Chapter 5: Conclusion
5.1 Research Findings
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
5.1 Research Findings
“To spin a cocoon around oneself” (作繭自縛) is often used as a metaphor to describe a Machiavellian who is “enmeshed in a trap of one’s own devising.” While Chinese President Xi Jinping has proclaimed “An Era of China’s Greatness,” U.S. President Donald Trump has also promised to “Make America Great Again.” They have both spun a cocoon around themselves that can be best represented in Steve Forbes’ words as “Promises made should be promises kept.”President Xi attempts to win the support of the Chinese masses by declaring that China as a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development, and an upholder of international order.However, this kind of rhetoric is sure to collide with President Trump’s promise to “Make America Great Again.” The two countries, both under leaders with tough-minded attitudes and strong-willed personalities, have become enmeshed in a trap of their own devising that is known as the “Thucydides’s Trap,” in which war is almost always the result—though it does not have to be.
After tracing the historic path and scrutinizing data about the U.S.-China relations, the author has found answers to the three research questions and got a better understanding of each state’s strategies for survival. The conclusions are laid out in this section following the sequence of the three images of analysis grounded on the descriptive criteria of offensive realism, and the author then works to establish connection and coherence in implications that are based on the prescriptive criteria of offensive realism.
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5.1.1 Donald Trump and the U.S.-China Relations
Through analyzing President Trump’s rhetoric, policy-choices, and negotiation strategy, the author provides the personal context for the answer to the first research question: How
has President Trump’s perception of American power and position in the international system gave rise to his “America First” foreign policy and how will this policy affect the U.S.-China relationship? The author concluded that laying out the specific goals and formulating
coherent “strategies for survival” for the U.S. to pursue in the competition for power gave rise to the President’s foreign policy.According to Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, the optimal “strategy for survival” is for the great powers to maximize their share of world power, and their first task is to lay out the approaches to pursue the goal in the competition for power—specifically, great powers strive to become the hegemon in their respective regions of the world. A general direction for the great powers to follow is to first aim to become wealthy—in fact, much wealthier than their rivals, because military power has an economic foundation. Second, great powers aspire to build the mightiest land forces. Third, in modern times, great powers also seek to achieve nuclear superiority. While studies based on offensive realism focus on these competitions between the major state actors, the author argued that the individuals navigating the policies of these states are also key players that deserve scrutinizing.
The author found that during the past two years of President Trump’s administration, language appeared to become action. No matter how exaggerated his statements appear, the President himself can make an about-face decision and excuse himself by saying, “No deal is better than a bad deal.” In the Trump-style deal-making strategy, “good deals” that can help the U.S. “maximizing their share of world power” are the goal of their negotiation tasks, and
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“walk away” is an auxiliary negotiating tactic for the achievement of the goal. The inflated rhetoric “No deal is better than a bad deal” represents the guide-line of negotiation employed by the Trump administration and the “strategies for survival,” by which America maintains its dominant share of world power.
More than two years after his inauguration, U.S. President Donald Trump continues to be regarded as an unconventional President. His rhetoric, policy, and actions still invoke debates and oppositions. Western media coverage has long been notorious for their emotive, negative, and sensationalist reporting which often harbors a deep prejudice against certain political figures, especially unconventional figures who are different from the traditional government elites. In order to properly understand President Trump and his policies, scholars and policy-makers should not be over-reliant on media reports. Nonetheless, as an experienced strategist and negotiator, President Trump does have the ability to hide his intentions and manipulate his opponents through hyperbolic messages.
Trump’s business background has strong effects on his vision of American politics. As an entrepreneur, Trump always takes profit and loss into consideration rather than base take and give on political correct as a conventional politician. The author found that President Trump’s belief in reciprocal relations, fair trade, and benign competitions are rather common in western business culture. In this sense, he is not in a category himself. The quality between western-styled businessmen and that of eastern-styled businessmen can be quite different. In fact, the misconception of Trump’s western-style quality once misled Chinese politicians into chaos and difficulties in making decisions.
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Long-term Trends of America’s China Policy
In the 1970s and 1980s America’s China policy was based on an asymmetrical relationship between a strong America and a weak China, particularly on the idea that the U.S.
is able to influence Chinese Communist regime to ultimately accept the western concepts of democracy and capitalism. This was an era in which the U.S. believed in the inevitable success of American-led democracy, but history has proven these predictions have been deflected. China has risen in both economy and military, and has created a hybrid style of economy known as State Capitalism, which does not bring democracy and liberty but threat to the global community. Trump’s hardline attitude towards China should be explained as a reflection of viewpoints of the American public and strategic community rather than his own innovation that comes out from vacuum. Actually, the consensus on the need to contain China started to emerge as early as the administrations of President George W. Bush and President Obama. Therefore, President Trump’s tough stance on China will last.
However, a fruitful outcome of negotiation is possible between President Trump and President Xi, and Beijing and Washington can still cooperate in the short term. China will learn lessons from their trade conflicts, but it will speed up its pace to catch up America in omnibearing development, to stabilize its role in international politics, and to secure its position as a regional hegemony in Asia. As Richard Nixon wrote in his memoir that though in age, he was younger than Mao, his political life (presidency) was much shorter the dictator.
The problem of “political life” does concern many people, supporting or protesting, friends or enemies, domestic or abroad, who all seem try to wait out President Trump. Indeed, politicians always take the problem into their political calculation. However, his legacy may last much longer.
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5.1.2 The Impacts of Trump’s Policies on U.S.-China Economic Relations
The author provides the U.S. domestic economic and military context for the answer to the second research question: What is President Trump’s perception of the U.S.-China trade
and economic relationship and what is his strategy to maintain American economic superiority against China? The author concluded that President Donald Trump’s promise to
“Make America Great Again” is not so much grounded on “the notion that the U.S. is in decline” and that the President is going execute a “quick-fix” operation to revitalize the “crippled” country as is grounded on the accusation that “China had been taking advantages of the United States on trade for many years” and that he knew how to stop it.
The China’s economy has already allowed Beijing to challenge American influence around the world. What is more alarming, China’s economy will continue ascending and is predicted to become bigger than that of the United States by 2027. By that time, Beijing’s influence will expand, and fear of the Asia-Pacific region becoming China’s backyard will be even more likely to come true. According to Mearsheimer, while great power goes about maximizing their share of world power, an economic foundation is essential for American military power. Great powers also aim to be wealthier than their rivals which lays a firm foundation for their military power.
Both the HSBC, in March, 2019 and the International Monetary Fund in July, 2018 predicted that China could become the world’s largest economy by 2030. Their projections suggest China’s GDP will grow up from US$14.1 trillion today to the level of US$26 trillion by 2030; meanwhile, the U.S. will see its GDP rise more slowly from US$20.4 trillion to US$25.2 trillion. Over the next decade, the Chinese will remain the single biggest contributor
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to global growth. If China become the world’s biggest economy by 2030 and remain the single biggest contributor to global growth over the next decade, it is advisable to predict that all nations around the world will deem China to be the economic hegemony on the planet.
Offensive realists argue that economic growth must come before military expenditure. If America wants both to constrain China to become a military great power that ensues as a result of it becoming an economic behemoth, the U.S. has to change its strategic thinking about China and more actively advance its national interests. Currently, Washington’s main option for containing the threat China poses to its national interests is to impose restrictions on the country’s trade and investment activities. However, as the resulting trade dispute has demonstrated, neither side is willing to back down. China is trying to defuse the tension with the United States, but it will not concede on its core economic policies, including those supporting its tech sector. Although President Donald Trump claimed that the U.S. is not about to be overtaken, China will not cave in to the United States on its Made in China 2025 program or on its crucial industrial and tech policies. Beijing will stand firm no matter what Washington threatens. The current trade dispute is just the first round of an economic fight.
The underlying competition between them will last years, decades and even will persist far beyond the current presidential administration in Washington.
U.S. leaders believed that bringing China into the WTO would create jobs and increase exports for America. Admitting China to the organization unlocked its enormous market of more than 1.25 billion people. Though the move did encourage Beijing to liberalize its economy which pay off for the U.S. economy, upon joining the WTO, China gained cheap access to global markets, which quickly became a strategic concern for other countries. When the U.S. took note of China’s precipitous economic rise, a collision between the United States
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and China becomes inevitable from the moment. It proved to be Washington’s biggest strategic blunder in the past 30 years.
Throughout history, China has often been the dominant economic and military power in the Asia-Pacific arena. Even before it began its joined the WTO, the country contributed about five percent of the global economy. Membership in the WTO may have expedited the PRC’s climb to become the world’s largest economic power. It is advisable to reason that its enormous market of more than 1.25 billion people soon or later will get the country back to the position of the world’s largest economic power and eventually return to the position of dominance with or without Membership in the WTO.
On December 18, 2018, President Xi Jinping addressed his nation to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Chinese “reform and opening up,” focused on how the Communist Party of China guided the nation to its current success and emphasized the country’s right to pursue its own path going forward. He said, “No one is in a position to dictate to the Chinese people what should or should not be done.” After all, in the mind of Chinese leader, “the desire to preserve Communist Party rule is the overarching factor that shapes every aspect of national policy, foreign as well as domestic.”
As Nixon writes in his Memoir, “As I look back on that week in China…, confirming my belief that we must cultivate China during the next few decades while it is still learning to develop its national strength and potential. Otherwise we will one day be confronted with the most formidable enemy that has ever existed in the history of the world.” Obviously America has failed to “cultivate China during the next few decades while it is still learning to develop its national strength and potential,” While U.S. President Trump’s anticipation for China to
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make “a structural change” may come to nothing, the U.S. has been confronted with the most formidable enemy that has ever existed in the history of the world.”
Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? According to the theory of offensive realism, economic competition precedes military competition, then hegemonic war comes. If the U.S. may not defend its position of economic supremacy, the fear of losing military hegemony surely will read to trade war first, then physical war. America and China cannot escape Thucydides’s Trap.
5.1.3 The Impacts of Trump’s Policies on U.S.-China Military Relations
Under the guidepost of “America First” foreign policy and “Make America Great Again,”
the pendulum of U.S. strategies has been swinging further toward the far side of nationalism.
Contracted to former President Obama’s strategy that focused on engagement and cooperation with China, the President Trump’s team concentrates oppositely on identifying the mounting threats posed by China and pledged that the United States would push back against them.
While reflecting on problems faced by Americans today highlights, many experts have pointed out that one of the reasons that the U.S. has been relaxed about China’s rise after the Cold War was the deeply ingrained belief that globalization was spreading Western values.
What’s worse, some Americans even became so complacent that they thought globalization and Americanization were virtually synonymous. The belief that globalization was spreading Western values began to gain support at the era of President Clinton and culminated at the era of President Bush. In fact, their administrations’ promotion of “Engagement and Enlargement”
as American national strategy stretched straight into the era of President Obama.
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The term “engagement” is admirably intended to convey an embrace of internationalism and rejection of isolationism. And term “enlargement” the administrations means expanding the community of democratic states. Retrospective studies have found “Engagement and Enlargement” provides little practical guidance for foreign-policy decision making let alone military strategy. While Chinese has been ascending in economic success, it is unwilling to make changes to democratize its political system. On the contrary, China is seen to compete effectively across the political, economic, military and informational domains in ways probably not duplicated by other competitors, that is, China becomes a strategic competitor of the U.S.
According to the theory of offensive realism, economic growth must come before military expenditure. As above mentioned, President Donald Trump claims that “the U.S. is not about to be overtaken” by China under his “Make America Great Again” policy; however, the U.S.’s response could not prevent China’s economic ascendancy because China’s military strategy is more like in a “Go” game. China will “gnaw as silkworms do and swallow as a whale does” without its opponent’s knowledge until the “loser” loses overall. Observing current Chinese counter measure to President Donald Trump’s deal-making strategy, we can decide that China would not truly cave in to the U.S. on its Made in China 2025 or on crucial industrial and tech policies. President Trump’s trade strategy will only help galvanize CCP regime into action to build up its military muscle with a more rapid pace. The competition for hegemony, regional and global, will be intensified in the decades to come. The synchronized growth of Chinese economic power and its military strength can be anticipated.
America has failed to prevent China’s economic ascendance and military expansion during the past four decades, how can its strategies to reduces China’s global economic clout
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today when China’s technological capabilities have increased significantly? When Chinese technology developed further, and enough to match its economic strength, China would inevitably become formidable foe for the U.S. When the gap is narrowing at a rate, the U.S.
has to face the inevitable and keep the edge in as many commercial and military technologies as possible before it is too late. America and China cannot escape Thucydides’s Trap.