結論與未來研究方向 - 應用Stackelberg模型於價高量多市場之兩階層供應鏈合約設計研究

5.1 結論

本論文為單一上游製造商與單一下游零售商，兩階層供應鏈之合約設計。

從最基本的供需曲線開始思考，與大多數有關合約設計的論文最大的相異在於，

以往的合約設計對於供需曲線，通常設定價格與數量成反比的關係。另外，在大多數的商業行為中，下游零售商對上游製造商的購買行為，都是以量制價。即下游零售商以量的增加，來換取上游製造商在產品價格上的降低。而本論文欲提出不同的思維是在於，若是此商業行為轉變成，下游零售商提出希望購買的價格後，上游再根據出價的高低，決定提供給下游的產品數量。如果下游零售商提出的購買價格越高，則上游製造商將會考慮提供更多的產品。因此基於這個想法，

本論文提出，價格與數量之間成正比關係的合約設計。除了對供需曲線的思考不同外，本論文更跳脫以往大部分論文僅設計與討論單一種模型，試圖同時導入多種模型的思考。首先討論基本的線性曲線，設計出數量獎勵模型以及無數量獎勵模型。不僅如此，更提出組合兩條不同的供給曲線之想法，設計出折線式混合模型。並且找出在滿足模型成立之限制條件下，各個模型的均衡最佳解。同時，對三種模型在相同的設定情況下，比較三種模型對於上游製造商以及整體供應鏈，

利潤優劣的敏感度分析。結果發現在三種模型合約之中，不論是上游製造商或是整體供應鏈來說，選擇折線式混合模型合約將會是最有優勢的決策。另外，本論文亦分析相關市場參數以及製造商單位製造成本的變化，對上游製造商以及下游零售商的決策變數的影響。並就敏感度分析之後所得到的結果，賦予經濟上所可能對應的意義說明。

5.2 未來研究方向

基本上，本論文為討論供應鏈簡化至兩階層的結構。但是，實際的供應鏈的階層大小卻是遠較這個數字來的大。同時，同一階層內的組成數目也非單獨只有一家廠商而已，而是許許多多家廠商共存在市場之中。因此，未來的研究可思考多階層與多家廠商的問題，並且進一步的思考，同一階層內的多家廠商是否有彼此競爭的行為，又該怎麼處理。另外，三種合約模型皆為討論供需曲線為連續之直線。然而，並非所有連續的供需曲線皆能符合實際的狀況，討論非連續的供需曲線，如階梯函數等等，也是未來值得去深入探討以及研究的議題。

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在文檔中應用Stackelberg模型於價高量多市場之兩階層供應鏈合約設計研究 (頁 66-71)