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Trump’s Strategy to Counter China’s Economic Threats

Chapter 3: Trump and the U.S.-China Economy Relations

3.3 Trump’s Strategy to Counter China’s Economic Threats

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and reveals the intentions to push America out of the Asia-pacific chessboard, America will inevitably take countermeasures to defend its status quo position as a regional hegemon and global leader. The author therefore turns to look at U.S. President Trump’s strategy to balance against China.

3.3 Trump’s Strategy to Counter China’s Economic Threats

In the previous section, the author reviewed President Xi Jinping’s economic strategy and the three major ways that China harms American economic and national security. Various examples also prove how Chinese expansionist intentions and authoritarian political structure are threatening regional and even global stability. President Trump has accused China of

“economic aggression” and considered it to be the biggest long-term challenge to the U.S.48 President Trump has addressed these challenges by imposing tariffs on China, which has led the U.S. and China into a trade war.

When the newly elected U.S. President Trump first invited Chinese President Xi Jinping to his Mar-a-Lago home in 2017 and shook hands on an initial “100-Day Action Plan,” the relationship between their two administrations seemed to have started off on a friendly basis and it is difficult to imagine that a full-blown trade war would soon erupt. To better understand the on-going U.S.-China trade war, the author drew a timeline to examine how the disputes unfolded and escalated (Appendix).49

48 Demetri Sevastopulo and Shawn Donnan, “Trump to Accuse China of ‘Economic Aggression,’” Financial Times, December 16, 2017, accessed on October 17, 2018,

https://www.ft.com/content/1801d4f4-e201-11e7-8f9f-de1c2175f5ce.

49 Dorcas Wong and Alexander Chipman Koty, “The US-China Trade War; A Timeline,” China Briefing News, August 31, 2018, accessed November 29, 2018,

http://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/.

From how he brought China to the negotiation table and from his strategies to defend American interests against China, President Trump fully exhibited the deal-making skills he described in the Art of the Deal. For example, Trump keeps his true intentions obscured from his rivals so as to “maximize his option.” He has largely maintained an amicable personal relationship with the Chinese leader, and even praised the authoritarian state by said that “I don’t blame China for taking advantage of us. I blame our leaders and representatives for allowing this travesty to happen.”50 He explained that “who can blame a country for being able to take advantage of another country to the benefit of its citizens?”

Trump makes use his leverages, and even create them. He believed that “Just as you can create leverage…through promotion and psychology” and that “The best thing you can do is deal from strength, and leverage is the biggest strength you can have. Leverage is having something the other guy wants. Or better yet, need. Or best of all, simply can’t do without.”51 Most importantly, he wrote, is that “you should never do is pay too much, even if that means walking away from a very good site. Which is all a more sophisticated way of looking at location.”52 The U.S. has, more than once, cancelled a scheduled meeting with Chinese delegates; this often happens when China refuses to make concessions, attempts to buy time, or backtracks on commitments.

There are times when Trump is explicit about his dissatisfactions with the outcome of a negotiation, often through official announcements, the mass media, or, the unconventionally, the social media. He makes sure that he can “get the words out” by keeping his rhetoric full

50 See “Don’t Blame China for Taking Our Advantage, Blame Our Leaders: Donald Trump,” Zeenews, February 6, 2019,

https://zeenews.india.com/world/dont-blame-china-for-taking-our-advantage-blame-our-leaders-donald-trump-2 177653.html; also see Ali Vitali, “Trump, Once Critical from Afar, Gives China a Pass in Trade War,” NBC News, November 9, 2017,

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-says-he-doesn-t-blame-china-taking-advantage-u-n819221.

51 Donald J. Trump and Tony Schwartz, Trump: The Art of the Deal (New York: Ballantine Books), 45-63.

52 Ibid.

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of fire and fury.” As he once wrote, “The point is that if you are a little different, or a little outrageous, or if you do things that are bold or controversial, the press is going to write about you. I’ve always done things a little differently, I don’t mind controversy, and my deals tend to be somewhat ambitious.”53 What many have believed to be Trump’s unstable characteristics is in fact his key strategy to confound his rivals.

3.4 Chapter Summary

The U.S.-China relationship has undergone periods of amity and hostility under different state leaders, governments, and varying domestic and international political contexts. When the U.S. and the PRC edged toward rapprochement in the 1970s, the American leaders gave little thoughts to the “China threat.” The PRC, back at the time, was in a state of turmoil, having barely survived the devastation of Cultural Revolution at home. America was also busy dealing with a more powerful enemy, and considered China to be a potential ally which can balance against the USSR.

However, under the CCP’s authoritarian governance, China’s economic and technological advancement was fast and furious. Today, as the world’s second largest economy, China is truly capable of threatening the American hegemony. While the author identified three majors ways in which the Chinese latent economic power challenges the U.S., the greatest concern for President Trump should be China’s actual military capabilities.

Whether China has the military power and expansionist intentions will be the focus of the next chapter.

53 Donald J. Trump and Tony Schwartz, Trump: The Art of the Deal (New York: Ballantine Books), 45-63.

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