東北亞漸增的單身率：年輕人親密關係形成之瓶頸 - 政大學術集成

全文

(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語博士學位學程 International Doctoral program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences - National Chengchi University. 博士論文 Doctoral Dissertation. 東北亞漸增的單身率：年輕人親密關係形成之瓶頸 Rising Celibacy Rates in Northeast Asia: Bottlenecks in Forming Intimate Relationships among Young Adults. Author: Philippe Cachia Advisor: I-Ching Lee. 中華人民 107 年 1 月 January, 2018.

(2) 論文題目－東北亞漸增的單身率：年輕人親密關係形成之瓶頸 Topic - Rising Celibacy Rates in Northeast Asia:. Bottlenecks in Forming Intimate Relationships among Young Adults. 研究生: 卡夏指導教授: 李怡青. Author: Philippe Cachia Advisor: I-Ching Lee. 國立政治大學亞太研究英語博士學位學程 International Doctoral program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences - National Chengchi University A Thesis Submitted to the International Doctoral program in Asia-Pacific Studies, National Chengchi University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 中華人民 107 年 1 月 January, 2018.

(3) Abstract Increasing rates of celibacy have been observed in Northeast Asian countries. One common explanation is that women refuse to marry because of gender-unequal family roles prevalent in Northeast Asian countries. This thesis examines an alternative explanation for the rising celibacy rates in Northeast Asia: Both genders may be unable to find a spouse because they integrate social and familial influences in their choice of a partner. Therefore, the inability, and not the unwillingness to find a partner delays Northeast Asian marriages. To support this thesis, I surveyed and compared the relationship formation of young adults from Taiwan, Japan, and France, where issues of celibacy and fertility are unheard of. The study confirms that French young adults are more likely to be in a relationship, and have fewer difficulties entering relationships compared to Taiwanese and Japanese. The study also found supporting evidence that social influences, integrated into partner’s choice, (a) predicted fewer partners and enhanced the perception that finding a partner is time-consuming for Taiwanese women, and (b) predicted difficulties in finding the right partner for Taiwanese and Japanese women. Finally, the results confirmed that Northeast Asian women who refuse unequal gender roles have lower intention to enter relationships, although no effect of gender roles on the number of partners was observed. Overall, these results support the hypothesis that a mechanism linking social influences, paramount to Northeast Asian social life, to relationship formation probably contributes to the inability to find a partner, possibly resulting in increasing celibacy. This mechanism may be functioning independently from gender roles. The increasing celibacy has serious consequences for Northeast Asian countries, such as negatively impacting their fertility rates, with dire consequences for social systems, economies, and even these countries’ very existence. The study guides Northeast Asian government planners and relationship counselors to encourage singles to favor personal choices to familial, or social requirements when choosing their intimate partners.. Key Words: Intimate Relationships, Dating, Singlehood, Social Networks, Social Norms, Pragma Love, Gender Roles, Celibacy, Northeast Asia. i.

(4) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………………. v. LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………………... vi. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION……………………………….. 1 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW…………………….… 5 2.1 ULTRA-LOW FERTILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA……………………... 5. 2.1.1 DEMOGRAPHIC STUDIES ON PREMARITAL RELATIONSHIPS …………... 7. 2.1.2 ASIAN VALUES AND CELIBACY …………………………………………….... 9. 2.1.3 SOCIAL INFLUENCES, SELECTION CRITERIA AND LOW FERTILITY….... 13. 2.1.4 CONCLUSION………………………………………………….…………………. 15. 2.2 LITERATURE ON RELATIONSHIP FORMATION…………………….. 16. 2.2.1 SOCIAL NETWORKS’ INFLUENCE ON RELATIONSHIPS…………………... 16. 2.2.2 PRAGMA LOVE ……………………….…………………………………………. 20. 2.2.3 GENDER ROLES …………………………………………………………………. 25. 2.3 DATING STEPS………………………….…………………………………... 28. 2.4 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………….. 29. 2.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES…………………………. 30. CHAPTER THREE: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS………….…….. 33. 3.1 INTRODUCTION……………………….………………………………….... 33. 3.2 PROCEDURE………………………………………………………………... 33. 3.2 RESULTS…………………………………………………………………….. 34. 3.3 CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………. 38. ii.

(5) CHAPTER FOUR: QUANTITATIVE METHODS……………….. 41. 4.1 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION…………….…………………………………….. 41. 4.2 GENERAL METHODS…………….………………………………………... 41. 4.3 INSTRUMENTS…………….………………………………………………... 43. 4.4 CONSTRUCTS’ EQUIVALENCE…………………………………………. 46 4.5 ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE ……………………………………………... CHAPTER FIVE: DATING EXPERIENCE, DATING PYRAMIDS AND DATING DIFFICULTIES…………………… 5.1 DATING EXPERIENCE…………………………………………………….. 48. 53 53. 5.2 DATING PYRAMIDS……………………………………………………….. 54 5.2.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS……………………………………………………….. 54. 5.2.2 DATING STEPS (DATING PYRAMIDS)……………………………………….... 55. 5.2.3 NOT BEING PURSUED AND NOT FINDING “MISTER RIGHT”……………... 58. 5.3 DATING DIFFICULTIES….…..…………………………………………… 58 5.4 CONCLUSION….…..…………………………………………….………….. 60. CHAPTER SIX: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL NORMS AND PRAGMATISM ON DATING………………………………………. 61 6.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS………………………………………………… 61 6.1.1 SOCIAL NORMS AND PRAGMATISM…………………………………………. 61. 6.1.2 CONTROL VARIABLES………………………………………………………….. 63. 6.1.3 NOTE ON SKEWED AND LEPTOKURTIC VARIABLES……………………... 64. 6.2 EFFECT OF SOCIAL NORMS VIA PRAGMATISM ON DATING OUTCOME AND DATING DIFFICULTIES……………………………... 65. 6.2.1 FRENCH-TAIWANESE COMPARISON…………………………………………. 66. 6.2.2 FRENCH-JAPANESE COMPARISON …………………………………………... 67. 6.2.3 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………... 68. iii.

(6) 6.3 EFFECT OF PRAGMATISM ON DATING STEPS……………………. 68. 6.3.1 FRENCH-TAIWANESE COMPARISON ………………………………………... 69. 6.3.2 FRENCH-JAPANESE COMPARISON …………………………………………... 70. 6.3.3 PREDICTING NOT FINDING “MISTER RIGHT”………………………………. 71 6.3.4 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………... 71. 6.4 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………...... 72. CHAPTER SEVEN: THE EFFECTS OF GENDER-UNEQUAL FAMILY ROLES ON DATING……………………………………... 73 7.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS………………………………………………… 73 7.2 EFFECT OF FAMILY ROLES ON DATING INTENTIONS……………. 74. 7.3 EFFECT OF FAMILY ROLES ON DATING OUTCOME………………. 75. 7.4 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………..……….... 76. CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION………... 77 APPENDIX………………………………………………………………………… 85 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………. 105 QUESTIONNAIRES………………………………………………………………. 119. FRENCH QUESTIONNNAIRE (WOMEN) ……………………………………….. 120. FRENCH QUESTIONNNAIRE (MEN) ……………………………………………. 127. TAIWANESE QUESTIONNNAIRE (WOMEN) ………………………………….... 134. TAIWANESE QUESTIONNNAIRE (MEN) ……………………………………….. 140. JAPANESE QUESTIONNNAIRE (WOMEN) ……………………………………... 147. JAPANESE QUESTIONNNAIRE (MEN) ………………………………………….. 154. ENGLISH QUESTIONNNAIRE (WOMEN) ……………………………………….. 161. ENGLISH QUESTIONNNAIRE (MEN) ………………………………………….... 168. iv.

(7) LIST OF FIGURES Page Figure 4.1. Indirect (via Pragmatism) and Direct Effects of Social Norms on Dating Outcome and Difficulties…………………………………………………… 48 Figure 4.2. Conditional Indirect (via Pragmatism) and Direct Effects of Social Norms on Dating Outcome and Difficulties………………………………………... 50 Figure 5.1. Dating Pyramid for French Participants………………………………... 56 Figure 5.2. Dating Pyramid for Taiwanese Participants……………………………. 57 Figure 5.3. Dating Pyramid for Japanese Participants……………………………… 57 Figure 6.1. Predicting Number of Past Partners and Time Barrier with Social Norms via Pragmatism…………………………………………………………….... 65. Figure 6.2. Predicting Dating Steps and Not Finding “Mister Right” with Pragmatism via Time Barrier……………………………………………………….. 69. Figure 7.1. Predicting Dating Intentions with Gender-unequal Family Roles…….... 74. Figure 7.2. Predicting Number of Past Partners with Gender-unequal Family Roles via Dating Intentions ……………………………………………………………….. 75. Figures in Appendix Figure A.1. Optimized Model with Standardized Loadings for Social Norms……... 92. Figure A.2. Optimized Model with Standardized Loadings for Pragmatism……….. 93. Figure A.3. Optimized Model with Standardized Loadings for Opposite Sex Barrier (women) …………………………………………………….. 94. Figure A.4. Optimized Model with Standardized Loadings for Opposite Sex Barrier (men)…………………………………………………………. 95. Figure A.5. Optimized Model with Standardized Loadings for Gender-unequal Family Roles……………………………………………………………………….... 96. v.

(8) LIST OF TABLES Page Table 2.1. Ranks for Mate Selection Criteria (Buss et al., 1990)……………….…... 22. Table 3.1. Demographics of Interviewees…………………….…………………….. 34. Table 3.2. Sample Size by Gender and by Dating Status………………….………. 41. Table 5.1. Dating Status and Number of Past Partners……………………………... 53. Table 5.2. Singles’ Dating Steps……………………………….…….…….…….…. 55. Table 5.3. Singles’ Dating Difficulties……………………….…….…….…….….... 59. Table 6.1. Social Norms…………...….…….…….…….…………………………... 62. Table 6.2. Pragmatism…………….…….…….…….………………………………. 62. Table 7.1. Gender-unequal Family Roles…………………………….….…….……. 74. Tables in Appendix Table A.1. Persons Involved in Dating Decisions Mentioned by Interviewees…….. 85. Table A.2. Dating Difficulties Mentioned by Interviewees…………….…………... 86. Table A.3. Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables……………………………... 87. Table A.4. Descriptive Statistics of Observed Variables….………………………... 89. Table A.5. Descriptive Statistics of Constructs….………………………………….. 90. Table A.6. Factor Loadings Based on Principal Component Analysis for Social Norms (Original Scale)……………………………………………………… 91 Table A.7. Factor Loadings Based on Principal Component Analysis for the Opposite Sex Barriers for Women (Original Scale)……………….……………. 91. Table A.8. Factor Loadings Based on Principal Component Analysis for the Opposite Sex Barrier for Men (Original Scale)……………….………………... 91. Table A.9. Summary of Model Fit and Invariance by Country for Social Norms….. 92. Table A.10. Summary of Model Fit and Invariance by Country for Pragmatism…... 93. Table A.11. Summary of Model Fit and Invariance by Country for Opposite Sex Barriers (women)……………………………….….………………………………... 94. Table A.12. Summary of Model Fit and Invariance by Country for Opposite Sex Barriers (men)……………………………….….…………………………………... 95 Table A.13. Summary of Model Fit and Invariance by Country for Genderunequal Family Roles……………………………….….………………………….... vi. 96.

(9) Table A.14. Predicting Number of Past Partners and Singles’ Time Barrier with Social Norms via Pragmatism (French vs. Taiwanese)……………………….. 97 Table A.15. Predicting Number of Past Partners and Singles’ Time Barrier with Social Norms via Pragmatism (French vs. Japanese)…………………………. 98 Table A.16. Predicting Dating Steps with Pragmatism via Time Barrier (French vs. Taiwanese) …………………………………………………………….. 99 Table A.17. Predicting Dating Steps with Pragmatism via Time Barrier (French vs. Japanese)……………………………………………………………….. 100 Table A.18. Predicting Not Finding “Mister Right” with Pragmatism via Time Barrier (French vs. Japanese and French vs. Taiwanese)…………………………... 101 Table A.19. Predicting Dating Intentions with Gender-unequal Family Roles (French vs. Japanese and French vs. Taiwanese)………………………………….... 102. Table A.20. Predicting Number of Past Partners with Gender-unequal Family Roles Via Dating Intentions (French vs. Japanese and French vs. Taiwanese)…….. 103. vii.

(10) CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION A decline in romance among Japanese people is inevitably having an effect on the birth rate (The Telegraph, 2017)1. Taiwan Birth Rate falls to World’s lowest (Voice of America, 2016). Northeast Asians tend to marry less2. The Japanese also tend to date less2. Although the first fact has been of great interest to numerous scholars and government planners, the second one attracted far less attention outside of Japan. Clearly, however, the two are intricately related: how can someone choose his or her spouse without choosing a dating partner in the first place? Could it be that other Northeast Asian countries are also facing the rejection of intimate relationships observed in Japan? This study attempts to answer the question, and by the same token, understand the difficulties that may arise in the process of finding a spouse in Northeast Asia. The thesis first includes a review of the sociological, macro-level literature conducted by demographers. Next, it reviews the social psychological literature on intimate relationships’ formation, before defining the study plan. On one hand, demographic studies have associated the changes in marriage practices in Western countries with industrialization, urbanization, and post-modernization: Romance, sexuality, and relationships, including marriage, have been “liberated.” While individuals in the West marry less, they also tend to build families outside of the bonds of marriage. The same evolution was not observed in Northeast Asia: When Northeast Asia experienced its own industrialization and urbanization, romance and sexuality were also liberated, but marriage remained the foundation of families: premarital cohabitation and premarital birth have remained the exception until now. One may wonder what value changes observed in Western countries may have failed to transpire in Northeast Asia, and why? Demographers of Northeast Asia have especially linked issues of fertility to the difficulties marrying. Celibacy increases because of new opportunities offered to women in higher education, access to the job market, and gained independence (e.g., McDonald, 2000a, 2000b). These macro-level observations. 1. Young Japanese not looking for love because it’s ‘too much trouble’ (The telegraph 2017).. Asia’s lonely hearts: Women are rejecting marriage in Asia: The social implications are serious (The Economist, 2011). 2. 1.

(11) should be the consequence of aggregated individual-level processes, but studies of relationship formation at the micro- or individual-level are rarer. On the other hand, individual-level studies on intimate relationships3, though numerous, rarely provide a detailed analysis of the process people follow to enter into a relationship. Just to qualify intimate relationships, more than 33 instruments have been proposed in the last 50 years4. These various measures have been applied to a variety of cultural samples of Asian countries or Asian ethnic groups in Western countries. Cross-cultural studies in the field typically attempt to uncover an association between Northeast Asian societal characteristics such as collectivism or filial piety for example, and typologies of love. As a consequence, cross-cultural research on relationship formation constitutes a number of disconnected studies, using diverse samples and diverse instruments. My objective is to link a macro-level phenomena with an individual-level process. To do so, I must first clarify which psychological concepts may be used to qualify the process toward finding a partner in particular, in the Northeast Asian social context. Then, I can compare variables across cultural groups, but also I should attempt to understand what processes are in place that may limit the formation of relationships in Northeast Asia. To that end, I am proposing a novel framework for the relationship formation singles, in order to understand what hampers progress in the successive steps that lead to finding the right person. Then, I apply and compare results for a sample of Japanese, Taiwanese and French young adults. Social situations that hamper relationship formation will by default also hinder spouse selection and marriage itself. So what “Asian values” may be related to the issue of singlehood in Northeast Asia? The issue is as complicated as Asian countries are diverse. First, demographers point to the highly gendered roles in Asian families as the reason behind women preferring celibacy5 to marriage (e.g., McDonald, 2000a, 2000b). Indeed, in Asia, women are often in charge of household chores, raising children, and caring for the elder, while men work for a paycheck. The gender role explanation alone, may however not fully account for celibacy rates, as variations in. In this thesis, “intimate relationships” refer to heterosexual relationships that may lead to marriage. I label them as intimate to differentiate them from other dyadic relationships such as friendship. 3. 4. See E. Hatfield, L. Bensman, & R. L. Rapson (2011). 5. I distinguish celibacy (not being married), from singlehood (not having a partner).. 2.

(12) unequal gender roles’ endorsement in Northeast Asia do not translate automatically into increased celibacy: For example, Taiwan appears more gender-equal than Japan, and yet celibacy rates are comparably high (above 30% of individuals in the 30-34 years old cohort; Jones & Yeung, 2014) in both countries. I will therefore investigate if the rejection of genderunequal family roles, by women in particular, may be associated with less interest in relationships because of the subaltern role women are expected to play. Second, collectivism, a commonly used explanatory variable in Asian studies, may also affect the formation of intimate relationships, but the direction of this effect is unclear. If Northeast Asians tend to value social interdependence so much, they should strive to enter a new relationship. Instead, singlehood and celibacy are on the rise. A better explanation may be that adding a partner to one’s highly interdependent social network requires caution because the existing members of the network may not like him or her. In Northeast Asia, youths for example have to perform filial duties for their parents and respect parental wishes. The involvement of additional people when choosing a partner may complicate the process, and indeed delay and possibly annihilate it. This is the main proposition of this study: The strong interpersonal ties distinctive of Northeast Asian social life tend to hamper the choosing of a partner by making the decision more arduous, thereby leading to relationship formation issues. Because the endorsement of unequal gender roles and collectivism are not a single monolithic set of attributes, but rather vary in type and strength, their effect on relationship formation should be compared across countries, to avoid false generalizations. This study examines relationship formation from a process perspective. I am not only comparing mean values across countries and genders, but I also examine at which step in the process of forming an intimate relationship, societal variables characteristic of Northeast Asia may act. First, individuals may totally reject relationships and miss the first step of having the intention to find a partner. For others who are intending to find a partner, adapting their choice to the needs and prescription of one’s social network may handicap the step of choosing someone. Finally, the road to a relationship may be obstructed by various stumbling blocks: youths may not have time, or may not be able to meet enough new people to find potential partners. These factors are tested in the study, in order to shed light on not only cultural differences, but also gender differences within a country. Overall, the process of entering into a relationship is complex. The goal of this research is therefore to explore this process and possibly find culture- and gender-specific bottlenecks.. 3.

(13) The study is aimed at understanding the issue of singlehood in Northeast Asia within an ecological (not experimental) setting. Therefore, it has direct implications for government planners, as well as for scholars of relationship-formation outside of Northeast Asia. Young adults who stay single will not be able to marry. And celibacy, because of its association with low fertility, is probably the main social issue for Northeast Asian countries, as low fertility undercuts social security systems, weakens the economy as the workforce shrinks, and ultimately calls into question the very long-term existence of the affected countries, which are at risk of disappearing within the century. Thus, I hope the study can help government planners fine-tune their fertility policies. In addition, the study may also provide guidance to young people themselves. To that end, this research elaborates a cross-cultural framework to understand the process of entering intimate relationships, which may help counselors examine the difficulties that youths face when seeking a partner. Being in a relationship is a way of life that differs widely from being single. Despite popular culture in Northeast Asia is beginning to perceive celibacy in a positive light, as singles are unhindered by familial duties and can enjoy consumption fully6, psychological research still sees intimate relationships as one main source of psychological and physical wellbeing: being in a pleasant and stable interpersonal relationship is associated with, among other benefits, more happiness and better health (e.g., Baumeister and Leary, 1995). Therefore, if this study can help singles find a partner and become happier, this would be a great achievement.. As proposed by K. Tolbert in her article “Japan's New Material Girls: 'Parasite Singles' Put Off Marriage for Good Life” (also see Gordon, 2003; Osteria, 2015). 6. 4.

(14) CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW This study analyzes young adults’ intimate relationships7 and especially the difficulties they may face while seeking a partner 8 . Because in most situations, one needs to be in a relationship to have children, this section of the literature review is situated into the larger domain of demographics studies. After examining sociological explanations of the collapse of fertility in Japan and the four dragons9, I narrow down the review to individual-level studies of relationship formation in Northeast Asia. Finally, I propose a set of research questions and hypotheses that may explain difficulties in entering intimate relationships in Northeast Asia.. 2.1 ULTRA-LOW FERTILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA According to the demographic transition theory (Lesthaeghe and Moors, 1996; van de Kaa, 2002), economic development is typically followed by a drop in fertility, a phenomenon labeled “the first demographic transition.” The phenomenon was observed during the industrialization of Western countries (late 18th century), Japan (early 21st century) and the four Asian dragons (1980s and 1990s). Then, “the second demographic transition” occurs, characterized by a rebound of Total Fertility Rate (TFR10), as social changes such as marriage outside of wedlock, sexual liberalization, and gender role equalization become more common. The important consequence of the second demographic transition, observed so far among most Western countries, is that fertility rises back to a level (TFR of 1.6 or above) that stabilized populations (Jones, 2009; McDonald, 2000a, 2000b)11. Japan and the four Asian dragons never experienced the fertility rebound typically associated with the second demographic transition (Jones, 2009; Jones, Straughan, & Chan, 2009; Kang, 2013; S.S. Lee, 2009; M. Lee, 2009;. 7. Young adults refer to the 18 to 25 years old cohort, for whom relationships become serious and intimate (Arnett, 2000; Cohen, Kasen, Chen, Hartmark, & Gordon, 2003). 8. Partner in this study is understood as dating partner, i.e., the girlfriend or the boyfriend someone is involved with. When refereeing to married individuals, I use the terms spouse, husband and wife. 9. Demographic studies tend to lump Japan and the four dragons (or four newly industrialized countries, i.e., South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) together. However, cross-cultural social psychology studies tend to lump Northeast Asian countries (i.e., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China) as one group, thus keeping Singapore out. 10. TFR is the most common measure of fertility. It is the theoretical averaged number of children a women would have between ages 15 and 49 (WHO, 2015). 11. Although with the exception of southern European and German speaking countries, where fertility rates have remained low (Jones, 2009; McDonald, 2000a, 2000b).. 5.

(15) McDonald, 2000a, 2000b; Suzuki, 2006): fertility kept decreasing to ultra-low levels12, below TFR of 1.3. The expected TFR for 2016 is 0.8 in Singapore, 1.1 in Taiwan, 1.2 in Hong Kong; 1.3 in South Korea and 1.4 in Japan (World Factbook, 2016). TFR below 1.3 not only hampers economic development and social systems, but also challenges the long-term existence of these nations (McDonald, 2000a, 2000b). The population of Japan for example is expected to drop to 88 million in 2065, from 123 million today (Otake, 2017) and the population of Taiwan is expected to drop to 19 million in 2060, from 23 million today (Executive Yuan, 2014). This so-called “Asian fertility crisis” encouraged demographic research and policy changes, which so far have not been able to reverse the trend (for summaries, see Jones, 2009; Jones et al., 2009; McDonald 2000a, 2000b). Demographic specificities of Asia. Before reviewing demographers’ explanations for the ultralow fertility in the region, two points of caution should be noted. First, demographers tend to overlook singlehood (the absence of a partner), and focus rather on celibacy (the absence of a spouse), as their analyses usually examine macro-level census data such as marriage rates. Therefore, demographers typically describe the path to fertility as 1) celibacy, 2) marriage, 3) having children. Demographic studies focus on nuptiality rates (step 1 to 2) and marital fertility rates (step 2 to 3). There is, however a dearth of research that unpacks celibacy into 1a) singlehood, and 1b) having an intimate partner (for an exception, see Ishida, 2011). Second, demographics studies in Japan and the four dragons tend to combine the causes for not getting married (celibacy) and the causes for not having children (marital fertility), because in these countries, childbirth rarely occurs outside of marriage: The percent of extramarital births represent less than 2% of births in Japan and Singapore, 3% in South Korea, 4% in Taiwan, and less than 6% in Hong Kong (Chao, 2011; Jones, 2013; Yap, 2009). In comparison, the numbers are 60% in France, 40% in UK, and 50% in Sweden, where couples may stay unmarried and still have children. For this reason, the absence of marriage is considered the primary reason for low fertility in Japan (Atoh, Kandiah, & Ivanov, 2004; Ishida, 2011; Miyamoto, 2010; Takahashi, 2004), in Hong Kong (Yip, Li, Xie, & Lam, 2006), and in South Korea (Choe, Retherford, & Kim 2004)13. Alarmingly, the percent of un-married individuals. 12. The collapse of fertility to “lowest-low” level (TFR < 1.3) is labelled “ultra-low” (Yap, 2009, pp. 160).. 13. Peter McDonald (2009) however argues marital fertility is a more important issue than marriage rates.. 6.

(16) in the 30-34 year old cohort rose from less than 10% in 1970, to above 30% (Japan and Taiwan), and above 25% (South Korea) in 2010 (Jones & Yeung, 2014). Taking into account these two points (lumping celibacy with singlehood, and the rare occurrence of premarital birth), demographic studies of Asia often overlook a possible underlying issue with singlehood, which is not reported by national census. It is however required to find a partner in order marrying. In this review, I will first examine the few existing studies associating singlehood with low fertility. Then, I will analyze the arguments and counter-arguments surrounding the idea that women, because of gender-unequal family roles, are “causing” high celibacy rates and are consequently “responsible” for the Asian fertility decline. Finally, I develop the argument that integrating familial and social requirements into one’s partner’s choice may have a detrimental effect on relationship formation, for both men and women, in Japan and the four dragons. 2.1.1 DEMOGRAPHIC STUDIES ON PREMARITAL RELATIONSHIPS Even though demographic research rarely targets relationship formation prior to marriage, demographic studies are nevertheless indirectly informative regarding singlehood. In order to marry, individuals certainly must choose a partner because marriages are no longer arranged in Japan and the four dragons (e.g., Iwai & Yasuda, 2009). A 2004 study indicated that 39% of Japanese celibates do not have a partner (Retherford & Ogawa 2006). A large majority of celibates however want to marry (more than 92% of unmarried Japanese according to a 2005 study; Suzuki, 2006; 85% of Singaporeans of both sexes; Jones, 2012), but many celibates may not find the ideal person (among Taiwanese celibates, 42% of men and 48% of women cited “have not met ideal mate” as the main reason for being unmarried; M. Lee, 2009). A longitudinal study (the Japanese Life Course Panel Survey; Ishida 2011) indicated that 12% of dating students were married one year later, but only 1% of single students were married one year later. In sum, difficulties in marrying may stem from difficulties in finding a partner in the first place. One proposed reason for delayed marriage is the absence of practical ways for singles to meet (Ishida, 2011; Ishida, Arita, Tanabe, & Murakami, 2009; Ogawa, Retherford, & Matsukura, 2009). To improve the situation, Singaporean and Japanese planners have launched pre-marriage promotional campaigns with slogans such as “Make room for love in your life,” or “Life would be lonely without a family” (Wong & Yeoh, 2003), assigned budgets to support matchmaking events (Hernon, 2015; Jones, 2009), and opened dating sites (Jones, 2013). Governments hope to address the celibacy issue by targeting singlehood. Therefore, the 7.

(17) current study should examine whether or not there are more difficulties in the formation of relationships in Japan and the four dragons, compared for example to a country such as France, where issues with finding a partner are typically unheard of. Therefore, my first research question is: Is it more difficult to enter intimate relationships in Northeast Asia? Furthermore, despite premarital sex and intimate relationships are common among young adults in Northeast Asia, premarital births and cohabitation with one’s partner however, are more controlled than in the West. Self-reported surveys on premarital contraceptive usage indicate that premarital sex is common in Japan (e.g., Ogawa et al., 2009). For example, as early as 1993, 43% of Japanese female university students, and 57% of male students, reported past sexual intercourse (Retherford, Ogawa, Matsukura, 2001). In 2000, 57% of 16 year old women in Japan reported having used contraception methods (Retherford et al., 2001). Abortion data also confirms the occurrence of premarital sex: The number of abortions among the 15-24 year old cohort represented 21% of the total in Hong Kong in 2002 (Yip, Law, & Cheung, 2009), and abortion for unmarried women represented 42% of the total number of abortions registered in South Korea (S.S. Lee, 2009). Although premarital sex is tolerated, premarital birth remains socially unacceptable in Japan and the four dragons. The percent of extramarital births is below 2% of total births in Japan and Singapore, 3% in South Korea, 4% in Taiwan, and less than 6% in Hong Kong (Chao, 2011; Jones, 2013; Yap, 2009), while it is 60% in France, 40% in UK, and 50% in Sweden. In other words, although the sexuality of young adults have been freed, birth decisions outside of marriage appear more constrained. In a similar fashion, although dating is allowed in Japan and the four dragons, extending an intimate relationship into cohabitation is rarer than in Western countries. In Japan, an estimated 20% of married individuals reported having cohabitated before marriage (Ishida, 2011; Raymo, 2003a; Raymo et al., 2009). According to a Taiwanese study (Yang, 2004), 7% of the 20-29 years old, and 20% of the 30-39 years old were cohabitating, a tiny number compared to European countries, where the majority of couples are or have cohabited (Anderson & Kohler, 2013; Prioux, 2006; Raymo, 2003a; Raymo et al., 2009). In France for example, only 20% of the marriages used to be preceded by cohabitation in 1965, but the number steadily increased to stabilize at 95% since 1995 (Prioux, 2005, 2009). Why might such discrepancies exist, 8.

(18) between allowing premarital sex but not premarital childbearing, and between allowing intimate relationships but not cohabitation between partners? These may suggest “compressed modernity,” where some traditional virtues are dismissed (e.g., virginity before marriage) while others are resisting (filial duties; Ochiai, 2011). I suspect that childbirth and cohabitation, since they are socially visible and may impact familial social standing, are viewed as having to be controlled and sanctioned by marriage. Meanwhile, since sex and intimate relationships occur below the radar of social visibility, they are more socially tolerated. This situation differs greatly from most Western countries, in which various paths between having a partner, cohabitating with one’s partner, and having children before marriage are common. These apparently contradictory social allowances and proscriptions may arise from familial and social influences: Premarital relationships are tolerated within certain limits, if they do not antagonize more important social conventions. Thus in Japan and the four dragons, the values shift typically associated with the second demographic transition (e.g., Lesthaeghe, 2010; van de Kaa, 2002) may have occurred in terms of sexual liberalization and disappearance of arranged marriages, but less so in terms of agency in relationship choices such as the ability to cohabit with a partner and in extramarital childbirth decisions, which remain firmly within social and familial control well before marriage considerations. 2.1.2 ASIAN VALUES AND CELIBACY Blaming women. First, Asian demographers tend to lay the blame for the Asian decline in marriage rates on unmarried women, as women have turned “individualist,” and become concerned only with their own personal fulfillment: they may have metamorphosed into “parasite singles who feed on family”14 (Atoh, et al., 2004; Jones, 2012; Jones & Yeung, 2014; Kang, 2013; McDonald, 2009; Suzuki, 2006; Tolbert, 2000; Tsuya, Bumpass, & Choe, 2000; Yamada, 2001). In particular, women with a higher education have become more “picky” when choosing a husband (e.g., Cheng, 2014). Supporting these arguments, country mean percent of women who reach tertiary education was correlated positively with celibacy rates of 30-34 year olds (for both men and women), as well as with the mean age of marriage (for both men and women) among a sample of Asian countries (Cheng, 2014; Jones & Yeung, 2014; Raymo, 2003b; Raymo & Iwasawa, 2005). In Taiwan, the celibacy rates were higher among the most educated women and least educated men (Cheng, 2014) and the same was observed in. 14. An expression popularized by Yamada (2001).. 9.

(19) Singapore (Jones, 2013). In addition, TFR (Total Fertility Rate) was negatively correlated to women’s labor force participation (Straughan, Chan, & Jones, 2009). Finally, in Taiwan, the mean age of first marriage was associated positively with educational attainment (Cheng, 2014). Contradicting evidence, however, has been presented by other scholars. In most Asian countries, average marriage age has been delayed for both women and men (Jones & Yeung, 2014)15 giving rise to a generation of dansheng guizu or “single nobility”16 (Chang, 2009). In Taiwan the increase in percent (between 1980 and 2010) for those who never married in the 30-34 years old cohort was even larger for men (14% to 54%) than for women (8% to 37%; Y. Chen, 2012). In one South Korean study, the effect of women’s education on TFR amounted only to 7% of total change, and fertility rates declined equally for highly and poorly educated women (Choe & Retherford, 2009). Finally, in Japan, although women’s educational attainment did not change significantly between 1990 and 2004, women’s celibacy rates did increase significantly (Ogawa et al., 2009; Shirahase, 2000), thereby demonstrating that providing education to women is not directly associated with higher rates of celibacy. It is also unclear whether female behavior solely, is involved in the celibacy phenomenon. If many women are not willing to enter into relationships, then women should, on average, claim lower intentions to marry compared to men, and as a consequence, men should report more difficulties in finding a partner, compared to women. However, to the contrary, a Japanese survey conducted in 2007 indicated that 87% of men and 90% of women are willing to marry (Ishida, 2011) and surveys in Singapore indicated that 85% of celibates of both sexes were willing to marry (Jones, 2012). Do men have more difficulties in finding a partner? In Taiwan, both celibate men (42%) and women (48%) cited “have not met ideal mate” as the main reason for being unmarried (M. Lee, 2009). Men may also directly be involved in the celibacy issue: Because of their filial and social duties, Northeast Asian men may be cautious before engaging in a relationship that involves social obligations: 38% of Taiwanese celibate men cited “economic reason” as a cause for being unmarried (M. Lee, 2009). Therefore, even if the marriage decisions of Northeast Asian women is often claimed to be the source of the celibacy issue, empirical evidence does not always support this claim. Thus, one item to clarify is whether or not there is a gender difference in not just the intention but also in the ability to 15. Changes in average marriage age between 1970 and 2010: Among Taiwanese women, from 23 to 30 years old (vs. 25 to 33 for men), among Japanese women, from 25 to 30 years old (vs. 28 to 30 for men) and among South Korean women, from 23 to 30 years old (vs. 27 to 33 for men; Jones & Yeung, 2014). 16. An expression coined by D.T. Chang (2009), to characterize the new social class of singles in Taiwan, with high standards of living and no familial responsibilities.. 10.

(20) form relationships among Northeast Asian singles. This question requires a step-by-step examination of the relationship formation process of singles. Blaming gender-unequal family roles. One way to shed light on a possible gender difference in relationship formation is to search for the causes of celibacy. Demographic studies suggest gender-unequal family roles observed in Japan and the four dragons explain the weakening of marriage rates (e.g., McDonald, 2000a, 2000b; Raymo, Park, Xie, & Yeung, 2015). First, Northeast Asian women may refuse marriage, because of the role they are expected to play in the family (McDonald, 2000a, 2000b; Tsuya, Choe, & Wang, 2009). The Confucian traditions endorsed in Japan and the four dragons certainly foster women’s obedience and subaltern role in the family (Tsuya, Choe, & Wang, 2009). For example, on a 2006 populationrepresentative study, 49% of Taiwanese agree that “A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family” (Iwai & Yasuda, 2009). Thus, married women are expected to shoulder the majority of housework, in addition to child-education, and possibly caring for in-laws (Atoh et al., 2004; Tsuya & Bumpass, 2004). Peter McDonald proposed that the gap between gender-equality in education reached by Northeast Asian countries on one hand, and gender-inequality of the traditional Asian family structure on the other hand, push women away from married life (2000a, 2000b, 2006, & 2009; see also Raymo, Park, Xie, & Yeung, 2015). He summarizes both the changing and rigid elements of gender roles: “In the institution of education and market employment, considerable gender equity was afforded to women. (…) In contrast, family related institutions, especially the family itself, have continued to be characterized by gender inequity. (…) By the time women begin to consider family formation, they have experienced considerable freedom and gender equity as individuals, but they are keenly aware that these gains will be distinctly compromised once they have a baby.” In addition to the culturally embedded gender roles, Northeast Asian governments have also encouraged policies that support “familialism”: Families—but for the most part the wife— should care for children and the elderly, with little financial incentives from governments (Chui, 2007; Ochiai, 2011). For example, co-residence of elderly people with their family members is common in Japan (55%), and the four dragons (57% in Hong Kong, 60% in Taiwan, 64% in South Korea, and 74% in Singapore; cited by Chui, 2007). This serves the normative and welfare concerns of the “Confucian state” by reducing the demand for institutional care services, “painted as” promoting respect for the elderly (Chui, 2007; Ochiai, 2011). The burden 11.

(21) of the elderly then practically falls on the wives’ shoulders: For example, Japanese men’ main reason for divorce is the unwillingness of his wife to live with his parents (Ono & Sanders, 2009). Employers’ practices also contribute to familialism: A report by Goldman Sachs titled “Womenomics 3.0 the time is now” indicated that 70% of Japanese women leave their job after the birth of their first child, a move often encouraged by their employers, compared to about 30% in the USA (Hernon, 2015). Such practices differ greatly from the deinstitutionalization of marriage that occurred in Western Europe, where governments have supported services for the care of children and the elderly, thereby allowing women to embrace their professional careers with more ease (Ochiai, 2011). Finally, empirical association between women’s education and fertility at country levels, presented above (Cheng, 2014; Jones & Yeung, 2014; Raymo, 2003b; Raymo & Iwasawa, 2005; Straughan, et al., 2009) also appears to evidence the effect of unequal gender roles especially for educated women. Highly educated women in Japan and the four dragons may therefore feel they cannot have both a career and a family, and are forced to make a choice between the two. A factor that amplifies the dilemma of staying unmarried, or raising a family lies in the costs associated with these options (e.g., Y. Chen, 2012; Kang, 2013; Ogawa et al., 2009). Marrying rich men may provide safety to women, enough to compensate for living on a single revenue, and for the burden of household chores. Indeed, hypergamy (choosing a partner of higher social status) is common among Asian women (Jones et al., 2009). Japanese unmarried women, for example, ranked of first importance the income and occupation of a potential mate (Ogawa et al., 2009). A survey by the Meiji Yasuda insurance indicated that two third of Japanese women expected their husband to earn the equivalent of US$40,000 per year (Hernon, 2015). The same study found that unfortunately, only 25% of men of the 20-29 year old cohort earn that income, which may force both men and women to postpone marriage (Ogawa et al., 2009; Yamada, 2004). Evidence behind the gender roles-celibacy association is not fully convincing however. In particular, the studies neglect generational changes, and differences in gender-inequality across countries. First, younger cohorts at marrying age may be less traditional: In Taiwan and Japan, individuals of 20-29 years old disagree on average with the proposition “A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family” (Asian Social Survey 2006; cited by Iwai & Yasuda, 2009). However especially, gender inequality differs among Northeast 12.

(22) Asian countries. Taiwan, which was highly patriarchal before industrialization, has seen drastic changes toward “gender egalitarianization” (W. Chen, 2012; Thornton & Lin, 1994): In 2006, a majority of the 50-69 years old agree, and a majority of the 20-49 disagree with the statement that “A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family” (Iwai & Yasuda, 2009). At the country level, Taiwan’s global ranking in gender equality17 is much higher (38th; 55th for Singapore), than that of Japan (111th; 116th for South Korea; Chen & Low, 2017; Global Gender Gap Report, 2016). Therefore, if the rise of celibacy was solely caused by unequal gender roles, the issue should be more acute in Japan and South Korea compared to Taiwan and Singapore. Yet, ultra-low fertility is observed across all four countries. Although gender-unequal family roles probably reduce the appeal of marriage among Northeast Asian women, other causes that impact both men and women should also be present. Therefore, I expect that the link between rejecting gender-unequal family roles and singlehood may be valid among Japanese women in particular, but less so among Japanese men and Taiwanese of both genders. These leads to a second research question: Are Japanese women (but not Taiwanese women) who reject gender-unequal family roles unwilling to enter intimate relationships? 2.1.3 SOCIAL INFLUENCES, SELECTION CRITERIA AND LOW FERTILITY Social influences. Northeast Asian values are not monolithic: they are highly contrasted and should not be lumped together as a set of “traditional family values.” For example, as explained above, gender-unequal family roles, though bounded by a shared Confucian heritage among Asian countries, are not endorsed with the same intensity across generations and countries. Another aspect of Confucian heritage is the attachment to one’s family and one’s social network. Relationships and marriages in particular are not formed in a vacuum. Just as they are influenced by social networks and families in the West (e.g., Loving, 2006), so they are in Asia. In particular, because Northeast Asians value social interaction more than Westerners (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1990), social and familial influences on relationships and marriage may also “explain” difficulties in choosing a partner, if the social network needs to approve of the relationship, before marriage. This may explain why fertility rates (in 2009) are significantly lower among Singaporean Chinese (TFR = 1.08), than non-. 17. Measure of gender equality is based on education attainment, economic participation, political empowerment, health and survival. 13.

(23) Confucian Indians (TFR =1.14) and Malay (TFR =1.82; Govmonitor, 2010) although they are decreasing over time for the three groups (Yap, 2009). Another sign of the relative importance of social and familial influences is the apparent contradiction between allowing premarital sex and relationships on one hand, but disapproving of cohabitation and premarital birth on the other. This demonstrates that intimate relationships among young adults in Japan and the four dragons are not as free as they are in Europe (where premarital birth and cohabitation are common), but rather constrained by social and familial regulations. In summary, the possible detrimental effects on celibacy of, on one hand, gender-unequal family roles, and on the other hand, general social influences are typically lumped together as “traditional family values” (see e.g. Lesthaeghe, 2010). I argue here, however, that genderunequal family roles and social influences may differ, (a) in which gender they affect the most, and (b) in which Asian country they are more commonly observed. Furthermore, I would argue that social influences (potentially more than gender roles) best typifies how culture in Japan and the four newly industrialized countries may affect the younger cohorts of singles’ decisions on relationships and marriage. To empirically test these assertions, the two societal characteristics will be treated separately in the current study. Criteria-based selection of a partner. Because social life in collectivist countries promotes social interdependence (Hofstede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1990), decisions regarding family, lineage and social networks tend to involve others. A new partner is also an addition to the social network, and possibly a new family member. It derives naturally that the choice of partner cannot be solely based on one’s personal taste, but should incorporate various requirements flowing from familial and social interdependence. These selection criteria may vary by culture. For example, Japanese may value social regulation and harmony (wa) more than Westerners (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Therefore choosing a partner may involve elements related to matching a partner with one’s personal situation, such as one’s social and educational background. Japanese to a certain extent, but Chinese in particular, may be attentive to duties toward one’s family (xiao) and to one’s social networks (guanxi; e.g., Zhang & Kline, 2009). These elements lead to the main research questions to address: Are social networks encouraging a criteria-based selection of intimate partners, which in turn hampers relationship formation in Japan and Taiwan?. 14.

(24) 2.1.4 CONCLUSION Demographic studies on the ultra-low fertility issue in Japan and the four dragons provide an informative assessment of the difficulties individuals may face when considering marriage. These studies have evidenced a series of possible explanations for the increasing celibacy rates in these countries, leading to a fertility decline to ultra-low levels. The “traditional values” of Japan and the four dragons emerge as one possible cause of celibacy increase. The demographic literature typically lumps Asian values together, however, often associating familial influences and gender-unequal family roles into a common label. Consequently, the literature argues that gender-unequal family roles may limit women’s interest in entering into relationships, as women in Asian have become more highly educated, more demanding, and unwilling to become housewives. Gender roles alone do not seem to explain single men’s difficulties in finding a partner, however. In addition, unequal-gender roles are not endorsed by younger cohorts, especially in more egalitarian societies such as Taiwan. Therefore, whether or not the obstacle to marriage lies only in women’s behaviors, and whether it is solely a consequence of gender-unequal family roles, remains to be demonstrated. Second, the discrepancy in social allowance between, on one hand, socially “invisible” (and therefore accepted) premarital sex and having a partner, and on the other hand, socially “visible” (and therefore unacceptable) premarital cohabitation and childbirth, appears unrelated to gender roles, but rather seems to indicate that social and familial influences are guiding relationship organization among young adults in Japan and the dragons, well before marriage is even considered. I propose here that the importance given to social interaction in Japan and the four dragons may be translated into additional selection criteria when choosing a partner that are related to social influences. The focus on selecting a matching partner may then delay the process of entering an intimate relationship with someone who could become one’s spouse. Consequently, in this study, I opted to examine why individuals stay single in the first place. The effect of selection criteria associated to family or networks should be a feature of Asian societies, as Northeast Asians value social interdependence more than , for example, the more individualist French. The bundle of matching criteria when choosing a partner may vary, echoing the diversity in social influences by country and gender. Several research questions emerge from the review of this demographic literature. First, is there a general problem in the process of finding a partner itself (RQ1), as men and women may face 15.

(25) difficulties, or may be too busy to engage in the process of finding a partner? Second, due to the importance given to social interaction in Japan and the four dragons, are there stringent criteria when choosing a partner, which would complicate the identification of a satisfactory partner (RQ2)? Finally, gender-unequal family roles, commonly endorsed by Japanese, may hamper the dating process. Thus, are Japanese women especially unwilling to enter into relationships, because they reject the gender-unequal family roles society expects them to accept (RQ3)? These research questions will be addressed in the next section, by a set of empirically testable hypotheses originating from a review of the individual-level literature.. 2.2 LITERATURE ON RELATIONSHIP FORMATION 2.2.1 SOCIAL NETWORKS’ INFLUENCE ON RELATIONSHIPS Studies conducted in Western countries (the USA for the most part) have shown that intimate relationships do not exist in isolation, but are rather influenced by social networks, family, and friends (e.g., Felmlee, 2001; Knobloch, & Donovan-Kicken, 2006; Loving, 2006). Social networks not only determine the environment where couples are formed, but they also influence the formation, maintenance, and termination of relationships (Felmlee & Sprecher, 2006). For example, parents often choose to live in a neighborhood where their children can meet the “right” persons (Goode, 1959); Studies done in the USA indicate that individuals with close network ties tend to have more stable relationships, and tend to feel more love (Parks, Stan, & Eggert, 1983; Sprecher & Felmlee, 1997); Courtship progression was faster for those with network and family support (Parks et al., 1983; Krain, 1977). Conversely, network opposition toward a couple’s relationship could enhance the feeling of love in Western countries, in what is called the “Romeo and Juliet effect” (Driscoll et al., 1972). Finally, partners are less likely to break up if they engage and communicate frequently with their partner’s family and friends (Parks & Adelman, 1983). Various explanations for parental and network involvement in partner selection have been proposed. Evolutionary psychologists have argued that parents and children both have interests in the selection of mate (e.g., Apostolou, 2007, 2010; Buunk, Park, Duncan, 2010). These interests may diverge however. Parents are more attentive to displays of parental investment and cooperation with the ingroup because they would have to compensate for deficiencies, which may hamper an even distribution of resources among offspring. Conversely, youths may be more attentive to traits indicative of heritable fitness, and less worried about resources and about the long term (Buunk, Park, & Dubbs, 2008). Others have proposed that networks, family, and friends serve as a source of 16.

(26) validation of one’s relationship quality (Loving, 2006). In sum, social networks may have a positive effect on accelerating the formation of relationships and stabilizing them, but they may also conflict with individuals’ choice of a partner. Cultural differences in the importance of social networks have been observed, with consequences on relationship formation. First, it appears that in the West, the transition to adulthood is associated with “breaking-up” with the parents, in a process of “generative tension” (Rothbaum, Pott, Azuma, Miyake, & Weisz, 2000). The separation with parents may stem from the Christian cultural inheritance. According to the bible, “A man shall leave his father and his mother and hold fast to his wife and they shall become one flesh” (Gen. 2.24). This is certainly not the case in Northeast Asia, in line with a process of “symbiotic harmony” (Rothbaum et al., 2000), where the relationship with parents stays stable throughout adolescence to adulthood. In other words, young Westerners approaching adulthood tend to separate from their familial influences more than Northeast Asian young adults. The individualist-collectivist dimension, which qualifies the relationship between individuals and society across countries, has explained a range of behavioral differences (Triandis, 1990). For example, in individualist countries such as France (Hofstede, 1980), individual achievements and initiatives are valued and the “I” identity matters more, whereas in collectivist countries such as Taiwan and Japan, belonging and fitting in with the ingroup, as well as the “we” identity matter more (Gao, 2001; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1990). With a focus on intimacy in relationships, other authors have also argued that the strong ties to ingroup members (characteristic of collectivist societies), may contribute to diffuse intimacy with a partner, while the relatively weaker ties to ingroup members (characteristic of individualist societies) may accentuate intimacy with one’s partner (Dion & Dion, 1988). In a cross-cultural study on the intervention of parents in marital decision, the authors observed that parental involvement was positively associated to country collectivism, and among Canadian participants of various cultural origins, there was more parental influence for ethnic Asians than for Caucasians (Buunk, Park, & Duncan, 2010). Consequently, the involvement of kin and social networks on intimate relationships’ formation should be stronger in collectivist countries such as Japan and Taiwan, compared to an individualist country such as France. Individuals in collectivist societies tend to values the opinion of their social network and parents more (Dion & Dion, 1988), with possible consequences on relationship formation. Cross-cultural psychology scholars have argued that the construction of self is intimately 17.

(27) associated to others in collectivist societies: Individuals tend to hold an “interdependent self” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1990). In contrary, the construction of the self in individual societies is founded and self-reliance and independence from others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The normative emphasis on interconnectedness in collectivist cultures has consequences on many aspects of life, as individuals constantly control and regulate their thoughts, emotions and behaviors with the primary goal of maintaining harmonious social interdependence (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). When it comes to predict social behaviors, social interconnectedness holds a critical importance (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). According to the theory of planned behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), social norms (defined as the perception that significant others have an opinion on one’s behavior, combined with the importance given to that opinion) is a predictor of behavioral intentions, together with the personal attitude toward the behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Because individuals in collectivist societies value social interconnectedness, I expect that social norms matter more for forming intimate relationships in Northeast Asia, than in an individualist countries such as France. Both close significant others such as family members and broad social networks may affect relationship formation in Northeast Asia. Confucian values (characteristic of Taiwanese and Japanese societies) dictate family and kinship bonds as the foundation of social structure (Pimentel, 2000; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). Filial piety, or obedience and respect of parents, is a sacred virtue (Zhang & Kline, 2009). Therefore, family related selection criteria matter more in marital decisions (Higgins, Zheng, Liu, & Sun, 2002), parents have more say on marital decisions (Pimentel, 2000), and parents influence the quality of intimate relationships more in Chinese societies, compared to the West (Zhang & Kline, 2009). Chinese men in particular may be sensitive to their filial duties in transmitting the family lineage through marriage (e.g., Chang & Chan, 2007; Rothbaum et al., 2000; Zhang & Kline, 2009). In addition to kin and family, broad interpersonal networks also matter more in Asia compared to the West, as they determine the context of social interdependence, individuals’ standing in society that involves notions of reciprocal feelings, face, and shared identity (Zhang & Kline, 2009). Therefore, Northeast Asians would prefer to partner and marry someone approved by their social network, and would be more committed to a relationship approved by their social network (Zhang & Kline, 2009). In other words, both familial and broad social networks may guide relationship decisions. Finally, circumstances related to the social environment may also affect relationship formation in Northeast Asia more than in the West. Asian philosophies such as Buddhism, Taoism and 18.

(28) Shintoism, emphasize the importance of broad perspectives and contexts (Chang & Chan, 2007). Northeast Asians are more likely to accept conditions imposed by social circumstances while Westerners tend to downplay contextual information and perceive more personal control over their relationships (e.g., Markus and Kitayama, 1991). For example, relationships tend to fluctuate more, and courtship last longer among Chinese compared to Americans (Chang & Chan, 2007). The common view in Taiwan and Japan holds that stable and reliable marriages can only occur once the context is appropriate. For example, surveys indicate that for young Taiwanese, “leaving home,” “finishing education,” and “getting a full time job” should be settled before considering marriage (based on panel data from the Taiwan Youth Project collected between 2007 and 2009, analyzed by Lang-wen Huang, cited in Yeung & Alipio, 2013). In Taiwanese young adults’ criteria for mate selection, 45% were not related to their partner per se (vs. 26% for the US sample), but to social networks and circumstances (Chang & Chan, 2007). Thus, among Northeast Asia in particular, social circumstances appear decisive in determining when searching a partner should be engaged, and what criteria of selection should apply. In conclusion, the influence of Northeast Asian social life on relationship formation may take many shapes, from country collectivism, familial duties, the need to match the partner with one’s social network, and to social circumstances. In order to ensure that I empirically measure the same perception of the “social networks” construct among Taiwanese and Japanese participants, but also the French, the construct should be wide-ranging. In line with the theory of planned behaviors (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), I thus opted to inquire how much the participants values the influence of significant others in their partners’ choices. Valuing significant others more, implies that family members, friends and society in general, hold an important place in someone’s judgments. Selection criteria in partner selection. Because Northeast Asians value social networks when making relationship decisions more than Westerners, they may tend to incorporate these outside requirements as additional criteria for choosing a partner. In particular, decisions regarding family, lineage and social networks occur at the core of the social value system in Northeast Asia (e.g., Chang & Chan, 2007; Retherford, Ogawa, & Sakamoto, 1996; Rothbaum et al., 2000; Zhang & Kline, 2009). Because a new partner is also an addition to the social network, and possibly a new family member, these social roles of the future partner raise the stakes involved in his or her choice. Therefore, the choice of partner cannot be solely based on. 19.