未來研究方向

透過模型的推導以及數值的模擬已達成本研究之目的。惟仍有些許問題值得 繼續探討，茲將簡述於下：

1. d 值與 u 值應有所限制：

本研究認為技術水準的提升有助於雙方的投資增加，以及有助於產出的提升。

並根據此推得 d 值，其越大對於向後整合越有利，以及 u 值越大，越有利於 向前整合。然而在高度專業化的產業之中，採取互不整合之策略也許會是較 好的選擇。因為高度專業化的兩個廠商若要進行整合，則其管理上的溝通以 及知識的分享將會有較大的阻礙。也就是說雙方的交易成本會隨專業化而提 高。故後續研究可以對此進行探討。

2. 技術移轉對下游技術之影響：

本模型雖考慮技術移轉對產出影響，然而我們並未討論技術移轉對下游廠商 技術水準之影響。然而如果下游的技術水準受到改變，則產出也將隨之改變。

因此更廣泛的分析應將此納入考慮。故建議後續研究可以將技術移轉併入下 游技術水準，作為其內生變數。

3. 未來考量將市場競爭因素納入模型，以發展動態決策推論。

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