從古唯識三性說到新唯識三性說—論「清淨依他起性」的概念在唯識三性說發展中的關鍵角色

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告

期末報告

從古唯識三性說到新唯識三性說—論「清淨依他起性」的概念

在唯識三性說發展中的關鍵角色(第3年)

計 畫 類 別 ： 個別型計畫 計 畫 編 號 ： MOST 101-2410-H-004-214-MY3 執 行 期 間 ： 103年10月01日至105年09月30日 執 行 單 位 ： 國立政治大學哲學系 計 畫 主 持 人 ： 耿晴 計畫參與人員： 大專生-兼任助理人員：林芳民 大專生-兼任助理人員：張明蘭 大專生-兼任助理人員：向富緯 博士班研究生-兼任助理人員：孫亞柏 博士班研究生-兼任助理人員：胡志強

中　華　民　國　106　年　02　月　06　日

中 文 摘 要 ： 本計劃主要目標在於證成印度唯識學發展過程中，曾經出現不同的 三性說模型：較為早期的單層模型以及較為晚期的雙重模型。這個 結論能夠解決1960年代以來日本學者上田義文與長尾雅人關於哪個 模型才是唯識學正宗的爭論。筆者的結論指出，兩個模型的出現並 非孰是孰非的問題，而是思想發展早晚的差異。筆者也嘗試指出從 單層模型發展至雙層模型背後可能的理由為何。另外值得注意的是 ：兩種模型皆同時出現在《辯中邊論》以及《大乘莊嚴經論》中。 這點可以支持該兩種文獻皆屬於多層次的作品，其中包含了較早與 較晚的成分。以上兩個結論合併起來，將對於唯識思想的發展形成 一個全面的新觀點。 中 文 關 鍵 詞 ： 唯識學、唯識三性說、單層模型、雙層模型、《辯中邊論》、《大 乘莊嚴經論》、上田義文、長尾雅人

英 文 摘 要 ： This project aims to show that in the development of Indian Yogacara thought, there were two different models for the theory of three natures: the single-layer model that was earlier vs. the double-layer model that was later. This observation helps resolve the debates between two prominent Japanese Buddhologists—Ueda Yoshifumi and Nagao

Gajin—during the 1960s. I conclude: the appearance of these two models does not suggest that one is right and the other is wrong but reflects the different phases of the development of Yogacara thought. I also provide

interpretations for why the earlier single-layer model developed into the later double-layer model.

The other noteworthy thing is: both models appear in the Madhyantavibhaga and in the Mahayansutralamkara. This supports the idea that both texts consist of multiple

layers and include both earlier and later elements. Combing both observations, we have a whole new perspective about the development of Yogac?ra texts and thought.

英 文 關 鍵 詞 ： Yogacara, Theory of Three Natures (trisvabhavanirdesa), single-layer model, double-layer model, Madhyantavibhaga, Mahayanasutralamkara, Ueda Yoshifumi, Nagao Gajin

目錄 1，「從古唯識三性說到新唯識三性說—論「清淨依他起性」的概念在唯識三性說 發展中的關鍵角色」成果報告 1﹣10 2，2013 你那 7 月 8﹣9 日赴比利時根特大學（University of Ghent）出席國際會 議心得報告 11﹣33

A，前言 本計劃為3 年期（2012.10﹣2015.9）新進人員研究計劃，期滿時由於剩餘經 費尚充裕，申請延長至2016.9 結案。期間筆者共發表國內期刊論文 3 篇，研討 會論文5 篇；國外期刊論文 1 篇、研討會論文 2 篇、專書論文 2 篇，成果應能符 合科技部預期的目標。 B，研究目的 本計劃核心是印度佛教哲學最主要的學派之一﹣﹣唯識學派﹣﹣的核心理論﹣ ﹣唯識三性說﹣﹣的檢討。主要目標在於證成印度唯識學發展過程中，曾經出現 不同的三性說模型：較為早期的單層模型以及較為晚期的雙重模型。這個結論能 夠解決1960 年代以來日本學者上田義文與長尾雅人關於哪個模型才是唯識學正 宗的爭論。筆者的結論指出，兩個模型的出現並非孰是孰非的問題，而是思想發 展早晚的差異。筆者也嘗試指出從單層模型發展至雙層模型背後可能的理由為何。 另外值得注意的是：兩種模型皆同時出現在《辯中邊論》以及《大乘莊嚴經論》 中。這點可以支持該兩種文獻皆屬於多層次的作品，其中包含了較早與較晚的成 分。以上兩個結論合併起來，將對於唯識思想的發展形成一個全面的新觀點。 C，文獻探討 針對前述上田義文與長尾雅人關於三性說的爭論，北野新太郎(1999b，2005a) 援引菅原泰典（1985）所謂「單層構造」與「二重構造」的對比，來檢討這個爭 論。這裡所謂的「單層構造」，意思是：依他起性與遍計執性分別對應到在認識 中呈現之主觀的與客觀的兩個面向，兩者之間的關係是「能認識——被認識」的 關係。對比於此，在「二重構造」下，在依他起性中即已經存在這兩個客觀與主 觀的表象，而遍計執性則是對於這兩個面向的表象的進一步概念化與實體化。 北野認為：古唯識三性說採用「單層構造」而今唯識三性說採用「二重構造」； 這是兩者最主要的差異。陳一標（2000: 47）指出：上田與長尾爭論的焦點，即 是「依他起性亦即識中，是否有相分內境的存在」。意思是說：在古唯識三性說 中，依他起性只有對應到「識」的主觀面而沒有對應到「境」的客觀面。對比於 此，在今唯識三性說中，依他起性同時對應到見分的主觀面與相分的客觀面。陳 一標的解釋應該與北野一樣，都是從今唯識三性說中依他起性同時帶有見分、相 分的表象這點來看待古、今唯識三性說的根本差異。 舉例來說，在古唯識下，能認識的「識」屬於依他起性；被認識的「境」（對 象、例如杯子）屬於遍計執性。但在新唯識下，主觀能認識的「眼識、意識」與 客觀被認識的「圓形、有環狀附屬部分等的表象」兩者都屬於依他起性；而將這 些主客觀進一步實體化為「持續存在的自我」與「獨立於識存在的杯子」等錯誤

的概念，則屬於遍計執性。 根據陳一標（2000: 46-7）與北野（1999b: 75-78）的討論，上田與長尾對於 唯識三性說的不同理解可以整理如下表： 遍計執 依他起 圓成實性 所依據之經 典 上田支持的 古唯識=單層構造 境=所分別= 所取 識=能分別= 能取 二取之無 真諦譯《轉識 論》 長尾支持的 新唯識=二重構造 能取=我； 所取=法 見分（見識） =能分別； 相分（相識） =所分別=內境 二取之無 玄奘譯《成唯 識論》 筆者主張：在古、今唯識三性說的差異的議題上，陳一標與北野都忽略了一 個重要的面向。在上表中，圓成實性同樣都指涉「二取」（即、錯誤的實體化概 念）的消除。這在古唯識三性說中蘊涵同時去除遍計執性與依他起性兩者。然而 在今唯識三性說中則可能僅僅意味去除遍計執性上兩方面的實體化與概念化，而 並不蘊涵同時要斷除遍計執性與依他起性兩者。也就是說：除了「單層構造」與 「二重構造」的差異，古唯識與今唯識另一個主要差異是：要達到圓成實性，是 否依他起性必然要斷除的問題。 注意到古唯識三性說與今唯識三性說的差異之後，進一步的問題是：我們該 如何看待這個差異？在上田支持的古唯識三性說與長尾支持的今唯識三性說兩 者之間，哪一個才是正確的唯識三性說模型？ 在回應這個問題之前，首先我們應該注意到：如竹村牧男（1995：29）指出 的：上田主要是繼承宇井伯壽的立場，認為唯有真諦才忠實地傳承了印度唯識學 說。而長尾則是站在中國傳到日本的法相宗的立場，認為玄奘——窺基一系才是 唯識正宗。上田與長尾之爭，其實也正是宇井伯壽推翻傳統法相宗、發揚真諦思 想的翻案主張。而關於何為正宗的爭論，則也反映了宇井對於傳統法相宗傳承的 不滿。 對於兩人的爭論，筆者不贊成如竹村牧男選擇支持某一邊，1也不同意從何 者為唯識學正宗的角度來考察。筆者同意北野新太郎的進路，即，將兩人的爭論 放回到唯識思想發展過程的歷史脈絡下來考察。意思是說：在唯識思想發展可考 察的至少數百年的長流中，彌勒、無著、世親也只不過是數個斷面，世親之後尚 有新的議題與新的困難出現，後來的唯識學者仍然要嘗試去面對。因此去追究真 諦與玄奘何者代表唯識正宗在筆者看來其實不是最有意義的問題，甚至可能是一 個假問題。這個問題完全忽略了唯識思想是一個動態的發展過程而不是一個靜態 的考古物。職是之故，與其追問何為唯識正宗，筆者認為更有意義的議題是：臚 列並比較在現存唯識文獻中存在的三性說模型，並且追索這些模型彼此之間的發 1 _{竹村雖然沒有明示，但是字裡行間顯然看出他不同情上田的主張，見竹村1995：30。}

展關係。 在這樣帶著歷史意識的脈絡下，北野新太郎(1999b，2005a)考察上田義文與 長尾雅人的爭論，認為其爭論的核心是「彌勒型三性說」與「無著型三性說」的 爭論，兩者各有所本。根據北野，「彌勒型三性說」即是前述的「單層構造」；而 「無著型三性說」則是前述的「二重構造」。（1999b：81）2 _{北野結論道：世親} 綜合了「彌勒型三性說」與「無著型三性說」，後來的安慧與護法，則分別接近 前者與後者。而上田義文與長尾雅人，也分別接近於前者與後者。（1999b：83） 北野新太郎將這個爭論還原到唯識思想的發展當中。並非上田與長尾之間有 一人是對，另一人是錯，而是兩人所見到的是不同時期的唯識思想，哲學的對立 其實源於侷限於歷史發展中的某一斷面。這點在印度思想發展中特別多見。 然而北野的限制至少有以下兩點：（1）一方面他儘管對於古、今唯識三性說 為何出現，找到歷史的根據。然而他完全沒有解釋從哲學思想的角度來說，為什 麽在古唯識之後，又出現了新的一個三性說模型。今唯識三性說的出現，究竟是 因應什麽樣的新的哲學議題與挑戰？（2）另一方面，北野認為唯識學在世親之 前的發展，也就是所謂「彌勒型三性說」（「單層構造」）與「無著型三性說」（「二 重構造」）的區別，足夠涵蓋唯識學從彌勒——無著——世親——安慧——護法 的發展。然而如前述，古、今唯識三性說的差異，除了北野提到的「單層構造」 與「二重構造」之外，還有關於「依他起性是否是染污的，因而終極來說必須滅 除」的差異。如以下要指出的，在無著之後三性說發展的主要動力，是根據「依 他起性不滅」（《攝大乘論》的「清淨依他起性」為肇始）而出現的有為的依他起 性與無為的圓成實性之間的關係的問題。據此來說，北野的討論並未能夠涵蓋無 著之後三性說的發展。 從歷史發展的角度來考察三性說的發展，另一個有影響力的例子是Alan Sponberg。Sponberg（1982）認為關於唯識學三性說存在三個不同的模型，他分 別稱之為「樞紐模型」（Pivotal model）、「漸進模型」（Progressive model）以及「窺

基的模型」。前兩個模型最主要的區別在於：在達到圓成實性的同時，依他起性 究竟滅或是不滅。根據「樞紐模型」，圓成實性其實等同於清淨的依他起性，因 此依他起性在圓成實中不滅；但若根據「漸進模型」則依他起性必須首先被消滅， 圓成實性才能顯現。Sponberg 認為：第三個「窺基的模型」則結合了前述兩種 模型。這個模型根據依他起性與圓成實性存在「不一不異」的關係，因此主張依 他起性不能完全斷除，要斷除的只是染污的依他起性，也就是被實體化的錯誤概 念（即、遍計執性）。在根本無分別智認識到真如的總相（即、共相；sāmānya-lakṣaṇa） 2 _{「彌勒型三性說」的特徵是「依他起性與遍計執性之間存在主、客關係」；「無著型三性說」的} 特徵是「將認識的主、客同時視為是內在於識的依他起性」的差別。

之後，後得無分別智則在世俗的意義下認識到不帶有實體化錯誤概念的別相（即、 自相；sva-lakṣaṇa），即，清淨的依他起性。Sponberg 的模型可以圖示如下：3 遍計執 依他起 圓成實 經典 Progressive Model 「漸進模 型」 Reification of phenomenal experience as “self” and “things” Phenomenal experience as interdependent, arising as the result of cause and condition

The pure unchanging Thusness of all being beyond the impermanence of the Dependent nature 日本中世 紀法相宗 Medieval Japanese Hossō scholarship4 Pivotal Model 「樞紐模 型」 Reification of the dependent nature The manifold of all causally conditioned and conceptually mediated phenomenal experience Non-reificati on of the dependent nature 《攝大乘 論》 K’uei-chi’s Model 「窺基的 模型」 Delusion, i.e., reification of the dependent nature as self and things (Sponberg: 107) Xiang (相) as particulars (Sponberg: 106) Defiled = imagined nature; i.e., objective domain of the incorrect cognition (Sponberg: 108) Pure: objective domain of the subsequently acquired cognition (Sponberg: 106 & 108)5 Xing (性) as the universal (Sponberg: 106) Objective domain (i.e., the universal of Thusness) of the fundamental cognition (Sponberg: 106 & 108) 《大乘法 苑義林章》、《成 唯識論》 筆者對於Sponberg 的批評是：他提出的「漸進型」與「樞紐型」模型分別 接近於上田義文與長尾雅人的模型，然而他卻忽略了檢討「漸進型」與「樞紐型」 兩者之間存在「單層構造」與「二重構造」的明顯差異。這是他關於三性說研究 明顯之不足。另外，不同於上田義文與長尾雅人，儘管Sponberg 帶著清楚的歷 史意識來考察唯識三性說的發展，他對於歷史發展的主張卻大有疑問。例如他認 為「漸進模型」是在東亞流行的詮釋（1982: 101），並在註釋中提到可以在日本 3 _{可參見趙東明 (2011): 269-280。} 4 _{Sponberg (1982): 115, note 9.} 5 _{參見：《大乘法苑義林章》卷1：「第一出體者，此有二種。一、所觀體；二、能觀體。所觀唯} 識，以一切法而為自體，通觀有無為唯識故。略有五重：一、遣虛存實識，觀遍計所執唯虛妄起 都無體用，應正遣空，情有理無，故觀依他圓成諸法體實。二、智境界，應正存有，理有情無故。」 (T1861:45.258b19-24)

法相宗作品中找到（1982: 115-116），這其實是很大的誤解。早在《辯中邊論》 「相品」中，即已有「識生變似義、有情、我及了；此境實非有，境無故識無（I.3）」 以及「依識有所得，境無所得生；依境無所得，識無所得生 (I.6)」的主張，也 就是說，隨著境（遍計執性）首先被滅除，識（依他起性）也隨之滅除。6 也就 是說，Sponberg 所謂的「漸進模型」，其實在印度唯識文獻中已經出現，絕非東 亞佛教後來才出現的。 恰恰指出Sponberg 的上述錯誤的是 D’Amato。D’Amato(2005)首先指出當前 學者對於唯識學三性說的主流看法如下：依他起本身是清淨的，遍計執乃是在依 他起性上的概念化，而一旦去掉錯誤的概念化之後留下來的依他起性，其實也就 是圓成實性。這個主流看法的主要文證是世親《唯識三十頌》的頌文21cd。7_根 據這個主流模型，依他起性本身是清淨的，無需滅除。這應該是Sponberg 所謂 「樞紐模型」最重要的特徵。然而D’Amato 指出《大乘莊嚴經論》的三性說卻 主張依他起性必須斷除，其中最明確的文證之一是MSA XIX.51 的註釋指出「依 他起性的消滅」(paratantrasvabhāva-kṣaya)。8 _{而這正是 Sponberg 所謂「漸進型」} 的特徵。9 D’Amato 的研究，明確指出在印度佛教文獻（而且是在可能比無著 《攝大乘論》更早的《大乘莊嚴經論》）中存在「漸進型」的三性說。這可以支 持筆者批評Sponberg 錯誤地主張「漸進模型」三性說是後來東亞佛學的發明。10 儘管Sponberg 的主張有一些錯誤，但也包含一些洞見。首先，他特別強調 「清淨依他起性」的概念，以及依他起性與圓成實性不一不異的議題。其次，他 指出了「智」在三性說的重要性；分別敘述如下。 首先，「清淨依他起性」的概念其實正是「樞紐型」的特徵。這個概念首先 見於無著《攝大乘論》引用《大乘阿毘達磨經》，主張遍計執性即是染污的依他 起性；而圓成實性則是清淨的依他起性。這也為前面D’Amato 提到的主流模 型——世親《唯識三十頌》中「圓成實性即是依他起性上去除遍計執性」的定 義——鋪好了道路。也就是說：當遍計執性與依他起性結合的時候，成為染污依 6 _{這也正是傳為真諦所造的《十八空論》中「方便唯識」與「正觀唯識」的差異。《十八空論》} 卷1：「一者、方便，謂先觀唯有阿梨耶識，無餘境界，現得境智兩空，除妄識已盡，名為方便 唯識也。二、明正觀唯識，遣蕩生死虛妄識心及以境界，一皆淨盡，唯有阿摩羅清淨心也。」 (T1616:31.864a24-28)

7 _{“niṣpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā,” Levi (1925): 14. 如下所述，這並非一個獨立的模型，}

而是世親對於無著《攝大乘論》樞紐模型的一種解讀。 8 _{D’Amato (2005): 197.} 9_{在2011年美國宗教學會年會，有一場Jay Garfield 與 Jonathan Gold 針對傳為世親所造之《三} 性論》（Trisvābhāvanirdeśa）中的三性說的辯論，根據筆者看來，其核心也正在於「依他起性是 否滅除」的爭論。參考： Garfield (Unpublished); Gold (2006a), (2006b). 10 _{筆者在另一篇論文中則嘗試指出：「漸進型」三性說在《辯中邊論》中也存在。見Keng (2010）。}

他起性；而當依他起性上去除了遍計執性時，則成為清淨依他起性，也就是圓成 實性。 然而進一步思考，這樣的主流模型中其實存在一些根本的困難。依他起性一 定是有為法，然而圓成實性中卻包含了無為的真如（tathatā）。如此，則依他起 性如何可能直接等同於圓成實性呢？如此則產生了清淨依他起性與圓成實性是 一或異的問題。以下筆者要指出的是：主張清淨依他起性存在的文獻（即、《攝 大乘論》之後的文獻）中，由於依他起性同時指涉認識中主客觀的兩個側面（即 所謂的「見分」、「相分」），因此清淨依他起性有可能指涉認識中主客觀的兩個側 面其中的一個：（1）從客觀面來說是：無「實體」概念的表象，例如「圓形、有 環狀附屬部分等的表象」（而沒有「杯子」的概念）；（2）從主觀面來說是：認識 （1）的表象的「識」。就（2）不從概念化的角度認識（1）的意義來說，可以說 （2）即是唯識學所要追求的「智慧」。 順此，清淨依他起性與圓成實性的關係至少有兩種：（1’）從客觀面來說： 清淨依他起即是在表象上「概念化」（遍計執性）的闕如，這與圓成實性的真如 是不一不異，因為清淨依他起性是「法」，而圓成實性的真如是「法性」，「法」 與「法性」不一不異，就如同「表象」與支配表象生滅變化背後的原理——「空 性」——一樣。（2’）從主觀面來說：清淨依他起性作為「智慧」，以圓成實性的 真如作為所緣緣。11。清淨依他起性與圓成實性的關係是認識（能緣）與被認識 （所緣）的關係，而不特別強調兩者之間不一不異的關係。 這裡特別值得注意的是關於智慧在三性說中扮演的不同角色，如下所詳述的， 可以藉由對比《攝大乘論》、《成唯識論》以及《瑜伽師地論》看出不同的安排。 首先，在《攝大乘論》中，智慧、無分別智、後得智在三性說中沒有佔據任何位 置。但在較晚的《成唯識論》中，則記錄了關於智慧是否應該對應到圓成實性或 是依他起性不同主張（參見以下「從《攝大乘論》到《成唯識論》的三性說」一 節的討論）。這點也可以印證筆者所主張的：智慧進入三性說中，乃是與清淨依 他起性的概念有關。 以下，筆者將嘗試深入剖析《攝大乘論》的三性說如何在從古唯識到新唯識 的發展中，扮演承先啟後的關鍵角色。為了討論的方便，本計劃暫且將唯識三性 說的發展分為以下4 期。 11 _{真如作為「所緣緣」，可見《瑜伽師地論》卷52：「問：若此習氣攝一切種子復名遍行麁重者，} 諸出世間法從何種子生？若言麁重自性種子為種子生，不應道理。答：諸出世間法從真如所緣緣 種子生，非彼習氣積集種子所生。」(T1579:30.589a13-17)；《解深密經》卷2：「若即於此分別 所行遍計所執相所依行相中，由遍計所執相不成實故，即此自性無自性性，法無我真如清淨所緣， 是名圓成實相。」(T676:16.696b23-26)；《辯中邊論》卷2：「若寂靜者，謂所證滅及能證道，能 寂靜故。彼所觀義，謂即真如，是寂靜道所緣境故。如是所說若諸寂靜、若所觀義，總名無為。」 (T1600:31.471a22-25)

（1）預備期：《解深密經》 （2）古唯識：《辨中邊論》第一品 （3）中唯識：《攝大乘論》 （4）新唯識：《成唯識論》 本計劃主要關注點在於從（2）如何發展到（4）的變化。特別著重在分析（3） 的《攝大乘論》如何提出了新的哲學觀點與製造新的哲學困難，因而促成了唯識 三性說的思想發展。希望藉由重建思想發展的細部機制，能夠清楚看到真正影響 唯識三性說發展的哲學議題。 D，研究方法 本計劃的中心是探究在三性說發展中主導的哲學議題，特別是伴隨「清淨依 他起性」概念而來的哲學困難。筆者的目標並非要提出關於三性說發展史的大論 述，而毋寧是想先探究三性說各個主要模型中的差異、探索為何導致如此差異背 後的哲學問題。 儘管本計劃的核心興趣是哲學的，但必須說明歷史與文獻方面的考慮還是絕 對必要的。之所以特別重視歷史的脈絡，原因是在佛學研究中，由於思想傳承與 作者不明，因而對於核心概念的把握常常存在許多不同的詮釋。這些不同的詮釋 有時出於後代印度翻譯者的不同理解、出於漢文、藏文詮釋者的創造性理解，但 是也有出於印度佛教思想本身的進一步發展。一個重要的例子是：關於「佛性」 的概念，在印度經典以及中國詮釋中即存在多種不同的解釋。12 不先釐清這些 概念的不同詮釋的歷史脈絡以及相互間的傳承、發展關係，就冒然進行哲學論證 的分析與重構，在筆者看來是相當大的冒險，也會落入本文開始提出的上田與長 尾爭論的陷阱。另一方面，正因為印度佛教發展的歷史諸多隱晦，因此概念的發 展史也可以回過頭來幫助釐清印度佛教經典的傳承歷史。換言之，哲學概念分析 與歷史發展的拼湊，兩方面應該是相互為用，相輔相成的。 在研究概念發展時，藉由詞彙的檢索與分析也是一個重要的研究方法。例如 筆者在博士論文中，嘗試藉由梵文詞彙 “prabhāvita” 在聯繫法身與真如的特殊 使用方式，論證世親的《攝大乘論》已經接受了法身等同於真如的思路。13這點 12 _{例如窺基提出根據印度佛典，佛性即可以有四種解釋：《說無垢稱經疏》卷5：「種性有二：一} 無漏、二有漏。無漏有二：一無為性，《勝鬘經》云：在纏名如來藏，出纏為法身。《涅槃》云， 師子吼者，是決定說。一切眾生，悉有佛性。二、有因緣性，在纏名多聞熏習法爾種子，出纏名 報身。《楞伽經》云：阿梨耶識名空如來藏，具足無漏熏習法故，名不空如來藏。《勝鬘》依無為 義，煩惱為能覆藏，真理為所覆藏。《楞伽》依有為義，阿賴耶識為能攝藏，種子名所攝藏。二 種能藏、二種所藏，皆名如來藏。」(T1782:38.1088a2-11)。關於「佛性」與「佛姓」概念在中 文脈絡下的混淆與《佛性論》與《大乘起信論》的不同詮釋，參見耿晴(2011a)。 13 _{見Keng 2009, Chapter 7.}

對於了解唯識與如來藏思想的會合，具有重大的意涵。總之，筆者認同在研究方 法上的多元論，認為所有的研究取徑—哲學、文獻學、電腦輔助的詞彙檢索分析、 宗教學—等等都應該相互為用，而不應該劃地自限。 E，結果與討論（含結論與建議） 1，本人在計劃執行期間發表國內期刊論文 3 篇，研討會論文 5 篇；國外期刊論 文 1 篇、研討會論文 2 篇、專書論文 2 篇。成果應能符合科技部預期的目標。茲將 本計劃最核心的論文摘要臚列如下： 1a：耿晴，2013.12.〈法身為真如所顯 —論《能斷金剛般若波羅蜜多經釋》 對於法身的界定〉，《臺大佛學研究》，26, 1-56。摘要如下： 本文首先簡要回顧世親的《攝大乘論釋》如何改變了無著《攝大乘論》對於 法身的界定。無著傾向將法身視為是有為法，但世親卻明白主張法身是無為法， 並且使用了特殊的梵文術語prabhāvita 來描述成佛時法身從被遮蔽狀態變成被揭 露狀態的轉換。 本文接著指出：類似於《攝大乘論釋》對於法身的界定與 prabhāvita 一詞 的使用，也出現在《能斷金剛般若波羅蜜經釋》中。兩種文獻都主張法身與真如 是等同關係，這點與作為如來藏思想代表作的《寶性論》 完全一致。在等同關 係的前提下，《能斷金剛般若波羅蜜多經釋》主張：不同階位的聖人間的差別在 於真如的部分顯現（菩薩）與完全顯現（佛）的不同。 相較於《攝大乘論釋》並未探究法身與智慧的關係，《能斷金剛般若波羅蜜 經論》進一步主張：法身的本性是智慧，而且由於法身恆常不變，因而佛智慧必 須恆常不變，是一種去除了所有概念化思維的不帶有任何「相」的智慧。凡夫則 是為概念化思維所覆蓋因而這個智慧不得顯現。 最後，根據《攝大乘論釋》與《能斷金剛般若波羅蜜多經釋》的高度相似性， 本文主張兩種文獻皆為世親所造，但《能斷金剛般若波羅蜜經論》代表了世親融 合如來藏思想進入唯識體系更為成熟的成果。 1b，耿晴，2014.12.〈《辯中邊論》頌文中的兩種唯識三性說模型〉，《臺大佛 學研究》，28, 51-104。摘要如下： 本文從學者關於唯識學三性說的爭論出發，指出之所以產生這些爭論背後的 主要原因是由於唯識學文獻本身即主張不同的三性說模型。本文首先界定兩種三 性說模型：單層結構與雙層結構，並且分別簡述其主要特徵。單層結構的主要特 徵是：依他起性與遍計所執性之間的關係是能取與所取的關係；雙層結構的主要 特徵是：依他起性本身包含有相分、見分的二分，遍計所執性乃是將依他起性作 為「所遍計」、在二分之上進一步的概念化與實體化。根據兩個模型的差異，本

文接著以《辯中邊論》頌文為核心，分析〈辯中邊論‧相品〉頌文中的三性說是 單層結構；而〈辯中邊論‧真實品〉頌文則與《攝大乘論》一樣，主張雙層結構。 根據這個結論，筆者總結過去學者對於《辯中邊論》三性說的誤讀，以及伴隨這 些誤讀而來對於現存《辯中邊論》頌文結構的錯誤主張。最後，筆者根據《辯中 邊論》中存在兩種不同版本三性說以及《攝大乘論》對於《辯中邊論》引用不一 致的兩個線索，提出對於《辯中邊論》頌文結構的新建議：現存《辯中邊論》頌 文是一個多層次的文獻，其中有較為古老的層次與較為年輕的層次。 1c，耿晴，2015.12. 〈《大乘莊嚴經論》的兩種唯識三性說模型〉，《臺大佛 學研究》，30, 1-64。摘要如下： 本文首先檢討過去學者對於《大乘莊嚴經論》三性說的討論，然後簡述單層 結構與雙層結構兩種不同的三性說模型。據此對於現存《大乘莊嚴經論》的頌文 進行仔細的文本分析，主張其中包含了單層與雙層結構兩種不同的三性說模型。 現存《大乘莊嚴經論》頌文〈真實品〉中隱含支持的是單層結構三性說；但〈述 求品〉明白主張的則是雙層結構三性說。類似的狀況也出現在《辯中邊論》中： 〈相品〉與〈真實品〉分別主張單層與雙層結構的三性說。然而本文也進一步指 出，不同於某些學者的主張，雙層結構三性說並不必然蘊涵依他起性是終極清淨 的、因而無需滅除。事實上，本文認為在整部現存《大乘莊嚴經論》的頌文以及 散文註釋中，都找不到明確支持「終極清淨依他起性」概念的證據。最後，依據 現存《大乘莊嚴經論》中存在兩種三性說模型以及《攝大乘論》對於《大乘莊嚴 經論》引用之不一致的兩個線索，本文建議現存《大乘莊嚴經論》頌文應該被視 為是一個多層次的文獻，其中至少包含較古老以及較新的兩個文獻層次。

1d，Ching Keng, 2014.12. "A Re-examination of the Relationship between the

Awakening of Faith and Dilun School Thought, Focusing on the Works of Huiyuan."

（〈《大乘起信論》與地論思想關係再探：以慧遠的作品為中心〉）. In Lin, Chen-kuo and Michael Radich, Edited, A Distant Mirror: Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and

Seventh Century Chinese Buddhism (Hamburg: University of Hamburg Press). 摘要

如下：

The question of the origin of the Awakening of Faith has been a hotly debated issue for decades. For scholars who argue for its Chinese provenance, the assumption was made that the Awakening of Faith was composed under the influence of the Dilun School. This paper aims to challenge this assumption by arguing that in the works of Huiyuan, arguably the most important Dilun master, we do not find the essential doctrinal feature of the Awakening of Faith, namely, the compromise or even the total

obliteration of the distinction between unconditioned and conditioned dharmas. In contrast, Huiyuan’s works maintain a dualist scheme: e.g. his differentiation between the aspects (men 門) of inherently pure (xingjing 性淨) and expedient (fangbian 方 便). Under this differentiation, moreover, the inherently pure aspect is unambiguously unconditioned, with no blending into conditioned dharmas. Based on this

obaservation, I argue that the compromise made in the Awakening of Faith should be regarded as a new invention rather than a direct outgrowth from the Dilun School. I end this paper with possible implications of my thesis for our understanding of Dilun thought and for the early reception of the Awakening of Faith.

2，本人憑藉本計劃支持下發表的成果，已經順利升等至副教授，對於科技 部的支持深表感謝！ 3，本人在計劃執行期間由於適逢內人懷孕、小孩出世等家庭因素，預計出 國參與國際會議與移地研究均不得已取消。將計劃經費流用至助理經費，擔任助 理的研究生皆能夠努力協助搜集一手文獻於二手資料，為筆者接下來的研究計劃 提供了很好的基礎。對於經費流用的彈性處理，本人表示萬分感謝。未來將盡力 排除家庭因素，達成出國開會研究的目標。

國科會補助專題研究計畫出席國際學術會議心得報告

日期：102 年 08 月 09 日

一、參加會議經過

本次會議由比利時根特大學巴得勝（Bart Dessein）教授主辦，台灣的法鼓佛教學院鄧偉仁教授協 辦，台灣有多位學者參與，算是一次很難得的展示台灣佛學研究實力的國際會議。台灣學者分別 從巴利文獻的原始佛教、南傳佛教與當代佛教，北傳漢譯等等不同角度發表論文，足以證明台灣 學者的深度與廣度。 會中邀請兩位研究阿毗達磨的重量級學者 Johannes Bronkhorst, Venerable K.L. Dhammajoti 發表主 題演講，特別值得一提的是：日本的桂紹隆教授也全程參與，給筆者與其他發表人提出非常受用 的建議，算是難得的收穫。

二、與會心得

阿毗達磨在世界佛教研究的光譜中，算是較為冷門的領域。主要原因在於其哲學思辨性非常強， 又與宗教實踐有很密切的關聯，加上絕大部份的梵文文獻佚失，因此研究的難度相當高。然而從 另外一個角度來說，佛教思想可以說有很大部分是從阿毗達磨這個母體（matrix）中繁衍出來。大 乘中觀哲學的開拓者龍樹以反對阿毗達磨作為哲學思辨的起點；大乘唯識哲學則在對於意識分析 的部分繼承了阿毗達磨綿密的分析架構，並進一步發展。因此這一次的會議，可以說是多年來少

計畫編號

NSC101－2410－H－004－214－MY3

計畫名稱

從古唯識三性說到新唯識三性說—論「清淨依他起性」的概念在唯識三性說發展中 的關鍵角色（第 1 年）

出國人員

姓名

耿 晴

服務機構

及職稱

政治大學哲學系助理教授

會議時間

102 年 7 月 8 日至

102 年 7 月 9 日

會議地點

比利時，根特(Ghent)大學

會議名稱

(中文)

從阿毗曇到阿毗達磨──印度、中亞與中國的早期佛教經院主義

(英文)

From Abhidhamma to Abhidharma: Early Buddhist Scholasticism in India, Central-Asia, and China.

發表題目

(中文)

護法《廣百論釋論》中對於極微常住的辯破

(英文)

The Refutation of the Permanence (Nityatva) of Atoms (Paramāṇu) in Dharmapāla’s Guang bailun shi lun (A Commentary on the Catuśataka)

有的關於阿毗達磨研究學者的集合，期待未來可以開展出更為豐碩的成果。 本次會議較為美中不足的地方是：研究南傳阿毗曇與北傳阿毗達磨的學者的對話仍然相當有限。 這點殊為可惜。其實本來這樣類型的會議目的正在於打破佛教過去以來不同領域間隔閡的問題， 顯然一次的對話似有不足，期待未來能夠有第二屆的阿毗達磨會議在台灣舉辦。 詳細會議議程參見附件一。

三、發表論文全文或摘要

論文全文如附件二。英文摘要如下：

Vasubandhu in his Viṃśikā famously refute the theory of atoms and argue that the collection (samhata) of atoms is in contradiction with the defnition of atoms as having no extension. Interestingly, Xuanzang in his Chinese translation has two terms to depict the collection: hehe 和合 and heji 和集. Kuiji identifies hehe as the position held by the Sautrāntika masters, and heji held by the New Sarvāstivāda masters. The implication is that Vasubandhu refutes the hehe position and afterwards the New Sarvāstivāda masters came up with a new and modified position in response to Vasubandhu. But what exactly is these two positions?

A common opinion is that hehe means a collection among different kinds of atoms (in terms of their color and shape) but heji means a collection among the same kinds of atoms. The problem, however, is it would be very difficult to see how the latter position can be proposed as a response to Vasubandhu’s successful refutation of the former position since both positions talk about collection.

To investigate, I point out that Vasubandhu’s argument against hehe would make sense only if hehe implies contacts among atoms when they are collected. For this reason, I argue that a crucial clue behind heji is that it is a collection with no contact among atoms. This implication does not seem to be clearly spelled out in Kuiji’s commentary on the Viṃśikā. Fortunately, in Dharmapāla’s GBLSL, he reports a position that confirms this interpretation.

四、建議

無

。

五、攜回資料名稱及內容

本次會議並未出版會議論文集。攜回資料為發表人的書面摘要。

六、其他

附件一：會議議程：

Monday, 8 July 2013 Time Programme 09:30 ~ 10:00 Registration 10:00 ~ 10:10 Opening Address 10:10 ~ 11:00 Keynote Speech 1:

Johannes Bronkhorst (Université de Lausanne, Switzerland):

“Abhidharma and Indian Thinking”

11:00 ~ 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 ~ 13:00

Session 1: Early Indian Abhidharma (I)

Lance Cousins (Oxford University, UK):

“Sanskrit abhidharma literature of the Mahāvihāravāsins”

Siglinde Dietz (University of Göttingen, Germany):

“Some Theravāda Abhidhamma and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma terms: research into the development and differentiation.”

Rupert Gethin (University of Bristol, UK):

“The Good, the Bad and the Undetermined: Reflections on the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra listing of dharmas”

13:00 ~ 14:00 Lunch

14:00 ~ 15:30

Session 2: Early Indian Abhidharma (II)

Chair: Weijen Teng (Dharma Drum Buddhist College) Tse-fu Kuan (Yuan Ze University, Taoyuan, Taiwan):

“The Ańgutta Nikāya and Abhidharma”

Kin-tung Yit (National Sun Yat Sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan):

“The rūpa-kalāpa and meditation in the Theravada Abhidharma Tradition”

Tamara Ditrich (Nan Tien Institute, Berkeley, Australia):

“Interpretations of the terms ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā in the Abhidhamma”

15:30 ~ 16:30

Session 3: Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda Abhidharma

Chair: Marie-Hélène Gorisse (Ghent Centre for Buddhist Studies) Zhihua Yao (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong):

“The Sautrāntika-Sarvāstivāda Controversy on the Cognition of Nonexistent Objects”

Juan Wu (University of Tokyo, Japan):

“Interpretations of the “Rootless Faith” of the Patricide Ajātaśatru in the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā[-śāstra] and Other Relevant Sources”

16:30 ~ 17:00 Coffee Break

17:00 ~ 18:30

Session 4: Madhyamaka and Yogācāra

Chair: Tillo Detige (Ghent Centre for Buddhist Studies) Goran Kardaš (University of Zagreb, Croatia):

“Madhyamaka in Abhidharma śāstras: The case of Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhi”

“Truth and Liberation in Abhidharma and Chinese Yogācāra: On the theory of svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa”

Ching Keng (National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan):

“The Refutation of the Permanence (Nityatva) of Atoms (Paramāṇu) in Dharmapāla’s Guang bail un shi lun (A Commentary on the Catuśataka)”

19:30 ~ Conference Dinner

Tuesday, 9 July 2013

Time Programme

09:10 ~ 10:00

Keynote Speech 2:

Bhikkhu K. L. Dhammajoti (The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong):

“Saṃghabhadra's contribution to our understanding of Abhidharma”

10:00 ~ 11:00

Session 5: Vasubandhu and the Abhidharmakośa

Chair: Goran Kardaš (University of Zagreb, Croatia) Tsai Yao-ming (National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan):

“Perspectives on the Person and the Self in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa”

Jowita Kramer (University of Munich, Germany):

“Sources of Vasubandhu’s Pańcaskandhaka and Its Three Commentaries”

11:00 ~ 12:30

Session 6: Buddhism in Gāndhāra

Chair: Ann Heirman (Ghent Centre for Buddhist Studies) Collett Cox (University of Washington, Seattle):

“Commentarial Exegesis and the Development of Abhidharma: Evidence from the Early Buddhist Gāndhārī Manuscripts”

Stefan Baums (University of Munich, Germany):

“Buddhist Stages of Liberation and Their Uses in Early Gandhāran Scholastic Literature”

Ingo Strauch (Université de Lausanne, Switzerland):

“Abhidharmic elements in an early Mahāyāna sutra from Gandhāra”

12:30 ~ 13:30 Lunch

13:30 ~ 15:30

Session 7: Abhidharma in China

Chair: Thomas Jülch (Ghent Centre for Buddhist Studies) Eric Greene (University of Bristol, UK):

“Early Chinese Interpretations of Pratītyasamutpāda: Sense perception and desire in the translations of An Shigao and the writings of his Chinese

followers”

Max Deeg (University of Cardiff, UK):

“Abhidharma-Texts and Xuanzang’s Xiyu-ji”

Robert Kritzer (Kyoto Notre Dame University Kyoto, Japan) and Elizabeth Kenney (Kansai Gaidai University, Osaka, Japan):

“Jingying Huiyuan on aśubhabhāvanā”

Weijen Teng (Dharma Drum Buddhist College, Jinshan, Taiwan):

“Kuiji's Abhidharmic Recontextualization of Chinese Buddhism.”

15:30 ~ 16:00 Coffee Break

16:00 ~ 17:00

Session 8: Abhidharma in Tibet and Japan

Chair: Christophe Vielle (Université Catholique de Louvain) Esler Dylan (Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium):

“Traces of Abhidharma in the bSam-gtan-mig-sgron (Tibet, 10th century)”

Tatiana Ermakova (Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg, Russia):

“The Japanese Scholar Unrai Wogihara as Participant of the Russian Abhidharma Project”

17:00 ~ 19:00

Panel:

“Louis de La Vallée Poussin: Life and Work” panel organizers:

Christophe Vielle (Université Catholique de Louvain) Ann Heirman(Ghent University)

Speakers:

Christophe Vielle (UCL):“The works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin: A

Thematic overview”

Jean-Marie Verpoorten (ULg):“The Work[s] of Louis de La Vallée Poussin

as seen in the Review-articles of his Contemporaries”

Danny Praet (Ghent University): “Louis de La Vallée Poussin and Franz

Cumont: “Faculty politics and the scientific views of two colleagues on the interaction between ancient Greece, Rome, Persia and India”

Tom De Rauw (UGent) and Ann Heirman (UGent): “The importance of

Louis de La Vallée Poussin for Ghent University and beyond”

附件二：發表論文全文

On the Theory of the Accumulation of Atoms in Dharmapāla’s Dasheng Guangbailun

Shilun

Ching Keng National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Introduction

The theory of atoms and in particular the theory about accumulation of atoms are crucial in Yogâcāra philosophy, mainly because the refutation of these theories plays an essential role in establishing an Idealist position against the existence of external reality. This Idealist position attributes the distinction of Yogâcāra from, on the one hand, Buddhist Realists such as the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika, and also, on the other hand, from non-Buddhist Realists such as the Vaiśiṣikas.

Both the Buddhist and non-Buddhist Realists claim that atoms are the basic elements that constitute external reality. For this reason, refutation of external reality boils down to the refutation of the theory of atoms. A main feature about atoms is that they are too small to be visible. In fact, the Realists define atoms as having no extension. Here lies the main line of Yogâcāra refutation: it would not be possible for the realists to hold that atoms accumulate to form a big enough cognitive object-support (ālambana-pratyaya) without contradicting their definition of atoms as having no extension. This precisely is the main line of argument in Vasubandhu’s

Viṃśikā (henceforth abbreviated as Viṃ) Judging from the Viṃ itself, it appears that the Realists have been

overwhelmingly defeated by Vasubandhu.

But an issue that keeps puzzling me is: after refuting the atomic theory of the realists, why then does Vasubandhu cite the opinion of the "kāśmīravaibhāṣikās" that "to avoid the fault implicit in partlessness, namely, that the atoms cannot conjoin, maintain that it is the accumulations that conjoin with one another." (Kapstein 2001: 198)1 Is it not true that in Viṃ verses 11-12, Vasubandhu has already refuted the possibility in general that extensionless atoms can accumulate to form a larger aggregates? Then why would Vasubandhu bother with refuting a particular theory of accumulation held by the Kāśmīravaibhāṣikās? Moreover, this specific version is odd: it claims that aggregates accumulate to form a larger mass without explaining how that aggregate itself can be formed in the first place.2

Moroever, another lingering question is: why does Dignāga in his Ālambanaparīkṣā cite three realist positions, the second of which also concerns with some kind of accumulation of atoms. Then what about the third theory considered by Dignāga? Did Vasubandhu already refute in his Viṃ the third theory considered by Dignāga? If he did, why does Dignāga bother to refute this third theory? If he does not, then what is the difference

1 _{Regarding this theory held by the Kāśmīra-vaibhāṣika, I strongly suspect that this theory refers to the theory of}

"rūpasaṃghāta." This concerns the infamous notion of "eight substances arise together" (「八事俱生」 ("aṣṭa-dravyaka utpadyate") in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Cf. 吉元信行 1971:331. Here "shi 事" (dravya) means "real entities," i.e., paramaṇu. A natural reading of this would mean that eight atoms—in whatever way they form a cluster somehow—are born together as the minimum unit of reality. However, regarding this theory, Sasaki points out that the minimum accumulation of atoms consists of 20 atoms. Namely, an atom of rūpa (色) at center, surrounded by each atom of earth, water, fire and wind; such is the first group of 5, and then with the atom of gandha, of rasa, and of sparśa to constitute a whole group of 20 atoms. See Sasaki 2009. Many thanks to Professor Funayama for drawing my attention to Sasaki’s paper

2 _{In my understanding, Matthew Kapstein also seems to share my puzzlement. He interprets the Kāśmīravaibhāṣikās position}

to be a bit too brief: "The Vaibhāṣika theory in its developed form seems to have required unextended points of resistance, indivisible even in thought, falling within, but not filling, given spaces, and at the same time capable of existing only in cluster." (Kapstein 2001: 191). But in a footnote, he comments: "Here, his [i.e., Vasubandhu's] concern was probably an earlier version which postulated conjunction, not among atoms, but among clusters of unconjoined, simple, but extended, atoms." (Kapstein 2001: 202) Kapstein did not explain where he adopted this idea that the developed form of the Vaibhāṣika theory concerns clusters of unextended atoms but an earlier form of the Vaibhāṣika theory concerns clusters of extended atoms.

between the second and the third theory refuted in the Ālambanaparīkṣā, and how do they correspond to the theories refuted by Vasubandhu in the Viṃ?

Yet another puzzling issue is that, when translating the prose commentary of the Viṃ, 3 why does Xuanzang introduce two terms “hehe” (和合) and “heji” (和集)? If we consult the extant Sanskrit manuscript and Tibetan translation,4 it is clear that this is interpolated by Xuanzang.

Why did Xuanzang interpolate the term "heji"? Why does Dignāga cite the third theory beyond Vasubandhu's Viṃ? Inspired by the comments made by Kuiji and by Wengui discussed below that “hehe” refers to the pre-Abhidharmakośa (henceforth abbreviated as pre-AKBh) position from the Realists and “heji” refers to the post-Abhidharmakośa (henceforth abbreviated as post-AKBh) revised position from the Realists,5 I argue that Xuanzang was trying to introduce two versions of the opponents’ theory of accumulation of atoms.6 This would also explain why Dignāga bother with refuting the third theory. And if this is the case, it would also mean that the refutation of theories of accumulation in the Viṃ did not exhaust all possibile realist theories of accumulation. But then the further question would be: what is the room left for the Realist after Vasubandhu's seemingly definitive refutation?

This paper tries to answer the above questions by a close reading of the refutation of atomic theories in Dharmapāla’s Dasheng Guangbailun shilun (henceforth abbreviated as DGS). I believe Dharmapāla's DGS provides ample clues because Yogâcāra thinkers were engaged with lively debates against contemporary Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Realist opponents. Challenged by a Yogâcāra thinker in an earlier text, the

opponents proposed a revised theory that was targeted in a later Yogâcāra text. From this perspective, it would be very useful to investigate how the positions of opponents evolved through the three texts: Vasubandhu’s Viṃ, Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣā, and Dharmapāla’s DGS.7 This paper aims to show that Dharmapāla’s DGS is particularly helpful if we want to understand better the Realist opponents presented in Vasubandhu and Dignāga.

***

In Chapter One of Dharmapāla’s DGS, he lists a few theories about the accumulation among atoms. In this paper, I give an annotated translation and commentary of the relavant portion in Dharmapāla’s DGS in light of the commentary by Wengui (文軌; date unknown; ca. 7th century). When necessary, I also go back to Vasubandhu’s text. I try to show how Dharmapāla’s text helps us see the strength and limitation of Vasubandhu’s refutation. Towards the end of this paper, I show how Dharmapāla’s text and Wengui’s commentary help us understand the notion of “heji” and the third theory considered by Dignāga in his

Ālambanaparīkṣā.

Preliminary Observations about Wengui’s Commentary on the DGS 8

In reading Dharmapāla’s DGS, Wengui’s fragmentary commentary proves to be extremely helpful.

3 _{《唯識二十論》：「或應多極微和合及和集，如執實有眾多極微皆共和合和集為境。」(T1590:31. 75c21-22)}

4 _{“saṃhatā vā ta eva paramāṇavaḥ”(Levi 1925: 6) “rdul phra rab du ma’am” (Derge 4057, 7a2)} 5 _{See below, pages 13ff.}

6 _{Cf. Ui 《陳那著作 no 研究》，頁 94。}

7 _{According to Eltsinger, Dharmakīrti admits that atoms can indeed accumulate together to serve as an object-support. See and}

Arnold 2012: 28 (citing Eltsinger 2010: 430)

Unfortunately, only a tiny part of Wengui’s commentary, namely, his commentary on the first chapter of the DGS, survives in Dunhuang as the Pelliot Chinois 2101. It was first transcribed and included in the Taishō Tripitaka as No. 2800 in volume 85. Recently, the whole fragments were made available on the website of the International Dunhuang Project.9

We know very little about Wengui and his career. Two fragments of his work survive, namely, his

commentary on Dharmapāla’s DGS and his commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa (No. 848 in Volume 53 of the 卍新纂大日本續藏經 Manji Shinsan Dainihon Zokuzōkyō). According to Shen (2007), Wengui was a student of Xuanzang in the latter’s early career. He is specualted by Shen to be born around 615-675.

A Set of Terminlogy about the “Accumulation” of Atoms

As will become clear below, a key difference among the theories of atoms refuted by Dharmapāla lies in whether there is physical contact among the accumulated atoms. In what follows, I deliberately use the following set of terminology in order to avoid confusion.

“Accumulation”: a neutral term, does not suggest anything about the way in which atoms form an accmulation. A accumulation of atoms can occur with or without physical contact among atoms.

“Touching Accumulation” (saṃyoga): accumulation of atoms with physical contact among them.

“Untouching Accumulation” (saṃghāta/saṃhata?): accumulation of atoms without physical contact among them.

The First Theory of Accumulation: Touching Accumulation

The first position, which Wengui attributes to the Vaiśeṣika school, 10 _{reads as follows:}

復次有執極微是常、是實。 和合相助有所生成，自體無虧而 起諸果。

Furthermore, some [masters] hold: atoms are permanent and are substances. Atoms form touching accumulation (hehe), help each other and produce something. Without any loss in themselves, they produce effects.

[論主]此亦不然，義不成故。 若許和合必有方分，既有方分定 是無常。

[Dharmapāla answers:] This also is not true, because [their] intended meaning cannot be established. If one allows touching accumulation (hehe) among atoms, then one must concede the extension of atoms. And whatever that has an extention must be impermanent.

The position in target is precisely the position refuted by Vasubandhu in his Viṃ verses 11-12. Here Dharmapāla refutes the opponents by the same arguments as in the Viṃ, claiming that atoms cannot form touching accumulation (hehe 和合) because this would imply that each atom in the touching accumulation would have parts and hence cannot be permanent.

It must be noted here that, contrary to Vasubandhu, Dharmapāla in the DGS deliberately distinguish between touching accumulation and untouching accumulation, and provide refutation respectively. Here we must interpret the Chinese term “hehe” as "touching accumulation" and read the Vaiśeṣika position as holding that atoms form touching accumulation. Otherwise, Dharmapāla's argument would not hold. That is, “hehe” must mean an accumulation of atoms by means of physical contact, like a piling together of billiard balls. This is because if atoms can somehow form untouching accumulation, then this accumulation would NOT entail that each atom in the accumulation must have parts. Here in the DGS, Dharmapāla simply follows Vasubandhu's refutation in Viṃ 11-12.

9 _{http://idp.bl.uk/database/oo_scroll_h.a4d?uid=-6123781299;recnum=59140;index=6 Accessed Sept. 23, 2012.} 10 _{Wengui attributes this position to the Vaiśeṣika.}

This point is worth emphasizing because readers of the Viṃ often neglect to see that Vasubandhu also makes a distinction, despite implicit, between touching and untouching accumulation.11 That is: verses 11-12 refutes touching accumulation; and verse 13 refutes untouching accumulation held by the Vaibhāṣika of Kashmir. The reason behind this is: Viṃ 13 should mean to refute the kind of theory that escapes Vasubandhu's refutation in Viṃ 11-12, or there would be no point to bring up a new refutation. Now in Viṃ 13, the

Vaibhāṣika of Kashmir hold the theory that it is not the individual atoms that form touching accumulation, but it is the clusters (saṃghāta) of atoms that form touching accumulation. The obvious problem with this theory is: how could those clusters be formed in the way that escapes the difficulty pointed out in Viṃ 11-12. I have pointed out that the only possible way to escape the refutation of Viṃ 11-12 is to argue that atoms can form untouching accumulation in order to become clusters (saṃghāta). This is the reason why I intepret saṃghāta in Viṃ 13 as a cluster of atoms among which there is no touching accumulation.

Now regarding Viṃ 13, I argue that Vasubandhu's refutation is not successful. The argument runs as follows: O: opponents' view (Vaibhāṣika of Kashmir): atoms form untouching accumulation (saṃghāta). These untouching accumulations themselves can form touching accumulation (saṃ-√yuj).

Viṃ. 13ab: Whose accumulation is this? Namely, if there is no touching accumulation among the atoms in question, then why should we treat, say, atoms a1, a2…an as a saṃghāta but excluding atom an+1?

O': opponents' revised view: then let there be no touching accumulation among those untouching accumulation.

Viṃ. 13cd: then the opponents should not claim that atoms cannot be connected because they have no parts, since for those accumulations which do have parts, the opponents still deny them connection.

However, Viṃ13cd provides an invalid argument. Here I formulate Vasubandhu’s argument as follows: After veses 11-12, both the opponents and Vasubandhu agree P:

P: whatever that can form touching accumulation has parts.

Underlies the revised opponents' view that “untouching accumulations do not form touching accumulation” is the assumption Q:

Q: Untouching accumulations, which have parts, do not form touching accumulation.

Now Viṃ13cd claims that P and Q are in contradiction, but in fact they are not. The negation of P is: ~P: there exists some atom that can form touching accumulation but has no parts.

11 _{I believe Vasubandhu should have been quite aware of this distinction. Cf. Vasubandhu's discussion about whether atoms}

touch each other in the AKBh: Pruden p. 120:《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷 2〈1 分別界品〉：「又諸極微為相觸不？迦濕彌羅國毘婆 沙師說不相觸。所以者何？若諸極微遍體相觸，即有實物體相雜過；若觸一分成有分失，然諸極微更無細分。若爾何故相 擊發聲？[答：]但由極微無間生故，若許相觸擊石拊手體應相糅。[問]不相觸者聚色相擊云何不散？風界攝持故令不散。或 有風界能有壞散。如劫壞時。或有風界能有成攝。如劫成時。云何三根由無間生名取至境？[答]即由無間名取至境。謂於 中間都無片物。又和合色許有分故相觸無失。由許此理。毘婆沙文義善成立。故彼問言。諸是觸物為是觸為因故生。為非 觸為因故生。諸非觸物為問亦爾？彼就此理為不定答。有時是觸為因生於非觸。謂和合物正離散時。有時非觸為因生於是 觸。謂離散物正和合時。有時是觸為因生於是觸。謂和合物復和合時。有時非觸為因生於非觸。謂向遊塵同類相續。尊者 世友說。諸極微相觸即應住至後念。然大德說：一切極微實不相觸，但由無間假立觸名。此大德意應可愛樂，若異此者， 是諸極微應有間隙。中間既空誰障其行許為有對？又離極微無和合色。和合相觸即觸極微。如可變礙此亦應爾。又許極微 若有方分，觸與不觸皆應有分；若無方分設許相觸亦無斯過。」(T1558:29.11c4-29).

Since P does not claim that whatever has parts must form touching accumulation, Vasubandhu here is proposing an invalid argument against the opponents. In his commentary on the Viṃ, it seems to me that following Vasubandhu Kuiji also proposes an invalid argument.12

The same situation also seems to happen in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (henceforth abbreviated as AKBh), where Vasubandhu agrees with Bhadanta’s claim that atoms accumulate without physical contact among each other but there is nothing in between them. In my preliminary reading, the AKBh does not try to challenge this claim by Bhadanta.

My point here is that the Viṃ does leave some room for the opponents. Viṃ 11-12 merely successfully refutes the claim that extensionless atoms can form touching accumulation. Viṃ 13 does not successfully refute the claim that extensionless atoms can form untouching accumulation (sṃghāta), and untouching accumulations themselves form untouching accumulation. As shown below, this is precisely the revised theory from the opponents that Dharmapāla aims to refute in his DGS.

Second Theory of Accumulation: Accumulation via Complte Overlap

若言極微遍體和合、無方 分者，此亦不然。何以故？

If one claims that atoms accumulate by complete overlap, and hence without extension, then [Dharmapāla answers] this is not the case, either. Why? 頌曰： 在 因 微 、 圓 相 於 果 則 非 有 是 故 諸 極 微 非 遍 體 和 合 (I.13)

The attributes (xiang) of smallness and roundness that exist in the cause do not exist in the effect;

Hence atoms do not accumulate by complete overlap (I.13)

論曰：若諸極微遍體和合， 無方分故非少分合，是則諸微 應同一處，實果應與自因遍合， 無別處故，應亦微圓。

If [as the opponents claim] atoms accumulate by complete overlap, then since atoms do not have parts there is no part in contact (shaofen he) [in the accumulation], then all atoms [in the accumulation] should occupy the same location. The real effect (shiguo) should be in complete overlap with their own cause because there is no other location [to be occupied], and should also be small and round.

若爾應許一切句義皆越諸 根所了知境，由見所依餘可知 故。是則違害世間自宗。

[Dharmapāla criticizes] If so, then you should allow that all categories (padārtha-s) go beyond the scope of cognitive objects for sense organs, because the remaining [categories (padârtha-s)] can be known [to go beyond the scope of cognitive objects for sense organs] by seeing that their basis [goes beyond the scope of cognitive objects for sense organs]. If this is the case, then [the opponents] would violate their own presumption which is known to everyone in the world.

若言實果雖與自因遍體和 合無別處所，然由量德積集力 故，令其實果亦可得見。謂諸 實果雖無住處方分差別，然由 量德積集殊勝，令所依實非大 似大，方分差別分明可見。

If [the opponents] claim that the real effect is in complete ovelap with its cause without a separate location, but due to the power of the addition of amount (liang)—which is as a quality (de),13 _{the real effect can be visible.}

This means that the real effects have no different location and no parts, but due to the addition of the amount as a quality, the basis [of those atoms], despite not being large, seems to be large and its different parts can clearly be seen.

12 _{I think Kuiji also commits a fallacy in his inference “述曰：此重顯成，破聚無合。汝之聚色許有方分，亦不許相合，返}

顯成立極微無合不由無方分。若由無方分執極微無合，聚既有方分，聚色應有合？此中乃有法之差別及有法差別隨一不成， 非遍是宗法，同喻能立不成，異喻所立不遣，合有六過。” The underlined part is apparently an invalid argument claiming: “If no parts, then no connection” implies “If there are parts, then there is connection”!

13 _{“Magnitude” (parimāṇa) is one among the 24 qualities according to Vaiśeṣika. Cf. 《勝宗十句義論》：「德句義云何？謂}

二十四德名德句義。何者名為二十四德？一色二味三香四觸五數六量七別體八合九離十彼體十一此體十二覺十三樂十四苦 十 五 欲 十 六 瞋 十 七 勤 勇 十 八 重 體 十 九 液 體 二 十 潤 二 十 一 行 二 十 二 法 二 十 三 非 法 二 十 四 聲 。 如 是 為 二 十 四 德 。 」 (T2138:54.1263a1-6)

[答：]此但有言都無實義。 我先難汝。

[Dharmapāla answers:] All thse are empty words without corresponding reality. I begin with the following questions for you.

所生實果與諸極微既無別 處，應如極微越諸根境，汝不 能救何事餘言。

Since the real effect that you claim to be produced [by a accumulation of atoms] has no separate location from those atoms, it should go beyond the scope of cognitive objects for sense organs, just like those atoms. If you cannot dismiss this challenge, then what’s the point of [saying] other words?

若所依實如是相現，應捨 實體同彼能依，既成他相，應 捨自相。

If the real basis appears with such attributes [of largeness], then it should discard its being a substance and become the same with that which is based (nengyi 能依; i.e., the qualities 德). Now that the attributes of the other [i.e., the qualities] are established, its own original attribute [i.e., being a substance] should be disgarded.

亦不可說如頗胝迦不捨前 相而現餘相，其體無常前後異 故。此若同彼，應捨實體。

Nor can [the opponents] claim that [the case in question] is like a piece of glass: it appears to have the attributes of others without disgarding its previous attribute. This is because its [i.e., glass] substance is impermanent, being different between now and then. If this [i.e., glass] would be like that [i.e., atoms], then [the atoms] should disgard [its state of being] a substance. 德依於實，實體既無，德 亦非有。無實無德，誰現誰相？ 故可不[按：不可？]說「所生實 果不捨自相而現他相」。如是即 應唯德可見，所有實性皆越根 境，此亦違汝自所立宗。

Qualities are based upon substances. If there is no substance, then qualities also do not exist. If neither substance nor qualities exist, then which is going to appear, and in whose attribute? Therefore one cannot claim that the real effect that is produced [by a accumulation of atoms] appears in the attribute of others without disgarding its own attribute. If so, then it would follow that only qualities can be seen and that all substances go beyond the scope of cognitive objects for sense organs. This would also go against the thesis established by youself.

Dharmapāla argues that if atoms accumulate in the way of complete overlap, then the qualities of the atoms qua cause should be the same as the qualities of the accumulateed atoms qua effect. This apparently is not the case for the opponents, who claim that the quality of being small and being round are absent from the

accumulateed atoms, which becomes visible.

This alternative reminds us of verse 12cd of Viṃ, where Vasubandhu refutes the idea that atoms accumulate by overlapping with each other. Vasubandhu argues that if it is so then the extension of whole combination will end up being the same as one single atom.14 In the Viṃ Vasubandhu talks mainly about the size of the group of atoms. But Dharmapāla’s DGS differs from the Viṃ in that the former talks about “attributes” (xiang) as a quality (guṇā) according to the Vaiśeṣikas.15

To save their argument, the opponents further propose a theory about the addition of qualities. That is to say: although the accumulation qua effect occupies the same location with the atoms qua cause, still due to the addition of qualities the accumulation qua effect can become visible. For example, there is the quality of blueness in a single atom, which is invisible. But when atoms that bear blueness accumulate to a certain extent, the quality of blueness becomes visible.

Dharmapāla then refutes this theory about “addition of qualities.” His refutation begins with an outright rejection, followed by a refutation in the following three steps:

(1), if the real basis formed by overlapping among seven atoms appears in the attribute of largeness, then it

14 _{“ṣaṭkena yugapad yogāt paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṃśatā | ṣaḍbhyo digbhyaḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ paramāṇubhir yugapad yoge sati paramāṇoḥ}

ṣaḍaṃśatā prāpnoti | ekasya yo deśas tatrānyasyāsaṃbhavāt | ṣaṇṇāṃ samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakaḥ || 12cd || atha ya evaikasya paramāṇor deśaḥ sa eva ṣaṇṇāṃ | tena sarveṣāṃ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ piṇḍaḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syāt parasparāvyatirekād iti na kaścit piṇḍo dṛśyaḥ syāt || (Levi 1925: 7)”

15 _{The implication in the DGS is that for the Vaiśiṣikas, spatial extension is a category of quality (guṇa). But it seems odd that}

should discard its own attribute, which not only includes the attribute of smallness but also its nature of being a substance (dravya).

(1a), one cannot claim that the situation is like glass, which appears in the attribute of others without

discarding its own attribute. Dhamapāla refutes this response by pointing to the difference between glass and an atoms. Glass, according to him, has a substance that is impermanent but atoms as substances are permanent by definition.16 Hence Dharmapāla claims that if like glass an atom is impermanent, then it would not qualify as a substance.

(1b), Following (1a), if an atom appears in the attribute of largeness, then an atom would cease to be an atom as a substance. Now that qualities must be based upon substances, without a substance, upon which could the attribute of largeness as a quality be based?

(2), another unwanted consequence for the opponents is that it follows from (1) that only qualities such as the attribute of largeness can be seen but not the substance.

Now I summarize Dharmapāla’s argument:

Opponents’ thesis: atoms, each with the attribute of smallness, accumulate by overlapping and appear with the attribute of largeness due to the addition of qualities.

Dharmapāla’s refutation: If the resulting accumulation of atoms appears with the attribute of largeness, then it should discard its own attribute of smallness together with its nature of being a substance. The opponents cannot say that the situation is like glass, since glass is impermanent but atoms are permanent. If the resulting accumulation of atoms ceases to be a substance, then upon which could the attribute of largeness be based? Dharmapāla concludes: Hence, the resulting accumulation cannot be seen. By this Dharmapāla refutes the opponents’ thesis that the resulting accumulation of atoms appear with the attribute of largeness.

3, The Third Theory of Atoms: Untouching Accumulation

As I already noted, most modern scholars are not aware that, in responding to Vasubandhu, untouching accumulation of atoms, i.e., accumulation without physical contact, can be an option left for his opponents. For example, in Tola and Dragonetti (2004), it is proposed that the remaining alternative to the above two alternatives—atoms piled up in terms of physical contact and atoms overlapped—is that the Vaibhāṣikas of Kashmir maintain that molecules as groups of atoms can form touching accumulation since these molecules do have extension:

…the atoms do not present themselves isolated, but forming cohesive groups of seven atoms each. These groups (molecules) constitute the smallest atomic unity. In these groups one atom occupies the center and the others are joined to it “coming” from the six directions of space. These groups of seven atoms can be connected among themselves, since they possess parts. And in fact these groups connect themselves in more or less great number to build up the things that constitute the external world. (Tola and Dragonetti 2004: 103)

We can challenge Tola and Dragonetti’s reading by asking: how could the so-called molecule be formed in the first place given that Vasubandhu has already refuted the two possible ways in which atoms can form accumulation in Viṃ 11-12? In the above passage Tola and Dragonetti did not answer this question. Below, I

16 _{I think there is a problem here in Dharmapāla’s argument. The opponents claim that glass can appear with both its own}

attribute and the attributes of others. This does not necessarily imply the glass changes its nature of being a glass. How could Dharmapāla claim that the subatance of glass is impermanent?