(44) difficult to form a true relationship with God. With such defiance, it is natural that Margery “knew not verily the drawt of owry Lord” and the benefit of God’s “drawt” while she is still controlled by the sin of pride, and without a closer relationship with God, she would not know whether the message is from God.. Full Understanding of Oneself Built by Submissiveness Another obstacle in the process of verifying the sources of self-knowledge is also mentioned in the tradition of discretio spirituum by Gerson: he emphasizes that discretio spirituum is a “technique” that cannot be systematized, because it is “more a matter of experience dependent on a number of individual conditions, which are infinite” (351). Facing such a daunting task, Margery now learns humility by following spiritual models: she is first apprenticed as “Seynt Anne’s mayden and servawnt” (1.6.548) after God teaches her the importance of humility by punishing for her worldly pursuit. Here Mary serves as an example for Margery to learn humility: she sees that on receiving the message that she would be the mother of God, Mary replies that “I wold I wer worthy to be the handmayden of hir that schuld conseive the sone of God” (1.6.554-55). By hearing Virgin Mary say that she is “undeserving of the Work” in the Annunciation, Margery is taught to humble herself before God. (Hansen 200). Later Margery’s dialogue with Richard of Caister (1.17) highlights her struggle with infinite conditions in discretio spirituum, even with spiritual models: she laments “sche herd nevyr boke, neythyr in Hyltons boke, ne Bridis boke, ne Stimulus amoris, 32. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(45) ne Incendium amoris, ne non other that evyr sche herd redyn, that spak so hyly of lofe of God but that sche felt as hyly in werkyng in hir sowle” (1.17.1257-59). This list indicates that Kempe attempts to verify the authenticity of the voice through study and then is aware of the lack of relevant written instruction to assure herself: she can clearly see there are still many confusing conditions. Since no book can help explain the infinite, individual conditions, Gerson suggests visionaries should subject their revelations to the examination of spiritual authorities for they lack enough “experiential knowledge” for the examination. Gerson warns about how discretio may go wrong: for him the circulation of every false spiritual coin damages the visionary’s spiritual health, and any visionary using such counterfeit coins is wasting God’s grace. Some critics like Miller may consider that this demand of visionaries’ submissiveness to the superior manifests the clerical control on the subject (52), but when Gerson emphasizes the exhaustive individual conditions in discretio, and the necessity for submitting oneself to superiors, he is concerned about not being able to understand God’s grace in one’s life or to live a full life with such grace, not about visionaries demanding freedom. According to Gerson, one token of a life filled with pride and not submitted to authorities, a life not fully lived, is a life without charity: he warns that God leaves the proud and “takes away the nuptial garment of charity” (358). For him, such charity is a natural result of submissiveness, for “charity does not make itself God’s enemy through disobedience” (357). Julian of Norwich also stresses charity as the token of the Holy Spirit (1.18.1351) and counsels Margery “to be obedyent to the wyl of owyr 33. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(46) Lord God” (1.18.1346) if she wants to verify the sources of her self-knowledge. Such submissiveness for Gerson brings what he asserts to be an important criterion for a true visionary, “the durability of patience in adversity” (363). Later in The Book, Dominican anchorite’s smith metaphor also shows the importance of such patience in the process of understanding one’s true self. She encourages Margery by asserting that: God, for yowr meryte, hath ordeynd hym (Margery’s confessor) to be yowr scorge, and faryth wyth yow as a smyth wyth a fyle, that makyth the yron to be bryte and cler to the sygth whech beforn aperyd rusty, dyrke, and evyl colowryd. The mor scharp that he is to yow, the mor clerly schinyth yowr sowle in the sygth of God (1.18.1424-29) Here, the criterion for a true visionary in the discretio tradition also starts the process of becoming the bride in the tradition of bridal mysticism. The bride, according to William of Thierry, needs to undergo series of trials to cleanse her uncleanness and show her worthiness to be God’s lover (23). Julian of Norwich also instructs Margery to start such a process and relies on the Holy Spirit, which “mevyth a sowle to al chastnesse” (1.18.1353). Through discretio, Margery learns how to be led meekly and humbly to understand and accept her sinfulness, to be obedient in suffering to allow such hardship to cleanse her of the filthiness of her soul, and to wait patiently for the true self to emerge. The true self is the divine image that is defiled by the sin, and its beauty can shine again after the purification through God’s grace. Once she accepts 34. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(47) her own sinfulness and becomes humble and submissive. Her self-image as a sinner would undergo transformation through her suffering, and by clinging to God through these trials, she “settyn al here trost in hym, and nothyng sekyn ne desyrn but hym only” (1.18.1328-29), knowing that despite her sinfulness, she is still chosen to be purified and become God’s bride. Curiously, Kempe ends the discussion of Margery’s final realization of the necessity to accept and transform her present sinful self with the help from God with the incident of a stubborn widow, who does not trust God’s message through Margery. Windeatt suggests that “the abrupt transition suggests that this material may have been wrongly brought forward from the end of the next chapter, which concerns Margery Kempe’s dealings with several widows” (125). However, such “misplacement” may be a hint about what will happen if Margery remains proud and stubborn, not accepting the God-sent advice delivered to her. Here Margery understands by her feeling that this widow should leave the counsel of her current confessor, but the widow insists that she would only take Margery’s advice when “God wold yevyn hir the same grace he yaf” Margery (1.18.1438-39). God not only refuses to give the widow the same grace enjoyed by Margery but also laments “how hard it is to departyn a man fro hys owyn wyl” (1.18.1455-56). God’s lament captures the significance of humility and obedience, without which, one cannot really become a person capable of receiving God’s grace and learns about one’s true self. To get rid of one’s pride and acquire true self-knowledge about oneself is not easy; even leaving “the worshepys of the world” might lead to another kind of pride, 35. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.

(48) spiritual pride. Kempe shows when Margery forgets that her equilibrium is given by God, when she feels that fleshly stirring and secular temptation no longer disturb her, when she thinks that she is so “strong that sche dred no devylle in helle” (1.4.409-10), God immediately sent her “iii yer of greet temptacyon” (1.4.416). Kempe and her scribe specify a record of this great temptation serves as an “exampyl” that they “schuld not trostyn on her owyn self” (1.4.418). Bernard further explains that humility means not only “writing off our own goodness,” which pride goads us to appreciate (31), but also understanding that one’s “own dignity and good qualities” do not come from [one]self but God (85). Kempe here is arguing, in a sense, that she cannot be herself if she does not see the goodness of God within her as a gift from God. For Kierkegaard, one has “to lose one’s understanding” in order to form a true relationship with God through which one learns about and is enabled to live the true self (Sickness 310). If one does not lose this understanding, one will hold a false self-knowledge and believe the true self can exist without being connected to God. Recognizing this false self-knowledge means recognizing one’s powerlessness by oneself. Only by shedding off one’s (mis)understanding that s/he is good in his/her own right can one form a true relationship with God that enables a true understanding of oneself. Gerson also argues that only when one is humble enough to yield one’s understanding to God and subject oneself to God’s guidance can one really understand oneself (360), and Wyllyam Sowthfeld follows this principle later when he examines Margery’s relations with God to verify the source. He teaches Margery: the Holy Spirit “askyth of us a lowe, a meke, and a contryte hert wyth a good wyl” (1.18.1321-22). William of Thierry even advises 36. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.CHI.002.2018.A08.