本研究檢視公司對CEOs 採行經理人股權持有準則後對公司風險之影響，用 以了解風險趨避之經理人在持有公司大量股數後，對公司風險胃納(risk appetite) 改變之程度，探討是否同現代投資組合理論(Modern Portfolio Theory)所描述，當 CEOs 之財富不具多樣性時，會選擇採行降低公司風險之策略，無法使得經理人 和股東目標趨於一致。
本研究發現當公司對CEOs 採用經理人股權持有準則後，CEOs 會增加資本 支出此一較不具風險之財務及投資策略，降低研究及發展費用支出，及降低財務 槓桿比率此兩項較具風險之財務及投資策略。採用經理人股權持有準則後會誘使 CEOs 降低公司非系統性風險，由此可知 CEOs 會放棄採取淨變現價值為正但會 增加公司非系統性風險之計，但會使CEOs 增加公司系統性風險，因此對公司總 風險並無定論。採行經理人股權持有準則後，CEOs 會使公司持有更多衍生性金 融工具以進行避險，並增加採用衍生性金融工具作為避險之方法。本研究發現當 公司對CEOs 採用經理人股權持有準則後，會造成 CEOs 更為風險趨避，無法使 公司CEOs 和公司投資者之目標趨於一致。
本研究之限制，有關衍生性金融工具的研究中作者大多採用EDGAR 資料庫 中10-K 所揭露之資料，亦有少數使用資料庫的研究，包含 LexisNexis database (Mian, 1996)以及 Swap Monitor Publications, Inc. (Gay and Nam, 1998) ，關於本研 究避險之衍生性金融工具資料來自於Compustat 資料庫，由於 Compustat 資料庫 中的衍生性金融工具資料多有遺漏且分類不夠精確，如衍生性金融工具能按目的 區分為利率避險或匯率避險等，或能明確指出衍生性金融工具之類型，包含利率 交換合約、遠期合約或選擇權等，將能使衍生性金融工具模型之迴歸結果及分析 更為精確。
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附錄、變數之處理
附錄解釋本研究中有經過較特殊計算之變數，在Compustat 資料庫中有給每 個資料科目一個號碼，如變數係採用Compustat 資料庫中財務資料計算，下列解 釋有額外提及該資料科目之號碼。
1. MB：資產市質對帳面價值比。(資產帳面價值-權益帳面價值+流通在外股數*
股價)/資產帳面價值。(data#6-data#60+data#199*data#25)/data#6。
2. LEVERAGE：財務槓桿。短期借款+長期借款/總資產。
(data#9+data#34)/data#6。
3. RET：年度股票報酬係採用股票月報酬換算年度購買後持有報酬(buy-and-hold return, BHR)。BHR= [ ((1+ return of month 1) * (1+ return of month 2)
*...*(1+return of month12)) - 1] 。
4. BM：帳面價值對市場價值比。資產帳面價值/(資產帳面價值-權益帳面價值+
流通在外股數*股價)。data#6/(data#6-data#60+data#199*data#25)