商業判斷法則之歷史緣起與法理依據

美國法院不願事後審究董事之經營行為，可以追溯至 250 年前英國法院在 Charitable Corp v. Sutton 一案³²之判決，而美國法學上之發展則始於 175 年前，

路易斯安那州最高法院 1829 年在 Percy v. Millaudon³³一案之判決見解：「該董事 採取一項錯誤策略導致公司受損，若此項錯誤係謹慎之人也可能會觸犯者，不 能課與董事責任。相對於此，若主張必須要擁有完美的智慧來避免難以避免的 錯誤，將沒有任何人願意在如此嚴苛之條件下提供服務予他人，因此，責任之 基準不應專注在確認有無智慧，而是具備普通知識，並證明董事重大錯誤，係 具普通知識與通常注意之人不可能有之錯誤。」³⁴ 爾後羅德島最高法院在 1853 年的 Hodges v. New England Screw Co.³⁵一案，判決「若董事可能觸犯的錯誤，

31 Bryan A. Garner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 212 (8th ed,2004) (The presumption that in making business decisions not involving direct self-interest or self-dealing, corporate directorsact on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation’s best interest. The rule shields directors and officers from liability for unprofitable or harmful corporate transactions if the transactions were made in good faith, with due care, and within the directors’ or officers’ authority.)

32 26 ER 642 (1742)

33 8 Mart.(n.s.) 68 (La. 1829)

34 8 Mart.(n.s.) 68, 77-78 (La. 1829) (on the occurrence of difficulties, in the exercise of it, which offer only a choice of measures, the adoption of a course from which loss ensues cannot make the agent responsible, if the error was one into which a prudent man might have fallen. The contrary doctrine seems to us, to suppose the possession, and require the exercies, of perfect wisdom in fallible beings.

No man would undertake to render a service to another on such severe conditions. …The test of responsibility therefore should be, not the certainty of wisdom in others, but the possession of ordinary knowledge; and by showing that the error of the agent is of so gross a kind, that a man of common sense, and ordinary attention, would not have fallen into it.)

35 3 R.I. 9 (R.I. 1853)

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36 3 R.I. 9, 19 (R.I. 1853) (We think a board of directors acting in good faith and with reasonable care and diligence, who, nevertheless, fall into a mistake either as to law or fact, are not liable for the consequences of such mistake.)

37 78 Pa. 370 (1875)

38 78 Pa. 370, 392 (1875) (Directors are mandatories only, and as such, held to but ordinary skill and diligence, and are not responsible to their fellow corporators for the want of judgment and knowledge.

They are personally liable only where they are guilty of fraudulent conduct or of acts clearly ultra vires.)

39 207 N.Y. 113 (N.Y. 1912)

40 207 N.Y. 113, 124 (N.Y. 1912) (Questions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or action, adequacy of consideration, lawful appropriation of corporate funds to advance corporate interests, are left solely to their honest and unselfish decision, for their powers therein are without limitation and free from restraint, and the exercise of them for the common and general interests of the corporation may not be questioned, although the results show that what they did was unwise or inexpedient.)

41 李維心(2008)，〈從實務觀點談商業判斷法則之引進〉，《中原財經法學》第 22 期，頁 134。

42 戴志傑(2003)，〈公司法上經營判斷法則之研究〉，《月旦法學雜誌》第 106 期，頁 164。

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此為商事專業經理人制定了這樣較為優待的司法審查制度：商業判斷法則。⁴³ 歸納上述法院判決可以得到，商業判斷法則的理論基礎在於「司法認知其 係公司董事會經營管理伴隨而來的恩惠條款」。其內容又可細分為五點，詳述如 下⁴⁴：

一、鼓勵有能力者勇於任事

商業判斷法則承認人類並非全知全能，智者千慮必有一失，因此法院承認 董事在無個人利害關係且出於善意的前提下，基於當下時空中充分資訊所為的 決策，即便事後觀察認為輕率、錯誤，甚至導致公司蒙受經濟損失，董事亦無 須負擔賠償責任。法秩序藉此原則鼓勵適格的之人勇於任事經營公司，以謀求 社會群體利益，毋庸過度擔憂司法程序。

二、鼓勵創意、創新與投資

法院承認商業決策經常伴隨風險與不確定性，希望藉由法律制度的保障，

鼓勵帶有風險性質的投資，以獲取重大潛在利益。此外，基於效率的理由，公 司的決策者應該被允許得以果斷決策並享有免於被司法程序事後審究的相對自 由，鼓勵專業經理人進入新市場、開發新產品、創新與冒險。同時，股東基於 自由意志購買股票，相當程度上係自願自發的接受上述經營風險，自無事後再 追究的道理。

三、董事才是最適決策者

商業判斷準則避免法院陷入錯綜複雜的公司決策困境中，法院自承在公司 治理方面難以勝任，專業經理人在各方面都比法院更加適合擔任經營判斷的工 作。故有法諺：「辦公室才是推敲、探討經營問題的場所，而非法庭。」此外，

由於商機難遇的特性，一個優秀的商業決策往往極度講求效率與時機，一個適 格的專業經理人除了妥善運用當下所能客觀蒐集到的科學數據與知識資訊來判 斷，尚需與其他同業競爭同時與時間賽跑，因此若依事後諸葛的判斷來評價過 去的投資是否合理適當，評價者往往難以精確重現當時的時空背景而自陷於後

43 Jeffrey J. Rachlinskit, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev (1998) 571, 623 (With decades of experience in the matter and a basic understanding of the foibles of judging in hindsight, courts seem to have realized this, and carved out the business judgment rule for corporate managers alone among professionals.)

44 劉連煜(2007)，〈董事責任與經營判斷法則〉，《月旦民商法》第 17 期，頁 187-189。李維心，

同前註 41，頁 137。戴志傑，同前註 42，頁 161-162。

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見之明的邏輯謬誤而不自知。

四、確保公司經營與所有分離

商業判斷法則確保公司的經營者是董事而非股東。蓋若容許股東輕易且經 常的透過法院審查董事的經營決策，則公司決策權將時常受到勇於提起訴訟的 股東干擾與掣肘，長久以來更將因此而使實際上公司的決策經營權轉移至勇於 提起訴訟的股東之手。因此透過此原則，可保障公司治理集中且專業的價值，

雖然傳統上認為商業判斷法則主要保障董事的權利，但實際上是保障公司以及 全體股東的利益免於受到非專業的股東干涉，以落實經營權與所有權分離的現 代公司組織理論，使得公司決策集中化。

五、法院保障股東權利而非獲利

蓋若多數股東不滿意該董事之決策，則應該透過股東會表決等公司自治程 序將不適任的董事解職，而非逕行訴諸法院介入。此外，投資人於市場上認購 公司股票而成為公司之股東，其本質上即係一「投資行為」，故其亦應承擔投資 風險所可能帶來之不利益結果。蓋其於市場上對不同投資標的本有自由選擇之 權利，其既然選擇投資公司股票，必然是某程度判斷後相信該公司董事具有一 定經營能力而得以為公司獲取利益，而後其投資得以報償。故投資人在對於公 司資訊綜合判斷後選擇投資成為公司股東，必係對於公司董事具有一定程度之 信賴，而自願承受董事錯誤經營判斷所帶來之不利益風險。再從政策面上觀察

，以法律課予董事責任之目的，應係在於防範股東因董事之道德風險而受損，

而非保障股東使其投資無失敗之風險。若要求董事所作成之經營決策絕對不可 發生不利益或有害公司之結果，將無異於保護股東之投資收益，而過度加重董 事之責任。如此作法將有悖於經濟市場之正常性與效率性。因此商業判斷準則 基本上尊重董事之職權以及其決定。

後來，陸續出現幾個重要的法規使得商業判斷法則得以明文化。其一是，

美國律師協會(American Bar Association,ABA)制定「模範商業公司法(Revised Model Business Corporation Act, RMBCA)」。該法規在 RMBCA§8.30(a)規定：「

當免除董事責任時，董事會的每一位成員應該基於善意且基於董事合理相信係 以對於公司之最加利益的方式而加以執行。」⁴⁵ RMBCA§8.30(b)：「當董事會

45 RMBCA§8.30(a) (Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director,

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shall act: (i) in good faith, and (ii) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be inthe best interests of the corporation.)

46 RMBCA§8.30(b) (The members of the board of directors or a committee of the board, when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.)

47 RMBCA§8.31(a) (A director shall not be liable to the corporation or its shareholders for any decision to take or not to take action, or any failure to take any action, as a director, unless the party asserting liability in a proceeding establishes that: A. any provision in the articles of incorporation authorized by §2.02(b)(4) or the protection afforded by § 8.61 for action taken in compliance with § 8.62 or 8.63, if interposed as a bar to the proceeding by the director, does not preclude liability; and B.

the challenged conduct consisted or was the result of: (1) action not in good faith; or (2) a decision a.

which the director did not reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation, or as to which the director was not informed to an extent the director reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances; or (3) a lack of objectivity due to the director’s familial, financial or business relationship with, or a lack of independence due to the director’s domination or control by, another person having a material interest in the challenged conduct (a) which relationship or which domination or control could reasonably be expected to have affected the director’s judgment respecting the challenged conduct in a manner adverse to the corporation, and (b) after a reasonable expectation to such effect has been established, the director shall not have established that the challenged conduct was reasonably believed by the director to be in the best interests of the corporation; or (4) a sustained failure of the director to devote attention to ongoing oversight of the business and affairs of the corporation, or a failure to devote timely attention, by making (or causing to be made) appropriate inquiry, when particular facts and circumstances of significant concern materialize that would alert a reasonably attentive director to the need therefore; or (5) receipt of a financial benefit to which the

30 (Principle of Corporate Governance, PCG)」。該法在 PCG§4.01(a)規定：「董事或 公司的職員對公司有責任以善意履行其職能，且其合理相信係基於公司最佳利

director was not entitled or any other breach of the director’s duties to deal fairly with the corporation and its shareholders that is actionable under applicable law.)

48 RMBCA§8.31(b) (The party seeking to hold the director liable: A. for money damages, shall also have the burden of establishing that: (1) harm to the corporation or its shareholders has been suffered, and (2) the harm suffered was proximately caused by the director’s challenged conduct; or B. for other money payment under a legal remedy, such as compensation for the unauthorized use of corporate assets, shall also have whatever persuasion burden may be called for to establish that the payment sought is appropriate in the circumstances; or C. for other money payment under an equitable remedy, such as profit recovery by or disgorgement to the corporation, shall also have whatever persuasion burden may be called for to establish that the equitable remedy sought is appropriate in the circumstances.)

49 PCG§4.01 (a) (A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.)

50 PCG§4.01 (b) (Except as otherwise provided by statute or by a standard of the corporation and subject to the board's ultimate responsibility for oversight, in performing its functions (including oversight functions), the board may delegate, formally or informally by course of conduct, any function (including the function of identifying matters requiring the attention of the board) to committees of the board or to directors, officers, employees, experts, or other persons)

31 公司法(Delaware General Corporation Law, DGCL)」。該法第 102 條第(b)項第(7) 款規定：「關於免除或減輕董事因違反受任人責任而對於公司或公司股東為金錢

51 PCG§4.01(c) (A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty under this Section if the director or officer: (1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment;

(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and (3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.)

52 PCG§4.01(d) (A person challenging the conduct of a director or officer under this Section has the burden of proving a breach of the duty of care, including the inapplicability of the provisions as to the fulfillment of duty under Subsection (b) or (c), and, in a damage action, the burden of proving that the breach was the legal cause of damage suffered by the corporation.)

53 DGCL§102(b)(7) (A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of

53 DGCL§102(b)(7) (A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of