川普的中國外交政策：攻勢現實主義觀點 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學國際事務學院外交學系 Department of Diplomacy College of International Affairs National Chengchi University. 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 川普的中國外交政策：政治. 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 攻勢現實主義觀點. sit. y. Nat. Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Towards China: n. er. io. The Offensive Realist Perspective al iv n Ch engchi U Student: Shao-Kang Chen Advisor: Yeh-Chung Lu, Ph.D.. 中華民國 108 年 7 月 July 2019 DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(2) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(3) 謝辭 2016 年我有幸獲得「蕭萬長國際交流計畫獎學金」，讓我到美國卡內基國際和平基金會(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)實習。實習期間正值美國總統大選，使我有機會近距離觀察美國社會對共和黨候選人川普的觀感。這個獨特的經驗促使我將川普政府及其外交政策作為碩士論文的研究主題。這篇論文能完成首先要感謝的是我的指導教授盧業中博士。在漫長的研究過程中，老師都給予我最大的耐心與包容，支持我挑戰用英文撰寫的決定並幫助我突破種種瓶頸。回想和老師討論大綱、修正方向、直到通過論文口試，心中不勝感激，更慶幸自己當時找盧老師做指導教授。. 立. 政治大. 在研究所求學生涯中，家人一直是我最大的依靠和慰藉。我最要感謝我父親和母親. ‧ 國. 學. 的關愛、叮嚀與支持，我的所學、所成皆因他們而得以實現。非常感謝我的大哥大嫂，. ‧. 讓我即使離開家鄉也能擁有家人的陪伴；同時也謝謝姊姊越洋而來的電話，帶給我歡笑. sit. y. Nat. 和溫暖。最後，謝謝易樺和我同甘共苦，一起走過研究生最平淡枯燥的日子。. n. al. er. io. 在政大外交所的這幾年我有幸受教於許多國內頂尖的師長。在此感謝我的口試委員. i Un. v. 張登及博士和李明博士。我亦要感謝系上的教授們—陳純一老師、黃奎博老師、鄧中堅. Ch. engchi. 老師、張文揚老師、楊文琪老師在課堂上的教導。我也有幸結識許多志同道合的同學和朋友—雅惠、蔚琳、硯如、政樺、希鍾、Benjamin、Erik—謝謝他們送給我這段珍貴的回憶。最後，我期許自己能運用在政大積累的知識為國家與社會做貢獻。. i. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(4) 摘要本篇論文旨在探討美國總統唐納・川普的「美國優先」外交政策對中美關係的影響。為了深入了解川普總統對中美關係的認知與兩大強權間發生經濟或軍事衝突的潛在危險，研究者以攻勢現實主義與肯尼思・華爾茲的三個「層次分析法」做為論述的基礎。川普政府視中國為美國國家利益最大的威脅，而川普總統的政策目標是扭轉過去兩國在爭奪全球領導地位的長期競賽中有利於中國卻損害美國利益的雙邊關係。為了跳脫這種互動框架，川普政府採行「美國優先」策略，表明在中國改變其長久以來在諸多經貿與安全議題上不公平的行為前，美國意圖採取對抗性的立場。川普政府為達成目標而. 政治大. 採用的談判策略凸顯其對美中衝突較高的容忍性以及反制中方不當行徑的意願。. 立. 本篇論文的結論為川普政府有意透過「美國優先」策略削弱中國的經濟發展、遏止. ‧ 國. 學. 其強化軍事實力、並超越美國在印太區域的影響力。然而，依據攻勢現實主義的邏輯，. ‧. 這些預防性的措施可能仍難以阻止中共發展成一個真正足以威脅美國霸權地位的強權. sit. y. Nat. 國家。即便川普總統採取合乎現實主義的外交策略且試圖擴大與中國的相對權力，也僅. n. al. er. io. 能推遲中美戰爭爆發的時間點。事實上，當領導人特質等重要的非結構層次因素也符合. i Un. v. 攻勢現實主義的法則時，大國政治可能更難以跳脫「修昔底德斯陷阱」。. Ch. engchi. 關鍵字：川普、美國外交、「美國優先」政策、美中關係、攻勢現實主義. ii. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(5) Abstract This thesis aims to scrutinize the impacts of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy on the U.S.-China relations. To better understand how President Trump views the current U.S.-China relationship and the potential dangers of economic or military confrontations between the two great powers, the author employs the theory of offensive realism and Kenneth Waltz’s three “levels-of-analysis” as the basis of reasoning. The Trump administration has identified China as the greatest threat to U.S. national security, and President Trump’s policy aims to reverse the past trajectory of a bilateral. 政治大. relation that favored China and disadvantaged the United States in their long-run competition. 立. for global leadership. To break loose from that trajectory, the Trump administration has. ‧ 國. 學. adopted the “America first” approach which marks the United States’ intention to take a. ‧. confrontational stance until Beijing changes its long-standing unfair practices on a wide. sit. y. Nat. range of economic and security issues. The Trump administration’s negotiation strategy for. io. al. n. willingness to push back on Chinese misbehaviors.. Ch. engchi. er. achieving its objectives highlights their greater tolerance for friction with China and their. i Un. v. This paper concludes that through the “America first” strategy, the Trump administration seeks to diminish the Chinese economic development, undermine its military advancements, and prevent it from overwhelming American influences in the Indo-Pacific region. However, according to the logic of offensive realism, these precautionary measures may still fail to prevent the PRC from evolving into a veritable great power that threatens the American hegemony. Even as President Trump adopts a realist stratagem and seeks to increase the relative power against China, he can only delay the detonation point of a U.S.-China war. In fact, when non-structural factors like state leaders’ characteristics. iii. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(6) conforms to the tenets of offensive realism, it will be even more difficult for great powers politics to escape the “Thucydides’s Trap.”. Keywords: Trump, American foreign policy, “America First” policy, U.S.-China relations, offensive realism. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. iv. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(7) TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................... 1 1.1 Background and Motivation ............................................................................................ 1 1.2 Research Questions .......................................................................................................... 8 1.3 Literature Review and Offensive Realism ..................................................................... 11 1.4 Research Methodology .................................................................................................. 22 1.5 Research Limitations ..................................................................................................... 25 1.6 Chapter Arrangements ................................................................................................... 26. Chapter 2: Trump’s Perception of the American National Capability ...... 29 2.1 Trump’s Discourse and the “America First” Foreign Policy ......................................... 31. 政治大 2.3 Trump’s Discourse on U.S. Military Capability ............................................................ 47 立 2.4 Chapter Summary .......................................................................................................... 55 2.2 Trump’s Discourse on U.S. Economic Capability ......................................................... 36. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter 3: Trump and the U.S.-China Economy Relations ........................ 57 3.1 Impacts of the PRC’s Economic Rise on American Unipolarity ................................... 60. ‧. 3.2 The U.S. Perception of Xi Jinping’s Economic Policy.................................................. 66. y. Nat. 3.3 Trump’s Strategy to Counter China’s Economic Threats .............................................. 76. sit. 3.4 Chapter Summary .......................................................................................................... 78. er. io. Chapter 4: Trump and the U.S.-China Military Relations .......................... 79. al. n. iv n C U Great Again” ..................93 4.2 The U.S. Military Strategy Underh Trump’s e n g“Make c h i America 4.1 The PRC’s Military Strategy under Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” ............................. 80 4.3 Thucydides’s Trap: Is an Inescapable War Approaching? .......................................... 103 4.4 Impacts of U.S.-China Contentions ............................................................................. 110 4.5 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................ 116. Chapter 5: Conclusion ................................................................................... 117 5.1 Research Findings ........................................................................................................ 117 5.2 Implications for Future Studies.................................................................................... 126 5.3 Closing Remarks .......................................................................................................... 129. Bibliography ................................................................................................... 131 Appendix: Timeline of the U.S.-China Trade War (2017-2019)................ 161. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(8) LIST OF FIGURES. Figure 2.1. United States GDP from 2009 to 2017. ................................................................ 38 Figure 2.2. United States Annual GDP Growth Rate from 2009 to 2018............................... 39 Figure 2.3. Quarterly Growth of the Real GDP in the United States from 2011 to 2018 ....... 41 Figure 2.4. United States Unemployment Rate from 2008 to 2018........................................ 43 Figure 2.5. Dow Jones Industrial Average from 2009 to 2018 ............................................... 44 Figure 2.6. United States Crude Oil Production ..................................................................... 45. 政治大. Figure 2.7. United States Steel Production ............................................................................. 46. 立. Figure 2.8. United States Military Spending from 2000 to 2017............................................ 49. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 4.1. American Attitude Toward China ...................................................................... 111. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. vi. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(9) LIST OF ACRONYMS Acronym. Full Name. ACA. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. AEI. American Enterprise institute. AIA. America Invents Act. AIIB. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. ARRA. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. BCA. Budget Control Act. BCT. Brigade combat team. BEA. Bureau of Economic Analysis. BIS. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security. BLS. Bureau of Labor Statistics. BRI/OBOR. Belt and Road Initiative/One Belt One Road. CCP/CPC. Chinese Communist Party/Communist Party of China. 學 ‧. ‧ 國. 立. 政治大. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. CDB. China Development Bank. CPTPP. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. DJIA. Dow Jones Industrial Average. DoD. Department of Defense. EXIM. Export Import Bank of China. FCC. Federal Communications Commission. GDP. Gross domestic product. GNP. Gross national product vii. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(10) MRC. major regional contingency. NAFTA. North American Free Trade Agreement. NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NDAA. National Defense Authorization Act. NSS. National Security Strategy. OCO. Overseas Contingency Operation. OPEC. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. PRC. People’s Republic of China. TPP. Trans-Pacific Partnership. UNESCO. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. UNHRC. United Nations Human Rights Council. US. United States. USA. United States of America. USAF. United States Air Force. USCG. United States Coast Guard. USMC. United States Marine Corps. USMCA. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. USN. United States Navy. USTR. United States Trade Representative. WMD. weapons of mass destruction. WSA. World Steel Association. WTO. World Trade Organization. 學 ‧. ‧ 國. 立. 政治大. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. viii. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(11) Chapter 1: Introduction. 1.1 Background and Motivation On January 20, 2017, Donald John Trump was inaugurated as the 45th President of the United States of America. The concerns about President Trump’s lack of political and military experiences invoked quite a lot of debates around the world. For example, Zachary Crockett argued in his article that “Donald Trump is the only President ever with no political or military experience.”1 The British Academy also held a penal discussion titled “Trump:. 政治大 How to Understand an Unconventional President,” claiming that “From governing by Twitter 立 ‧ 國. 學. to making unguarded comments about other world leaders, Trump’s campaign and presidency have established him as one of the most unconventional presidents in modern. ‧. history.”2. y. Nat. io. sit. During the past years, like or dislike, optimistic or pessimistic, supporting or opposing,. n. al. er. experts and media in the field of international politics have been scrambling to answer. Ch. i Un. v. questions as follows. What is the unconventional president’s worldview and how does the. engchi. world view the new president? How would the unconventional president wield his political power? What impacts would his behaviors bring for the international community? Would he keep the commitments made by his predecessors toward allied nations? Can he stand strong enough to ward off rival powers of the U.S. in the world arena? What role would the U.S. play in the anarchic and even chaotic world in the future? 1. Zachary Crockett, “Donald Trump is the only President ever with no political or military experience,” Vox Media, January 23, 2017, accessed June 5, 2017, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/11/13587532/donald-trump-no-experience. 2 Emma Long, Scott Lucas, and Stephen Reicher, “Trump: How to Understand an Unconventional President,” The British Academy, February 21, 2018, accessed August 27, 2018, http://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/events/trump-how-understand-unconventional-president. 1. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(12) However, even when so many experts and media have been working ardently and being so ready to express their ideas, few answers or debates from them seemed to have satisfied the curious minds about President Trump around the world. The author designed this project in search of a better understanding of how the unconventional American President would deal with all of those issues. Motivated by President Trump’s speech in Riyadh where he said, “We are adopting a Principled Realism, rooted in common values and shared interests,”3 the author set forth the analysis through the lens of offensive realism. The author found that offensive realism could best represent President Trump’s perception, rhetoric, and policy. 政治大. choices. For instance, his catchphrases such as “Make America Great Again” and “America. 立. First” foreign policy wedge quite well into the theoretical assumptions of offensive realism. ‧ 國. 學. that states “always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their. ‧. interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international. sit. y. Nat. community.”4 President Trump’s trade war with the PRC, his proposal of “a historic increase. n. al. er. io. of defense budget,” and his rhetoric that “Nobody is going to mess with us. Nobody. It. i Un. v. (budget) will be one of the greatest military build-ups in American history” are in accordance. Ch. engchi. with offensive realist concepts of “state survival” and “the pursuit of power maximization.” The author began with the examination of President Trump’s worldview and his understanding of U.S. current position which drive the mission of his administration. In a speech given at the Center for the National Interest on April 27, 2016, Donald Trump, then the presumptive Republican nominee for the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, asserted that “After the Cold War, our foreign policy has veered badly off course” and it has “no vision, no 3. U.S., The White House, President Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit, May 21, 2017, accessed December 17, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit/. 4 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 33. 2. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(13) purpose, no direction, no strategy.”5 Trump sees the present-day America as a “crippled” superpower that is struggling to uphold its position as world leader, but is overburdened with and weakened by unfitting foreign policies.6 President Trump considers the previous Obama administration’s “pragmatic internationalist” foreign policy, which embraced “partnerships, institutions, and diplomatic engagement,” as a major reason to America’s decline in power and reputation.7 Specifically, he identified five major weaknesses in Obama’s foreign policy as follows:. 治政 implementing policies, and its military strength further 大weakened. 立 2) The U.S. allies are not paying their fair shares to defend their own security.. 1) The U.S. resources are overextended, its economic potential crippled through. ‧ 國. 學. 3) America’s friends are beginning to think it less dependable. 4) The U.S. is no longer respected by its rivals.. ‧. 5) America no longer has a clear understanding of its foreign policy goals.. y. Nat. io. sit. Trump’s perceptions of the status quo are in line with offensive realists’ interpretation of. n. al. er. the ascend and descent of American hegemony which emphasizes the pursuit of self-interests. Ch. i Un. v. and “balance-of-power.” Looking back on history, the U.S. weathered through difficult times. engchi. and achieved the position of global supremacy by focusing on increasing its own national capabilities. American political leaders first balanced against European colonialists to gain dominance in the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. Once the U.S. attained the position of regional hegemon, it became “free to roam around the globe and interfere in other regions of the world.”8 But even as a hegemon, its primary concern remains to be preserving 5. Donald J. Trump, “Trump on Foreign Policy,” The National Interest, April 27, 2016, accessed on December 27, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/trump-foreign-policy-15960. 6 Donald J. Trump, Great Again: How to Fix Our Crippled America (New York: Threshold Editions). 7 John G. Ikenberry, “Obama’s Pragmatic Internationalism,” The American Interest, April 8, 2014, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/04/08/obamas-pragmatic-internationalism/. 8 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 365. 3. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(14) its edge in relative power by containing the other revisionist states that also seek dominance in their vicinity. If rising powers are left unchecked, they could grow strong enough to encroach upon America’s sphere of influence. The U.S. had thus spent much of the twentieth century balancing against four major powers—Wilhelmine Germany, imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union.9 During these periods, the American foreign policy had a clear-cut goal which is to increase its own power and undermine that of its enemies. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended the Cold War and also led to the culmination of U.S. power as it became the leader of the “unipolar” international system. Yet. 政治大. the triumph over their enemy deprived America of the eminent threat to state survival, and. 立. the U.S. leaders had, as President Trump put it, “lost sight of their core interests.”10 Unable. ‧ 國. 學. to determine who or what the enemies are in this seemingly peaceful post-war interlude, the. ‧. U.S. policymakers became lax in checking and balancing against the rise of potential. sit. y. Nat. adversaries. The U.S. foreign policy which was long guided by realist principals become. n. al. er. io. “misguided” by internationalist belief that perpetual peace could be achieved through. i Un. v. diplomatic engagement, economic cooperation, and multilateral institutions.. Ch. engchi. The belief that the realist explanation of international politics has become obsolete was shattered by the September 11 terror attacks (9/11 attacks) on the U.S. in 2001. However, as President George W. Bush searched for the perpetrators in the Middle East, America’s attention was further diverted away from guarding against the rise of potential great powers and seemed to turn a blind eye to the fact that its old-time rivals like the PRC has been accumulating strength and capability to challenge its hegemonic position in Asia. In fact,. 9. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 367. Donald J. Trump, “Trump on Foreign Policy,” The National Interest, April 27, 2016, accessed December 27, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/trump-foreign-policy-15960. 10. 4. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(15) after the 9/11 terror attacks, America changed its China policy from “Congagement” to “Engagement.”11 This internationalist strategy has largely dominated the U.S. approach to great power politics until President Trump came along. With the commitment to amend what he alleged as the “misguided” post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy, President Trump came to office with the promise to “Make America Great Again” through a new set of foreign policy that puts “America first” again.12 By prioritizing American national interests over internationalist agenda, Trump claimed that the U.S. will be able to maintain maximum flexibility in defining and carrying out new strategies instead of. 政治大. being shackled by the outdated commitments made to allied states. In order to formulate a. 立. clear-cut and relevant foreign policy, President Trump designated three groups of challengers. ‧ 國. 學. that threatens the U.S.: the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran. ‧. and North Korea, and transnational terrorist organizations.13 Trump accentuated the need to. sit. y. Nat. deal with these menaces and attain “peace through strength.”14 Besides, he pronounced that. n. al. er. io. he would advance American interests through “sharp bargaining and deal making skills” and. i Un. v. would not resort to military solutions unless no other alternatives were available.15 In this. Ch. engchi. sense, the foreign policy of Trump administration will once again be based on what Trump described as “principled realism.”16. 11. Yeong-Kuang Ger, “From Congagement to Engagement: The Changing American China Policy and Its Impact on Regional Security,” American Journal of Chinese Studies, vol. 11, No. 2, October 2004, 159-180. 12 Joseph V. Micallef, “Trumpism, Globalism and US Foreign Policy,” Huffpost, May1, 2016, accessed August 28, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-v-micallef/trumpism-globalism-and-us_b_9817174.html. 13 U.S., The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, accessed December 20, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 14 Peter Navarro, “The Trump Doctrine: Peace Through Strength,” The National Interest, March 31, 2016, accessed on April 5, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-trump-doctrine-peace-through-strength-15631. 15 Joseph V. Micallef, “Trumpism, Globalism and US Foreign Policy,” Huffpost, May 1, 2016, accessed August 28, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-v-micallef/trumpism-globalism-and-us_b_9817174.html. 16 Anne Gearan and Steven Mufson, “Trump Sets Out National Security Strategy of ‘Principled Realism’ and Global Competition,” The Washington Post, December 18, 2017, accessed December 20, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-sets-out-national-security-strategy-of-principled-realism-and-gl 5. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(16) Since President Trump’s worldview is in line with the theory of offensive realism, he is likely to find the rise of China “the most important geopolitical development of the twenty-first century.”17 The so-called “Rise of China” began with its former leader Deng Xiaoping’s “economic reform and opening-up” policy which led to the explosive economic growth and military build-up over the past forty years. Offensive realists have predicted that if its economic power continue to grow, China will “fundamentally alter the architecture of the international system” which the world has come to know since the end of the Cold War. Today, the PRC seems to be more and more assertive on the international stage under. 政治大. President Xi Jinping who is actively proclaiming Chinese national interests and projecting. 立. economic and military influences abroad as a leading great power. For instance, President Xi. ‧ 國. 學. claimed that “the Chinese people are now confident in providing a “Chinese Solution” to. ‧. mankind’s exploration of better social systems” on the 95th anniversary of the founding of. sit. y. Nat. the Communist Party of China (CPC) on July 1, 2016.18 Similarly, he told the assembly at. n. al. er. io. the 2017 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, that China should “guide economic. i Un. v. globalization.”19 However, Chinese economic development and military assertiveness from. Ch. engchi. President Trump’s rhetoric and policy towards China, it appears that he considers to be major threats to the American hegemony. As political consultant Alex Castellanos put it, “Trump is the first President that takes the China Threat seriously.”20 obal-competition/2017/12/18/7edcb0be-e412-11e7-ab50-621fe0588340_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=. 628d4e488efe. 17 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 361. 18 “95 Years on, ‘Never Forget the Past,’” Shanghai Daily, July 2, 2016, https://archive.shine.cn/nation/95-years-on-Never-forget-the-past/shdaily.shtml. 19 “Full Text of Xi Jinping Keynote at the World Economic Forum,” CGTN America, January 17, 2017, accessed March 30, 2017, https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum. 20 Tim Hains, “Castellanos: Trump is the First President to Take the China Threat Seriously,” Real Clear Politics, May 26, 2019, accessed June 1, 2019, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/05/26/castellanos_trump_is_the_first_president_to_take_the_chin a_threat_seriously.html?spot_im_scroll_to_comments=true. 6. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(17) From the perspective of offensive realism, President Trump’s commitment to “Make America Great Again” bears striking resemblance to President Xi’s call for a “Chinese solution.” Both leaders are apparently dissatisfied with their status quo position and the power distribution in the international system. As China accumulates strength, it threatens to stymie America’s power projection and ability to exert influence on the global scale. Out of the fear of China’s underlying revisionist or even expansionist intentions, the U.S. will instinctively enhance its own response capabilities. Realists have warned that should the two great powers become caught in “spirals of fear” lose control between, war is most likely to ensue.21. 立. 政治大. Today, America and China are looking to almost opposite worldviews. The U.S. seems to. ‧ 國. 學. retreat from global responsibilities—either out of reluctance or inability to provide public. ‧. goods—while determined to maintain its hegemonic position; the PRC, on the other hand,. sit. y. Nat. appears to be bolstering its image as a generous and ardent leader while seeking to expand its. n. al. er. io. regional and global influences incrementally. Besides, while China is strong and politically. i Un. v. united under the communist party, President Trump sees a relatively divided society with. Ch. engchi. various parties and interest groups championing different beliefs at home and abroad. To understand how the unconventional president and his administration are navigating in this shifting world, the author designed this thesis to scrutinize the Trump administration’s foreign policy towards China through the theoretical lenses of offensive realism. The author explores individual, domestic, and structural level factors that led to America’s fear of the rise of China, President Trump’s corresponding strategy to balance against it, and how his policy can maintain the American hegemony.. 21. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 346. 7. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(18) 1.2 Research Questions When offensive realists employ Kenneth Waltz’s “three levels-of-analysis” to examine state behaviors, great power politics, and the causes of wars, they tend to focus on the structural (systemic) level factors. Offensive realists consider states, particularly the great powers, to be the main actors of international relations. Yet while structural factors are the key components of offensive realist study of U.S.-China relationship, the author found that influential individuals like President Donald Trump plays a vital role in directing the policy. 政治大. choices and behaviors of great powers. In other words, if the leader of the great power. 立. personally takes a given dimension of interests as paramount, it is more likely that the great. ‧ 國. 學. power would take those given interests seriously and adopt policies accordingly vis-à-vis its. ‧. opponent. It is more than the nature or intention of states, but the inclination of the leader,. sit. y. Nat. that shapes what the great power wants.. n. al. er. io. President Trump’s unconventional thinking and course of action led him to propose the. i Un. v. “America First” foreign policy which is vastly different from those of other post-Cold War. Ch. engchi. American leaders. In prioritizing and increasing American national interests, the Trump administration has adopted a hardline and confrontational policy towards China. Although the international system remains unipolar, the nature of the U.S.-China relationship has changed since Trump came to office. Great power disputes, contentions, and wars that arise from these non-structural causes has been the blind spot of past offensive realist studies. In hope of filling in this theoretical gap, the author organized this thesis project around President Trump’s perception, rhetoric, and foreign policy towards China. To elicit the. 8. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(19) driving ideas that influence the missions and policies of President Trump’s administration towards China, the author designed three research questions as follows.. 1) How has President Trump’s perception of American power and position in the international system gave rise to his “America First” foreign policy and how will this policy affect the U.S.-China relationship? This question aims to study President Trump’s perception of the concept of “power.” Specifically, does America have enough power relative to its rivals in President Trump’s eyes?. 政治大. Do President Trump’s rhetoric such as “Make America great again” and his “America First”. 立. foreign policy imply his perception of American power as in decline? Does President Trump. ‧ 國. 學. interpret the relative increase of Chinese capabilities and its intentions as benign or malign?. ‧. When dealing with great power politics, how did Trump gain the impression that “China has. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. been taking advantage of the U.S. for many years”22 and how does he plan to turn the tide?. i Un. v. 2) What is President Trump’s perception of the U.S.-China trade and economic relationship. Ch. engchi. and what is his strategy to maintain American economic superiority against China? President Trump outlined in his book Great Again: How to Fix Our Crippled America the many social, political, economic, and security problems that the U.S., as a country, has been troubled with. However, Trump has place particular emphasis on the economic aspect and condemned previous administrations and their policy-choices for weakening the American economic power which led to America’s declining ability and credibility to lead the 22. “Donald Trump Says ‘Poor’ American Leadership in Past ‘Allowed’ China to Take Advantage of the United States,” Firstpost, April 10, 2018, accessed on April 21, 2018, https://www.firstpost.com/world/donald-trump-says-poor-american-leadership-in-past-allowed-china-to-take-ad vantage-of-united-states-4425477.html. 9. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(20) world. By comparison, the PRC has been making incremental progress to increase its economic strength and influences on the regional and global scale. Theoretically, offensive realists have considered wealth to be a state’s fundamental strength which can be translated into military power. They have also argued that great powers are more concerned with relative power than absolute power; when the relative power between an existing hegemon and a rising power closes, wars are likely to ensue. This question aims to find the connection between offensive realist theory and President Trump’s practice to preserve America’s edge against China’s growing economic clout.. 立. 政治大. 3) How does President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy affect the U.S.-China military. ‧ 國. 學. relations? Can the two great powers avoid Thucydides’s Trap under Trump’s administration?. ‧. Reflecting on offensive realists’ pessimistic belief in an ultimate tragic outcome to great. sit. y. Nat. power politics, the author examines Mearsheimer’s conclusion of an inevitable Sino-U.S. war. n. al. er. io. and evaluates the possibility of such an event occurring during Trump’s Presidency. With. i Un. v. President Trump and President Xi as leaders, have U.S. and China come even closer to the. Ch. engchi. breaking point of a great power war? How does Trump plan to maintain the U.S. hegemony through “peace through strength”? To gain some insight to these debates, the author looked at President Trump’s response to the PRC’s assertive rhetoric, Chinese militarization in the South China Sea, and the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Having evaluated the military capabilities and intentions of both great powers and discussed their leaders’ policies and strategies, it is imperative to ask again: is a war between these two great power inevitable and imminent? If the answer remains as Mearsheimer had predicted, how would the rest of the world react to the tragic scenario? 10. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(21) 1.3 Literature Review and Offensive Realism The academic study of international relations is said to be grounded on the paradigm of realism which has served as the dominant explanation of international political phenomena. Although political scientists have been seeking alternative interpretations of state behaviors and their interactions, most of the existing theories have founded their identities and arguments against that of realism. To adapt to the ebb and flow of the political environment, a number of theories have branched out within the realist paradigm. For example, William. 政治大. Wohlforth identified four generations of modern realists that have emerged since. 立. international relations was established as a distinct field of study in the early twentieth. ‧ 國. 學. century: the inter-World Wars and wartime generation, the early Cold-War generation, a. ‧. détente generation, and the post-Cold War generation.23. sit. y. Nat. Yet, regardless of the evolution of the analytical methods and approach, realist theories. n. al. er. io. converge around four fundamental assumptions concerning the nature of the international. i Un. v. system and the behaviors of the states within.24 First, states are the most important actors in. Ch. engchi. the study of international politics and are treated as the unit of analysis. Second, realists believe that the international system is anarchic in nature, meaning that no central authority or an ultimate arbitrator stands above states that can come to defend their security or interests when a state or a group of states show aggression towards others. Third, states are rational actors that are capable of devising strategies to maximize their chances of “survival,” which 23. William C. Wohlforth, “Realism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press), 131-149. 24 See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton); Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press) and Theory of International Politics (MA: Addison-Wesley); and William Wohlforth, “Realism,” in the Oxford Handbook of International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press). 11. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(22) includes both territorial integrity and domestic political autonomy. Finally, realists defined the concept of “interest” in terms of “power” which they believe can most effectively ensure state survival.25 In the post-Cold War era, “offensive realism,” represented by John J. Mearsheimer and his iconic The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, has emerged as one of the most prominent realist theories. While offensive realism inherits the fundamental assumptions of the realism paradigm, it gives greater emphasis to the accumulation of power. Offensive realists believe that since no states can foresee others’ intentions and has no higher authorities to rely on. 政治大. within the anarchic international system, they must seek to maximize their own power to. 立. ensure state-survival. Mearsheimer further argued that “Great powers are primed for offense.. ‧ 國. 學. But not only does a great power seek to gain power at the expense of other states, it also tries. ‧. to thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense.”26 Built on classical and neorealism,. y. sit. n. al. er. io. follows.. Nat. offensive realists provide a unique worldview based on five additional assumptions as. i Un. v. First, while states are the basic unit of the realist analysis of international relations,. Ch. engchi. offensive realists tend to focus on the “great powers” because they assume that “these states have the largest impact on what happens in international politics.”27 Great powers are determined on the basis of their relative military capability. Specifically, to be recognized as a great power, a state must possess “sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world.”28 And even if the candidate ultimately suffers defeat, “it must have some reasonable prospect of turning the 25. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf),. 5. 26 27 28. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton), 3. Ibid, 5. Ibid, 3. 12. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(23) conflict into a war of attrition that leaves the dominant state seriously weakened.”29 Aside from conventional forces, great powers in the nuclear age must also have “second-strike capability” to withstand a nuclear strike and retaliate against the aggressors. Second, offensive realists hold that the “structural factors” like international anarchy and the distribution of power are responsible for the behaviors of great powers—including their constant fear of one another and the relentless competitions for power. In this respect, it is unlike classical realism which attributed such fear to human nature. Third, offensive realists also assume that great powers are rational actors, which means. 政治大. that they are conscious of the anarchic world in which they inhabit and would meticulously. 立. calculate their chances of survival in it. They would devise strategies to secure their interests. ‧ 國. 學. against others, and also undermine those that compete with them.. ‧. The next two assumptions deal with state “capabilities” and “intentions.” Offensive. sit. y. Nat. realists define “Capabilities” as the offensive military capabilities that great powers. n. al. er. io. inherently possess, which make them a potential threat to others in the system. “Intentions” is. i Un. v. defined as the intangible and ever-changing beliefs, concepts, or ideologies that reside within. Ch. engchi. the minds of state leaders. While capabilities can be easily calculated by counting the tangible military assets that great powers own, intentions are almost impossible to measure. States are almost always uncertain about one another’s intentions, and for this reason states are perpetually fearful of an aggression from a malign counterpart. To gain some insight to a state’s intentions, researchers often have to rely on observing the foreign policy and rhetoric of its leaders.. 29. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton). 13. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(24) These assumptions together shape the offensive realist concept of “power.” Offensive realists asserted that the anarchic nature of the international system and the uncertainty of others’ intentions have led states to fear for their own survival and hence seek to maximize their share of the world’s distribution of power. The great powers, however, not only seek additional increments of power, but also aim to become the most powerful state in the system because “the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon.”30 To achieve hegemony, great powers would attempt to “gain power at the expense of other states” and to “thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense.” When changes in international balance-of-power favor. 政治大. their fellow competitors, great powers would even undermine the balance and redirect the. 立. changes in their own favor. In sum, great powers are prime for offense and their interactions. ‧ 國. 學. are doomed to end tragically in war.. ‧. Offensive realists also find the number of great powers or “poles” within the system to. sit. y. Nat. have significant influence on how international politics works. For example, following the. n. al. er. io. demise of the Soviet Union, the world is seen as “unipolar” under American hegemony. In. i Un. v. recent years, however, the discussions on polarity have begun to change in the wake of. Ch. engchi. China’s economic rise which has led scholars and pundits to debate the transition of the unipolar international system to a bipolar or multipolar world. Mearsheimer, for example, believed that Asia will become an “unbalanced multipolar system” with China being more powerful than other Asian great powers like Russia, Japan, and India.31 He also asserted that the U.S.-China rivalry in Asia will be more war-prone than that of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation because China will have the potential and incentive to become a hegemon. Yet, Mearsheimer has only made a tentatively prediction of the escalation of U.S.-China security 30 31. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton), 3. Ibid, 398-399. 14. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(25) competition, but has offered little insight into the causes and impacts of this transition of polarity. Some scholars like Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth hold that China qualifies as an “emerging potential superpower” that stands out among other Asian great powers, but is not yet strong enough to alter the unipolar international system.32 However, while they believe that the American primacy will endure for a long time to come, the U.S. must make changes to its grand strategy in preparation of balancing against China’s rise. However, not all realist theories share such offensive realist pessimistic view about great. 政治大. power politics. Proponents of “defensive realism” argued that rather than anxiously seeking. 立. for more power, states are better off maintaining however much power they already possess.. ‧ 國. 學. Defensive realism, outlined by Kenneth Waltz in the Theory of International Politics, shares. ‧. key theoretical assumptions like international anarchy and state-centrism with offensive. sit. y. Nat. realism. However, in regard to state behaviors and strategies for survival, Waltz rejected the. n. al. er. io. idea that anarchy led states to act aggressively in their competitions for power. Instead, he. i Un. v. made the opposite case that anarchy encourages states to behave defensively because “the. Ch. engchi. first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.”33 Defensive realists provided several arguments that refuted offensive realist understanding of “power.” First, when a state attempts to gain power at the expense of others, the potential victims would join forces to balance against the aggressor and thereby leaving it worse off than it would have been had its refrained from seeking additional power. Defensive. 32. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,” International Security 40, no.3 (2016). 33 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (MA: Addison-Wesley), 126. 15. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(26) realists therefore asserted that “At least in the long run, the balance of power that arises out of international anarchy punishes aggression; it does not reward it.”34 History has shown that the great powers that aim for hegemony has frequently earned self-defeat, and they are advised to adopt a defensive and moderate foreign policy. Second, defensive realist pointed a way out of the “Thucydides’s Trap,” or the “security dilemma,” by distinguishing individual security and state security.35 Security dilemma arise from offensive realists’ assumptions of states “capabilities” and “intentions.” Specifically, any increments in a state’s military capability—even for the mere purpose of enhancing its. 政治大. own security—will be seen as a threat because its intentions are obscured to others. Due to. 立. the fear of an aggression, other states will respond by strengthen their own capabilities, and. ‧ 國. 學. ultimately locking them in a vicious cycle of security competition. Yet, defensive realists. ‧. asserted that “states are not as vulnerable as men are in a state of nature”36 and their demise is. sit. y. Nat. a difficult and prolonged process. In the face of a crisis, great powers can refrain from. n. al. er. io. undertaking pre-emptive strikes until they have gained definitive evidence of an aggression and save from blundering into an unintended war.. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Lastly, defensive realists proposed the concept of “offense-defense balance”37 which distinguishes defensive weapons and policies from offensive ones. By doing so, they argued that it is possible for states to adopt compatible strategies “to make itself more secure without. 34. Jack Snyder, Myth of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (New York: Cornell University Press), 11. 35 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” in World Politics, No. 2, 157-180. 36 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press), 172. 37 See Jack Snyder, Myth of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (New York: Cornell University Press); Robert Jervis, “Cooperation in the Security Dilemma,” in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press), 167-214; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006) and “Offense, Defense, and the Cause of War,” in International Security 22, no.4 (1988). 16. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(27) making others less secure.”38 When offense has the clear advantage, meaning that “it is easier to destroy the other’s army and take its territory than it is to defend one’s own,”39 states are more likely to engage in war. Contrarily, when defense has the upper hand, states would choose to take on an assault than launching a preemptive strike. In the nuclear age, states with second-strike capabilities are even more capable of deterring aggressors. Defensive realists therefore conclude that technological and geographical factors tilt heavily towards the defending party. According to defensive realist optimistic view, the United States and China can avoid. 政治大. the “Thucydides’s Trap” as long as China makes clear that it has no aggressive intentions. 立. towards its neighbors nor the incentive to challenge the U.S. dominance in Asia. Yet looking. ‧ 國. 學. at today’s U.S.-China relationship under President Donald Trump, it is clear that offensive. ‧. realism remains more relevant to the reality. First, China’s rhetoric and foreign policy have. sit. y. Nat. revealed its ambitious and even aggressive intentions. Second, state leaders’ decisions may. n. al. er. io. not always be as rational as believed and their perceptions of other states’ intentions are. i Un. v. likely to lead to the escalation of a crisis. Stephen Van Evera, for example, has pointed that. Ch. engchi. most of the modern great wars resulted from leaders’ misperceptions of their prospect to prevail. 40 Lastly, as there are no agreed and reliable method to distinguish defensive weapons from offensive ones, the increase of Chinese military strength is most likely to be seen as a threat to other countries. Apart from examining how China conveys its intentions, it is also important to look at how the American President Donald Trump interprets Chinese intentions. Other than a vague 38. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation in the Security Dilemma,” in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press), 187. 39 Ibid. 40 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006). 17. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(28) definition of the concept of “intentions,” offensive realists has provided little information about the means and to measure it. Since offensive realists defined “Intentions” to be state leaders’ beliefs and perceptions of the world, one way for researchers to gain insights to the intentions of a state is to observe the discourse and rhetoric of its leaders and their foreign policies. Rhetoric can be indicative of a state’s intention to launch a war because it “Usually precedes armed conflicts and hints at the important issues over which the upcoming war will eventually be fought.”41 The rhetoric and discourse of a Presidential speech, for example,. 政治大. may give away the state leader’s personal values, beliefs, and orientations in the. 立. decision-making process. At the same time, their public statements, made with the specific. ‧ 國. 學. purpose of delivering certain messages to its recipients, particularly to a state’s domestic. ‧. populace, also reflect the preferences and ideology of the targeted audience.. sit. y. Nat. Foreign policy is a more concrete and definitive form of a state’s intentions for it is the. n. al. er. io. ultimate product of decision-making. Foreign policy is also a reliable indicator because its. i Un. v. effects are rather durable, as James Chace underlines, “An obsolete foreign policy cannot be. Ch. engchi. lightly discarded; commitments once made are not easily broken.”42 When rhetoric and foreign policy come together, they can help shed light on a state’s intentions. For instance, Steve Bannon, the former White House Chief Strategist to President Donald Trump, views China as the primary economic threat to America. Bannon says, “If we don’t get our situation sorted with China, we’ll be destroyed economically.”43 With advisors 41. Drazen Pehar, “Leaders’ Rhetoric and Preventive Diplomacy: Issues We Are Ignorant About,” Knowledge and Diplomacy, 2002, accessed August 2, 2017, https://www.diplomacy.edu/resources/general/leaders-rhetoric-and-preventive-diplomacy-issues-we-are-ignoran t-about. 42 James Chace, A World Elsewhere: The New American Foreign Policy (New York: Scribner), 5. 43 Joshua Green, “Bannon’s Back and Targeting China,” Bloomberg, September 28, 2017, accessed October 1, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-28/bannon-s-back-and-targeting-china. 18. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(29) like Bannon championing the idea that portrays China as the primary threat to the U.S., it is safe to assume that President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy will likely take on a hardline position in dealing with China. “Capabilities,” which is closely related to a state’s intentions, is critical to offensive realist study of U.S.-China relations. Offensive realists place their primary concern in the military capabilities. A state’s active military buildup, which encompasses many aspects ranging from the acquisition of more advanced technology, the increase in the enlistment of military personnel, and the adoption of new strategies and policies, can reflect the state’s. 政治大. intentions. A glimpse into China’s recent military development can help unveil its goals and. 立. ambitions; similarly, the U.S.’s military deployment can reveal some information of its. ‧ 國. 學. planned response to China.. ‧. Offensive realists usually equate military capabilities to power; but in reality, states are. sit. y. Nat. also deeply concerned about their latent power, which is defined as the “socio-economic. n. al. er. io. ingredients that go into building military power” and “is largely based on a state’s wealth and. i Un. v. the overall size of its population.”44 Population alone can neither reflect a state’s economic. Ch. engchi. capacity nor guarantee it a wealthy economy. Wealth, on the other hand, “incorporates both the demographic and the economic dimensions of power.” 45 For this reason, offensive realists tend to employ wealth as the measure of latent power. With the experiences of three European great powers, Mearsheimer argued that wealth underpins a state’s military strength; that is, it “constitutes the societal resources that a state has available to build military forces.”46 By this logic, China, which has largest population in. 44 45 46. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton), 55. Ibid, 61. Ibid. 19. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(30) the world and the largest economy by nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP), can transform itself into a military leviathan and upset the existing international balance-of-power. Other schools of international relations theories have also come to challenge offensive realist analysis of the future U.S.-China relations. Neoliberalism, for instance, has criticized offensive realism for underrating the possibilities of cooperation between states on non-traditional security issues through international institutions. However, these criticisms, in truth, are not outright rejected by offensive realists, but simply received as supplements to their theory. Economic interdependence The author indeed finds it beneficial to take certain. 政治大. perspectives of these criticisms into consideration in the effort to enhance the arguments of. 立. offensive realist. However, it is not the aim of this study to go into the details of each and. ‧ 國. 學. every one of these rebuttals; rather, the goal is to put the theory of offensive realist into. ‧. practice by employing it to scrutinize the most important great power politics of the. sit. y. Nat. twenty-first century between the U.S. and China.. n. al. er. io. In the coming chapters, the author will gradually unravel the mystery of how the U.S.. i Un. v. President Trump responds to the increasing threat of a stronger China through the six. Ch. engchi. indicators which derive from intentions and capabilities. While examining the intentions and military power of both China and the U.S, the author takes the angle of analysis largely from the perspective of the latter, as can be seen as below.. 1) Is the U.S. actively increasing its capabilities? 2) Is the U.S. seeking new allies and strengthening its relations with existing ones? 3) Is the U.S. helping its allies to increase their capabilities against China? 4) Is the U.S. undermining China’s capabilities? 5) Is the U.S. preventing China from seeking new allies and sabotaging China’s relations with its existing friends? 6) Is the U.S. attempting to weaken the capabilities of China’s allies? 20. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(31) In recent decades, China’s growing economic, military, and political clout has generated concerns in the U.S., and the American foreign policy towards China was a hot issue during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. As Derek Scissors, an expert on China’s economy at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), pointed out “The current direction of U.S. politics is headed toward populism, isolationism, and bashing China for good reasons or bad.” 47 Dealing with China is inescapable. It has become difficult now, and might get harder and harder in the future. As Henry Kissinger puts it, “The United States and China are both indispensable pillars of world order. Remarkably, both have historically exhibited an. 政治大. ambivalent attitude toward the international system they anchor, affirming their commitments. 立. to it even as they reserve judgment on aspects of its design. China has no precedent for the. ‧ 國. 學. role it is asked to play in the twenty-first century order, as one major state among others. Nor. ‧. does the U.S. have experience interacting on a sustained basis with a country of comparable. y. sit. n. al. er. io. domestic order.”48. Nat. size, reach, and economic performance while it embraces a distinctly different model of. i Un. v. In sum, the real challenge for President Trump in formulating a foreign policy suitable. Ch. engchi. for meeting the future U.S.-China relations and global politics, is not a choice between isolationism and internationalism, but between different internationalist strategies.”49 One cannot expect a superpower like the United States to forever be the friend of a rising power like China, or vice versa. As Trump designates China as an enemy, he must weigh and produce a policy that can best serve the interests of his country. Nations that sit between the. 47. Joshua Green, “Bannon’s Back and Targeting China,” Bloomberg, September 28, 2017, accessed October 1, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-28/bannon-s-back-and-targeting-china. 48 Henry A. Kissinger, World Order (Penguin Press, New York, 2014), 226. 49 George Friedman, “Isolationism vs. Internationalism: False Choices,” Mauldin Economics, May 10, 2016, accessed December 19, 2017, http://www.mauldineconomics.com/this-week-in-geopolitics/isolationism-vs.-internationalism-false-choices#. 21. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(32) two giants such as Taiwan, Singapore, and the Philippines are inevitably “subjected to the ultimate presupposition of a real possibility of a friend-and-enemy group.”50 All parties are supposed to review their own policies, interior and exterior, under the new international political situation.. 1.4 Research Methodology Research Approach This research is built on the theoretical bases of John J. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. 政治大. and borrows Kenneth Waltz’s “three levels-of-analysis” for the analysis of the changes in. 立. U.S.-China relationship. The author looked at the core tenet of “power” in the realist theory,. ‧ 國. 學. and focused on examining the shifting international distribution-of-power following the rise. ‧. of China and how U.S. President Trump seeks to preserve the American position as the sole. sit. y. Nat. hegemon. Evidences were provided to show the economic and security threats that China. n. al. er. io. poses for the U.S. The attempts from both countries to alter the balance-of-power through. i Un. v. aggrandizing their own powers, forming coalitions with allies, and undermining their rivals’. Ch. engchi. strength and influences were key objects of analysis. State leaders’ perceptions and intentions, the national capabilities of both the U.S. and China, and other non-structural factors were also scrutinized. Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Unlike past offensive realist studies of the U.S.-China relationship which tend to focus on analyzing structural-level factors, the author seeks to strengthen the explanatory power of the theory by bringing in the first and second image-factors like President Trump’s. 50. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 35. 22. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(33) perceptions, the collective decisions of his administration, and his trade and security strategies. For example, presidents who accepted the liberalist arguments that if China is democratic and enmeshed in the global capitalist system, it will not act aggressively and would instead be content with the status quo in Northeast Asia may adopt an “engagement” policy towards China and promote its integration into the world economy and transition towards democracy. Yet, others like President Trump who agree with the offensive realist view is likely to believe that “a policy of engagement is doomed to fail…because democracies care about security as much as non-democracies do, and hegemony is the best. 政治大. way for any state to guarantee its own survival.”51 Rather than the “engagement” policy,. 立. offensive realists claimed that it is better off for the U.S. and its Asian allies to employ the. ‧ 國. 學. “containment” strategy. The author therefore looked at whether President Trump’s policy. ‧. does conform to offensive realism and its effects on the outcomes of his trade war and. n. al. y. er. io Research Methods. sit. Nat. geopolitical competitions with China in the Indo-Pacific region.. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. The research method of this study is qualitative with a chronological narration. The author focused on studying U.S. President Trump’s disputes ad negotiations with China from June 2015 to June 2019. The author constructed his arguments based on a variety of materials, including academic researches, government reports, media coverages, and information posted on social media (particularly President Trump’s “Twitter” messages). Political scientists have long relied on theoretical or conceptual models to interpret and explain international relations phenomenon. Different methods and approaches gave rise to. 51. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 4. 23. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(34) debates of the means and perspectives to understand the intricate relationship between nations. While there are many advantages to using political models, history, however, provides yet another prism to view international relations.52 The “historical approach” offers political scientists an insight into the nature of conflicts between the state actors on the global stage. In essence, it provides two principle uses for studying international relations. First, it serves as a means for contextual understanding, particularly in conflict resolution or area studies analysis. It is also a measure of themes and patterns of state interaction over time. Secondly, the long-term analysis of trends and patterns. 政治大. can be equally insightful as scholars develop awareness of the differing regional perceptions. 立. of global political issues.. ‧ 國. 學. Throughout history, the U.S. and China have constantly juggled their relationship. ‧. between friend and enemy. However, they both have a very confusing concept of politics in. sit. y. Nat. the distinction of friend and enemy toward each other. They are both unwilling to regard the. n. al. er. io. other as friend and reluctant to see the other as enemy. From the Chinese perspective, they. i Un. v. regard the U.S. as “both friend and enemy” and engage with them in “both coalition and. Ch. engchi. competition.” From the American perspective, they, historically, respond to the Chinese challenge in three options, such as: 1) accommodation; 2) containment, confrontation, or untrammeled strategic rivalry; and 3) global cooperation paired with regional resolve. In human history, never has such subtle relation happened to two nations that are overwhelmed by mixed love-hate feelings.. 52. James R. Sofka, “Historical Approaches to International Relations,” Online Learning Tips, January 31, 2013, accessed June 27, 2017, https://onlinelearningtips.com/2013/01/historical-approaches-to-international-relations/. 24. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(35) 1.5 Research Limitations Theory and time are the two major limitations in this research. First, the nature of the offensive realist theory confines the discussion of political incidents and phenomenon largely to the “structural level.” To observe the realist principals, the author must abide by the basic assumptions of the theory even when borrowing the arguments of other schools of international relations theories. Moreover, the author aspired to bridge theory with practice and has therefore gone to great lengths to incorporate the latest developments of the U.S.-China relations into the analysis. Since theories are often portrayed as “The idle. 政治大. speculations of head-in-the-clouds academics that have little relevance to what goes on in the. 立. ‘real world’,”53 much has to be done to find a balance between them.. ‧ 國. 學. Time and timing also provided many obstacles during the research. First, President. ‧. Trump has taken office for merely two years, many of his proposed strategies and foreign. sit. y. Nat. policies are yet to be enforced. Even the orders that have taken effect during the past two. n. al. er. io. years must await the test of time and their results remain to be seen. Timing bring surprises as. i Un. v. well, as is written in the Bible, “The race is not to the swift or the battle to the strong, nor. Ch. engchi. does food come to the wise or wealth to the brilliant or favor to the learned; but time and chance happen to them all.”54 President Trump has gone about-face on the decisions and policies he has made earlier due to the need of negotiations, and the author has to be cautious in analyzing and predicting the development of events. The time frame of this research is set between June 15, 2015, when Trump announced his candidacy for U.S. president, and June 29, 2019, when the top leaders from the U.S. and China agreed to resume bilateral negotiations after reaching a truce on trade war during the G20 Summit. 53 54. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 8. The Holy Bible, Ecclesiastes 9:11 (New International Version). 25. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(36) 1.6 Chapter Arrangements In the following chapters, the author employs Kenneth Waltz’s three levels-of-analysis to scrutinize the reason why the gap of the relative national capability between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is narrowing and the way that President Trump tries to preserve the U.S. global primacy with his magnum opus “America First foreign policy”. Chapter 2 begins with an examination of Trump’s discourse and rhetoric that have sporadically floated up in his public statements, publications, and social media posts. The homogeneity between Trump’s personal perception of the domestic and international. 政治大. challenges to the U.S. and his foreign policy priorities reveal how individual-level factors can. 立. affect a state’s foreign policy direction. The author then looks at how domestic-level factors. ‧ 國. 學. contribute to the wax and wane of U.S. national strength. Economic, military, and ideological. ‧. causes are discussed in independent sections.. sit. y. Nat. The systemic-level challenge that the rise of China poses for the U.S. is the central topic. n. al. er. io. of both Chapter 3 and 4, while the former focuses on the economic aspect of the Sino-U.S.. i Un. v. contentions and the latter on their military disputes. Both chapters follow the similar line of. Ch. engchi. development: the author starts with a review of the way that China has accumulated its national capabilities through economic and military policies and the way that its strategy towards the U.S. has developed over time. Next, the policy and strategic changes under the incumbent President Xi Jinping were examined in independent sections. The author then analyzed President Trump’s responses to China’s growing assertiveness and the way that he tries to curb Chinese expansionism under Xi’s leadership with his “America First” policy. Finally, the author categorizes a list of issues-of-contention between the two great powers and. 26. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(37) seeks to determine the area in which they may find common grounds from the treacherous minefield in which a misstep may result in a full-blown war. In the concluding Chapter 5, the author offers a cautious opinion that, in accordance with offensive realists’ predictions, the U.S. and China have been edging closer and closer to the brink of war under the leadership of President Trump and President Xi. Notably, other than the shifting distribution of power in the international arena and other systemic-level factors which offensive realists have traditionally emphasized, the author argues that individual and domestic-level factors have been going hand in hand to bring about this result.. 政治大. The last, but most critical, idea that the author wants to propose for his future studies is as. 立. follows. Since the idea of war cannot be wiped out from human nature according to the tenets. ‧ 國. 學. of offensive realism, “trade war” should be the prime option for modern states to engage with. ‧. each other in conflicts because “wealth” is the major premise for big powers to secure and. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. sustain the position of “hegemon.”. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 27. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(38) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 28. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

(39) Chapter 2: Trump’s Perception of the American National Capability. This chapter aims to find answers to the question: How has President Trump’s perception of American power and position in the international system gave rise to his “America First” foreign policy and how will this policy affect the U.S.-China relationship? As an educator’s beliefs affect the designing of his/her course syllabus and instruction, so. 政治大. does a high level political leader’s perceptions affect the formulating of his/her foreign. 立. policy agenda and mission operation. Trump’s campaign and presidency have established. ‧ 國. 學. himself as one of the most unconventional presidents in modern history. Trump claimed that. ‧. prioritizing American interests will be the overriding theme of his administration and he also promised to install a new foreign policy vision that “replaces randomness with purpose,. er. io. sit. y. Nat. ideology with strategy, and chaos with peace.”. al. Though the unconventional President’s views about U.S. foreign policy are more. n. iv n C h ebynhis complex than those that were represented h i U the author is convinced that g cpredecessors, they can be seen in terms which fitted in with the strain of offensive realism. The author thus employed Waltz’s three “levels-of-analysis” model to look at President Trump’s rhetoric towards the domestic and international problems that he believes the U.S. is facing.. Since Kenneth Waltz introduced the three “levels of analysis” or “images” of the causes of war, they became a prevalent model for analyzing state interactions.1 While each political science theory focus on different aspects of international relations, structural theories like offensive realism have place the emphasis on systemic-level features and pay “little attention 1. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press). 29. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900667.

川普的中國外交政策： 攻勢現實主義觀點 - 政大學術集成

川普的中國外交政策：攻勢現實主義觀點 - 政大學術集成