Chapter 4: Trump and the U.S.-China Military Relations
4.1 The PRC’s Military Strategy under Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
states” and he assumed that “the balance of power is largely synonymous with the balance of military power.”1 As a rising power, China’s move to advance and modernize its military strength is likely agitate the existing hegemon which can ultimately ignite a great power war.
Since such dynamics will have far-reaching impacts on the world, special attentions should be given to how the Sino-American military relations has changed under the Chinese President Xi Jinping and American President Donald Trump.
When President Trump has gained insights into America’s current weaknesses and intents to do something to correct the tilted balance of the U.S.-China relations, the wax and wane of the relative military strength between the two great powers during the past decades should come under as much, if not more, scrutiny as their relative economic capabilities.
Just as Trump has recognized China as America’s principal long-term competitor and that Beijing would not curb its assertive rhetoric and practices if the United States asked nicely, neither would Beijing refrain from military adventures in the Asian-Pacific and on the global scale. In this chapter, the author hence aims to answer the research question: How
does President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy affect the U.S.-China military relations? Can the two great powers avoid Thucydides’s Trap under Trump’s administration?
The author draws on the discipline of offensive realism to assess the possibility of military confrontations between these two great powers and its impacts on the overall international relations.
4.1 The PRC’s Military Strategy under Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”
Chinese National Objective Under Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”
1 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 55.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
81
The security competitions between great powers are most likely to escalate into military confrontations when the competitors bear conflicting goals and are determined to defend what they consider to be irreconcilable claims. Therefore, to better understand why President Trump perceives the U.S.-China security competition the way he does, it is essential to first give a careful scrutiny of the rhetoric, behaviors, and capabilities of the Chinese leadership which best represent the intentions and objectives of the authoritarian regime in its pursuit of power.
According to the 2015 white paper China’s Military Strategy published by Chinese State Council Information Office, “China’s national strategic goal is to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021 when the CPC celebrates its centenary; and the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049 when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) marks its centenary.”2 These “two centenaries” goals are the basic foundations of President Xi Jinping’s national objective often known as the “Chinese Dream.” In particular, Xi infused the “strong military dream” into his “Chinese Dream” by asserting that “The Chinese Dream is to make the country strong. China’s armed forces take their dream of making the military strong as part of the Chinese Dream. Without a strong military, a country can be neither safe nor strong.”
China’s ambition to attain greater power can often be detected in President Xi’s rhetoric on achieving the Chinese Dream. For example, in the report delivered to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 18, 2017, Xi made clear of the theme and purpose of the new Congress as follows:
2 People’s Republic of China, The Information Office of the State Council, China’s Military Strategy (Full Text), May 27, 2015, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm.
‧ decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.3
Xi’s call for a “national rejuvenation” arise from the Chinese collective trauma of the
“Century of Humiliation,” which is the conglomerate of the historic complacence of the Middle Kingdom and its experiences of subjugation under Western powers in the 19th and 20th century. President Richard Nixon best represented this traumatized mindset in his description of the Chinese as a “people live in angry isolation” under the U.S. containment policy. 4 Over the past decades, this hateful mentality has transformed into an unquenchable desire for power.
Following the downfall of the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders perceived a period of strategic opportunity and they took the chance to embark on an intense economic and military development.5 As President Xi set forth in his speech at 19th National Congress of the CPC, “It will be an era for all of us, the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, to strive with one heart to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. It will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind.”6 President Xi reminded the delegates at the Congress and his people that “With the gross domestic product rising from 54 trillion to 80 trillion yuan, China has maintained
3 “Full Text of Xi Jinping's Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” China Daily, November 4, 2017, accessed May 2, 2018
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.
4 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 546.
5 Jim Garamone, “DIA’s China Military Power Report Details Leaders’ Strategy,” January 15, 2019,
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1732657/dias-china-military-power-report-details-leaders-strateg y/. 6 “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” China Daily, November 4, 2017, accessed May 2, 2018
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
83
its position as the world’s second largest economy and contributed more than 30 percent of global economic growth.”7 Taking into account the traumatized mentality of the Chinese populace, President Xi’s call for a national rejuvenation, and China’s enormous wealth and population, China seems to have both the incentive and capability to pursue greater power;
President Xi’s national objective to transform the Chinese military into one of the most powerful forces in the world hence becomes essential and justifiable.
President Xi’s Strategy to Achieve Chinese Military Objectives
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is currently the largest military force in the world in terms of the number of military personnel in service. Moreover, Dan Taylor, a senior defense intelligence analyst at the DIA, argued that “it’s thought the PLA receives about $200 billion a year in funding—about 1.4 percent of China’s gross domestic product—though lack of transparency means exact numbers can’t be determined.”8 Supported by significant increases in Chinese defense spending every year since 1990, Chinese military modernization has made impressive strides in the past decade.9 In fact, the Chinese government has been accelerating the increase of the PLA budget by an average of 10 percent per year from 2000 to 2016.
On July 30, 2017, the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA, President Xi Jinping observed a parade featuring 12,000 military personnel and about 700 air and ground armament. In his speech given at the parade, President Xi stressed the need to build a
7 “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” China Daily, November 4, 2017, accessed May 2, 2018
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.
8 Jim Garamone, “DIA’s China Military Power Report Details Leaders’ Strategy,” January 15, 2019,
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1732657/dias-china-military-power-report-details-leaders-strateg y/. 9 Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defense Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,” The China Quarterly, December 2013, no. 216, 805–830.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
world-class military loyal to the Communist Party and capable of defeating all invading enemies. Besides, President Xi’s government has ordered the modernization of the PLA in an attempt to make it a leaner force capable of operating far from Chinese territory.10
According to the report China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win released by the United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in January 2019, “China’s military rise is well-planned, and Chinese leaders are following a strategy they believe will lead to greater power and influence both regionally and globally.” The report “details some of the efforts made by the world’s most populous nation and the world’s second largest economy to build a military force that will allow it to back up plans for great rejuvenation.”11 “This ambition permeates China’s national security strategy and guides the development of the People’s Liberation Army.”12
Xi Jinping’s Agenda on “Major Military Missions”
The Chinese leadership is aware of the PLA’s shortcomings and the need for improvement in training. President Xi Jinping has launched a series of military reforms and conducted joint operations in the hope of leading the PLA to become a more formidable force. In his report to the 19th CPC National Congress, President Xi argued stated that “With a view to realizing the Chinese Dream and the dream of building a powerful military, we have developed a strategy for the military under new circumstances, and have made every
10 “Xi orders absolute loyalty to party,” The Standard, July 31, 2017, accessed April 9, 2019, http://www.thestandard.com.hk/sections-news_print.php?id=185712.
11 Jim Garamone, DIA’s China Military Power Report Details Leaders’ Strategy, January 15, 2019,
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1732657/dias-china-military-power-report-details-leaders-strateg y/. 12 Ibid.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
85
effort to modernize national defense and the armed forces.”13 Xi said in a speech at the Zhurihe Training Base in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, “The world is not all at peace. Peace must be safeguarded.”14 “We have strengthened military training and war preparedness, and undertaken major missions related to the protection of maritime rights, countering terrorism, maintaining stability, disaster rescue and relief, international peacekeeping, escort services in the Gulf of Aden, and humanitarian assistance.” Ultimately, of course, “the Party’s goal of building a strong military in the new era is to build the people’s forces into world-class forces.”15 In order to achieve his goal of building a more formidable force, President Xi has introduced many measures as follows.
1. Massive Anti-Corruption Campaign
For Xi, on the one hand, a strong CPC and a stable political environment are deeply interconnected; on the other hand, the good economic performance associated with invincible military strength. The integration of these critical factors is indispensable for a
“reinvigorated China.” To achieve the objective of the reformation, the government under Xi's leadership undertook massive anti-corruption campaign. As a critical part of the campaign, there came the rectification of military discipline. According to the official numbers published in the South China Morning Post, an oversea party medium, China's anti-graft body, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), has ousted over 250 senior officials from the CPC and the military since 2012 and has also been
13 “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” China Daily, November 4, 2017, accessed May 2, 2018
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.
14 “Xi orders absolute loyalty to party,” The Standard, July 31, 2017, accessed April 9, 2019, http://www.thestandard.com.hk/sections-news_print.php?id=185712.
15 Ching Chang, “PRC Defense Policy Noted in The Nineteenth CCP National Congress,” December 1, 2017, http://cimsec.org/prc-defense-policy-noted-nineteenth-ccp-national-congress/34863.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
investigating up to two million lower-level officials. It hailed the crackdown has led to an actual reduction in graft and the campaign helped President Xi purge his political opponents, both of which highlighted the vigorous start of strengthening the Chinese military development.
2. Establishing the Central Leading Group for Military Reform
For the purpose of comprehensive military reform, President Xi Jinping had established the Central Leading Group for Military Reform under the Central Military Commission on the 3rd plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in November 2013. In January 2014, the Central Leading Group for Military Reform had made a plan to reduce the number of military regions from seven to five
“Theater Command” in order to have joint command with ground, naval, air, and rocket forces. Besides, they increased naval capabilities in the East China Sea and turned Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou into military areas to project power into the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea.
In December 2015 they scraped the General Political department, General Logistics, and General Armaments. Only the Central Military Commission (CMC), the supreme military policy-making body, is retained to exercise the command and control of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police and the Militia. And then they merged Lanzhou Military Region and the Chengdu Military Region. (New West zone), and consolidated the seven regional commands into five units to reorganize four army headquarters.16
16 Ching Chang, “PRC Defense Policy Noted in The Nineteenth CCP National Congress,” December 1, 2017 http://cimsec.org/prc-defense-policy-noted-nineteenth-ccp-national-congress/34863, 34.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
87
3. Xi Jinping’s Two-Stage Plan for Military Development
“Based on a comprehensive analysis of the international and domestic environments and the conditions for China’s development, we have drawn up a two-stage development plan for the period from 2020 to the middle of this century.”17
“In the first stage from 2020 to 2035, we will build on the foundation created by the moderately prosperous society with a further 15 years of hard work to see that socialist modernization is basically realized. The vision is that by the end of this stage, the following goals will have been met: China’s economic and technological strength has increased significantly. China has become a global leader in innovation.”
“In the second stage from 2035 to the middle of the 21st century, we will, building on having basically achieved modernization, work hard for a further 15 years and develop China into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful. By the end of this stage… China has become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence…The Chinese nation will become a proud and active member of the community of nations.”
“We will adapt to the trend of a new global military revolution and to national security needs; we will upgrade our military capabilities, and see that, by the year 2020, mechanization is basically achieved, IT application has come a long way, and strategic capabilities have seen a big improvement. In step with our country’s modernization process, we will modernize our military across the board in terms of theory, organizational structure, service personnel, and weaponry. We will make it our mission to see that by 2035, the
17 “Full Text of Xi Jinping's Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” China Daily, November 4, 2017, accessed May 2, 2018
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
modernization of our national defense and our forces is basically completed; and that by the mid-21st century our people’s armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces.”
4. Military Training
Informed by observing the past military operations of the U.S. military, the Chinese military authorities are making vigorous efforts to advance both the abilities and gaps in capability of PLA. To improve the defense industrial base and decrease the PLA’s dependence on foreign weapon acquisitions, they reformed the way the PLA bought weapons and instituted several broad scientific and technical programs.
5. Key Technological Areas
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has achieved progress in key technological areas, ranging from precision-guided missiles to advanced surface ships and combat aircraft; PLA personnel are more highly trained and skilled, capable of carrying out increasingly complex operations near to and farther away from China’s shores; and Chinese military doctrine and strategy have been updated to emphasize modern, joint maneuver warfare on a high-tech battlefield.18 Roger Cliff, a senior researcher at RAND Corporation, predicted that in the next five to ten years, China’s military will be as modern as America’s European allies.19
6. Six Large Military Parades in Xi’s Seven Years in Power
18 James Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein, ed. China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Washington D.C.: Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 2002).
19 “China’s Military Strategy: Challenging America’s Role in Asia?” Truman Center, accessed April 10, 2019, http://trumancenter.org/asia-china/chinas-military-strategy-challenging-americas-role-in-asia/.
‧
On April 23, 2019, China will hold a large-scale maritime military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in the Yellow Sea off the coast of Qingdao in Shandong province and will invite more than a dozen foreign navies to participate. However, the United States refused to invite the Chinese Communist Party to send ships or officials to participate in the CCP’s naval activities.20
Actually, merely one year before, the military held a naval review in the South China Sea featured a total of 48 vessels and 76 planes, including China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, its Type 094A and 095 nuclear submarines, 052D guided missile destroyers and J-15 fighter jets, and President Xi Jinping personally reviewed it.21
The Hong Kong media said that Xi Jinping took office for seven years and held six large military parades, becoming the leader of the Chinese military parade. Xi Jinping’s frequent military parade seems to have deep meaning. Military analysts said the exercise would give the navy the opportunity to display its rapidly growing strength and show how that has increased in the past 12 months.
7. President Xi’s Achievements in Military Reform
Taken together, these changes have better enabled the PLA to fight what the U.S.
Department of Defense describes as “short-duration, high-intensity regional conflicts.”22
“Cliff believes that China’s investment in military capabilities might result in a security challenge for the United States if the Chinese are able to: 1) acquire the capability to "force
20 Liu Zhen, “Chinese Navy’s 70th Birthday Parade Set to Showcase Country’s Rising Sea Power,” South China Morning Post, March 1, 2019, accessed March 26, 2019,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2188303/chinese-navys-70th-birthday-parade-set-showcase -countrys-rising.
21 Ibid.
22 U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, April 26, 2016,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016 China Military Power Report.pdf.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Taiwan to accept unification with the Chinese mainland, even if the U.S. intervenes militarily,” 2) acquire the capability to “defend Chinese interests elsewhere in the region,”
and 3) over the long term is able to displace the United States as the ‘preeminent military power in the region.’”23
In regard to hardware, Roger Cliff pointed out that the Chinese have been procuring ever more advance military hardware including ballistic missiles, fighter aircraft, precision guided munitions, surface to air missiles, submarines, anti-ship ballistic missiles, intelligence and surveillance assets, and cyber.
In regard to software, Roger Cliff pointed out that the Chinese are also improving training, the development of military doctrine, and improving the quality of enlisted personnel and officers. When this process is complete, the Chinese will have a military that could present a “daunting challenge to both the United States and Taiwanese militaries.”
8. China’s Military Augmentation in Asia-Pacific Area
On June 7, 2013, President Xi said to President Obama that “This is a wonderful place, a place of sunshine, and it’s very close to the Pacific Ocean. And on the other side of the ocean is China. When I visited the United States last year, I stated that the vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for the two large countries of China and the United States. I still believe so.” “And, Mr. President, we’re meeting here today to chart the future of
On June 7, 2013, President Xi said to President Obama that “This is a wonderful place, a place of sunshine, and it’s very close to the Pacific Ocean. And on the other side of the ocean is China. When I visited the United States last year, I stated that the vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for the two large countries of China and the United States. I still believe so.” “And, Mr. President, we’re meeting here today to chart the future of