為什麼土地改革在台灣成功而在秘魯不成功? 1950-1975 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 為什麼土地改革在台灣成功而在秘魯不成功? 1950-1975. ‧. Why did Land Reform Work in Taiwan, but not in Peru? 1950-1975. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Student: Lidia Elizabeth Quispe Pacombia Advisor: Alex Tan, Ph.D.. 中華民國 107 年 7 月 July 2018. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(2) 為什麼土地改革在台灣成功而在秘魯不成功? 1950-1975 Why Did Land Reform Work in Taiwan, but not in Peru? 1950-1975. 研究生：李娣雅. Student: Lidia Elizabeth Quispe Pacombia. 指導教授：陳永福 Advisor: Alex Tan, Ph.D. 國立政治大學. 治政亞太研究英語碩士學位學程大立 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 碩士論文. A Thesis. sit. y. Nat. Submitted to International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies. er. io. n. a l Chengchi University National iv. n U engchi In partial fulfillment of the requirement. Ch. For the degree of Master in Asia-Pacific Studies. 中華民國 107 年 7 月 July 2018. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(3) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. First of all, I would like to express my deep thanks to my advisor, Prof. Alex Tan, for his continuous support to my thesis research, for his patience, motivation, enthusiasm, and immense knowledge. I would also like to thank my thesis committee members, Professor Yen-Pin Su and Professor Kar Yen Leong, for generously agreeing to be part. 政治大 shown me different perspectives on my thesis topic and that has made my thesis 立. of my committee and for their valuable comments on my thesis. Their feedbacks has. enriched.. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. I would also like to thank the academic, financial and technical support of the Ministry. sit. y. Nat. of Education of Taiwan, the National Chengchi University, and the International. io. al. n. degree in Taiwan.. er. Institute of Government (IGOB), for providing me the opportunity to pursue my master. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my mother, Damiana Pacombia, and my father, Ruben Quispe, for their love, patient, support, and understanding while studying abroad. To my best partner Daniel Segura and all my friends in Taiwan and Peru, for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement throughout my years of study and during the process of researching and writing this thesis. This achievement would not have been possible without them. Thank you.. Lidia Quispe July 2018. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(4) 摘要. 這份研究的動機是希望能透過台灣與秘魯的案例比較，對土地改革文獻作出獨創性的貢獻。現存的土改文獻通常都強調相較於其他國家，台灣的土地改革較為成功。同時，台灣的土地改革也時常被拿來與其他亞洲國家做比較。然而，這項研究計畫，將台灣的土地改. 政治大革政策與拉丁美洲相比，特別是對秘魯的土地改革政策進行比較，立. ‧ 國. 學. 因為現有的許多文獻，都認為土地改革政策的實施在該地區是不成. ‧. 功的。本文的主要目的是解釋儘管秘魯與台灣之間存在顯著的相似. sit. y. Nat. 之處，為什麼土地改革政策在台灣會成功，而在秘魯則不然。兩者. er. io. 都是農業經濟，在土地改革政策，且實施過程中也有類似的一黨政. n. a. v. l C 治制度。這份論文採用比較分析方法探討可能影響土改結果的因素。 ni. hengchi U. 結果表明，台灣的土地改革政策，實施地比秘魯更有效率，這主要歸功於三個因素：保障其權利和激勵措施，國家對投資和技術援助的支持，以及良善的制度，是台灣土地改革成功的關鍵因素，但在秘魯展現出。. 關鍵詞：土地改革,台灣，秘魯，制度，政府，權利. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(5) ABSTRACT. The motivation of this research is to make an original contribution to land reform literature by comparing the cases of Taiwan and Peru. Existing literature on land reform usually emphasizes Taiwan’s success as an example for other countries, and Taiwanese land reform is frequently compared with other countries in the region of Asia. This research project,. 政治大. however, compares Taiwan’s land reforms to those conducted in Latin. 立. America, specifically Peru, since much of the existing literature considers. ‧ 國. 學. the implementation of land reform as unsuccessful in this region. The main objective of this paper is to explain why land reform was successful in. ‧. Taiwan, but not in Peru, despite notable similarities between the two. y. Nat. sit. countries. Both were agricultural economies and had similar one-party. a. er. io. political systems during the land reform implementation. This research. n. v l paper uses comparative analysis to explore possible n i explanatory factors for Ch. U i e h n c g the different results seen in the two countries. The results suggest that land. reform implementation in Taiwan was more effective than in Peru primarily due to three factors. Guaranteed rights and incentives, State support in investment & technical assistance, and institutions were the key factors identified for the success of land reform in Taiwan, but not presented in Peru.. Keywords: Land Reform, Taiwan, Peru, Institutions, Government, Rights. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(6) TABLE OF CONTENTS. 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………….1 1.1. Background of the study………………………………………………........1 1.2. Research purposes………………………………………………………….4 1.3. Research Method…………………………………………………………...5 1.4. Organization of the study ………………………………………………….7 2. Theoretical Framework……………………………………………...…...8. 政治大. 2.1. Concept of Land Reform…………………………………………………...8. 立. 2.2. Defining Success of Land Reform……………………………………….....9. ‧ 國. 學. 2.2.1. Economic criteria…………………………………………………….9 2.2.2. Social criteria………………………………………………………..10. ‧. 2.3. Literature Review…………………………………………………..…......11. sit. y. Nat. 2.3.1. State support in investment & technical assistance ………………...12. al. er. io. 2.3.2. Institutions………………………………………………………......13. v. n. 2.3.3. Guaranteed rights and incentives………………………………..….14. Ch. engchi. i n U. 2.3.4. Type of Political System……………………………………………15 2.3.5. NGO & International Organization………………………………....16. 2.4. Theories on Land Reform………………………………………………....17 2.4.1. Economic Efficiency…………………………….……………….…17 2.4.2. The New Institutional Economics (NIE)…………………………....18 2.4.3. Access Theory………………………………………………………19. 3. Land Reform in Taiwan…………………………………………….…. 22 3.1. Background of the Land Reform in Taiwan……………………………....22 3.2. Process of the Land Reform in Taiwan (1949-1953)……………………..24. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(7) 3.2.1. First Stage: Farmland Rent Reduction………………………….…..24 3.2.2. Second Stage: Sale of Public Land…………………….……….…..26 3.2.3. Third Stage: Land to the Tiller……………………………….….….28. 4. Land Reform in Peru……………………….……………………….…..30 4.1. Background of the Land Reform in Peru……………………………….…30 4.2. Process of the Land Reform in Peru (1963-1975)……………………...…32 4.2.1. Land Reform under Belaunde Government (1963-1968)……….….32 4.2.1.1. First Stage: Public Land Distribution ……………….…….32. 政治大 4.2.2. The Land Reform under Velasco Government (1968-1975)….……34 立. 4.2.1.2. Second Stage: Farmland Rent Reduction…………….……33. 4.2.2.1. Third Stage: Land Expropriation………..…………………34. ‧ 國. 學. 4.2.2.2. Fourth Stage: Formation of CAPS and SAIS………….…..37. ‧. 5. Land Reform Comparison between Taiwan and Peru…………….… 41 5.1. First Phase of Evaluation: Land Reform Effects………………………….41. y. Nat. io. sit. 5.1.1. Effects of the Land Reform in Taiwan…………………………..….41. n. al. er. 5.1.1.1. Economic Effects………………………………………….41. i n U. v. 5.1.1.2. Social Effects………………………………………….......45. Ch. engchi. 5.1.2. Effects of the Land Reform in Peru………………………………...46 5.1.2.1. Economic Effects………………………………………….47 5.1.2.2. Social Effects……………………………………………....52. 5.2. Second Phase of Evaluation: Explanatory Factors…………………….….57 5.2.1. Explaining each indicator’s difference………………………….…..57 5.2.2. Explanatory Factors.………………………………...........................59. 6. Conclusions…………………………………………………………...… 61 Bibliography………………………………………………………….….64. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(8) LIST OF TABLES. Table. Page. 1. First Phase of Evaluation Summary………………………………......56 2. Second Phase of Evaluation Summary……………………………….60. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(9) CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION. 1.1.Background of the Study In agricultural economies, land is the most important resource. With access to fertile land, people in the rural areas can feed themselves and their families. However, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2004) reports that landless. 政治大. household in rural areas represents about 80 percent of the people who are chronically. 立. hungry in the world today. In this regard, a powerful strategy for promoting economic. ‧ 國. 學. development, and the reduction of poverty and inequality, has been the implementation of land reform. After the end of WWII in 1945, land reform was implemented by several. ‧. governments around the world. They attempted to make radical changes in their. y. Nat. io. sit. territories, transferring agricultural land from powerful landlords to those who worked. n. al. er. the land. At the same time, other states considered land reform as part of their first step. i n U. in economic development and industrialization (Tai, 1974).. Ch. engchi. v. Among the East Asian countries, redistributive land reform has often been considered a substantial stimulus in the subsequent economic growth for Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. Before the reforms, there were a small number of large landlords and many small tenant cultivators. After the reforms, tenancy effectively disappeared, having an impact on structural change and income per capita. Consequently, reforms were responsible for at least half of the actual reallocation of labor out of agriculture in each of these countries (Talan, 2018). Regarding the development of agrarian structures, in South Korea and Taiwan, Japanese colonialism severely weakened the traditional. 1. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(10) ruling class and landowning aristocracy, taking away their political power, and this led, as in the Korean case, to be identified as collaborators of the Japanese. The coup de grace came with the agrarian reform after the Second World War. In Taiwan, the Kuomintang, a right-wing nationalist party, was able to introduce land reform because they did not own land on the island, while in Korea the need for political stability led to land reform, under the patronage of the Government of the United States. The result was that in East Asia there was a more equitable distribution of the land (Maya, 2016).. However, in Latin America, the agrarian condition demonstrated that landholding. 政治大. patterns cause social injustice and economic stagnation. In the majority of the Latin. 立. American countries the land distributions were so unequal that did not have an impact. ‧ 國. 學. on income redistribution and employment creation. In this situation, over one hundred million rural people living in poverty coexist with a minority that concentrated the. ‧. abundance of wealth. So, in the end, this inequality causes land tenure to be the main. y. Nat. io. sit. obstacle to the development of Latin America (King, 1977). One of the basic objectives. n. al. er. of land reform in Latin America has been to increase agricultural production. However,. i n U. v. in several cases, the immediate result of redistributing the land has been a reduction of. Ch. engchi. outputs. The new peasant owners did not have the technical competence to maintain former production levels. The Bolivian peasants are not the only ones who tended to ignore all but his own personal needs. And in Mexico, too, the ejiditarios were delayed in terms of productivity, partly because they lack technical know-how, and partly because the small size of many of the individual plots makes them inefficient (Robert, 1962). Moreover, in the case of Peru, new landowners had to compete in the market under unfavorable terms, and with insufficient economic support from the government. This situation left them in the same conditions as before, or, in some cases, even worse off.. 2. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(11) In the present thesis, I will compare the result of land reform in one country from East Asia and another one from Latin America, in this case, Taiwan and Peru respectively. The decision to study Taiwan and Peru is because both economies actually share common characteristics that could be useful to have a better understanding of the different results for each case.. First of all, land reform in Taiwan and Peru was run under a one-party system. In democratic states with multi-party systems, such as Puerto Rico, Venezuela and Chile, political parties openly competed for electoral support by compromising land reform.. 政治大. However, when a political party wanted to promulgate land reform, it had to follow the. 立. open debate and many compromises with other political parties. Meanwhile, in the case. ‧ 國. 學. of more authoritarian political systems, open party competition for popular support was severely restricted. However, even if the opposition parties were banned, the leftist. ‧. parties were still clandestinely organized. This generally increased the pressures on the. y. Nat. io. sit. regime to support some type of land reform. The competing officers were often looking. n. al. er. for populist support, which sometimes led them to undertake radical land reforms. This. i n U. v. was the case in Peru with Velasco Alvarado regime in 1969 and the Taiwanese reform. Ch. engchi. with the Chinese nationalist government in the 1950’s (Barraclough, 1999).. Second of all, both Taiwan and Peru experienced the same level of development during the period of analysis, being both agricultural economies. Before land reform, the economy of Taiwan was predominantly agricultural. The people employed in the agricultural sector represented 61% of the population and agriculture contributed about 36% to the domestic product. In this sense, the agriculture was a land-based economy, where the land problem was the basic problem in agriculture (Chang, 1974). In the case of Peru, agriculture has always been an important sector that sustains millions of. 3. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(12) families in the rural areas of Peru. During the 1950’s, the agrarian sector represented 24% of the national domestic product and the labor force in agriculture represented 59% of the population (Pintado, 2016). So, as we can see, before the land reform, both Taiwan and Peru were in almost the same conditions in terms of economic structure, predominantly agricultural.. Therefore, the fact that both Taiwan and Peru were controlled by a one-party system and that both were predominantly agricultural economies during the land reform implementation, give us a justification to evaluate the performance of land reform in. 政治大. both cases and to make a comparison in order to find the factors that explain why land. 立. reform worked in Taiwan but not in Peru.. ‧ 國. 學. 1.2.Research Purposes. ‧. This study aims to investigate the effect of land reform in the cases of Taiwan and Peru,. y. Nat. sit. and to answer the research question: “Why did land reform work in Taiwan, but not in. n. al. er. io. Peru?” In order to answer this clearly, this thesis will analyze the possible factors that. i n U. v. could have contributed to the different results in Taiwan and Peru.. Ch. engchi. Most of the existing comparative literature on Taiwanese land reform compare Taiwan with other countries within Asia; there are few studies comparing Taiwan with countries outside Asia. This paper presents a different case by comparing Taiwan with a Latin American country, Peru. Although Taiwan and Peru are from different regions, there are distinct similarities between the two cases. They both experienced the same level of development during the land reform implementation and the type of political system was the same in both cases; a one-party system.. 4. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(13) Moreover, the economic conditions of rural areas in Peru have not changed significantly since the land reform in 1969. Most people in those areas still live in poor conditions, without access to the basic needs of health and education, and competing with unfavorable conditions in the market. Government actions have been insufficient to eliminate poverty and enhance the living standards of rural people. It is hoped that this research will make a contribution to the future agrarian policy debate, in particular, the consideration of factors that are relevant to the benefit of rural people. This thesis considers land reform to be a complete program, which includes not only the. 政治大 more has to be done, as land reform is still incomplete. It is the responsibility of the 立 distribution of land but also government support for the new owners. In this context,. government to provide the peasants with the basic tools and knowledge they need to. ‧ 國. 學. develop the agrarian sector and to assure total rights over their lands.. ‧. 1.3.Research Methods. sit. y. Nat. io. er. This thesis is a literature-based study investigating land reform in Taiwan and Peru between 1950 and 1975. Information from this literature is used to analyze the possible. al. n. v i n factors which influenced on theC results of land reformUimplementation for both cases. hengchi The methodology in the present thesis will include a comparative method, using the. Most Similar System Design (MSSD) developed by John Stuart Mill in his book “A System of Logic” in 1843. According to Przeworski & Teune, the MSSD is used in order to identify some attribute for explanation, where “systems” that share common characteristics are selected for the comparative analysis, and where “the following theoretical implications follow: (1) the factors that are common to the countries are irrelevant in determining the behavior being explained since different patterns of behavior are observed among systems sharing these factors; and (2) any set of variables that differentiates these systems in a manner corresponding to the observed differences 5. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(14) of behavior. . . can be considered as explaining these patterns of behavior” (Przeworski & Teune, 1970).. So, taking into consideration that both cases share common characteristics such as the type of political party, one-party system; and the fact that both were in the same level of economic development during the land reform implementations, the present work will perform a comparative analysis for both cases. First, we will develop a detailed study of the land reform in Taiwan and Peru regarding its background and the process of the land reform. After studying the situation of both cases, we will conduct a. 政治大. comparative analysis to explain the difference between the result of the land reform for. 立. Taiwan and Peru. This analysis will involve two phases.. ‧ 國. 學. The first phase will analyze each of the indicators mentioned in the “definition of land. ‧. reform success”, described by Tuma in the theoretical framework section. The. sit. y. Nat. indicators include variables such as Production, Productivity, Income, Employment,. n. al. er. io. Investment, Social & Political Stability, and Peasant Participation & Decision Making.. i n U. v. At the end of the analysis, a summary table will be created. The second phase of the. Ch. engchi. comparative analysis implies the evaluation of the indicators with different results in each case. The cause of each difference will be evaluated, confirming if the factors presented in the literature review are helpful to explain the different results in both cases. At the end of this evaluation, a summary table will be created in order to have a clear understanding of which were the relevant factors that explain the difference between the results of the land reform performed in Taiwan and Peru.. It’s necessary to specify that in order to evaluate the effectiveness of an intervention programme is necessary to include long-term outcomes as well as immediate or shortterm outcomes (Mouton, 2001). However, for the purpose of the present thesis only 6. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(15) short-term evaluation will be considered as a long-term evaluation would require more extensive analysis.. In addition, both English and Spanish language literature will be utilized. Documents used, come from case studies, researchers contributing to universities and NGOs, individual researchers, newspapers, scientific magazines, governmental and international reports.. 1.4. Organization of the Study. 政治大 This thesis is organized into six chapters, including the introductory one. Chapter 2 立 presents the theoretical framework, including the definition of land reform, the. ‧ 國. 學. definition of land reform success, literature review and theories related to the possible. ‧. explanatory factors for land reform success. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 include an. sit. y. Nat. overview of land reform in Taiwan and Peru respectively, focusing especially on the. io. er. background and land reform process. Chapter 5 is composed in two phases. The first phase will analyze the effects of the land reform implementation in the case of Taiwan. al. n. v i n Ctohcompare Taiwan’sUand Peru’s land reforms, using and Peru. The second phase aims engchi economic and social indicators with different results. So, at the end of the comparison,. we will determine if any of the factors or theories explained in the literature review could explain the different results in both cases. At the same time, comparative tables will be included for clarity. Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the main conclusions.. 7. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(16) CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. Few attempts have been made to develop general principles or a body of theory specifically for land reform (King, 1977). However, it is necessary to outline previous conceptualizations of land reform and review the related theories available, in order to. 政治大. understand the possible factors that could influence the result of land reform implementation.. 學. ‧ 國. 立. 2.1. Concept of Land Reform. ‧. The definition of land reform has been subject to different interpretations. Some. sit. y. Nat. describe it as the way to provide land to the landless, while others have defined it as a. io. al. n. 1969).. er. complete program for the transformation of the entire agricultural economy (Warriner,. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. According to Tai (1974), land reform refers to public programs that attempt to restructure equitably and rationally a defective land tenure system by a drastic and rapid process, and where the purpose of the reform is to increase the productivity of land through government-sponsored tenure changes. These changes involve both redistributive programs (land redistribution and tenancy reform), and developmental programs (cooperative farming and publicly instituted land settlement). Among the three kinds of reform programs, the author suggests that land redistribution is the most important, because it is a direct solution for inequality of land ownership, and that land redistribution should be considered as a basic agrarian change, where other reform. 8. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(17) measures have a more complementary role. Furthermore, if the program of land redistribution is not considered, the efforts to solve inequality and increase productivity are limited, as the security of tenure and rent reduction will not be guaranteed (Ladejinsky, 1965).. An agricultural policy seeking only to give land to the landless without providing the new owners with essential agricultural services may result in the fall of production, interfering with one major objective of tenure changes. The common understanding of land reform excludes measures such as agricultural research, extension, credit and. 政治大. marketing; measures related to tenure reform. Moreover, this kind of reform could have. 立. a significant change in agricultural services institutions and provide useful tools for. ‧ 國. 學. peasants to improve their lands (Carroll, 1961).. ‧. 2.2. Defining Success of Land Reform. y. Nat. io. sit. Land reform is a complex process that could have different effects on societies. And. n. al. er. due to the various social, political and economic objectives of each society, its. i n U. v. evaluation may be difficult as those objectives may be inconsistent with each other.. Ch. engchi. According to Tuma “there are no generally accepted criteria for determining the success of such a program, nor adequate tools for measuring its progress”. However, he mentioned two criteria that may be considered, the economic one and the social one. (Tuma, 2013).. 2.2.1. Economic criteria In order to analyze the economic development after a land reform, it is necessary to focus on the economic indicators. The economic development is usually reflected in the increase of per capita real income, which has to be accompanied by improvements in. 9. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(18) the economic and social structure (investment, productivity, and employment) in order to have sustained economic development (Tuma, 2013). Investment in agriculture involves the farmer having sufficient resources, such as machinery, irrigation and drainage facilities, and fertilizers. Those resources will contribute to the productivity of the land and the worker. And since investment partly depends on domestic saving, an increase of investment may thus be an indicator of the success of land reform on the improvement of economic development (Tuma, 2013).. On the other hand, the variation in land productivity is related to a higher efficiency, a. 治政 better use of resources, and improvements in the use of大 technology. The change in this 立 indicator also implies an increase in income and thus saving and investment on land. ‧ 國. 學. Indeed, a higher productivity produced by land reform may be one of the most. ‧. important indicators that contribute to economic development. Another important indicator may be the level of rural employment since it reflects the income’s distribution.. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. (Abhijit, 1999). i n U. v. Finally, the increment in production, which reflects the change in the response capacity. Ch. engchi. of agriculture to the demands of industry and manufacturing, is another important indicator. When agriculture is able to provide industrial raw materials, food, labor and a market for industrial products, land reform may reflect its important contribution to industrialization and development (Yu-Kang & Schive, 1995).. 2.2.2. Social criteria On land reform, social and political goals are more difficult to measure. According to Tuma (2013), one of the most important indicators could be the participation of the farmers regarding voting, representation and decision-making activities. Another. 10. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(19) indicator is the degree of social and political stability. This is measured by the tendency to change the government by constitutional means or not, and the continuity of the government without relying on forceful means. However, these indicators can only demonstrate that change has been made. The impact of the reform will depend on the scope of that change. In agreement with Tuma (2013), if we assume that measurement of social indicators is feasible, there are three approaches that we can use to evaluate land reform: (1) the goal achievement approach, (2) the perceived achievement approach, and (3) the closing-the-gap approach. “Goal. 政治大 prior the reform is achieved. “Perceived Achievement approach” considers a reform 立. achievement approach” implies that a reform is successful if the objective specified. successful if the relevant parties perceive that their objectives have been satisfied. And. ‧ 國. 學. finally, the “Closing-the-Gap approach” considers a reform successful if it reaches to. ‧. reduce the gap between the agricultural sector and the more developed sectors in the. io. sit. y. Nat. society (Tuma, 2013).. er. 2.3. Literature Review. al. n. v i n C hproblem around U Poverty has always been a major the world. The solution to this engchi. problem would result in the improvement of living standards for about two-thirds of the world’s population. The majority of these people living in poor conditions are from rural areas, where they have been facing many restrictions to their most basic need and resource, the land. Many conflicts have been taking place over the tenure of land, where land reform has been frequently a popular slogan for the redistribution of wealth and economic development in several countries (King, 1977).. Some authors have shown that land reform can contribute to poverty alleviation, but others question the validity of this relationship. What we do know is that the successful. 11. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(20) experience of land reform in specific countries still gives rise to debates on how the developmental process has been affected, not only by initial conditions but also by choice of development strategy and policies. Several authors have sought to identify the most important policies, factors, or variables in determining the course of development. It is difficult to select the determining factors, however, in the course of the discussion, several important factors have emerged. A growing body of literature has examined different factors that can be classified into five main categories: (1) state support in investment and technical assistance, (2) institutions, (3) guaranteed rights. 政治大. and incentives, (4) type of political system and (5) NGO & international organization.. 立. 2.3.1. State Support in Investment & Technical Assistance. ‧ 國. 學. Land reform can play a major part in stimulating the rural economy, particularly in. ‧. providing the rural population with a greater command over their own food supply.. sit. y. Nat. However, without further changes in the agricultural infrastructure and in the non-farm. io. er. activities of an underdeveloped region, land reform can be less effective. According to North & Martinez (1997), important differences between the policies implemented by. al. n. v i n C hAmerica are mainlyUfocused on: (1) Deep agrarian the East Asian countries and Latin engchi. reforms, (2) Participatory institutions for small producers, (3) Large extension services, (4) Protection and promotion of rural sectors, (5) Intensive technologies in the use of labor and (6) Strong investment in primary and secondary education.. In Latin American for instance, the land reforms have generally been “incomplete”, because they failed to provide beneficiaries with the tools to develop. This factor explains why they have had a poor record in solving the poverty problem. As Janvry and Sadoulet mentioned “from the social aspect, land reform in Latin America has been effective in displacing traditional landed elites and achieving political control over. 12. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(21) peasants, but not in promoting the social incorporation of beneficiaries” (Janvry & Sadoulet, 2002). The case in Peru shows us that agrarian reform does not seem to have been focused on promoting the development of agriculture. Although in its initial formulation the law defined agrarian reform as an integral process, the reality is that important components, such as technical assistance and training for peasants and cooperative members, were limited and even suspended after a few years (Castillo, 2003). Further tests carried out with recent evidence in nineteen countries, including Peru and Taiwan, reveals that land reform based on redistribution to small-scale farmers. 政治大 scale agricultural sector (Widerman, 2006). 立. can succeed only if there are a significant state support and investment in the small-. ‧ 國. 學. 2.3.2. Institutions. ‧. A pre-reform agrarian system suggests that land reform is basically a social and political. sit. y. Nat. issue. It cannot be convincingly justified exclusively on economic grounds or agro-. io. er. technical logic of cropping intensity in land use and application of technological advance to subsistence cultivation. From whichever aspect the policymaker or. al. n. v i n development analyst approachesC the problem of rural development, these problems rest hengchi U. upon a host of retrogressive institutional arrangements and rural power relations (ElGhonemy, 1990). In the book “The Political Economy of Rural Poverty: The Case for Land Reform”, the author identifies the institutional determinants of poverty, with particular emphasis on the barriers to entry to the land and credit markets, where land reform is viewed as an anti-monopoly policy to regulate productive forces, while reducing the concentration of wealth and power in order to save the society from destabilization. However, the cases of the study found that governments and their technocrats are not neutral, as usually assumed in neoclassical economic models. Exploitative relations and corruption prevail and often the interests of those economic 13. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(22) classes on whom government depends for their tenure in office are served, while the interest of the rural poor is passed over (El-Ghonemy, 1990).. In order to promote sustainable and equitable development, well-informed and specific strategies are required by the government and other social actors involved. The institutions that govern land tenure must be continuously adapted and regulated to serve the public interest. But, if institutions and policies that regulate rights and obligations in terms of access to land are made primarily to favor the dominant corporations and other powerful groups, instead of the families in need, the “public interest” can easily. 政治大. be interpreted as the opposite of sustainable development (Barraclough, 1999). The. 立. strong emphasis on top-down state action and bureaucratic modes of implementation. ‧ 國. 學. may limit the potentials of land reform to achieve desired changes in land tenure and land use in practice (Sikor & Muller, 2009).. ‧. Nat. io. sit. y. 2.3.3. Guaranteed Rights and Incentives. n. al. er. The principal problem for the people living in rural poverty lies in insecure and. i n U. v. inequitable terms of access to land. Many of these people are not able to generate. Ch. engchi. enough income to satisfy their basic needs, while others produce a surplus that is usually appropriated by the landlord, employers, intermediaries, collectors of taxes, and others (Barraclough, 1999). In their study, Boyce, Rosset, & Stanton suggest that there is not a single formula for the success of land reform, but the evidence of the East Asia countries (Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, China) shows that successful cases in land reform share common factors such as: The security of rights for future investment in land improvements, women’s rights to land, as well as guaranteed and protected rights for indigenous communities to land, forests, water and other common property resources. Adequate distribution of land for agriculture, which is free of claims disputed. 14. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(23) by other poor people, is also important, and, when families receive land, they should not carry heavy debts to pay for it. Small farmers need a supportive policy environment, including access to credit, fair prices for their products, and access to infrastructure and social services. Policies are needed to reward farming practices that generate environmental benefits (e.g. conservation of agricultural biodiversity), as well as to discourage farming practices that generate environmental costs (e.g., use of pesticides). The author concludes that experience shows that pro-poor land reform is possible. When done well, land reform is a powerful strategy to reduce poverty while improving. 政治大. environmental quality (Boyce, Rosset, & Stanton, 2005).. 立. 2.3.4. Type of Political System. ‧ 國. 學. Effective land reforms have never been mainly technocratic practices. Their realization. ‧. has always required the active participation of political parties or similar political. sit. y. Nat. organizations. Throughout history, political parties have played a major role in land. io. er. reforms, but these roles have varied widely in different political systems. In a comparison of the reform performance of competitive and non- competitive systems, it. al. n. v i n is shown that is much easier forC a non-competitive system h e n g c h i U to effect meaningful tenure reform. According to the author, where most of the developing countries in need of. reform are controlled by multiparty or bi-party systems (competitive system), the probability for prompt, effective and drastic land reform is generally not bright. On the other hand, in countries where political power is concentrated in one party or a small group of leaders (non-competitive system), the elites really seek to broaden their rural base in order to have the support of the peasants; the possibility of a relatively successful reform is high (Tai, 1974).. 15. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(24) In democratic states with multi-party systems, such as Puerto Rico, Venezuela and Chile, political parties openly competed for electoral support by compromising land reform. However, when a political party wanted to promulgate land reform, it had to follow open debate and many compromises with other political parties. Meanwhile, in the case of more authoritarian political systems, open party competition for popular support was severely restricted. However, even if the opposition parties were banned, the leftist parties were still clandestinely organized. This generally increased the pressures on the regime to support some type of land reform. The competing officers. 政治大 land reforms. This was the case in Peru with Velasco Alvarado regime in 1969, the 立. were often looking for populist support, which sometimes led them to undertake radical. nationalist government in the 1950’s (Barraclough, 1999).. Nat. sit. y. ‧. 2.3.5. NGO & International Organization. 學. ‧ 國. military junta in El Salvador in 1979 and the Taiwanese reform with the Chinese. io. er. Progressive NGOs and committed international organizations can play important roles as catalysts in helping grassroots peasant and landless movements to organize and press. al. n. v i n C h by the author, these their demands for land. As described international institutions can engchi U help through (1) research focused on the livelihood and sustainable development. problems of the rural poor, (2) providing valuable technical assistance, material resources and legal aid, (3) facilitating the use of modern communication technologies by peasants and others struggling for reform, (4) publishing violations of socioeconomic and human rights, corruption and other abuses suffered by the poor and (5) advancing land reforms through advocacy at all levels (Barraclough, 1999).. Nonetheless, evidence in Ghana and Kenya suggests that when global land policies are backed by World Bank/IMF and other development partners, in aspects such as titling. 16. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(25) and registration of lands, the promotion of land markets and the individualization of tenure delegitimizes local institutional contexts. So, in the end, these international institutions could significantly change local institutional structures and increase transaction costs of reform programs for investments (Narh, Lambini, Sabbi, Pham, & Nguyen, 2016).. In conclusion, as we observed in the literature review only the three first factors (“State support in investment & technical assistance”, “Institutions” and “Guaranteed rights and incentives”) are useful to explain why land reform work in Taiwan but not in Peru,. 政治大. since the fourth factor regarding the “type of political system” is the same in both cases. 立. Taiwan and Peru and will not contribute to explaining the different results on land. ‧ 國. 學. reform implementations. And finally, it will not be fair to compare the fourth factor “NGO & international organization”, since during the first years of land reform. ‧. implantation Taiwan received assistance from international organizations as the JCRR. y. Nat. io. sit. (Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction). However, in the case of. n. al. er. Peru, available literature about land reform in Peru does not mention international. i n U. v. organizations as a fundamental actor during the first stage of land reform. Ch. engchi. implementation in Peru. One of the main international organization that promoted the agricultural development through technical assistance was the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which started their operations in Peru in 2011.. 2.4. Theories on Land Reform 2.4.1. Economic Efficiency The present theoretical aspect aims to explain why state intervention is important to increase efficiency in agricultural production, which is related with the first factor suggested in the literature review, “State support in investment & technical assistance”. 17. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(26) According to Jelic et al. (2014), the historical concern of the government to increase the food supply for the population, lead the government to take measures for agrarian interventions in order to increase the production efficiency. However, the question is why if the economy works by the effects of the free market, the government budget has to help to improve the efficiency of resources. The reason why the state needs to intervene in this aspect is that the manufacture and agrarian sectors have different structures. While the first sector has as a target the maximization of its production, which would stimulate the innovation in new technologies, the agrarian sector only. 政治大 sub-optimization problem rise and there is a concern that the agrarian sector will not be 立 pursues a standard profit or at least food supply for their family. As a consequence, a. able to provide enough food required by the country. Not only regarding the amount of. ‧ 國. 學. food but also at acceptable prices for the urban population. So, due to the gap between. ‧. both manufacture and agrarian sector, there is the necessity of the state to provide the. sit. y. Nat. family agriculture system with new technology diffusion and its accurate. io. er. implementation in practice through technical assistance or advisory service. The author suggested that public investments in research and development seem to be a field of. al. n. v i n C h as they leadUto improvements in agricultural interventions in contemporary agriculture engchi productivity (Jelic, Jasminka, Srecko, & Jugoslav, 2014).. 2.4.2. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) This approach holds that the economic performance of a country depends on institutions. New Institutional Economics (NIE) studies how institutions and property rights appear and work (North, 1995), and how costs associated with interactions between social groups have an impact on economic behavior and outcomes (Williamson, 1985). According to Ostrom, “the concept of an institutional statement as a broad term encompassing three types of statements—rules, norms, and shared strategies. These 18. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(27) statements describe opportunities and constraints that create expectations about other actors’ behavior” (Ostrom, 2005). When the institutions are defined, uncertainty is reduced and it provides a structure to daily life. The institutions are therefore the fundamental determinants of economic performance in the long term.. In a land reform program, considering institutions in this way shows how the reform process eliminates or reduces constraints and create incentives to access and invest in land. Furthermore, it helps to understand how property rights can be organized to avoid externalities to the landowners and the society in general. In this context, the structuring. 政治大. of property rights is fundamental to a land reform program. Correct structuring of. 立. property rights can help to ensure socially fair, equitable, and legitimate outcomes, as. ‧ 國. 學. well as reducing the costs of investing in land.. ‧. This thesis follows the NIE's approach, and its associated property rights theory, to. sit. y. Nat. explain how land reform institutions work. It also investigates the institutional changes. n. al. er. io. and barriers to implementation, as well as the progress provided by land reforms and. i n U. v. property rights institutions for enhancing access to land and investment in agriculture.. Ch. engchi. Therefore, this approach is related with the second factor suggested in the literature review “Institutions” and gives us an insight on how institutional structure matters.. 2.4.3. Access Theory The Access Theory developed by Ribot & Peluso (2003) describes how accessing things, such as resources, is more than simply having rights to it. Having “access” involves a web of powers, in which property allows actors to improve, control, and maintain access to their resources, in order to participate and obtain benefits from them. Therefore, a property is not only about rights, but also about all different forms of. 19. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(28) getting access and holding power. In this context, among the many forms of power that provide access to resources, rights are just one of them. Moreover, this theory also helps us to understand why certain people or institutions take advantage or benefit from resources, having or not rights to it.. The definition of access, used in the access theory, facilitates the analysis of who really benefits from land reforms and what are the processes they are willing to go through. Thus, access in the land sector is related to the cases where powerful actors are able to use their authority or power in the land market in order to restrict those people with. 政治大. rights (property), their ability to obtain benefits from the land. This is a characteristic. 立. usually seen in developing countries, where people could have the right of using their. ‧ 國. 學. resource but due to different factors such us bureaucratic factors or intermediaries, they are not able to have access to it and therefore, the benefits that can be obtained from. ‧. that resource are totally or partially denied.. sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. Hence, this approach is related with the third factor suggested in the literature review. v. n. “Guaranteed rights and incentives” and helps us to understand how guaranteed rights. Ch. engchi. i n U. or access to the land are important to create incentives for the peasants in order to improve and invest in their lands. So, as we can see this is an important factor that could determine the success or failure of a land reform program. If the peasants cannot have guaranteed rights or access to their land, they will not be satisfied and won’t be willing to work the land efficiently as they will not receive the total benefits of their work.. To summarize, land reform will be consider in the present work as a complete program that aims to provide not only land to the landless but also governmental support to the new farm landowners and according to Elias Tuma, it success will depend on the performance of its economic indicators (Production, productivity, income, employment, 20. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(29) and investments) and social indicators (Political and social stability, and decision making and peasant participation). According to the literature review, the possible factors that could explain why land reform worked in Taiwan but not in Peru could be related to the factors “State support in investment & technical assistance”, “Institutions” and “Guaranteed rights and incentives”. At the same time, three theories related to the explanatory factors were found. The first one is “Economic Efficiency”, which is related to the factor “State support in investment & technical assistance” and where the historical concern of the government to increase the food supply for the population,. 政治大 agrarian sector. The second. lead the government to take measures for agrarian interventions in order to increase the production efficiency in the. 立. theory is “The New. Institutional Economics”, which is related to the factors of Institutions. In this case,. ‧ 國. 學. Institutions are fundamental to a land reform program in order to be socially fair,. ‧. equitable, and to reduce the costs of investing in land. And finally, the “Access Theory”. sit. y. Nat. is related with the factor “Guaranteed rights and incentives”. Where having “access”. io. er. involves a web of powers, in which property allows actors to improve, control, and maintain access to their resources, in order to participate and obtain benefits from it.. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. This then brings to the conclusion of this particular chapter. The following chapter discusses the background and process of the land reform in Taiwan.. 21. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(30) CHAPTER 3 LAND REFORM IN TAIWAN. 3.1 Background of the Land Reform in Taiwan Between 1895 and 1945, Taiwan was under the Japanese administration. During this period, Japan improved the Taiwanese agriculture, especially in the production of rice. 政治大 agriculture sector, mainly on issues of water management and new crop varieties. The 立 and sugar. The Japanese technicians transferred technology and innovation to the. principal purpose of the colonial administration was to enhance Taiwanese agriculture. ‧ 國. 學. so that larger supplies of food could be exported to Japan to sustain its industrialization. ‧. effort (Yu-Kang & Schive, 1995). According to Samuel Ho, during this period,. sit. y. Nat. “Taiwan developed an effective administrative system; a fairly extensive infrastructure;. io. er. an agricultural sector that was, after Japan, the most advanced in Asia; the beginning of an industrial sector; and some modern commercial and financial institutions” (Ho,. al. n. v i n Ch 1987). In this aspect, all those investments in material and human capital made during engchi U. the colonial period helped the Taiwanese farmers to be prepared for the land reform that would take place a few years later.. Another important contribution of the Japanese administration was the cadastral survey of all the land properties between 1898 and 1904. This report showed the characteristics and conditions of the properties and cultivated lands in order to eliminate the “double property” in 1905. This survey also allowed the administration to identify the landlords that were not paying taxes. This helped to increase the income for the government, which later would be invested in the development of Taiwan (Vander. 22. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(31) Meer & Vander Meer, 1968). Nevertheless, this measure did not solve the problem of tenancy conditions. During the Japanese period, 40% of the farmers were tenants, 25 % part-owner and 56% of the cultivated land was rented (King, 1977).. According to King (1977), the following tenancy conditions were also presented during the Japanese administration  In 1930, only 6% of the landlords possessed half of the cultivated lands.  Few contracts were written and generally were violated by the landlord.  The tenants used to pay exorbitant rent to the landlord, and also the tenant had to. 政治大. deposit a large amount of money to secure their lease.. 立.  The rent was between 50 % and 70% of the annual crop and farmers had to pay for. ‧ 國. 學. it in rice..  Subletting of the land was common and it leads to cumulative exploitation.. ‧.  About 82% of the farmers that needed credit, asked private moneylenders, which. y. Nat. sit. usually were landlords.. n. al. er. io.  Between 1926 and 1940, a yield of rice per hectare increased by 1.4% annually,. i n U. v. lands rents increased 1.2 % and the value of paddy land, 2%.. Ch. engchi.  Additionally, during the later stages of the World War II, Taiwan was bombarded. by the Allies and the damages caused by this and from severe typhoons, made Taiwan reduce its agricultural production by 12% annually.. According to Chang, under this system of tenancy, the productivity of land and the farmer’s incentive to produce were limited, and this produced an increment on the poverty of the rural society. Therefore, because of their situation of poverty and the uncertainty of tenure, tenants were not willing to make any long-term investment in their land (Chang, 1974).. 23. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(32) However, after the Japanese defeat at the end of World War II in 1945, General Order No. 1 instructed Japan to surrender its troops in Taiwan to Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party Kuomintang (KMT). This new situation made people from the urban area of Taiwan to move to the rural areas. As a consequence of the pressure over the lands, it made the landlords increase the price of the rents even higher. In addition, the population grew with the migration of 1.5 million refugees from mainland China and the 630,000 nationalist armies. In this situation, the landlords had to support the KMT of taking the administration of Taiwan, because. 政治大 drastic reform. So, it was better that KMT, a group of intellectual elite, could manage 立. they were afraid that the communist party could come to Taiwan and introduce a. the government of Taiwan (Burisch, 1969).. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 3.2 Process of the Land Reform in Taiwan. sit. y. Nat. The Kuomintang land reform took place in three stages. Firstly, farm rent reduction in. io. er. 1949, where rents were limited to a maximum of 37.5% of the main crop yield. Secondly, the sale of public land previously owned by the Japanese nationals. And. al. n. v i n C hin 1953, where mostUof the landlords were forced to finally, the “Land to the tiller Act” engchi sell their lands to the tenants.. 3.2.1 First Stage: Farmland Rent Reduction The first measure of rent reduction was enacted in 1949, but since it was evaded by the landlords, another Act was enacted in 1951 called the “Farm Rent Reduction to 37.5% Act”. The objective of this measure was to reduce the rent by a maximum of 37.5% of the standard annual yield of the main crop. However, the landlord established the rent according to their expectations of the annual yield in each particular holding and according to the local conditions. So, in this case, the agrarian cadaster made by the 24. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(33) Japanese with 26 categories of dry and irrigated land was of so much help. This generated that tenants with a higher yield above the standard yield of their main crop, were satisfied with the rental, and those with a lower yield below the standard through poor weather conditions ended in rental cancellations for that season (King, 1977).. According to King (1977), during the implementation of the Farmland Rent Reduction, the following measures were also implemented: . Extra burdens to the tenants, such as payment in advance and security deposits, were eliminated. This provided the tenants with security of their rights never experienced before in Taiwan.. 立. 政治大.  The contracts had a minimum of 6 years (before was 3 years). And even though. ‧ 國. 學. the contract finish, the landlord could have his land back only if he met one of the three requirements: (1) Evidence that the landlord can work the land, (2) His. ‧. income is insufficient to sustain his family or (3) the tenant has proofs to be. y. Nat. sit. supported by the government.. n. al. er. io.  The subletting was not allowed, and to write contracts was mandatory.. i n U. v.  A hierarchical structure of committees was implemented from the national to the. Ch. engchi. local areas. This helped to improve the operations of the land reform without any bureaucratic limitation.. After all those implementations, there was an exhaustive revision of all the contracts (377,000 in total), which involved about 300,000 hectares of land. At the end of the revision, the Act of 1951 revealed that an approximate of 35,000 of the contracts signed in 1949 had been violated, mainly by the landlord. After the revelation of this Act, many landlords decided to sell their lands because they perceived that rent reduction had been affecting their incomes severely. On the other hand, there were others that speculated. 25. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(34) about a future expropriation of land, so that they preferred to sell part of their lands at very low prices. This early sale of lands with prices below the market created an incentive for the tenants to start buying those lands. Those prices offered by the landlords were even below the prices that would be offered later in the “Land to the Tiller” program (Burisch, 1969).. As a result of this first phase of the land reform, it generated economic changes with the decline of the land value. According to a survey conducted by the China Institute of Land Economics, it revealed that in December 1949, the year of the enforcement of. 政治大. the rent reduction program, the average price of paddy fields dropped by 19.4% and by. 立. 42.4% the dry lands. However, the living standards of agrarian families were improved,. ‧ 國. 學. without the need for radical changes in tenancy structure. Since extra production was now to be enjoyed entirely by the tenant, it increased the incentive to produce more for. ‧. them and for the market (Chang, 1974).. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. As well as providing the farmers with a better quality of life, this first phase of the land. i n U. v. reform created certain prerequisites for future phases of land reform. On the one hand,. Ch. engchi. it generated an organizational structure with the rent committee and the establishment of an efficient local tenancy, with the help of the cadaster. And on the other hand, in the psychological aspect, the reduction of the land prices made the tenants be aware of future opportunities.. 3.2.2 Second Stage: Sale of Public Land The sale of public lands, previously owned by the Japanese, started in 1948. The majority of the public land was transferred to public enterprises, such as the Taiwan Sugar Corporation. But, this was stopped with the “Farmland Rent Reduction” program. 26. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(35) implemented in 1949. However, this project of public land sale was implemented again in 1951. Between 1948 and 1958, six sales were made, where two of the main sales were the national and provincial lands in mid - 1951, and the expropriation of the Taiwan Sugar Corporation in 1952 (King, 1977).. Before the sales of land, the tenants on public lands used to pay 25% of the annual crop. But, after the sale of public lands, the financial burdens were higher. Even when the 20 semi-annual repayments to the government within ten years were equivalent to the rents of 25% of the annual crop, the taxes and other charges increased the farmers’ expenses. 政治大. According to the calculations of Koo, including all the taxes and other charges, the total. 立. rents were between the 25.5% - 32.5% of the standard annual crop yield, a proportion. ‧ 國. 學. that was below the proportion paid by the tenants with the 37.5% law. This situation generated high expectations for the new landholders to have a complete right over their. ‧. lands within ten years (Koo, 1968).. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. In the process of public land sales, the priority was directed to the former tenants or. i n U. v. local farmers with insufficient land. As a result, an approximate of 130 000 tenant’s. Ch. engchi. families bought a total of 70 000 hectares, giving an average of a ½ hectare per family. It is also important to mention that this process was relatively slow. On the one hand, it was due to the care in the selection of the new landowners and the decisions about the repayment methods. But on the other hand, it also showed the obstructionism of public enterprises against the enacted law and the discomfort of the small-scale private farming (Koo, 1968).. Finally, as a result of the second phase of the land reform in Taiwan, by selling 40% of the public lands and transforming tenants into new landowners, this program served as a pilot stage before the final phase of the land reform “Land to the Tiller”. 27. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(36) 3.2.3 Third Stage: Land to the Tiller Through the Act of 1953, it empowered the government to expropriate the lands of the landlords with lands above a certain limit and to create new owner-farmers. The private landowners could have up to 3 hectares of rice field and up to 6 hectares of dry land, both types of lands of average quality. Rice was the most important agricultural product for Taiwan and the rice sector was influenced immensely by the land reform (Chen, 1994). The lands from above those limits were mandatory purchase by the government for about 2.5 times the standard annual crop yield, where 70% of the compensation was. 政治大 with the participation in stock 立shares of government enterprises (Chang, 1974).. in form of land bonds linked to the prices of agricultural products and 30% where paid. ‧ 國. 學. The tenant had to pay 2.5 times the standard crop yield, plus a 4% of interest for over. ‧. ten years in twenty installments, one payment after each crop yield. The payment in. sit. y. Nat. both rice and cash was less than the payment with the rent reduction program of 37.5%. io. er. during the last four years. Moreover, regarding governmental investment, the state made a considerable financial commitment in order to promote agricultural. al. n. v i n C hagricultural investment modernization. During the 1950’s, represented a fifth of the engchi U. total national investment. Additionally, land reform was complemented with a strong program of agricultural extension directed by the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), which promote the creation of associations of farmers. Those associations developed new technologies, marketing and credit cooperatives, and participated in agricultural planning. As a result of the final stage of the land reform, about 140,000 hectares of land were sold to 195,000 new owner-farmers, which generate the increment of the proportion of owner-farmers from 56% to 86% of the total farmland between 1948 and 1959 (Koo, 1968).. 28. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(37) According to Jolly, as was the case half a century earlier with the Japanese land reform, the expropriation of land was made easier by the fact that the government had no interest in the support of the landlords. The Kuomintang leaders, coming as they did from the mainland China, also felt no obligation to the local elite (Jolly, 2003).. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 29. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(38) CHAPTER 4 LAND REFORM IN PERU. 4.1 Background of the Land Reform in Peru In order to understand the land reform in Peru is necessary to specify that Peru is divided into three main regions: the coast (Costa), the highlands (Sierra) and the jungle (Selva).. 政治大. Each of these regions had different characteristics in its agricultural structure. For. 立. instance, in the highlands, the agrarian system was composed mainly by the hacendados,. ‧ 國. 學. which were privileged with the arable lands; while the poorest lands belonged to the traditional communities. On the other hand, the agricultural system in the coast was. ‧. characterized for having largely irrigated lands, which were specialized in the export of. y. Nat. io. sit. sugar, and where 65% of the sugar plantations belonged to foreign enterprises. Finally,. n. al. er. the jungle was characterized for having extensive areas of forest, some of them. i n U. v. inaccessible and others exploited because of its natural resources. So, due to the. Ch. engchi. significant difference in the agricultural structure of these three regions, a very important issue discussed by the government was the land reform issue. If the government wanted to start a process of development and modernization, a change in the tenure system was fundamental (Carroll, 1970). In order to understand the situation of the tenure and agrarian system before the land reform, the following paragraphs will provide the most relevant aspects.. Regarding tenancy structure, in 1961 less than 4000 farm holdings (which represented 0.4% of the total) occupied 76% of the cultivated land. From these 4000 farm holdings,. 30. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(39) 1000 belonged to large landowners with lands of more than 2500 hectares each, occupying about 62% of the total cultivated land. On the other hand, 700,000 smallholders, which represented 83% of the total farm holdings, had less than 5 hectares each and in total, they occupied about 6% of the arable land (Brodsky & Oser, 1968).. With respect to the incomes distribution, the lowest income was for those families composed of landless and tenant workers that lived in the highlands. The number of families that lived in this situation was 700,000 families, and it represented about 3 million people, equivalent to over a quarter of the total population of Peru. On the other. 政治大. hand, due to the development of the guano industry and the increasing export market. 立. for cotton and sugar, large plantations were consolidated in the coastal region. The. ‧ 國. 學. oligarchy that existed during those times was associated with the commercial landlords of the coast, but not with the traditional landlords of the highlands (Cotler, 1967).. ‧ sit. y. Nat. Between 1950 and 1960, the agricultural performance was not going well, due partially. n. al. er. io. to factors related to the landlords. The variation of food production (2.5% annually) did. i n U. v. not increase as the population growth (3.3% annually). As a consequence, the. Ch. engchi. agricultural exports were reduced and the import of food started to grow. Between the periods of 1960 and 1970, the values of imports grew from 8 million USD to 67 million USD approximately. On the other hand, the other responsible for the food shortage was the little use of lands from large properties. Farms with more than 500 hectares cultivated only 10% of the total area, while properties below 10 hectares worked 66% of the land. According to estimations, 1 million of those holdings could have been cultivated without significant investment on infrastructure and another 1.5 million hectares with regular investment (Carroll, 1970).. 31. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(40) Due to this situation, an agrarian reform was expected to come since the peasants began to reveal and even started to invade lands in 1950. Those rebellions took place mainly in the south and central part of the highlands (Craig, 1969). But the conflicts increased with the excessive demands of the landlords over the tenant workers, who had been working hard on their plantations. Peasants refused to work the lands for the landlords and organized groups to defend themselves from dislodgement attempts. As a consequence of this conflict between landlords and peasants, the army was sent to those areas, where many acts of violence took place. The peasant’s movement was extended. 政治大 But, since this movement produced the expulsion of many landowners, the government 立. to 300,000 members, considered as one of the largest in the history of Latin America.. of the President Belaunde enacted a special decree in 1964 with a local land reform in. ‧ 國. 學. order to stop all these conflicts (King, 1977).. ‧. 4.2 Process of the Land Reform in Peru (1963-1975). sit. y. Nat. io. er. In the case of Taiwan, every stage of the land reform had a specific program enacted by the government. However, it was not the same case in Peru. The land reform law. al. n. v i n C hgovernment took place under the Belaunde and Velasco’s in a nonspecific program as engchi U Taiwan did. So, in order to have a clear understanding of the land reform. implementations, we will divide it according to a chronological order, which is not a formal one. But for the purpose of the study, it will be helpful to have a better understanding of the procedure of the land reform in Peru.. 4.2.1 Land Reform under Belaunde Government (1963-1968) 4.2.1.1 First Stage: Public Land Distribution Fernando Belaunde Terry, the President of Peru, after taking the power in 1963 decided to introduce a new law regarding land reform. After listening to the other parties' 32. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.

(41) proposal, the result was a complicated and extensive law, enacted in 1964. Unfortunately, this law was not mandatory, which protected and secured the land of many large landowners. In the land reform process, the public lands were distributed first. Three regions of the highlands (Cuzco, Puno, and Pasco-Junín) were prioritized by the government since those areas were the ones where the peasants’ movement started. While, in the region of the coast, the sugar plantations were excluded from the law. These plantations were very efficient agricultural landholdings, managed by corporative properties and agro-. 政治大 capital of Peru), giving priority to the coastal region characterized by a more 立 industrial operations. The last fact reflects the oligarchy that prevailed in Lima (the. agricultural wealth. At the same time, it also reflects the indifference of the government. ‧ 國. 學. with the remote areas of the highlands, whose landowners had only local political power,. ‧. but not national, and whose land expropriations were considered by the government. 4.2.1.2 Second Stage: Farmland Rent Reduction. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. “acceptable” in order to avoid peasant movements (Carroll, 1970).. n. v i n Cland Another aspect of the Belaunde’s was the rent reduction limited up to 20% h ereform ngchi U. of the annual crop yield and the extension of rent contracts up to 6 years. The tenants had the opportunities to become legal landowners up to 15-30 hectares, where the new landowners could pay their lands in 20 annual payments with a grace period determinate by the ONRA (National Bureau of Agrarian Reform), with a maximum of 5 years. However, the administrative process for expropriation used to take an average of 18 months. This reflects the inefficiency and the lack of rigor of the reform (Medina, 1970). The compensation for expropriations was in one part paid in cash and the other part in bonds.. 33. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.010.2018.A07.