台灣供電系統可靠度分析：跨國比較 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Reliability Analysis of Taiwan’s 治政 System: Power 大立 A Cross-Country Comparison 台灣供電系統可靠度分析：跨國比較 n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Eric Alexander Strom 史愛理 Advisor: Dr. Ssu-li Chang 張四立教授 July, 2016.

(2) Reliability Analysis of Taiwan's Power System: A Cross-Country Comparison 台灣供電系統可靠度分析：跨國比較. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(3) Acknowledgements I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Ssu-li Chang 張四立 of the Institute of Natural Resources Management at National Taipei Universes, who sparked my initial interest in this topic. Dr. Chang spent an enormous amount of time and effort to shepherd me through this process. I would also like to thank Dr. Hei-Chu “Ruby” Liao 廖惠珠 of the Department of Economics at Tamkang University and Dr. Bai-ku Wei 魏百谷 of the Graduate Institute of Russian Studies at National Chengchi University for their assistance in revising my thesis, as well as for agreeing to join my committee. Special thanks Dr. Yeh-Chung Lu 盧葉中 of the Department of Diplomacy at National. 政治大 who moved heaven and earth to make my graduation possible. 立. Chengchi University, Director of the International Master’s Program in International Studies,. Additional thanks to Ms. Hsueh Mei-Ying 薛美英 of Taipower’s electrical dispatch. ‧ 國. 學. office for helping me acquire the data needed for this study.. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. i.

(4) Abstract This thesis examines reliability and long term planning in Taiwan’s power system by developing new metrics to evaluate existing systems, and then comparing them with comparable data from North America. The study involved series of spreadsheets retrieved from Taipower’s Power Dispatch Office to determine historical reliability for all generation in Taiwan, deriving a new metric to analyze that data, and then comparing it to North America Generating Availability Data System figures. The study then uses those figures to evaluate. 政治大 The study concludes that while Taiwan’s existing power systems have comparably high 立. existing long term electrical usage projections from different Taiwanese government bodies.. ‧ 國. 學. reliability, excessive politicization of electricity and lack of political autonomy in energy administration hinder Taiwan’s long term electrical prospects. Additionally, existing. ‧. evaluations of long-term needs are overly optimistic and do not account for political changes.. sit. n. al. er. io. Abstract (Chinese):. y. Nat. Keywords: Taipower Co., Power System, Cross-country Analysis, reliability. Ch. i n U. v. 本論文範圍為台灣供電系統可靠分析而審查長期電力消費發展，發展新供電可靠指標，而. engchi. 拿新指標來跟北美洲供電系統做比較。本論文以現有的台電公司電力調度處建立新分析架構來做跨國分析。然而本分析用新架構來審查現有的台灣各政府單位預期電力消費發展計劃。. 關鍵詞：台電，供電系統，跨國分析，可靠指標. ii.

(5) Table of Contents Acknowledgements ...............................................................................................................i Abstract ................................................................................................................................ ii Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ iii Figures and Tables .............................................................................................................. iv Chapter 1: Background and Purpose of Study .................................................................... 1 1.1: Purpose .................................................................................................................... 1 1.2: Why Taiwan? - Special case .................................................................................... 2 Taiwan’s Energy Security.......................................................................................... 5 Taiwan’s electrical system by the numbers .................................................................. 6 1.3 Supply balance .......................................................................................................... 6 . 政治大. Capacity Factors: Difference between installed capacity and actual production........ 14 Different types of reserves ......................................................................................... 16 . 立. 1.4 The Limits of Renewables: The Case of Germany’s Energiewende ....................... 18 . ‧ 國. 學. Chapter 2: Literature Review ............................................................................................. 22 2.1: The Link between GDP and Electricity consumption .............................................. 22 2.2: Policies of Taiwan’s Major Political Parties ............................................................. 23 . ‧. 2.2.1 KMT Policies ..................................................................................................... 23 . y. Nat. 2.2.2 DPP Policies ..................................................................................................... 23 . sit. What would 10% actually look like? ........................................................................... 26 . al. er. io. Chapter 3: Methodology .................................................................................................... 27 . n. 3.1 Analysis ................................................................................................................... 29 . Ch. i n U. v. 3.2 Data sources ............................................................................................................ 29 . engchi. 3.3 Model Construction and Preliminary Analysis ......................................................... 30 3.4 Preliminary Results .............................................................................................. 34 3.5 Capacity Factor Vs Availability Factor .................................................................. 36 3.6 Discussion ............................................................................................................ 37 3.7 Problems with Taipower’s Numbers ..................................................................... 37 Chapter 4: Results ............................................................................................................. 42 4.1 Initial Observations ............................................................................................... 42 4.2 International Comparison ..................................................................................... 42 4.3 Early Conclusions ................................................................................................ 45 4.4 Limitations of the AIA/AIG Model ......................................................................... 46 4.5 Projections ........................................................................................................... 47 4.6 How Much Operating reserve would Taiwan need? ............................................ 51 iii.

(6) 4.7 Further Study ....................................................................................................... 52 4.8 Qualitative analysis: ............................................................................................. 53 4.9 Taipower’s Double Edged Sword ......................................................................... 53 4.10 Resolving political deadlock: .............................................................................. 56 Chapter 5: Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 59 Research Questions: ..................................................................................................... 59 Final Remarks ................................................................................................................ 61 Bibliography....................................................................................................................... 62 Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 71 Appendix 1 June Preliminary Analysis ........................................................................... 71 Appendix 2 Combined AIA/AIG Results from all sources .............................................. 72 Appendix 3 Source Raw Data and Individual AIA/AIG Calculations .............................. 73 . 政治大 3.2 Taipower Nuclear Generators .............................................................................. 75 立 3.3 Taipower Hydro Generators ................................................................................. 76 3.1 Taipower Thermal Generators ............................................................................. 73 . ‧ 國. 學. 3.4 IPP and Cogeneration Extrapolations .................................................................. 78 3.5 Taipower Solar ..................................................................................................... 79 . ‧. 3.6 IPP Solar .............................................................................................................. 80 3.7 IPP Wind .............................................................................................................. 81 . Nat. sit. y. 3.8 Taipower Wind ..................................................................................................... 82 Appendix 4 Projections .................................................................................................. 85 . io. n. al. er. 4.1 Taipower Projections ............................................................................................ 85 . i n U. v. 4.2 Taipower Projections - 100% Nuclear Availability Scenario ................................. 87 . Ch. engchi. 4.3 MOEA Projections ................................................................................................ 89 4.4 MOEA Projections - 100% Nuclear Availability Scenario ..................................... 92 . Figures and Tables Figure 1.3.1: Spinning reserve illustration, Taipower. Illustrates load curve during July 15th 2013 ...................................................................................................................................... 10 Deceptive Numbers: Co-Gen distortions in statistics ............................................................ 11 Figure 1.3.2: Taiwan Installed Generating Capacity by Fuel Type 2015 (Source MOEA BOE Energy Statistics Handbook 2015)........................................................................................ 12 Figure 1.3.3: Taiwan Net Renewable Installed capacity by source in MW - 2015 (MOEA) .. 13 Figure 1.3.4: From 15-06-2016 at 5AM. Most units under environmental or transmission restraints ............................................................................................................................... 13 Figure 1.3.5: Taiwan Total Electricity Generation by fuel, 2015. Data from MOEA BOE Energy Statistics handbook .................................................................................................. 15 iv.

(7) Figure 1.3.6: Taiwan Net Renewable Generation Breakdown by Source, 2015. Data from MOEA BOE Energy Statistics handbook .............................................................................. 15 Figure 1.4.1: Electricity production in Germany in week 26, 2011 (Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE) .................................................................................................. 19 Figure 1.4.2: Electricity production in Germany in week 26, 2016 (Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE) .................................................................................................. 19 Figure 1.4.3 Electricity Import and Export of Germany in week 26, 2011, positive numbers indicate imports (Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE) ................... 20 Figure 1.4.4 Electricity Import and Export of Germany in week 26, 2016, positive numbers indicate imports (Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE) ................... 20 Figure 2.2.2: GDP and Electricity Consumption Growth Rates Compared (MOEA 2014) .... 25 Preliminary Quantitative Analysis: ........................................................................................ 31 Equation 3.3.1 ....................................................................................................................... 31 Equation 3.3.2 ....................................................................................................................... 31 Equation 3.3.3: Effective Availability Factor .......................................................................... 32 Equation 3.3.4 Average individual generation was calculated as follows: ............................ 33 .............................................................................................................................................. 39 Figure 3.7.1: Taiwan Capacity factors by source, 2015. Data sourced from Taipower, Data.gov.tw, and MOEA Energy Statistics handbook 2015 .................................................. 39 Figure 3.7.2. Taiwan Average availability by source (In KW) - 2015. Note that this uses Average Individual Generation instead of average individual availability for wind and solar sources. ................................................................................................................................ 40 Figure 3.7.3; Taiwan Average Availability (KW) by source, using AIG for wind, solar, and cogen .................................................................................................................................... 41 Table 4.2.1: Taiwan Availability Factors compared to US NERC GADS data. ..................... 44 Table 4.2.1: Taiwan 2015 Capacity Factors compared to NERC GADS Net Capacity Factors. .............................................................................................................................................. 44 Table 4.2.3: Taiwan 2015 figures compared to seasonal GADS availability ........................ 45 Figure 4.5.1: Comparison of MOEA 2014 and Taipower 2016 long term development reports .............................................................................................................................................. 48 Figure 4.5.2: Taiwan 2015 Average Availability Assuming 100% Nuclear Availability ......... 49 Figure 4.5.3: Projection Scenarios Assuming 100% Nuclear Availability.............................. 51. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. v.

(8) Chapter 1: Background and Purpose of Study 1.1: Purpose This thesis seeks to explore the underlying cause of Taiwanese energy insecurity first by examining the current situation using established indicators, domestic policies, and comparing those with international standards. Then the author will examine Taiwan’s governance structures and interest groups. From there, the author will make policy recommendations for different scenarios. This thesis will rely on existing energy security and energy indicators as data sources,. 政治大. but the primary analysis will be descriptive - exploring policy issues in a qualitative way. For. 立. example, as a marginalized island nation, Taiwan is unable to import electricity and must rely. ‧ 國. 學. entirely on domestic power production. This kind of constraint is not easily articulated in a quantitative analysis.. ‧. The goal is to weave together political and technical realities to find the most effective. sit. y. Nat. path forward. It is this author’s observation that energy governance in Taiwan is increasingly. al. er. io. politicized, and the discussions in the political and technical spheres are disconnected. News. v i n C h citing inaccurateUfigures, sometimes even being Op-eds appear in influential newspapers engchi n. articles discuss energy imports and the electricity supply without any context or background.. unable to distinguish between different units of energy. The DPP’s own energy policy is based on political aspiration rather than technical requirements. We need a meaningful analysis that examines not just technical issues, but how Taiwanese civil society and government shapes energy policy. Though energy in most countries does have a political dimension, Taiwan’s top-heavy policy making structure and the absence of a centralized, independent energy policy body that is both technically literate and politically savvy mean that a more robust analysis is needed. Because of Taiwan’s geographic isolation, the problems with energy policy, and electricity policy in particular, are much more pressing than they would be otherwise. When 1.

(9) Germany, the United States, or any other large or land-linked economy has a problem, they can use fixed infrastructure to import from their neighbors. Cross border pipelines, transmission lines, scalable land shipping - all of these are backup plans not available to a small island nation. Even Japan has multiple independent power grids with interties. Their relative size allows them to pool risk in a way that is beyond Taiwan’s capacity. Taiwan’s single grid is efficient and effective, but needs more flexibility than an interconnected grid because risk cannot be shared by multiple independent actors. In many such interconnected countries, there is a tendency to view power in “net” terms. For example, Germany continues to enjoy large profits from its electricity exports -. 政治大 evening hours when solar plants don’t produce. Though this is an effective strategy for an 立 and has a huge export heavy balance, but still relies on imports to meet demand during. integrated European economy, or any large grid, this cannot work in an isolated grid. In an. ‧ 國. 學. isolated island grid, physics will trump accounting. We can print more money, but not more. ‧. energy. If electrical load exceeds generation and there are no imports available, load shedding is required.. n. er. io. al. sit. y. Nat. 1.2: Why Taiwan? - Special case. i n U. v. Taiwan provides a unique opportunity to explore energy security issues because of. Ch. engchi. its geographical and political isolation, coupled with its high tech, energy intensive economy. In most other countries there is substantially more flexibility in energy policy because of the proximity of neighbors or indigenous energy supplies. Taiwan has neither. For example: Germany can close its nuclear and coal burning plants - originally its key sources of baseload electricity production - and still import baseload power from the extensive French nuclear infrastructure through the European grid. Though this “outsourcing” of electrical production could, under some indicator schemes, threaten German energy security, the profound difference is that this is a feasible policy option to begin with. Germany’s proximity to Russia also gives it import prospects for natural gas for indigenous power production. Germany also has substantial domestic coal resources. 2.

(10) Powerful diplomatic allies and integration into the European union add further cushion to German energy policy. Taiwan, conversely, has a completely isolated power grid, no land neighbors, and virtually non-existent indigenous energy resources. There are no direct energy links to neighbors, nor are there any credible plans to build them. Taiwan’s non-indigenous energy supplies must be imported through conventional shipping. This lack of local resources is made even more complex by its lack of diplomatic capital. Taiwan’s government - the Republic of China - was the losing side of the Chinese civil war. When the communists took power on the mainland, the nationalists retreated to. 政治大 since the 70’s when the PRC replaced them as “China” on the UN security council. To the 立. Taiwan and took the ROC government with them. The ROC has been largely unrecognized. chagrin of the locals, PRC claims the self-governed democracy as part of its territory, and. ‧ 國. 學. refuses to have relations with any country formally recognizes the ROC on Taiwan. As a. ‧. result, most countries have formal relations with the PRC and unofficial relations with Taiwan. This political reality means that Taiwan is dramatically constrained on the international scene.. y. Nat. sit. The PRC works very hard to exclude Taiwan from most international organizations, as well. n. al. er. io. as causing routine political crises.. i n U. v. The political situation makes Taiwan’s energy situation even more dire because it. Ch. engchi. cannot rely on diplomatic allies or the international community for energy assistance. Additionally, it must strike a careful balance between cooperation with mainland China and protecting its de-facto independent status.. There periodic discussion in local news about Taiwan’s impending energy crisis, but there has been surprisingly little analysis, nor have there been substantial figures presented. This section will outline Taiwan’s energy mix and it’s geopolitical and geostrategic implications. There are conflicting reports about exactly how much of Taiwan’s energy supply is. 3.

(11) imported. The US EIA figures for 2010 seem to indicate that Taiwan imports somewhere between 85 and 90% of its energy. However, the Bureau of Energy within Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs reports 97.49% “imported energy dependence.” The discrepancy may arise from the EIA’s consideration of nuclear power as a domestic resource, regardless of fuel origin, as well as the re-exportation of coal products (US EIA) coupled small domestic oil and natural gas. Regardless of the exact degree, Taiwan imports the overwhelming majority of its energy. Thus far, Taiwan has been very careful to avoid direct energy links with the PRC. 100% of coal has imported since domestic production stopped in 2001 (US IEA Country Profile).. 政治大 mainland China as of 2011 (IFRI report). This is a downward trend, falling from 6.5% the 立 Coal imports primarily from Australia and Indonesia, with less than 4% imported from. year before, even as total imports increased. Even so, over the course of 15 years, Taiwan’s. ‧ 國. 學. electricity consumption has more than doubled, from 102 to 218 billion kilowatt hours (US. ‧. EIA Country Statistics), and electricity consumption continues to rise.. Taiwan’s nuclear power program operates with the US as its exclusive supplier of. y. Nat. sit. nuclear fuel, but the government has announced that it intends to slowly reduce its. al. n. shortfall.. er. io. “dependence on nuclear power” - potentially exacerbating Taiwan’s existing baseload power. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. For oil, Taiwan relies heavily both on imported crude oil for domestic refinement as well as imports of finished petroleum products. Most of Taiwan’s domestic crude has been exhausted, though the US EIA reports that Taiwan continues to produce around seventythree thousand barrels per year - negligible compared to the nearly 400 million barrels per year it consumes. What remains in the energy mix consists of miniscule amounts of domestic renewables and hydroelectric, consisting of less than two percent of the energy mix. Ironically, the smallest contributor to Taiwan’s energy mix is the only one immune from external price shocks and resource crises. The government has announced plans to increase energy from renewables to 16% by 2025, but it is unclear if this is a feasible goal. 4.

(12) (Liao, Jhou 2013). Taiwan’s Energy Security Taiwan is highly energy insecure. The 21st century Energy security risk index ranks Taiwan as a Quartile IV (Highest Risk), chiefly because of its heavy reliance on imports. (Institute for 21st Century Energy., 2012) A significant portion of this assessment stems from an indicator referred to as “import exposure.” The report classifies these by source - oil, coal, and natural gas - as well as adding a fourth field “total import exposure” to reflect imports in. 治政大considerably. Since the results complete imports of nuclear fuel, scores in this range suffer 立 are based on the percentage of national supply based on imports, having no substantial addition to these three. Since Taiwan relies so heavily on the traditional three imports, plus. ‧ 國. 學. domestic supply of any of them substantially increases Taiwan’s risk.. The other source of Taiwan’s energy insecurity is the economy’s dependence on. ‧. energy, commonly referred to as energy intensity. The risk index indicates that as Taiwan’s. y. Nat. sit. economy continues to expand into more high-tech industry, that the economic dependence. al. n. serious damage.. er. io. on energy prices dramatically. Should imports be disrupted, Taiwan’s economy would suffer. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Chief among imports is coal (ROC Bureau of Energy, EIA Country Profile). Coal makes up a majority of Taiwan’s electricity production, and is almost completely imported. Electricity usage in Taiwan has more than doubled in the last 15 years (EIA Country statistics), causing serious environmental degradation and, as much of Taiwan’s electricity is based on traditional thermal/coal plants, further aggravating Taiwan’s energy insecurity. While energy insecurity is important, this thesis will focus on Taiwan’s electricity supply system. However, the role of electricity as only a single facet of energy security cannot be understated. If primary sources of energy like coal, petroleum products, nuclear, or other fuels are unavailable due to supply shortage or political/military disputes, this analysis becomes moot. It is, however, the author’s opinion that dealing first with electricity is 5.

(13) a more immediate and solvable problem than dealing with energy security directly. Moreover, energy security is such a broad topic as to dramatically exceed the scope of a master’s thesis. It is my hope to address these issues in future PhD research.. Taiwan’s electrical system by the numbers. 1.3 Supply balance A power supply must always be balanced. Supply must always equal demand. With some exceptions, electricity cannot be stored. Therefore, electricity must be consumed at the precise moment it is generated. If not enough power is supplied, system frequency drops.. 政治大. There may be blackouts or brownouts, and if the shortage is severe enough, the system. 立. must shed load, meaning that it must cut some consumers. In Taiwan, this is done by region. ‧ 國. 學. in accordance with the load shedding procedures currently in place (台灣電力股份有限公司,. ‧. 2016), first by forcing the largest consumers to “sequester” themselves, then timing blackouts by region with increasing frequency as the shortages get worse. There is a priority,. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. etc.…. sit. with national defense taking precedence, then medical facilities and public transportation. i n U. v. Conversely, if power generation is too high, equipment may be damaged. Power. Ch. engchi. lines could overheat, catch fire, or simply melt. Damage to consumer and business equipment could be enormous. The best analogy would be to think of a power system much like a water system except that electricity travels at approximately the speed of light, and so changes in load or generation (demand and supply) are promulgated through the system virtually instantly. Electricity travels near the speed of light, depending on the transmission medium (Banks, 2007). It is then useful to think of generators as electricity pumps, and the power grid as a system of pipes on a massive scale. Power usage changes throughout the day. The highest spike is referred to as peak load. Generally speaking, power generation is divided into two types - baseload generation 6.

(14) and peak load generation. The logic is that baseload power should have high reliability and high uptime, with a low cost per kilowatt hour. Coal and most forms of nuclear power are examples of this type of power source. Peak power, conversely, is only used when electricity usage is at its highest. In Taiwan, this tends to be in the early afternoon. The most important characteristic of peaking power sources is dispatch ability: the ability to change output rapidly in response to changes in load that occur beyond the range of operating reserves. These kinds of energy sources can usually be dispatched within 5 minutes of any event, and are typically load following. Common examples include natural gas and hydro-electric. Renewables - specifically solar and wind - present unique problems because they. 政治大 when they do, they do not always do so at the time, place, or amount anticipated. This 立. are not always available. Sometimes, the wind doesn’t blow or the sun doesn’t shine - and. means that renewables must be pooled either on a massive scale to minimize risks. ‧ 國. 學. (extremely costly) - or backed up by near-instant dispatchable power supplies. The US. ‧. National Renewable Energy Laboratory describes this capacity as a new form of reserve called ramping reserves. NREL points out that this form of reserve has not been widely. y. Nat. sit. studied. (Impacts of Solar Power on Operating Reserve Requirements (Fact Sheet), 2012). n. al. er. io. The prime examples of renewable power development - namely in Europe, and specifically. i n U. v. Germany - have intertied power grids with neighboring countries which mitigates some of the. Ch. engchi. uncertainty when dealing with these kinds of renewable energy sources, so they have not had to explore ramping reserves. Germany in particular relies heavily on pumped storage facilities. However, conventional sources still make up more than 70% of the German power supply. Approx. 16% of Germany’s total power comes from nuclear, 44% from coal, and 14% from gas. The remaining ~26% comes from mixed renewables. Although Germany’s power import/export balance is positive, they still rely on imports to balance their load in the evening. See section 1.4 The Limits of Renewables: The Case of Germany’s Energiewende. To understand the difference between base and peak load, Taipower has provided a reference schematic. It should be noted that Taipower’s records are surprisingly complete. 7.

(15) While searching for materials for this thesis, it should be noted that US power companies do not provide nearly as much information as is provided by Taipower. In interviews with staff from Bonneville Power in the US, this was attributed to national security issues and concerns about giving private actors an economic advantage.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 8.

(16) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 9.

(17) Figure 1.3.1: Spinning reserve illustration, Taipower. Illustrates load curve during July 15th 2013 Figure X depicts the second highest recorded load on Taipower’s system - from July 15th 2013. The peak load from this time was 35,097MW. While the largest load in Taiwanese history was 35,385MW on July 2 2014 (Taipower), Taipower continues to use the 2013 metric for its publications to describe its policies on spinning reserves. In general, power usage tends to peak on weekdays during the early to midafternoon during the summer. The figure lists the highest planned grid output is listed as 40GW, with nearly a gigawatt allocated for maintenance, 500MW for fault capacity, and approximately 1.5GW for. 政治大 errors, temperature variations, and hydropower.” This last category may be someone of a 立. the combined category of “thermal environmental restrictions reference point, transmission. ‧ 國. 學. misnomer because these four things don’t necessarily have anything in common. Environmental regulations on high polluting or high emission power sources make. ‧. sense - Taiwan is extremely dependent on coal and fuel oil for much of its capacity.. y. Nat. Transmission errors could conceivably be equipment failures. By temperature variations, it is. io. sit. likely referring to temperature variations in transmission lines. As discussed above, as load. n. al. er. on lines increases, they begin to heat up. With too much load, lines heat to the point where. Ch. i n U. v. they begin to sag. Since high voltage transmission lines are rarely insulated, it is essential. engchi. that they not touch other structures, for risk of electrocution and starting fires - to say nothing of electrical service interruption. The last describes hydrological events or other issues in hydro power generation. Some seasons yield less water than others. For Taiwan’s pumped storage systems, they are typically charged at night with excess capacity and discharged during peak hours. This cannot always occur. Droughts or other technical difficulties can also plague conventional pumped hydro storage alike.. 10.

(18) Unfortunately, these events are not correlated. Lumping them into one category risks the events coinciding and adding to each other. Even these seemingly generous margins for error are not sufficient to ensure an uninterrupted supply of power. Deceptive Numbers: Co-Gen distortions in statistics Some critics argue that the Ministry of Economics Energy Handbook for 2015 reports that more than 48GW of generating capacity, (Fang， Jay, 2016) and that this should be more than enough to meet Taiwan’s maximum recorded demand of 35.3GW, but these numbers do not tell the full story. More than 8GW of this number comes what are called “co-. 政治大 manufacturing purposes, which is sometimes available for power generation if surpluses are 立 gen” plants in Taiwan. These facilities are mainly coal-fired boilers that generate steam for. ‧ 國. 學. available. However, there is no guarantee of this. It is therefore essential that any analysis of Taiwan’s power grid treat cogen sources as having extremely low-capacity factors for the. ‧. purposes of public power generation. Taipower’s own real time data system records the. y. Nat. installed capacity of Co-gen facilities as being only 622.1MW, a far cry from the 8GW listed. io. sit. in the Bureau of Energy Statistics Handbook. This is because the BOEA handbook lists all. n. al. er. possible installed capacity, not just generating capacity available to the public power grid. As. Ch. i n U. a result, this installed capacity figure is somewhat inflated.. engchi. v. It should be noted that the Co-gen facilities often output more power to the grid than their recorded capacity. The following was taken on July 4th 2016 at 4PM Figure X: Co-Gen power output taken from Taipower’s real-time information system. The columns are Power source, installed capacity, and output capacity. Taiwan’s installed capacity is as follows: Coal:34.53 (16,815.7MW) Oil:7.59 (3,697.0) LNG: 33.11 (16,125.9) Nuclear:10.56 (5,144.0) Conventional Hydro: 4.29 (2,089.4) Wind:. 11.

(19) 1.33 (646.7) Solar PV: 1.33 (842.0) Biomass: 0.23 (111.3) Waste: 1.29 (629.1) with an additional 5.34 (2,602.0) from pumped storage.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 1.3.2: Taiwan Installed Generating Capacity by Fuel Type 2015 (Source MOEA BOE. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Energy Statistics Handbook 2015). Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 12.

(20) Figure 1.3.3: Taiwan Net Renewable Installed capacity by source in MW - 2015 (MOEA). The chart makes clear that well over 40% of Taiwan’s installed generation capacity comes from coal and oil burning plants. These facilities are subject to strict environmental regulations that prevent them from operating at the maximum capacities. In fact, these plants often operate at only 30% of their generating capacity, while still counting as installed generating capacity.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 1.3.4: From 15-06-2016 at 5AM. Most units under environmental or transmission. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. restraints. i n U. v. Even if we accept coal as a dominant source and restrict environmental concerns to. Ch. engchi. oil, we still face substantial supply problems. In the figure above we see that more than 2GWs of capacity are lost because of these restrictions. That already exceeds the margins provided for environmental and transmission problems, ignoring all other forms of power. In the event of other problems, like thermal anomalies on the lines or other issues with transmission or hydroelectric, this dramatically increases the risk of a power shortage and rationing. Clearly this measure is not a reliable assessment of contingencies. Beyond these problems with, we have the two reactors undergoing yearly maintenance both Unit 1’s at the first and second nuclear power plants - a total of 1,621mw. LNG XingDa#4 and Nanbu#3 operating at 50% capacity due to overhauls - 591.2MW. An unknown malfunction at the IPP LNG Guoguang plant - 480MW. Overhauls at hydros 13.

(21) QingShan#3 92 Tianlun#5(though this is outputting) (105), along with hydrology issues at both Zhuolan facilities 80MW and Zengwen 50. Finally, yearly maintenance at pumping Station Daguan 2 unit 2 250MW. Now we are short 3,019.2 MW. This would be within the normal range for the maintenance and misc. problems calculation, but when combined with the environmental constraints, we have more than 5GWs currently out of service due maintenance, transmission constraints, or environmental constraints. Then one must consider the role of the investor-owned power plants. With 3097.1MW of IPP-Coal and another 4610.0 of IPP LNG, which amounts to 7707.1MW, or 15.8% of the overall installed capacity. Many of these plants are much more expensive to. 政治大 thermal plants cost from NT$2.05 for coal to NT$3.29/KWh for LNG, compared with NT$1.22 立 run than Taipower’s own facilities, depending on the facility and the price of the contract. IPP. for Taipower Coal or $2.68 for Taipower LNG. (台灣電力股份有限公司, 2012). ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Capacity Factors: Difference between installed capacity and actual production. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 14.

(22) Figure 1.3.5: Taiwan Total Electricity Generation by fuel, 2015. Data from MOEA BOE Energy Statistics handbook. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 y. Nat. io. sit. Figure 1.3.6: Taiwan Net Renewable Generation Breakdown by Source, 2015. Data from. n. al. er. MOEA BOE Energy Statistics handbook. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. These figures are quite stunning compared to Figure 1.3.2: Installed capacity because we see some substantial disparities between installed capacity and actual generation. Coal and nuclear make up 34.5% and 10.6% of the installed capacity, respectively, but generate 44.6% and 14.6% of the actual power used over the course of the year. If we to look at previous years, both would go up substantially due to their relatively higher share of the baseload. Since coal and nuclear are among the most cost effective/kwh and have extremely high uptimes and capacity factors, it makes sense that they make up proportionally higher amounts of actual generation.. 15.

(23) Different types of reserves Explain Spinning reserves, ramping reserves, regulating reserves, and following reserves as described by NREL Taipower uses only two descriptors in its public data for reserves. The first is “備用容量率” - which describes the yearly maximum operating reserve that the public power system is required by law to handle. Though it is currently fixed by law at 15%, in 2015 it had fallen to 11.5%. (Taipower, Historical figures, 2016). The second type “備轉容量率” or “spinning reserve” is a daily value, which is recalculated each day based on expected load. (Taipower Figures, 2016). 政治大. There are several different measures of reliability in a power system. The US. 立. National Renewable Energy Laboratory has several definitions of reserves for dealing with. ‧ 國. 學. different events. NREL mentions Spinning reserve (which NREL refers to as contingency reserves) - but does not directly address operating reserves. It also addresses regulating. ‧. reserves, which are usually governed by automatic systems to correct small sudden. Nat. sit. y. changes such as spike or drop in frequency. They also recognize following reserve and a. al. er. io. new type of reserve, ramping reserve. Following reserves are manual reserves that are. v i n C h and relies at least them directly beyond the usual scheduling, e n g c h i U in part of pumped storage to n. directed by system operators to follow changes in load. Taipower does not appear to employ. deal with peak storage. Finally, ramping reserves are a new form of reserve that are designed to deal with events relating specifically to renewables - changes in weather conditions that might affect renewable output.. Green Gambit There are movements to transition to green power in Taiwan - but most “green “energy sources, like wind and solar - require “backups.” There are times when capacity is needed and the wind simply doesn’t blow, the sun doesn’t shine. Given Taiwan’s minimal pumped storage capabilities， backup power supplies are necessary. In most economies 16.

(24) like in Germany - these take two forms: importing power from neighbors, and domestic generation that can be mustered immediately (such as natural gas). Taiwan’s electricity consumption is continuing to grow as there is further electrification of the transit infrastructure. The High Speed Rail, MRT systems, and most conventional rail are run entirely on electricity. Additionally, there is a push toward electrification with electric scooters, notably Gogoro. These scooters are also heavily subsidized. (經濟部工業局, 2008) Shifting transportation in particular away from primary energy sources toward electrification is a laudable goal. If only because of their scale, fossil-fueled power plants at. 政治大 effective at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants if the power system is 立 scale are more efficient than individual vehicle motors. Even so, this strategy will only be. ‧ 國. 學. transitioned away from its heavy dependence on fossil fuels. Additionally, it should be noted that while electrification may reduce overall energy consumption (net oil imports and the like). ‧. - it will surely not decrease electricity consumption, especially in the short term. According to the BOEA energy statistics handbook, 11.90% of total energy was spent in transportation,. y. Nat. io. sit. while 28.8% was spent on electricity. Although serious challenges prevent major. n. al. er. replacement of fuels in aviation in the near future, we can safely assume that electrification. Ch. i n U. v. of ground consumer transport will shift much of this energy cost to be delivered through. engchi. electrification, either through rail - which is already largely electrified - or consumer land vehicles, such as the Gogoro scooters or perhaps even electric cars. Given the relatively low cost per kilometer driven of such vehicles, we can expect them to see as much or more use compared with conventional petroleum-primary vehicles. Although the electrification of personal transit will likely reduce the overall energy costs of transportation, shifting personal vehicles away from fossil fuels and to the electrical grid may increase demand for electricity by creating a new category of consumption vehicles, even if the impact of these new transportation systems causes a net reduction in energy usage.. 17.

(25) Due to obvious limits of electrification technology, we should not expect to see trucking electrified in the near future. At best, we will see biofuels replacing conventional fuels - as already occurs in the US. It is likely that these fuels will still have to be imported, as biofuel development in Taiwan has been stunted by lack of adequate governance mechanisms for food-waste products, and by low prices for conventional petroleum, preventing the growth of indigenous ethanol. (Hsu, 2014). 1.4 The Limits of Renewables: The Case of Germany’s Energiewende Many advocates of wind and photovoltaics hold up Germany’s Energiewende as a. 政治大 German energy policy in the context of Taiwan often fail to mention that, while Germany’s 立 model for the world to follow, and particularly Taiwan. However, many proponents of. ‧ 國. 學. net renewable generation and exports are impressive, even after several years of. development, Germany still relies on imports in the evening when solar facilities are not. ‧. available, and so while Germany can offer substantial exports of surplus solar power during the day, resulting in a net export of energy, on the daily peak cycle, they are still import. y. Nat. io. sit. dependent. Connection to the European grid and neighbors provides Germany with a kind of. n. al. er. insurance policy that Taiwan does not have. That means that even if Taiwan were prepared. i n U. v. to make massive investments in solar and wind generation, in addition to a power grid that. Ch. engchi. could support distributed and variable generation, comparable investments in conventional sources would need to continue to ensure stable supply during the transition.. 18.

(26) Figure 1.4.1: Electricity production in Germany in week 26, 2011 (Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE). 立. 政治大. Figure 1.4.2: Electricity production in Germany in week 26, 2016 (Fraunhofer Institute for. ‧ 國. 學. Solar Energy Systems ISE). ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 19.

(27) Figure 1.4.3 Electricity Import and Export of Germany in week 26, 2011, positive numbers indicate imports (Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE). 立. 政治大. Figure 1.4.4 Electricity Import and Export of Germany in week 26, 2016, positive. ‧ 國. 學. numbers indicate imports (Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE). ‧. Nat. sit. y. Data and charts retrieved from Fraunhaufer ISE https://www.energy-charts.de/power.htm. n. al. er. io. As we can see from Figures 1.4.1-1.4.4, over the course of five years, in spite of an. v. increase in peak electricity consumption for the same week from 63.78 in week 26 of 2011 to. Ch. engchi. i n U. 68.28 in 2016, imports have gone down and exports have increased. Yet in spite of these incredible gains, Germany still relies on imports in the evening. During more severe months, or if we look to earlier years, the import numbers go up substantially. Moreover, more than 75% of Germany’s electrical production still comes from nonrenewable sources, like coal, natural gas, and nuclear (which is scheduled for a phase-out). Currently, fossil fuel and nuclear generation make up just over 74% of German generation. (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Germany, 2014) This analysis is specifically intended to highly a single point: Germany’s renewables require backup. Though zero-price wholesale prices or even negative wholesale prices can account for the massive power exports, it is important that we highlight that, even after five 20.

(28) years of this policy, Germany still relies on imports to cover its evening demand when it's renewable sources are not available. As an island nation, Taiwan cannot rely on its neighbors for electricity, and as an export oriented economy whose economic base is manufacturing, its GDP growth is coupled with its electricity consumption (see section 2.1: The Link between GDP Electricity consumption). 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 21.

(29) Chapter 2: Literature Review 2.1: The Link between GDP and Electricity consumption In their article, “Electricity shortages and firm productivity: Evidence from China's industrial firms,” Fisher-Vanden, Mansur, and Wang discuss a core argument that is central to this paper. Their analysis of the PRC’s development suggests that electricity shortages do not prompt private generation, as is commonly believed. Instead, it often prompts either the outsourcing of the most energy intense processes or, more concerning, a storage of materials. The accumulation of material is inventory that is an effective drain on capital. One. 政治大. major distinction between the PRC and Taiwan is that the PRC does not have a unified. 立. power grid. It has many resources, particularly in new renewables, that are unutilized or. ‧ 國. 學. underutilized even as there are other shortages Given Taiwan’s export oriented economy and its impending power supply issues, this serves as a crucial theoretical link which. ‧. establishes the potential risks to Taiwan’s economy in the event of large scale power. sit. y. Nat. rationing.. io. al. er. Allcott, Collard-Wexler, and O'Connell “How Do Electricity Shortages Affect Industry? Evidence from India.” They conclude that electricity shortages do indeed lead to a lag in. n. v i n C hgeneration is not U economic growth. Investment in private e n g c h i as efficient as large public pools of. electricity, and electricity shortages disproportionately affect smaller producers because they are not large enough to benefit from economies of scale in backup generation. This results in economic lag as funds that could be spent on other production or investment. Although not directly related to this study, it might be worthwhile to explore the role and reasons for the development of cogeneration, and if that phenomenon might be linked to shortages of supply in Taiwan’s energy system An often cited problem by energy researchers in Taiwan is the connection or “linkage” between Taiwan’s GDP growth rates and electricity consumption rates, as well as the energy. 22.

(30) intensity of the Taiwanese economy. This has been noted in the MOEA Energy Statistics handbooks over the years (See Figure X).. 2.2: Policies of Taiwan’s Major Political Parties Both Taiwan’s major political parties - the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) - have published energy policies of varying degrees of thoroughness.. 2.2.1 KMT Policies. 治政大 paper on energy, even though The KMT has not published a substantive policy white 立 its own website says it supports a “pluralistic energy policy, to ensure energy security, and ‧ 國. 學. under the premise of a reasonable electricity price, with complimentary both boosts and. ‧. savings pragmatically develop clean energy, and strive towards a sustainable homeland.” (“政策綱領 - 中國國民黨全球資訊網 KMT Official Webstie,” [sic] n.d.). y. Nat. sit. This is little more than a political slogan, but essentially means an “all of the above”. n. al. er. io. energy policy, without setting targets or deadlines. It is well known that they have been. i n U. v. staunch supporters of nuclear power in the past. Perhaps a better view of KMT energy policy. Ch. engchi. is Hong Xiuzhu’s endorsement of a niche, pro-nuclear blogger Chen Licheng. (“台灣能源,” n.d.) Since the KMT currently lacks any governing mandate, even if they had a fully-fledged energy plan, it would not be possible to implement.. 2.2.2 DPP Policies The New DPP government has not articulated a meaningful energy policy since march of 2014. The DPP’s website says only that it will set Taiwan’s Reserve Generating capacity to 10% （民進黨新境界文教基金會）- substantially lower than even the lowest reserve ratio in the US. (US EIA 2012) Even the lowest US ratio - in Texas - is five 23.

(31) percentage points higher than the DPP proposal for Taiwan - and heat waves in Texas have previously caused supply problems (US EIA 2012) requiring Texas to import power from neighboring states. Moreover, this is particularly jarring when you consider that the DPP is not only proposing stripping Taiwan of its backup generating capacity, but also that unlike the power grids in the US and Europe, as an isolated island, Taiwan cannot import electricity from its neighbors. It is not clear to this author how the DPP plans to accomplish this change. Given President Tsai’s promise to phase out all nuclear plants, this would require only replacing these facilities, but bolstering existing capacity to reach 10% from other sources.. 政治大 Taipower’s estimates for March 24, 2016, and yet the energy policies are based on the 立. The current listing for the system-wide maximum output is 36,882M, according to. Bureau of Energy Reports (MOEA 2015), the last of which suggested Taiwan had an. ‧ 國. 學. installed capacity of more than 48 GW. As mentioned in previous sections Taiwan has. ‧. already had multiple electricity shortages (吳象元, News lense, 2015) due to periodic malfunctions and maintenance.. y. Nat. io. sit. It should be noted that the DPP’s expanded energy policy contains a number of. n. al. er. errors concerning the installed generating capacity of Taipower’s system, along with the long. Ch. i n U. v. term growth expectations. However, the DPP’s citations of older MOEA Long Term. engchi. Electricity Planning documents do not account for early failures and maintenance of nuclear power plants, nor do they account for any reliability issues in Taiwan’s power supply。 Though Taiwan can import liquefied natural gas and other petroleum products, without the installed capacity to convert it into electricity, a sudden crisis - such as a generation facility being damaged, as often happens with both coal and nuclear plants in Taiwan - having the fuel on hand does not translate into usable electricity. Thus, further reducing Taiwan’s reserve ratio could make the supply problem more serious.. 24.

(32) Additionally, Taiwan’s GDP growth is tied to its manufacturing, which is in turn tied to electricity consumption, as Taiwan’s GDP/kwh is still tightly coupled, unlike other advanced economies. See figure 2.2.2 (MOEA 2014).. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. Figure 2.2.2: GDP and Electricity Consumption Growth Rates Compared (MOEA 2014). y. Nat. io. sit. It is unwise, therefore, to further risk Taiwan’s electrical and economic stability for a. n. al. er. proposal that has not been well thought out. The DPP and President Tsai’s proposal. Ch. i n U. v. essentially assumes an unrealistic level of reliability - as there have been several occasions within the last two years.. engchi. While Taiwan does have a massive oil stockpile- approximately 90 days’ worth, depending on source (Yao, 2001) - and substantial refining capability to convert raw crude into whatever industrial petroleum or fuel it might need. However, the availability of fuel4 does not translate into reliable electrical power, and it is electrical power to which Taiwan’s GDP output is tied.. 25.

(33) What would 10% actually look like? Right now, Taipower projected spinning reserve is just over 5% - already well below the 10% mark. Based on the current calculations last year’s operating reserve was 11.4% (Taipower historical data) Current generation capacity is insufficient, certainly. All it would take would be the shutdown of a few plants, and that reserve ratio would be gone, as we saw on July 1st, 2015 - when several power facilities experienced malfunctions. At current levels of power consumption, that’s just about 3.5 GWs of power. The quantitative analysis component of this thesis is designed to evaluate the relationship between operating reserve and real-world availability.. 政治大 generator plus some fraction of立 the peak load. This is needed because if the single largest In most power systems, reserve ratios are configured to be the size of the largest. ‧ 國. 學. facility were to be somehow disabled, the power system would have to make up not only the cost of the lost generator, but may have other problems as well. Drops in frequency or. ‧. voltage could cause other reliability issues within the system.. y. Nat. Perhaps most importantly: having reserves does not mean they have to be used.. er. io. sit. Taipower primary expenses (beyond the massive capital loss of Gongliao/Longmen) are fuel, not personnel. Maintaining, say, extra natural gas plants, and alternating between them to. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. ensure all staff and equipment were functioning normally, would not represent a meaningful. engchi. environmental impact - since net usage is not likely to go up purely because of availability alone.. 26.

(34) Chapter 3: Methodology This thesis will follow a relatively simple methodology: first quantitative. The author will evaluate historical data for Taiwan’s power system during the summer months. As the data is only available for two years, the year with the highest completeness will be selected. If the author is unable to obtain data about the reliability of the generation facilities in question (i.e., number of hours/days undergoing maintenance) then the author will rely on average daily output of each facility and spinning reserve ratio to try to establish an. 政治大. underlying capacity factor, or at least some measure of reliability. Once those figures are. 立. attained, I will evaluate them based on various measures of Taiwan’s projected energy. ‧ 國. 學. needs. Those projected needs can be done several ways. The ROC Bureau of Energy and Ministry of economic affairs both have reports detailing long term projections of electricity. ‧. consumption. However, it is my own instinct that these reports are overly optimistic,. sit. y. Nat. particularly considering the role that co-generation plays in Taiwan’s energy mix. The trend. io. er. found in other countries has been that co-gen is an exception, not a norm, and that private generation for private consumption is usually less common than factories halting production. al. n. v i n and accumulating inventory of inputC materials. While these h e n g c h i Uare preliminary studies and. require further evaluation, it strengthens the case that co-gen power is not economically sustainable, and that Taiwan’s continuing power shortages place a potential (if unknown) downward drag on the Taiwanese economy, as demonstrated from the earlier discussion of energy intensity, and strengthens the case for enlarging public power pools. If number of down days can be retrieved from Taipower, a simple statistical model could be built to provide a mathematical base for a recommended energy reserve. The current model is based on a heuristic or “rule of thumb” established by Taiwan’s legislature, and as has been demonstrated in previous sections, this figure is overly optimistic for the. 27.

(35) purposes of determining reliability. The objective of this section will be to answer the following question:. Given available historical data on Taiwan’s generating reliability, what operating reserve would be required to maintain reliability for a feasible, worst-case scenario?. Though the question seems vast, and there are many possible ways to calculate this, this thesis will answer, if possible, with simple probabilities, rather than more exotic. 政治大 Once that figure has been determined, simple projections based on anticipated 立. calculations used in some power grids.. economic growth could be made to determine what generating requirements will be in the. ‧ 國. 學. coming years. Those requirements can be compared to existing policies, and can include. ‧. different scenarios concerning the political fate of nuclear power. (Activation or mothballing of Lungmen facility, extension or non-extension of life for existing plants, and probability of. y. Nat. sit. success on other renewable goals). n. al. er. io. Once reliability indicators have been derived and compared with different projections,. i n U. v. if there is a discrepancy, the author will evaluate the political or governance causes. The. Ch. engchi. hypothesis here is that Taiwan’s energy shortfall is not caused by unusual technical difficulties, but rather by governance issues. This leads us to our second research question:. Based on current stakeholders in Taiwan’s electricity policy, what policy changes would be needed to implement a policy to guarantee supply?. Taiwan’s lack of an independent energy authority coupled with Taipower being directly answerable to the legislature means that technical requirements are deprioritized over political requirements. That means that when demand grows, the only responsible authorities do not necessarily take action because legislators fear being electorally punished 28.

(36) if they take remedial actions. Raising the price of electricity, expanding nuclear or coal power, or mass land seizures for solar deployments would all result in electoral punishment. Additionally, due to prioritization in load shedding, a majority of the voting population will be isolated from the direct effects of shortages, since residential users receive highest priority after essential services. (限電種類,台灣電力股份有限公司, 2016). However, without understanding the exact nature of Taiwan’s power issues, we cannot assess the potential political impacts in realistic terms.. 3.1 Analysis. 政治大 linked to electricity consumption, 立we can predict electricity consumption changes by tracking If we assume as true the premise that Taiwan's current economic growth is directly. ‧ 國. 學. economic growth. Although it is likely that Taiwan's economy will hopefully one day uncouple from energy and electricity in particular, that is unlikely in the near term. To do this Taiwan. ‧. would need to shift away from manufacturing toward services. That kind of economic. y. Nat. restructuring will likely take more time than Taiwan's medium term electricity production. io. sit. problems. Projections of power availability suggest that Taiwan will face periodic shortages. n. al. er. for at least the next five years, and that they will continue to worsen. We know that power. Ch. i n U. v. limitations, technical or political, cause a serious economic drag, either by acquiring. engchi. inventories, or by limiting the profitability of largest firms due to replacement generating capacity or by pushing out the smaller firms that cannot support the economies of scale required to make private generation effective.. 3.2 Data sources The Generating Availability Data System (GADS) is maintained by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). It is a statistical database of all of the different grid-conceited generators in the United States and Canada. GADS reporting is mandatory for all generators larger than 20 MW, and covers 71% of all generators. It is. 29.

(37) important to emphasize that the North American electricity market is profoundly different from Taiwan. Each region within the US has a different configuration from that of Taiwan. Some regions have entirely privatized, market based electrical supplies. Others, like the Tennessee Valley Authority are fully federally owned. In Washington State, there is publically owned transmission, mixed generation, and separate ownership of distribution. The most unique aspect of the North American grid compared to Taiwan is its size and that all grids are interconnected. When there is a shortage in one grid, they can buy power from neighbors through interties. Policies such as operating reserve and grid composition are set by each region and utility in accordance with local laws. In spite of these differences, GADS. 政治大 Taipower’s Power Dispatching Department keeps figures on historical availability of 立. provides a rich data source that we can use as a basis for comparison.. all Taipower sources for many years. Those these data sets are not public; they are. ‧ 國. 學. available on request. Some of this data can be used to do a comparison with GADS.. ‧. These reliability indicators can be compared with regional indicators from the US. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation maintains extensive records on the. y. Nat. sit. reliability of US generation through the Generating Availability Data System (GADS) - a data. n. al. er. io. source which is available to the public. The author can then compare the. C. i n U. h e n g c Analysis 3.3 Model Construction and Preliminary hi. v. Taiwan’s long term power projections may be misleading. Although the MOEA 2014 report on long term electricity growth suggests that installed capacity will continue to grow, most of the growth the report documents will be in renewables with extremely low capacity factors. Taipower’s Long Term Growth report also suggests a similar, if more serious power shortfall. The full data sources for these reports are not available.. 30.

(38) Preliminary Quantitative Analysis:. To answer the question, “how much reserve does Taiwan need?” I have developed a prototype metric - Average Individual Availability - derived statistic for evaluating reliability of individual generation systems. Its formula is simple: Equation 3.3.1 Average Individual Availability =. %. 政治大 This metric tells us, on average, how much capacity is available according to 立. ‧ 國. 學. Taipower’s metrics of availability. Those metrics often drastically exceed capacity factors especially for wind power - so we can conclude that availability refers to maintenance,. restrictions. Taipower’s availability statistic is calculated as follows:. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Equation 3.3.2. ‧. hydrology, transmission and operational limits, and faults. It may also include environmental. v. 可用率＝〔１－（影響供電量／參考容量／全期時數）〕Ｘ 100 ％. Ch. engchi. i n U. 1 / / 100% Where: IGC=Impact to Generating Capacity, NMC=Net Maximum Capacity, PH=Period Hours. This metric has a number of serious flaws, but it still enhances our understanding of Taiwan’s electrical supply reliability by providing us with a baseline probability of when power is available from traditional sources. In phone interviews with the Taipower Electrical Dispatch section, their officers confirmed Taipower’s Availability Factor is impacted by situations like maintenance, thermal variations, hydrology problems (for hydro), breakdowns, transmission problems, fuel problems, or other technical issues that could influence supply 31.

(39) availability. They did not explain exactly how this was calculated for each source, and this will remain a major weakness of this study. NERC uses a collection of statistics, but the most important for the purposes of this study is the Effective availability factor. Although it has a different calculation procedure which is much more transparent than Taipower’s number, it still provides an availability percentage which accounts for both planned and unplanned outages: Equation 3.3.3: Effective Availability Factor. . 立. 治政大. 100%. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. EAF: Effective Availability Factor AH: Available Hours EPDH: Equivalent Planned Derated Hours EFDH: Equivalent Forced Derated Hours EMDH: Equivalent Maintenance Derated Hours ESEDH: Equivalent Seasonal Derated Hours Source: GADS Data Reporting Instructions, Jan 2015, NERC. sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. These are all derived from GADS data. While it is unclear how exactly Taipower’s. v i n C hfurther study if thisUtechnique is to be widely this study. This assumption will require engchi n. numbers are calculated, they are assumed equivalent to the GADS data for the purposes of. implemented as a comparative model. This assumption only affects this study where direct comparisons are made between NERC GADS data and Taiwan’s data, and does not affect the evaluation of Taiwan’s long term forecasts. Capacity factors alone are an insufficient means of assessing reliability of high uptime sources and dispatchable sources because they never exceed demand, nor do they unambiguously tell us about the underlying reasons for lack of production. In my proposal, I provided evidence of days when Taipower had serious losses of capacity due to maintenance and other unforeseen issues. This metric quantifies those events and provides general probabilities of failures based on historical data from Taiwan’s own experience. 32.

(40) This metric has a number of weaknesses: It is extremely to apply to intermittent sources like wind and solar. For wind, this metric only evaluates that wind turbines are not malfunctioning and able to harness any wind resources available. It does not allow us to know when the wind blows to generate power. For solar, Taipower does not keep availability statistics, and this metric cannot be calculated at all. Even so, solar suffers the same problems that wind does: the availability of the power plant does not mean the availability of intermittent and uncontrollable resources. This metric also distorts pumped storage. Pumped storage facilities need to be charged, and the availability metric provided by Taipower only indicates that the facilities are operational, not when they are charged. For these sources,. 政治大 analysis assumed 100% availability factors, but upon further consideration, using capacity 立 capacity factors will remain indispensable for power system planning. Though the initial. factors may be more accurate. In the datasets, I call this average individual generation,. ‧ 國. 學. and it is used when availability is thought to be unrepresentative.. ‧. Equation 3.3.4 Average individual generation was calculated as follows:. 100%. y. n. er. io. al. sit. Nat. Ch. i n U. v. A further problem comes from IPP facilities and Cogeneration. Taipower does not. engchi. keep facility level statistics on private power plants. For the purposes of this study, I assumed that the reliability of these private thermal plants was comparable to those of Taipower facilities using the same source, and extrapolated the values based on the combined average individual availability for all Taipower thermal plants on all co-gen and IPP plants. This will no doubt distort the result, but due to limited time, assuming these facilities to have similar repair records still provide a useful analysis.. 33.

(41) 3.4 Preliminary Results Based on the author’s June 2015 analysis, Taiwan had an average availability of 37,960.8 MW. That means that at any given time, we could assume that just under 38GW of generating facilities would be “available” - that is, not broken, under maintenance, or suffering other technical problems. This is overly optimistic because solar and wind sources have artificially inflated numbers. Capacity factors would be better analyses for these sources. Without wind and solar, the amount is 36,958.0 MW. This means that, barring other factors such as political ones, Taiwan should have a consistent source of power up to this peak level. It may be possible to reach higher outputs,. 政治大. but based on this historical period, it is not likely, nor could it be relied upon. I think of it as a. 立. maximum theoretical reliable supply.. ‧ 國. 學. Availability data of any kind of IPP and Cogeneration is not available to this author's knowledge. In places where it is necessary, Availability rates for these sources are assumed. ‧. to be comparable to Taipower’s availability for the same sources. This is both highly. y. Nat. generous, as Taipower’s availability rates are unusually high, and therefore also potentially. er. io. sit. inaccurate, skewing the IPP availability on the higher side. This is particularly true in the case of cogeneration, as the cogen system is not really firm power and produces only a. n. al. Ch. small fraction of its reported installed capacity.. engchi. i n U. v. For IPP capacity factors, they are calculated only using yearly averages, since monthly data is unavailable. The total IPP generation and capacity factors were derived in several steps. First, the total IPP generation and total LNG generation were retrieved from the MOEA Handbook, then Taipower’s total LNG generation was subtracted from the LNG total. The remaining LNG figure represents IPP LNG generation for the year. From there, that is subtracted from the total IPP value. The remaining IPP value should contain coal and IPP solar. IPP solar values - acquired from data.gov.tw - are then subtracted, leaving us with the IPP coal value. The MOEA Energy Statistics Handbook value for coal is not used. 34.

(42) because Co-Gen might also be counted, and co-gen installed capacity is extremely difficult to nail down. Using a similar process, we can derive IPP solar and wind installed capacity and, with data.gov.tw availability can derive their capacity factors. The true measures of reliability for Cogeneration have proven to be extremely difficult. Cogeneration refers to boilers for industrial use - usually coal fired - which sell their surplus steam as wholesale electricity to Taipower. The total generation is listed by Taipower and data.gov.tw, but installed capacity is hard to know. Not all of these facilities are designed for power generation, and installed capacity, availability, and capacity are unclear from easily. 政治大 available, while Taipower’s real time data system lists less than 0.6GW - but by this 立. accessible data. The MOEA handbook implies that there may be more than 7GW of installed. measurement they had capacity factors of more than 100% during 2015. In the quantitative. ‧ 國. 學. analysis, this thesis calculates all cogen capacity factors twice - once with the MOEA. ‧. installed capacity, and once with Taipower’s installed capacity. The difference in capacity factors is startling. Using the higher MOEA installed capacity results in average Cogen. y. Nat. sit. capacity factors around 12%, while the Taipower installed capacity ranges from 120%-. n. al. er. io. 190+%. Since the generated capacity is likely accurate, and GADS has no comparable data,. i n U. v. we will have to settle for incomplete data in this regard. GADS does record co-generation. Ch. engchi. capacity and availability data, but it is unclear how much installed capacity there may be, as GADS records a number of retirements for cogeneration, and no new installations as of 2014. For the availability factor, since Co-gen is primarily coal-based, Taipower’s coal availability factors were used in the initial analysis, however, this proved to be unrepresentative. Therefore, for this calculation this thesis has opted to use the same Average Individual Generation - based on capacity factor and installed capacity - similar to the metric for renewable source. However, without more information on how cogeneration is implemented, there is no way to tell which would be more appropriate. Further studies and data about cogeneration will be needed for a more thorough analysis. This method is, in the author’s opinion, the single greatest flaw in this analysis. However, without more accurate 35.

台灣供電系統可靠度分析： 跨國比較 - 政大學術集成

台灣供電系統可靠度分析：跨國比較 - 政大學術集成