Implications for Future Studies

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today when China’s technological capabilities have increased significantly? When Chinese technology developed further, and enough to match its economic strength, China would inevitably become formidable foe for the U.S. When the gap is narrowing at a rate, the U.S.

has to face the inevitable and keep the edge in as many commercial and military technologies as possible before it is too late. America and China cannot escape Thucydides’s Trap.

5.2 Implications for Future Studies

In his State of the Union address to Congress in February 1971, Nixon said, “The ultimate relation between Taiwan and the mainland is not a matter for the United States to decide.” Since there is no escape for Taiwan to be involved in the struggle between America and China because of its geopolitical position, the effort made by Taiwanese to understand the Trump administration is particularly intense. With the evolving relationships between Washington, Taipei, and Beijing, this research recommends that the Taiwanese government the good use of the opportunity to develop clear strategies to confront the China threat in the era of President Trump. Because President Trump’s goal and will to remain American hegemonic position and force Communist China to make structural change are clear and formidable that Taiwan should also shows its capability and determination as an active actor on the world stage.

First, according to offensive realism, great powers aims to achieve hegemony, first regional, then global. China, regardless of who its leaders are, will never give up pursuing hegemony. Taiwanese government should create a timely foreign policy to survive the attempts of the Communist China to isolate the island country from the international community. According to the paradigm of realism, the Trump administration is going on

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pursuing the best national interest. Though it seems to be characteristic of uncertainty in its policy reversals, his government’s policy will go on pursue the best American national interest. Because the U.S. is Taiwan’s most reliable ally in the Asia-Pacific arena, it is recommended that Taiwan build stronger relationship with Washington so as to survive the increasing pressure from China.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will go on finding excuses to counterbalance Taipei while trying to restrain U.S. influence in Taiwan Strait and South East Asia. Taiwan should have firm stand toward Beijing and welcome U.S. assistance. While maintaining a dialogue across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan should avoid playing two-prong strategy because it will please neither by trying to please both and vice versa.

Both President Trump and President Xi are concerned about their personal strategies, values, and long-term policies. From the perspective of strategies, they both surely would not forget to play Taiwan card as part of their strategies, Taiwan therefore cannot avoid becoming a bargaining chip for Washington and/or Beijing. To realize this goal of Taiwan’s national interest, Taiwan’s interactions with both major powers should be flexible in strategies, firm in values, insistent in long-term policies. At present the prime option for Taiwan’s foreign policy is to strengthen the support of Washington for the nation’s survival and keep Beijing at arm’s length for the peace of Taiwan Strait.

Second, according to offensive realism, national wealth is the potential factor for survival of a country. Taiwan should retrieve its businesses from Mainland China. Taiwan has been suffering semi-recession in its economy since the westward opening policy in 1980s.

President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” policy gives Taiwan an excuse to retrieve its huge investment on Mainland China.

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Third, according to offensive realism, military strength is the main factor for survival of a country to survive in the anarchic international arena. Taiwan should build up its military strength that can make immediately response to any malign foreign invade. According to realism, the U.S. will only help allies that are viable themselves. Since President Trump regards himself as a principled realist, his fundamental view shows that the U.S. should keep a distance with its allies because of the huge burden of unproductive money. Therefore, Taiwan must have self-defensive capability for self-protection and determination to ward off its enemy.

Encouraged by the international acquiescence to Putin’s intervention in Crimea Peninsula in 2014, President Xi may seek military adventures in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait at a limited cost. Taiwan should always be vigilant of China’s aggressive intentions. The “Taiwan issue” will continue to be a critical focus for those who choose to study the U.S.-China relationship from the offensive realist perspective in the future. Taiwan Strait has been one of the most likely ignition point of a war between the two great powers.

Ultimately, if Beijing truly wishes to reassert control over the island, military force may be its only option. That would be a risky step for a government that has not fought a war against a foreign state since a brief and unsuccessful conflict with Vietnam in 1979. It would also put Beijing on a collision course with Washington, which does not support Taiwan’s independence but has what the U.S. State Department describes as “a robust unofficial relationship” with Taipei. Even if Beijing is not on the verge of attacking the island, the Chinese rhetoric raises the risk that there may eventually be outright war. How President Trump perceives and handles the “Taiwan issue” is a highly recommended focus for future researches.

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