人民解放軍的非戰爭軍事行動: 評估解放軍擴大任務行動及其對中美軍事關係的意函 - 政大學術集成

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(1)Master’s Thesis. The People’s Liberation Army’s Military Operations Other Than War: Assessing the Consequences of the PLA’s Expanded Missions and Their Implications on政 Sino-U.S. 治 Military Relations. 大. 立. by. ‧ 國. 學 Joseph C. Gorman. ‧ sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of:. Ch. i Un. Master of Arts in Diplomacy. engchi. v. National Chengchi University Taipei, Taiwan (R.O.C.). June 2016. Thesis Advisor: Dr. Kwei-Bo Huang.

(2) Abstract The research conducted for this master’s thesis determined that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) current participation in military operations other than war (MOOTW) does not make significant contributions to its ability to develop its capability to conduct a large-scale war. Research was performed on the PLA’s MOOTW missions from 2008 in the areas of humanitarian aid and disaster response (HA/DR), noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and counterpiracy. General trends indicated that the PLA’s participation in these operations improved basic military capabilities that are fundamental to performing advanced tactics, but did not directly contribute to its ability to dominate air, land, and sea domains. Research also concluded that China is extremely concerned about how the international community views its role as a responsible stakeholder as an emerging global. 治政大 Besides the obvious military project goodwill as a result of its rapid military modernization. 立 competition presented by the PLA’s modernization efforts, the U.S. should share an equal, if power. Consequently, the U.S. should be concerned with China’s growing capability to. ‧ 國. 學. not greater concern for the resultant global political competition from China. This research develops a military cooperation framework based on the comparison of relative political. ‧. goals and political interests between two nations. When applied to Sino-U.S. relations, it presents a spectrum of options available to U.S. decision makers, but suggests that U.S.. y. Nat. sit. should only participate in military cooperation with the PLA if there are relative political. al. er. io. advantages to the U.S. Finally, it warns against decisions made out of the convenience of. v. n. short-term interest alignment that do not contribute to solutions for achieving long term political goals.. Ch. engchi. i. i Un.

(3) Acknowledgements I would like to thank the Department of Diplomacy at NCCU for what has been a lifechanging experience over the past two years. Special thanks goes to Dr. Kwei-Bo Huang, who has been an incredible help during my tenure at NCCU and has challenged me to become a better scholar of diplomacy. Despite his busy schedule, as my thesis advisor he has spent several hours discussing my ideas, reviewing my drafts, and keeping me pointed in the right direction all while allowing me the freedom to develop my own ideas. Also, I wanted to thank my Thesis Committee President, Major General Chia-Sheng Chen and Dr. Arthur S. Ding, both who provided important contributions to help me refine this paper. Also, I would like to thank all the individuals that I interviewed for their patience and time for helping me understand the both the political and tactical aspects required for Military. 治政大 Colonel Jim Faber who General Jim Soligan, Captain Tom Henderschedt, and Lieutenant 立 devoted extra time to my research and challenged me to think critically about the political. Operations Other Than War. I want to especially highlight the contributions of Lieutenant. ‧ 國. 學. implications discussed in the final chapter.. Additionally, I want to thank the George and Carol Olmsted Foundation for granting. ‧. me the incredible opportunity to travel abroad for three years and providing me the freedom and latitude to pursue Mandarin language training, graduate studies, and East Asian regional. y. Nat. sit. immersion. The experiences afforded to my family and me over the last three years have. er. io. been amazing, challenging, and of course, extremely rewarding. I have had the opportunity. al. iv n C have allowed me to reflect on the similarities of several cultures, as well as h e nandgdifferences hi U c help me gain a deeper and broader understanding of the world. For this, I will be forever. n. to travel to several locations I never previously dreamed of visiting, and these experiences. grateful. Lastly and most importantly, I want to thank my family for their support and encouragement. An exceptional thanks goes to my wife Sarah who provided constant encouragement and help in so many ways. I could not have completed this assignment without her and I am truly appreciative of all of her efforts and lucky to have her as such an important part of my life.. ii.

(4) Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………...i Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………ii List of Figures and Tables…………………………………………………………………….iv Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 1: Background: PLA History, Organization, and Important Definitions…………...10 Chapter 2: Literature Review………………………………………………………………...24 Chapter 3: Research Method, Restrictions, and Preliminary Findings………………………34 Chapter 4: Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief Findings……………………………………...40. 政治大. Chapter 5: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Findings…………………………………61. 立. Chapter 6: Counterpiriacy Operations Findings……………………………………………...78. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter 7: Summary and Thoughts on U.S. Cooperation with the PLA.................................95. ‧. Appendix A: List of Experts Interviewed…………………………………………………..125 Appendix B: List of Acronyms……………………………………………………………..127. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. References…………………………………………………………………………………..129. Ch. engchi. iii. i Un. v.

(5) List of Figures and Tables Figure 1. Range of Military Operations ..................................................................................... 8 Figure 2. The PLA organizational chart .................................................................................. 14 Figure 3. Comparison of old “Military Regions” and new “Theater Commands” .................. 16 Figure 4. Comparison of mission capabilities required for PLAN Gulf of Aden Operations, notional out of area major combat operations, and a Taiwan contingency ..................... 31 Figure 5. Relief contribution comparisons of China, India, and the U.S. ................................ 51 Figure 6. TRIADS containers being prepared prior to a humanitarian mission ...................... 59 Figure 7. Map of the Gulf of Aden .......................................................................................... 78 Figure 8. PLAN ships performing simultaneous abeam replenishments. ............................... 90 Figure 9. U.S. Navy sailors discussing damage control tools with PLAN sailors during a. 治政大 Model......................109 Figure 10. Political Goals vs. Political Interests Military Cooperation 立 Figure 11. Examples of selected nations and their military cooperation with the U.S. ......... 111 counterpiracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden. .................................................................... 93. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 12. China's position on the military cooperation framework. .................................... 119 Figure 13. Sino-U.S. potential for military cooperation based on geographic location. ....... 122. ‧ y. Nat. sit. Table 1. Comparison of HA/DR vs. Large Scale War Skills & Capabilities. ......................... 54. er. io. Table 2. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations vs. Large Scale War Skills & Capabilities... 72. al. iv n C Table 4. Summary of the PLA's MOOTW Impacts U on its Large Scale War h eFuture hi n c g Capabilities………………………………………………………………………….102. n. Table 3. Counterpiracy vs. Large Scale War Skills and Capabilities. ..................................... 89. iv.

(6) Introduction Under the current international order, powerful nations’ global interests are numerous and diverse. As a result, their militaries often spend little time conducting large scale war operations, but instead frequently participle in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). In 2004, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Hu Jintao’s proclamation of “new historic missions” marked a significant change in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) responsibilities. Traditionally, the PLA served two main purposes in Chinese governance. Its primary responsibility is to ensure that the CCP remains in power, and secondly, it is devoted to safeguarding China’s territorial claims, namely by preventing the loss of disputed territories. However, after Hu’s proclamation, the PLA’s duties. 政治大. expanded to include MOOTW, symbolizing the Chinese military’s growing presence on the world stage.. 立. When compared to traditional large scale war, “MOOTW are more sensitive to. ‧ 國. 學. political considerations” and serve to demonstrate to the international community a nation’s commitment to a cause and desire secure regional stability. Typically, MOOTW missions. ‧. seek to promote peace and deter war and/or instability (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,. y. Nat. Joint Publication JP-07, 1995, p. vii). In fact, the military may not be the lead agency. sit. responsible for the execution of the overall mission. Consequently, MOOTW missions. er. io. require extensive joint cooperation among military services, interagency cooperation among a. al. n. iv n C nongovernmental organizations (NGO),hand groups. e other hi U n g cinterest. nation’s departments, as well as multilateral cooperation among different nations, Additionally, it is critical. that military operators at all levels understand the political impacts of their actions. Depending on the circumstances of an operation, a tactical error or a seemingly simple misjudgment could have the potential to create grave consequences. When speaking of U.S. peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command Air Forces commander, Lieutenant General David Goldfein warned, “Tactical blunders have strategic impact,”1 emphasizing the important role MOOTW plays in diplomacy. The PLA’s military operations other than war (feizhanzheng junshi xingdong, 非戰爭軍事行動) are a subset of its “diversified military tasks” (duoyanghua junshi renwu, 多樣化軍事任務) and represent the Chinese expanding global political and security interests that are 1. Quoted from a speech given to Air Force personnel deployed to Southwest Asia in 2011 in response to a trend of U.S. forces cultural insensitivities in Afghanistan. As a side note, on July 1, 2016, General Goldfein was promoted to Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.. 1.

(7) commiserate with its economic growth (Hagt, 2015). MOOTW missions are extensive and diverse. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) defines the following as MOOTW missions2: arms control; combatting terrorism; Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations; enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations; enforcing exclusion zones; ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; humanitarian assistance; military support to civil authorities; nation assistance/ support to counterinsurgency; noncombatant evacuation operations; peace operations; protection of shipping; recovery operations; show of force operations; strikes and raids; and support to insurgency (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication, 1995, p. ix).. 治政 The PLA’s scope of operations is very similar to those of the 大U.S.’s; however, the PLA is still developing its own doctrine立 and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in several of ‧ 國. 學. these areas.. The PLA began MOOTW missions as early as 1961, when it joined forces with the. ‧. Burmese Army to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Labeled the “Mekong River Operation,” this small campaign’s main objective was to exterminate remaining KMT troops. y. Nat. sit. that had retreated to Burma’s Shan State that were suspected of receiving assistance from the. al. er. io. CIA (The Irrwaddy, 2003).. n. More recently however, the PLA rarely employs kinetic power in its MOOTW. There. Ch. i n U. v. are numerous examples of the PLA responding to domestic natural disasters to provide. engchi. humanitarian assistance and help restore government functions. The PLA has also demonstrated competence in organizing Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in Kazakhstan in 2010, Libya in 2011, and Yemen in 2015. Although these operations revealed some of the PLA’s significant limitations, they also were an important demonstration of China’s ability to conduct successful military operations outside of the Asian region and inside another nation’s sovereign borders. This ability should not be totally surprising though, because the PLA Navy (PLAN) has also begun to routinely conduct maritime MOOTW. Although China’s enforcement of disputed littoral territories in the South China Sea often dominate headlines, these operations. 2. The term “MOOTW” was coined in the 1990’s; however, recently the Joint Staff stopped using this term and now only defines specific missions previously under the purview of MOOTW. The principles explained in the 1995 document are integrated into the current doctrinal publications of specific missions. This paper references the 1995 doctrine in order to discuss broad concepts and considerations necessary to understand this wide range of operations.. 2.

(8) rarely fall under the purview of the PLAN, but rather the Chinese Coast Guard (formally called the State Oceanic Administration). While the PLAN may be indirectly involved in these operations as a second line of defense, it rarely interferes with operations and often maintains a distant presence as a show of resolve (Jakobson, 2015). Although there are a few notable incidents that provide interesting insights, not much can be learned about the PLA’s power projection capabilities from the majority of cases. Despite the fact the the PLAN seldom conducts operation outside of its own region, a trend is emerging that indicates PLAN power projection capabilities are growing. Since 2008 it has participated in counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden east of the Somali coast. Furthermore, in 2011, the PLAN’s hospital ship, Peace Ark, conducted operations through the Panama Canal and made port calls in Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago (Gunness & Berkowitz, 2015, p. 326). Most recently, the PLAN and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) joined multinational. 政治大. operations in the search of MH-370, a Boeing 777 that mysteriously disappeared on a flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing.. ‧ 國. 學. Planning. 立. ‧. The increase in frequency, size, location, and duration of the PLA’s MOOTW signals much more than an improved tactical proficiency, but rather an overall growing strategic. sit. y. Nat. capability. In order to conduct large-scale MOOTW, a significant amount of planning is. io. er. required at several levels. Many large-scale operations require assets from all three services of the PLA (Air Force, Army, Navy) demonstrating a growing joint capability. Furthermore,. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. any operations outside Chinese territory may require extensive diplomatic coordination. engchi. between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the nation(s) where the operation will take place. Consequently, in order to execute a successful operation, the PLA must be able to efficiently coordinate with the MOFA. Improved joint and interagency coordination is a critical indicator of China’s ability to project power because intra-governmental efficiency results in each important influencer of policy achieving a greater understanding of their counterparts’ requirements, and thus greater synergy in working towards the strategic objective of the operation. This concept is especially true in securing logistics requirements. Unlike the U.S., China does not have a global network of military bases, airports, and seaports available for usage. Thus, the successful deployment of the PLA’s assets becomes more challenging the further away from China it wishes to go. Greater power projection requires the cooperation and understanding of the MOFA to help the PLA secure access to critical logistics hubs. In November 2015, 3.

(9) PLA-MOFA cooperation reached a critical milestone when the MOFA began negotiating with Djibouti on the construction of a military base to be used as a supply and maintenance station for its Gulf of Aden counterpiracy mission (Xinhua, China, Djibouti negotiate over military base, 2015). Without the ability to resupply critical items such as foodstuffs, fuel, medical supplies, and parts; operations any distance from China are infeasible. In addition to securing logistics capabilities, the greater implementation of MOOTW demonstrates that the PLA’s intelligence collection and exploitation capabilities are improving. Prior to conducting any military operations, commanders require access to reliable intelligence to understand the general situation “on the ground.” Once commanders have an understanding of the local situation, they can perform threat and risk assessments, allowing them to provide recommendations and potential courses of actions for the civilian leadership to decide upon. Accurate intelligence collection and analysis also requires. 政治大. significant interagency coordination (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication. 立. JP-07, 1995, pp. IV-2). Although the PLA has its own intelligence department, the Chinese. ‧ 國. 學. government and CCP also have independent intelligence services (Swaine, The PLA Role in China’s Foreign Policy and Crisis Behavior, 2015). During operations in response to. ‧. forecasted contingencies, this stovepiped structure requires that the PLA work with other agencies to understand how the details of its assessment fits into the overall strategic picture.. sit. y. Nat. Not only does it provide the PLA an opportunity to learn new information it had not. io. er. previously collected, but also gain an understanding of other agencies’ perception of the situation. This understanding is especially important, because it may reveal the other. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. agencies’ interests and conflict areas the PLA may face when attempting to gain approval for. engchi. its preferred course of action. Naturally, intelligence sharing among various agencies is often problematic even in western nations’ intelligence organizations, which are currently more integrated than China’s. Once intelligence is gathered, in many situations senior military leaders must understand national level political goals in order to effectively develop Rules of Engagement (ROEs). Rules of Engagement set limitations on commanders’ ability to employ power in order to ensure political objectives are not compromised. For instance, ROEs typically define when and what type of force is authorized, legitimate targets, and predetermined responses for various situations. The development of ROEs often reveals conflicts between political and military interests. However, finding the right balance of these interests is one of the most critical components to effectively utilizing the military to achieve the political objectives of an operation. When ROEs are too strict, the military loses the ability to operate effectively 4.

(10) and will struggle to accomplish tactical objectives. If the ROEs are not adjusted appropriately, tactical failures could jeopardize both the overall military operation and political objectives. On the contrary, when ROEs are too relaxed, the military has too much freedom and can cause damage to political objectives despite its tactical gains. The indiscriminate bombing policies implemented in the European theater during World War II were designed to defeat the morale of the local populations. However, in reality this strategy backfired, as studies have indicated that indiscriminate bombing only strengthened the resolve of ordinary people. Ultimately, these attitudes increased the challenges for ground troops and resulted in a longer war. Since MOOTW are typically more politically sensitive than war, the PLA must effectively coordinate with the CCP leadership to precisely develop effective ROEs that balance both military and political objectives. As conditions change throughout the operation, ROEs must be appropriately updated to maintain the correct. 政治大. military-political balance (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication JP-07,. 立. 1995, pp. I-1, II-4, II-7).. ‧ 國. 學. Additionally, planning within China must include careful consideration of the messages sent to both its domestic population and the international community. In order for. ‧. the CCP and the PLA to maintain legitimacy and support, it must convey to the Chinese citizens why the operation is important. Domestic operations such as HA/DR or protection of. sit. y. Nat. littoral claims are a relatively easy sell; however, as China begins to project force outside of. io. er. the region, communicating a message that generates support potentially faces challenges. China has traditionally adopted a non-intervention policy that respects the right of foreign. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. governments to handle their own domestic affairs. However, as its foreign investments. engchi. continue to become more expansive in politically unstable areas, China has been required to increase the frequency of its MOOTW deployments. China must also consider the reactions of the international audience that is increasingly scrutinizing its actions. Sometimes China’s domestic will conflicts with international opinion, therefore it must ensure careful timing of its actions, messages, and signals to maintain legitimacy in both the domestic and international arenas (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication JP-07, 1995, pp. ix, IV-6-7). Execution Observing the PLA’s execution of MOOTW also provides clues to the improvement of its wartime capability. Successful execution of a military mission requires efficient command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 5.

(11) reconnaissance (C4ISR). First, the chain of command must be obvious and everyone must possess a shared understanding of each units’ responsibilities. During MOOTW that involve joint forces and multiple civilian agencies from several countries, these lines are easily tangled and confused, especially during a crisis. Secondly, lines of communication must be available and remain unobstructed. China’s dependence on sophisticated communications architecture, such as communications satellites and complex software applications, will continue to increase. Commanders require access to real-time information on the location and status of their assets to develop a three-dimensional picture of the operating environment. Furthermore, intelligence must be able to be collected in real-time, immediately exploited, and quickly disseminated. When these processes function efficiently, the quality of commanders’ decisions are more informed and their reaction time to changing conditions is reduced. By observing and evaluating the PLA’s execution of MOOTW, we can have a. 政治大. better understanding of its technological improvements and employment capabilities.. 立. During operations, the PLA must be able to effectively use logistical networks that. ‧ 國. 學. were established during the planning phase. During the deployment phase of mission execution, a variety of transportation assets must be carefully coordinated and executed to. ‧. ensure troops and their infrastructure requirements can arrive safely to the response location in a timely manner. Depending on the scenario, troops (and their civilian counterparts) may. sit. y. Nat. require significant infrastructure requirements such as communications, electricity, hospitals,. io. er. housing, security, storage facilities, construction vehicles, and transportation vehicles. Large airlift and sealift operations require operators to time their arrivals with precision to prevent. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. backlogs and mishaps. After operations have commenced, the PLA must be able to obtain a. engchi. capability to acquire resources locally or continue to import them. It will need to effectively manage logistical contingencies such as broken equipment, injuries and illnesses, and unforeseen supply shortages. Logistical support is also critical to maintaining the morale of its soldiers, which indirectly impacts the success of the operation. A soldier’s access to favorite foods, movies, exercise equipment, and communication devices to contact loved ones are also important to maintaining morale for long-duration missions. Observing the PLA’s execution of MOOTW also provides greater understanding into the decision making process at both the strategic and tactical levels. Traditionally, PLA authority was centralized giving soldiers in the field little leeway to make tactical decisions. However, in an era of informatization, both the CCP and PLA understand that its traditional methods of decision making are too slow. After observing the results of the first Gulf War, the PLA quickly realized that modern operations are extremely dynamic and rapid, requiring 6.

(12) battlefield commanders to effectively analyze events and make swift decisions (Cozad, 2015, p. 27). Currently however, most PLA commanders have no battlefield experience, thus they gain their experience through exercises and MOOTW. Organizationally, fast decisionmaking is problematic for the Chinese because the Politburo makes decisions through consensus, which is a very time consuming process. Besides making direct observations of the PLA’s actual operations, much can be learned by monitoring its joint military exercises. In fact, according to U.S. military doctrine, successful execution of joint operations is a critical capability needed to prosecute a large scale war. “Rehearsing key combat and logistic actions” (U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, 2011, p. V-37) allows a military to prepare for major operations by identifying shortfalls and becoming familiar with the operating environment. Recently the PLA has been conducting MOOTW related joint exercises with greater. 政治大. frequency. Although the focus of this report is not on PLA joint military exercises, they will. 立. be referenced periodically throughout the report to provide a more thorough evaluation of the. ‧ 國. 學. PLA’s capabilities. By analyzing the PLA’s trends in joint exercises and performance in different MOOTW, we are able to judge how well PLA officers are responding to an. ‧. informatized, joint operating environment.. sit. y. Nat. Research Question and Thesis Framework. io. er. The 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) supports “China’s rise and encourage[s] it to become a partner for greater international security,” but also accuses it of. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. “adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region” (U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 2).. engchi. Furthermore, it assesses “U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is… low but growing” (U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, p. 4) implying that the U.S. must be prepared to fight headto-head with China in a large scale war. Figure 1 illustrates how MOOTW fits into the overall range of military operations. It indicates that although there is potential for MOOTW to include combat, the majority of missions are non-combative. Currently, the PLA’s MOOTW are exclusively non-combative; however, because of the implications of the National Military Strategy, this thesis report is interested in the potential overlap of these two categories. The objective of this thesis research is to determine the answer to the following question:. 7.

(13) To what extent does the PLA’s military operations other than war act as a means for it to gain experience for large scale combat operations? By answering this question, this research will be able to determine if the PLA’s increasing participation in MOOTW is actually eroding the U.S.’s presumed military superiority in terms of large scale war.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. er. io. sit. y. Figure 1. Range of Military Operations (image edited from JP-07, 1995, p. I-2). al. iv n C the skills the PLA uses during MOOTWhcompares with skills e n g c h i U needed for large scale war. Since the NMS indicates that the U.S. will “continue to invest in a substantial. n. Specifically, through a survey of recent operations, the research will determine how. military-to-military relationship with China” (U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, p. 3), the following research will identify where DoD and PLA missions overlap. Through this comparison, future areas of potential cooperation will be identified. Lastly, the military and political ramifications of cooperation are considered. This thesis report is organized into seven chapters. The first chapter provides important context for the discussions in the remainder of the report including the background and organizational structure of the PLA, important definitions, and a detailed description of MOOTW mission sets covered in this report. The second chapter examines existing literature and notable publications regarding China’s security goals, the PLA’s changing. 8.

(14) relationship with the CCP, PLA capabilities, and recent PLA operations. The third chapter describes the research method utilized and discuses limitations and restrictions to the findings. Chapters four, five, and six present findings on the PLA’s humanitarian aid/disaster relief (HA/DR), non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), and counterpiracy missions, respectively. They determine each mission sets’ contribution to the development of the PLA’s large scale war ability and identify potential areas for military cooperation. The seventh chapter discusses the political implications of Sino-U.S. military cooperation and develops a framework to describe appropriate levels of cooperation. It recounts contemporary debates over this issue and applies the framework to make a concluding recommendation. Through several case studies, this paper will argue that the PLA’s participation in MOOTW does not make significant contributions to its ability to conduct large scale war.. 政治大. Evidence suggests that participation in these operations helps improve fundamental military. 立. capabilities and act as a method for PLA soldiers to gain operational experience; however,. ‧ 國. 學. they do not make direct contributions to the PLA’s ability to dominate air, land, and sea domains. But current trends indicate that China and the U.S. are in a competition to generate. ‧. goodwill from other nations in strategic locations. Thus, from a political standpoint, the benefits to Beijing created by the PLA’s MOOTW may prove to be damaging to the long. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. term goals of Washington.. Ch. engchi. 9. i Un. v.

(15) Chapter 1. Background: PLA History, Organization, and Important Definitions PLA History The PLA was officially founded in 1927 under the Communist Party of China and largely resembled an insurgency. It had little access to advanced weapons and often relied on guerilla tactics to engage enemies. After the conclusion of World War II, the PLA fought Chiang Kai-Shek’s badly bruised National Army, finally forcing it out of the mainland in 1949 when it retreated to Taiwan. Shortly after in 1950, the PLA entered the Korean War, winning the support of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Soviet Union provided the PLA with significant assistance in acquiring conventional weapons. By 1960, Sino-Soviet tensions developed and the PLA failed to effectively manufacture indigenous weapons when the USSR terminated its aid. During this time, Chinese leader Mao Zedong adopted the “People’s War” doctrine, which promoted the. 政治大. utilization of irregular tactics to repel foreign invaders. Mao envisioned maximizing the. 立. utility of China’s large territory by initially avoiding confrontation with the invader, drawing. ‧ 國. 學. them deep into the country. Afterwards, the PLA would harass supply lines and logistics hubs with small-scale yet frequent attacks. The level and intensity of the attacks would. ‧. gradually grow until supply lines were cut off forcing the enemy to retreat and ultimately leave (Cliff, 2015, Ch 1).. sit. y. Nat. Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, the PLA remained poorly equipped with outdated. io. er. 1950’s Soviet assets. During the era of economic reform beginning in 1978, the PLA was so underfunded that it regularly needed to supplement its budget by creating side companies.. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. This situation led to a disorganized and unfocused army that was crudely trained and. engchi. composed of uneducated conscripts from mostly rural locations. Consequences of this neglect were apparent when China suffered 20,000 casualties in a one month-long campaign during its invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (Cliff, 2015, Ch 1). Three major events in the 1990’s motivated the PLA’s current modernization. First, the 1991 Gulf War between Iraq and the U.S. served as the initial catalyst for reform because Chinese observers were shocked by the decisive employment of military technology that swiftly devastated Saddam Hussain’s army (Nathan & Scobell, 2012, Chapter 4). PLA capabilities remained relatively rudimentary until the second event in 1996, known as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, when the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan held its first democratic presidential elections and the PRC feared ROC-U.S. ties were becoming too close. As a result, the PLA conducted a missile test firing three ground-to-ground M-9 missiles that landed in the waters outside of Taiwan’s two main sea ports (CNN, 1996). In 10.

(16) response, the U.S. deployed two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait, signaling that the Americans would defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack. The final event occurred in 1999 when the U.S. bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing 3 and injuring 27 Chinese nationals (Dumbaugh, 2002). Although American officials insist the bombing was accidental, the incident sparked widespread outrage in China. Because the PLA had been neglected for so long, it lacked the capability to counter U.S. actions and military modernization became a central goal of the PRC. Modernization included revising doctrine, upgrading weapons, and improving the quality of personnel. In order to fund these improvements, significant increases in the defense budget were necessary. From 1978 to 1996, the PLA’s budget had only increased by 25%; however, from 1996 to 2014 the defense budget grew on average 11% per year (Cliff, 2015, Ch 1). In 1993, President Jiang Zemin signaled a change in military strategy by stating. 政治大. that the PLA must prepare for “local wars under conditions of modern technology, especially. 立. high technology” (Cliff, 2015, Ch 2); however, no significant doctrine was produced prior to. ‧ 國. 學. 1996. In 1999, the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest level of the PLA, published six campaign guidance documents: one for each service branch, one for joint. ‧. operations, and one for logistics. Following this release, the subordinate General Staff Department (GSD) published eighty separate combat regulations that directed how units. sit. y. Nat. would implement doctrine across a variety of services and operations (Cliff, 2015, Ch 2).. io. al. n. professionalization.. er. These publications marked a commitment to force-wide standardization and improvements in. Ch. i Un. v. The PLA’s 1950’s Soviet-era technology was also quickly phased out and replaced. engchi. with modern combat equipment. Today, the PLA’s main battle tank is the 98A, which is comparable to the U.S.’s M1A1 that enjoyed great success in the First Gulf War. This is a drastic improvement from the 1950’s style Type 85 tank that dominated the PLA inventory in 1996. It also has Shang class submarines, similar to early models of the U.S. Los Angeles class submarines. The PLAAF upgraded most of its J-8 fighter aircraft, derivatives of the 1950’s MiG-21, to the indigenously produced J-10 and J-11B fourth generation fighters (Cliff, 2015, Ch 1). Besides upgrading existing combat capabilities, the PLA has also developed other advanced intelligence and strike options that bring it closer to parity with the world’s leading militaries. China has developed one of the world’s best space programs, which include three facilities that launch 17-25 satellites per year since 2010. Each year, approximately half of these satellites have direct military applications such as navigation and remote sensing (U.S. 11.

(17) Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015, pp. 69-70). Additionally, the PLA currently maintains a large arsenal of ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles, demonstrating a formidable conventional strike capability. Estimates indicate it has more than 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles, which are difficult to intercept because of their trajectories (U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015, p. 51). Furthermore, China now possesses 50-60 nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), some of which have global reach with ranges exceeding 11,200 km. Its latest ICBMs can strike multiple targets from a single missile through their multiple reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology and it is even developing a mobile launching platform (U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015, p. 8). As the PLA modernizes its technology, it must also recruit high quality, educated soldiers to employ these advanced systems. Consequently, the PLA has raised the minimum enlistment requirements across the board. Previously, the PLA recruited most of its soldiers. 政治大. from rural areas, most of who had little to no education. Today, troops who enlist from rural. 立. areas require at least a middle school education and those from urban locations must possess. ‧ 國. 學. a high school or three-year technical college degree. In 2000, the PLA established the noncommissioned officer (NCO) ranks, creating professional opportunities for enlisted members.. ‧. NCOs are experts in their field and must obtain a high school or vocational degree, while the most senior ranked NCOs are required to have a three-year technical college degree.. y. sit. io. er. Ch 1).. Nat. Similarly, all of the PLA’s officers must enter service with a college degree (Cliff, 2015, In addition to higher quality recruits, the PLA now invests heavily in training its. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. forces for realistic and complex combat contingencies. Recently, the PLA has begun joint. engchi. service training, which often occurs in adverse environmental conditions such as at night or in poor weather conditions. It also has “blue force units,” which are specific units whose missions are to study and simulate the tactics of potential adversaries, allowing normal units an opportunity to practice against them. Units are required to meet specified performance standards, and those that fail are required to retrain (Cliff, 2015, Ch 1). Although the PLA has made an incredible transformation over the past 20 years, it lacks recent combat experience. In total, the PLA has only participated in three wars: the Korean War in 1950, the Sino-Indian War in 1962, and the Sino-Vietnam War in 1979. Both the Sino-Indian and Sino-Vietnam wars were short in duration, lasting less than one month. In 1969, China and the Soviet Union engaged in a seven-month border clash that never resulted in a large-scale war. As a result, even the most senior general officers in the PLA have little combat experience, and none of its troops have actual combat experience 12.

(18) under high-technology, informatized conditions. However, assuming that a lack of the PLA’s wartime experience correlates to combat inability would severely underestimate its actual capabilities. In fact, because of the PLA’s expanded mission set into MOOTW, it is gaining a significant amount of experience, learning several lessons, and developing notable proficiency from its recent operations. Understanding how the PLA’s proficiency in conducting MOOTW can translate into aptitude on the battlefield will be a constant theme throughout this report. PLA Organization When discussing the PLA’s MOOTW, it is important that readers understand China’s military structure so that decision-making and command relationships can be better comprehended. The most important concept to understand about the PLA is that it is. 政治大. controlled by the CCP, not the state. Mao’s statement that “power comes from the barrel of a. 立. gun and the Communist Party must always control this instrument of coercion,” (Cheung,. ‧ 國. 學. 2015) defines the special relationship between the party and the military. Consequently, the main objective of the PLA is to ensure that the CCP remains in power. The PLA began. ‧. implementing significant structural changes beginning on December 31, 2015. Although some details of the new command structure are still unclear as of this writing, Figure 2. sit. y. Nat. provides a graphical summary of the reforms.. io. er. The top decision making body in the PLA is the Central Military Commission (CMC). The CMC takes its strategic direction from the Politburo Standing Committee. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. (PBSC, not shown), which includes the top civilian leaders in China. Although the CMC. engchi. technically has dual chains of command, one for the party, and one for the state, in reality the positions are filled by the same people. For example, currently Xi Jinping holds four titles: he is the chairman of the CMC, the Commander in Chief of the military, the CCP’s SecretaryGeneral, and also the sitting President of the PRC. Although the membership of the CMC is flexible, it typically has two vice-chairmen, one of which is a general officer in the PLA. Usually the remaining vice-chairman position is filled by another PLA general officer or the the Vice President of China, who will assume the Presidency the next term. Given the structural overhaul, it is still unclear what other military members will hold CMC membership, but previously the minister of defense, the four Directors of the General Departments, the service chiefs, and 2nd Artillery Force Commander (which previously fell under the Army) all held CMC membership (Cliff, 2015, Ch 1). Given the restructuring’s. 13.

(19) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Figure 2. The PLA organizational chart. Top figure from (Cliff, 2015, Ch. 1).. 14.

(20) emphasis on “jointness,” it is likely that the Director of the CMC Joint General Staff will also hold CMC membership. The purpose of the restructuring is to “optimize the size and structure of the army, adjust and improve the balance between the services and branches, and reduce non-combat institutions and personnel” (CNTV, 2015). China’s 2015 Defense White Paper emphasizes the need for China to “give full play to the overall effectiveness of joint operations… and make integrated use of all operational means and methods” (Ministry of National Defense, The People's Republic of China, 2015), acknowledging the growing significance of the China’s Air Force and Navy. Traditionally, the PLA has been dominated by the Army which currently accounts for 73 percent of the entire military’s troops (including the Second Artillery Force), while the Air Force and Navy only account for 17 percent and 10 percent, respectively (Allen, Blasko, & Corbett Jr., 2016, p. 2).. 政治大. The reorganization eliminates the four PLA General Staff Departments, and replaces. 立. them with fifteen functional departments. These departments do not directly control combat. ‧ 國. 學. troops, but rather determine policy, strategy, and regulations for their section of responsibility (Cliff, 2015, Ch 1). Furthermore, the reforms also created a separate headquarters for the. ‧. Army, which used to be comprised of the four General Departments under the old scheme. Additionally, it renamed the Second Artillery Force as the “Rocket Force” and removed its. sit. y. Nat. previous position as a branch under the Army, upgrading it to its own independent service.. io. er. The services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping their forces. The seven Military Region (MR) Commands under the old system have been consolidated to five. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. “theater commands.” The new theater commands will be labeled Northern, Southern,. engchi. Eastern, Western, and Central. The function of the new theater commands and old military region commands are essentially the same, in that they have combat troops assigned to them, much like the U.S.’s geographical combatant commands. Commanders of these units are responsible for employing their troops and assets to accomplish the military tasks issued by the CMC and CMC Military Defense Mobilization Department (Allen, Blasko, & Corbett Jr., 2016, pp. 3-4). Figure 3 illustrates the territories associated with the former military regions and possible configuration of the new theater commands. These reforms are a clear signal that the PLA is posturing to achieve its goal of “winning informationized local wars” by employing “integrated combat forces… in system-vs-system operations featuring information dominance, precision strikes, and joint operations” (Ministry of National Defense, The People's Republic of China, 2015). In some respects, the CCP hopes to implement organizational changes similar to those made 15.

(21) 政治大. Figure 3. Comparison of old “Military Regions” (left) and new “Theater Commands” (right). Image credit: left, U.S. Department of Defense; right, STRATFOR.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. by the U.S.’s Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that reduced inter-service rivalries and required joint integration. It is also simultaneously implementing widespread consolidation demonstrated by the reduction of geographical commands and planned personnel cuts.. ‧. Although the PLA has traditionally been dominated by the Army, China’s expanding global. sit. y. Nat. interests and active defense strategy have led many to advocate for larger roles for its Air Force and Navy. Because the Army’s headquarters is no longer integrated with the General. io. n. al. er. Staff and it now shares equal status with the other service branches, it would be no surprise if. i Un. v. the Army’s dominance over PLA decisions and leadership erodes over the next 20-30 years.. Ch. engchi. Additionally, by upgrading the Second Artillery Force to its own service, now called the Rocket Force, the CCP is emphasizing the importance of China’s A2AD strategy. Nevertheless, according to a photograph of the new CMC staff analyzed by the Jamestown Foundation, 84 percent of the CMC staff are still Army members, suggesting that force rebalancing will be a challenging and gradual process for the PLA (Allen, Blasko, & Corbett Jr., 2016, p. 3). While little is known about the functions of each department within the CMC Staff, it seems that the Joint Staff Department, Office for Strategic Planning, and Office for Reform and Organizational Structure will all have major roles in improving the PLA’s force integration capability. Besides the four major services previously discussed, China has created the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) that will ensure its capability to operate effectively in an informationized environment. The PLASSF will conduct information 16.

(22) warfare through utilizing three types of forces: cyber-troops, space-troops, and electronic warfare forces. Cyber-troops will conduct both offensive and defensive cyber-warfare, while space-troops will manage China’s ISR and navigation satellites. The electronic warfare troops will attempt to degrade or disrupt enemy radar and communication systems through electronic jamming (Costello, 2016). Despite these potentials, the PLASSF must be able to effectively coordinate with the other services for its capabilities to achieve the desired synergistic effects. Because the current reforms posture the PLA to more effectively execute joint operations, the PLASSF should theoretically integrate effectively with the other services. Consequently, the current ease with which the U.S. transits the peripheries of China may be challenged in the near future. Additionally, organizational improvements combined with force modernization measures have the potential to increase the PLA’s global force projection and overall MOOTW capabilities.. 立. 政治大. Important Definitions in Military Operations Other Than War. ‧ 國. 學. Military operations other than war cover a wide range of military activities, some of which include combat roles. The difference between war and MOOTW is that war utilizes. ‧. large-scale combat operations to protect national security interests and achieve overall national objectives through the use of violent force, whereas MOOTW’s main objective is to. sit. y. Nat. utilize the military to achieve political interests by “deterring war, resolving conflict, [and]. io. er. promoting peace.” Consequently, the main objective of any MOOTW mission is always political in nature and thus “all military operations are driven by political considerations”. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication JP-07, 1995, pp. I-1). Although. engchi. Chinese applications of MOOTW emphasize the importance of using the military to achieve goals related to domestic and external security issues, the PLA still values the political benefits resulting from peace and stability. It is critical that personnel involved in a MOOTW mission are culturally savvy and understand the potential detrimental political impact of actions that may be considered offensive. Furthermore, commanders must track and quickly react to changes in the political landscape that may affect overall objectives or military operations. Although the term “MOOTW” has recently been eliminated from U.S. doctrine, it is a large part of China’s expanded mission set, thus the term will be used throughout the report. The DoD last published its Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War in 1995; however, many of the missions discussed below now have their own publications, suggesting that MOOTW operations are becoming increasingly important. 17.

(23) for both China and the U.S. Military doctrine in China is considered a state secret, so this paper will rely on U.S. doctrine to provide general definitions of each type of operation. This report will focus on three areas of the the PLA’s recent MOOTW. The first set of missions includes humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These missions are least likely to encounter hostilities and are characterized as non-combat operations. The second group of missions are Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, which is when the PLA is tasked to remove Chinese nationals from a foreign country who are endangered by violence from local political instability. The third class of missions includes counterpiracy and protection of shipping operations. These operations are typically conducted by the PLAN and may involve limited use of force to achieve objectives. Each group is organized according to their likeliness to encounter combat according to the range of military operations concept presented in the introductory chapter. The first. 政治大. group of operations is least likely to encounter combat situations, but each group thereafter. 立. faces progressively more risk. Although counterpiracy missions in the third group often. ‧ 國. 學. include small arms fire and Chinese noncombatant evacuations have always been conducted under permissive conditions, non-permissive NEOs have the potential to require significant. ‧. combat activities, including heavy fire exchanges.. sit. y. Nat. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief. io. er. HA/DR missions occur when the military is tasked to deploy to a foreign country in response to a humanitarian crisis or natural disaster. The overall tactical objectives of these. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. missions are to reduce human suffering and restore basic services so that governance can. engchi. resume. Accomplishment of these tasks paves the way for achievement of the strategic political objectives of HA/DR missions. By promoting an image of benevolence and compassion, nations are able to generate goodwill and increase their soft power in both the international community and with the country in which operations take place. As a result, the nation providing assistance is better equipped to accomplish their foreign policy objectives. Similarly, military support to civilian authorities occurs when military units are deployed domestically in response to a range of circumstances where civilian authorities do not have enough manpower or are ill-equipped to effectively manage the situation. Domestic mobilization of military forces is frequently utilized in response to natural disasters and occasionally during civil disorder. Well known examples in the U.S. include the augmentation of airport security officials by the National Guard in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks and the 2005 military support to Hurricane Katrina relief 18.

(24) efforts. The overall political objectives of eliminating domestic threats to national security are achieved by restoring governance and civil order. The military can contribute to the accomplishment of these goals by reassuring local populations of their safety (preventing looting, violence, etc.), assisting with humanitarian efforts (rescue, medical aid), and supplementing reconstruction efforts. In both of these missions, a non-military element of the government will lead the response operations. In the case of HA/DR missions, command relationships become extremely complex and easily tangled during multilateral responses. For instance, after a natural disaster strikes, the U.N. (and other NGOs) will make “consolidated appeals” for emergency assistance and sub-organizations such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and World Health Organization (WHO), will help to. 政治大. provide funding and information to relief efforts (United Nations, 2016). However, nearly all. 立. of the manpower comes from local authorities and foreign relief workers. But the national. ‧ 國. 學. government where the disaster is located has final authority over all relief efforts. Specific tactical level objectives are determined by local authorities. Each foreign military. ‧. commander is responsible to his own government and therefore must balance the requirements of his own government with those of the host nation. Commanders also must. sit. y. Nat. deconflict efforts with foreign militaries and NGOs. Command relationships may be varied. io. er. among individual HA/DR responses, but it is clear that they can quickly become complicated and confusing, especially in the chaotic aftermath of a disaster.. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. Ultimately, objectives will not be set by the military, so commanders will have to. engchi. carefully coordinate with other agencies to ensure that military operations compliment civilian political objectives. Consequently, the military must transform civilian objectives into specific military strategy so that individual missions can be effectively planned. HA/DR and military support to civilian agencies operations are especially challenging to plan because these missions are often in response to unforeseen events. Thus, not only is the military required to coordinate among multiple agencies, but the planning phase must happen quickly since a timely response is critical to achieving political objectives. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Noncombatant Evacuation Operations occur when a nation’s military is tasked to extract citizens, government employees, host nation nationals, and third country nationals in a foreign country to guarantee their safety. A number of different situations could lead to this 19.

(25) type of operation such as natural or manmade disasters, civil unrest, terrorist activities, or the outbreak of hostilities (Joint Publication 3-68, 2015, p. ix). Similar to the missions discussed above, a crisis may begin with little or no warning, requiring a rapid interagency planning process. In most cases the military provides support to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who leads the planning and execution of the mission. Military responses to these situations may differ depending on the nature of the emergency as well as the distances from the home country. For instance, during a response to a natural disaster, military operations will be conducted in a permissive environment requiring little protection of its assets, significantly reducing the intelligence collection requirements. Thus, the military often coordinates with the private sector to charter aircraft, ships, or vehicles to expedite the evacuation process. On the other hand, sometimes the military must operate in an uncertain or non-. 政治大. permissive environment, facing threats from a range of sources including lightly armed. 立. opposition forces to host nation militaries with advanced capabilities. In this case, the. ‧ 國. 學. military must rely on its intelligence assets to determine the best course of action to mitigate existing threats while executing a successful evacuation. Close coordination with MOFA is. ‧. required to craft well balanced ROEs that allow the military to protect its assets while simultaneously achieve political objectives. In most cases, widespread desires at home for. sit. y. Nat. the government to protect the safety of its citizens will generate added political pressure to. io. er. respond quickly and effectively. Nevertheless, military commanders must ensure that their forces are adequately prepared and equipped because an operational failure will be even more. al. n. politically detrimental.. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Counterpiracy and Protection of Shipping Operations Counterpiracy and protection of shipping operations are maritime activities that can be conducted solely by the Navy or by joint military and civilian forces such as the Air Force and Coast Guard. According to international law, piracy is “an international crime consisting of illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for private ends…that can be committed only on or over the high seas, EEZ, and contiguous zone, and in other places beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any nation” (Joint Publication 3-32, 2013, pp. IV-20). As a result, counterpiracy operations are conducted in waters far from the nation’s shore, and often occur in waters where Strategic Lines of Communication (SLOC) exist. Consequently, the military must frequently ensure logistical requirements are met to support operations that are potentially thousands of kilometers from home ports. 20.

(26) Protection of shipping operations is a broader mission that is not necessarily restricted to international waters. There are many strategies available to commanders to ensure the safe passage of trade ships, which vary from securing naval supremacy over a designated area or providing escort services to protect individual assets (Joint Publication 3-32, 2013, pp. IV-28). In all types of maritime operations, the Navy must have access to credible intelligence resources to accurately track threats, trade ships, and other neutral or friendly ships in the area. Also, because operations are frequently conducted far away from home over large areas, access to long range communications are essential for basic command and control. Similar to other MOOTW missions, counterpiracy and protection of shipping operations often result in a multilateral effort. For instance, Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) is a multilateral effort consisting of thirty countries that conducts worldwide. 政治大. counterpiracy operations (Combined Maritime Forces, 2015). Not only must actions be. 立. carefully coordinated within the coalition, but also with non-coalition members who are also. ‧ 國. 學. conducting similar missions. Operations in this category are more likely to perform combat related actions that include the usage of force to protect assets and the seizure of adversaries’. ‧. ships. In every case the naval forces have an asymmetric firepower advantage as pirates are only able to access small arms such as AK-47 assault rifles and occasionally rocket propelled. sit. y. Nat. grenades, requiring them to largely rely on maritime guerrilla tactics on targets of opportunity. io. n. al. er. (Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa, 2011, p. 10). Large Scale War. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. For the purposes of this study, the term large scale war is used to describe two major powers using the full capabilities of their militaries to conduct prolonged campaigns against each other. Large scale war involves physical combat in the air, land, sea, and space domains over large areas of territories. It does not include limited strikes, contingency situations, or skirmishes that do not escalate into a regional conflict. Furthermore, it does not include disputes over single points of territory, although these individual areas may raise tensions to a broader, regional level conflict that could result in large scale war. Because of the large geographic area of the conflict, effective logistics networks and supply chains will be critical to battlefield success. Fighting ends when one government surrenders or collapses. Although many in both China and the U.S. believe that the practice of large scale war among major powers is extinct, history has demonstrated otherwise. In the early 1920’s, many argued that World War I was “the war to end all wars,” (BBC News, 1998) but only 20 21.

(27) years passed before the start of World War II. Furthermore, despite the fact that nuclear weapons have only been used once in the history of war and several nuclear weapons treaties exist, many major world powers still possess them and developing regional powers are still actively pursuing their development. While these weapons may act as a deterrent, the fact that they still exist acknowledges that large scale war may still be a possibility. Thus, major military powers including China and the U.S. must be prepared for this scenario even if its chances of occurring are remote, because to ignore the potential for large scale war could jeopardize national survival. Given the current global political situation at the time of this writing, it is much more likely that China and the U.S. will engage in a limited skirmish or proxy war. However, the implications of the PLA’s MOOTW on these types of events are outside the scope of this paper and will not be directly discussed. However, readers may be able to infer the repercussions of the PLA’s MOOTW on limited engagements based on the research results.. ‧ 國. 學. Conclusion. 立. 政治大. This chapter provided an overview of PLA history and demonstrated how its. ‧. capability has grown dramatically in the last twenty years. As the size of China’s economy continues to grow, so do its global political interests. Although the PLA does not have recent. sit. y. Nat. wartime experience, it is preparing to assist China achieve its foreign policy objectives by. io. er. evolving into a modern military force that is capable of utilizing high technology to project power and conducting joint operations under a range of adverse environmental conditions. It. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. is however, gaining operational experience through its current MOOTW missions.. engchi. This chapter also provided a brief overview of the organizational structure of the PLA. Like most western militaries, it remains under civilian control; however, an important difference is that in China, the army is subordinate to the CCP, not the state itself. The PBSC provides strategic direction and decisions to the CMC, which is led by the PRC President. The CMC then oversees the implementation of strategy through its fifteen staff departments and executes military missions through its five military theater commands. This report will focus on Chinese MOOTW in the three mission categories of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, and counterpiracy. Although the military often plays large roles in the planning and execution of MOOTW missions, overall objectives are political in nature and ultimately seek to bolster a nation’s international status while encouraging peace and preventing war. Consequently, planning and coordination among several governmental departments, international partners, 22.

(28) and NGOs is frequently required. The next chapter will conduct a literature review of what is already known about PLA MOOTW in the three categories outlined above.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat al. Ch. engchi. 23. i Un. v.

(29) Chapter 2. Literature Review Overview on Sources Although studies of the PLA have traditionally been limited, its popularity is growing following the general western trend of increased Chinese studies. As a result, there have been several recent publications on many aspects of the PLA from a family of mostly western-educated authors. The majority of this literature review is derived from two books that resulted from separate conference proceedings on the PLA. The first book, titled PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policy Making, was published in 2015 and was a product of a conference on “The PLA’s Role in National Security Policy-Making” cosponsored by Taiwan’s Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), the RAND Corporation, and the U.S.’s National Defense University (NDU). It presents eleven articles by twelve different experts on the PLA.. 政治大. The second book, titled The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in. 立. China, was also published in 2015 and resulted from a conference on “Contingency Planning,. ‧ 國. 學. PLA Style” that was co-sponsored by CAPS, RAND, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), and NDU. Seventeen experts with extensive academic and. ‧. operational experience present fourteen articles on a wide range of PLA recent operations. In November 2015, I also attended a conference co-sponsored by CAPS, RAND, and NDU on. sit. y. Nat. “The PLA at 90: Evolutions, Revolutions, Legacies and Disruptions” where twelve draft. io. er. articles were presented by thirteen PLA specialists. Although these articles are not yet ready for publication, a significant amount of raw data was presented that will be useful for further. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. analysis. While some of the authors attended all three conferences, the majority of articles. engchi. were based on research from both western and Chinese sources. The imbedded diversity of sources within these articles along with the fact that there are 39 different authors in total, eliminates the threat of source bias. Additionally, Roger Cliff’s newly published book, China’s Military Power: Assessing Current and Future Capabilities, provides a comprehensive overview of the PLA’s competencies from a functional perspective. He covers changes in the PLA’s doctrine, personnel management, training, logistics, and weapons to assess and predict current and future power, respectively. Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell’s China’s Search for Security present insightful perceptions of the current security environment from China’s point of view and attempt to make sense of China’s sometimes seemingly confusing or contradictory policies. This book provides important political considerations for China’s MOOTW. 24.

(30) PLA Decision Making and MOOTW In order to fully comprehend the political objectives of the PLA’s MOOTW, one must first grasp China’s understanding of its own security situation. Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell in their book China’s Search for Security argue that China’s perception of its own vulnerabilities dictate its foreign policy initiatives. They suggest that threats to Chinese security are located in four domains, which they label “rings.” The first and most important ring covers both foreign and domestic threats located within Chinese territory, which includes claimed disputed areas such as Taiwan and littoral features within its self-proclaimed 9-dash line. China is particularly sensitive to foreign activities in these areas because it is skeptical that they will attempt to undermine internal political stability. The second ring includes China’s twenty bordering nations, all who have had border disputes with China. The regional systems that surround China’s location, including Central. 政治大. Asia, Northeast Asia, Oceania, South East Asia, and South Asia—45 nations in total—define. 立. China’s third ring. The last ring is anywhere outside of the first three rings and events in this. ‧ 國. 學. region traditionally have not directly threatened China’s security (Nathan & Scobell, 2012, Ch 1). Historically, most of China’s military operations have been conducted in the first ring.. ‧. However, in the past ten years, the PLA’s military operations other than war have expanded all the way to the fourth ring, suggesting that China’s vulnerabilities are growing along with. sit. y. Nat. its political ambitions.. io. er. Nathan and Scobell explain the overall decision making process in China. They briefly acknowledge the dual state-party structure within China’s governmental. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. organizations. The state structure is led by the National People’s Congress (NPC), which has. engchi. approximately 3000 delegates while the party structure is led by the 200 to 400-member Central Committee. These organizations only meet twice per year and their major duties involve appointing senior government leaders across several departments. However, the authors describe how the party-controlled Politburo (some 20 members) and even more elite Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC, 5-11 top leaders) have regular meetings to make important decisions that effectively run the country (Nathan & Scobell, 2012, Ch 2). It is also important to realize that the PLA has not had any uniformed military officers on the PBSC since 1997 (Saunders & Scobell, 2015). The only military representative on either the Politburo or PBSC is the Secretary-General, who is also the CMC chairman. Although the Secretary-General is the most powerful official in China, the military often feels its interests are often underrepresented, especially since Deng Xiaoping was the last. 25.

(31) Secretary-General with true military experience (Li, Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi, 2015).1 During periods of crisis requiring PLA intervention, China’s bureaucratic processes often prevent it from making critical decisions in a timely manner. First, the military must pass information to a number of “Leading Small Groups” (LSGs), committees organized with both military and civilian officials that deal with specific functional issues. Once each of the LSG recommendations is determined, they are passed up to the PBSC which deliberates and makes a consensus-based decision that directs PLA strategy. Consequently, the rate at which events occur in real time exceeds the capacity of the Chinese decision making process to effectively set policy. As a result, both senior PLA leaders and field commanders often wait an excessive amount of time while the PBSC determines an appropriate course of action.. 政治大 resulting in a disorganized and uncoordinated response. This trend is especially apparent in 立. Occasionally, out of necessity, the PLA fills this void by determining its own initial response,. MOOTW actions outside of China’s borders. Examples include PLAAF and PLAN. ‧ 國. 學. “aggressive” maneuvering in contested territories over the past fifteen years and the surfacing of a PLAN submarine close to a U.S. aircraft carrier in 2007 (Swaine, The PLA Role in. ‧. China’s Foreign Policy and Crisis Behavior, 2015). However, in 2013 President Xi Jinping. y. Nat. consolidated decision making power regarding national security issues to a single body by. io. sit. establishing the Chinese National Security Commission (CNSC; Zhao K. , 2015).. n. al. er. Lastly, Bonnie Glasser discusses how the PLA is able to utilize both the media and. i n U. v. military-to-military exchanges with other nations to promote its agenda (2015). Although her. Ch. engchi. essay focuses on the PLA’s influence over China’s Taiwan policy, she presents important PLA capabilities that could apply to MOOTW. Just like in the Taiwan case that she presented, Chinese media coverage of the PLA’s MOOTW missions can generate domestic support for overall military spending as well as psychologically condition Chinese citizens for the expanded scope of PLA operations. Furthermore, as the PLA increases its contact with foreign militaries through multinational MOOTW, it may seek to build sympathy and support towards its causes from foreign military officers (Glaser, 2015). As the PLA continues to develop its proficiency in MOOTW, it will increase its credibility with the party giving it access to additional political tools it did not previously have (Saunders & Scobell, 2015).. 1. Xi Jinping served in the PLA from 1979-1982 as Defense Minister Geng Biao’s personal secretary.. 26.