Chapter 4: Trump and the U.S.-China Military Relations
4.3 Thucydides’s Trap: Is an Inescapable War Approaching?
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4.3 Thucydides’s Trap: Is an Inescapable War Approaching?
Offensive realists have put forward several ways — including “balancing” and
“buck-passing”—to prevent the emergence of a new hegemon and preserve the existing international balance-of-power. The “balancing” strategy is that “the threatened state accepts the burden of deterring its adversary and commits substantial resources to achieving that goal.”47 By contrast, “with buck-passing, the endangered great power tries to get another state to shoulder the burden of deterring or defeating the threatening state.”48 In dealing with China, the strategy that the U.S. chooses will bring about different outcomes.
America as an Off-shore Balancer
As Michael Pillsbury pointed out in his book that, short of Armageddon and the end of human history, the conflicts between the modern great powers must be a “Hundred-Year Marathon” in politics, economy, and military.49 There is no longer any meaning of plundering the territory in the past centuries. Therefore, the military strategy of the superpowers should be concentrated on the long-term struggle for hegemony, but it is not necessary to achieve the final decisive outcome. In its competition with China, the United States must look into the next few decades and patiently combine political, social, and economic factors with military factors. Stubbornly planning to expand regional influences and projecting strategic forces for inter-continental goals are the key to sustaining the
47 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton), 13.
48 Ibid, 13.
49 Michael Pillsbury, Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2015).
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significance of the hegemony of the great powers and broadening the chances of survival of the human civilization.50
The United States is commonly referred to as an “offshore balance.”51 Having studied the attitudes, policies, and strategies adopted by various generations of American leaders, the author found that the U.S. and the PRC have largely maintained a stable relationship while competing on various fronts over the past 40 years. They did not seem to have much difficulties in manipulating the situation until the unconventional U.S. President Trump took office in 2017. Trump’s official showdown interrupted the overall benign atmosphere between the two great powers.
The U.S. and China both have been quietly preparing for a possible military confrontation. They acquiesced each other’s policies and tolerated one anothers’ attitudes in many dimensions. They secretly deployed military devices in many strategic spots with tacit permission. Through a basic scrutiny of the various dimensions of the military movements between China and the United States, the author is convinced that the possibility of a war between the two great powers is high and that they are actually prepared to make plans for the worst, sooner or later. The final showdown will take place. The prediction is not only grounded on the logic of offensive realism but also compatible with the Chinese ancient military philosophy, “Maintain an army for a thousand days, for unexpected needs.” On May 17, 2015, Xi said to John Kerry, “The broad Pacific Ocean is vast enough to embrace both China and the United States.”52 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi had been defiant in
50 Steve F. Kime, “A 21st-Century Military Doctrine for America,” Joint Force Quarterly 88, January 10, 2018, accessed February 21, 2019, doi:10.21236/ada443852.
51 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company), 42.
52 “Xi: Pacific Ocean is big enough for China, US,” News24, May 17, 2015, accessed January 15, 2019, https://www.news24.com/World/News/Xi-Pacific-Ocean-is-big-enough-for-China-US-20150517.
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that Beijing is “unshakeable” in defending its sovereignty.53From November 10 to 11, 2017, leaders met in Danang, Vietnam for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (OPEC) meeting. On November 16, 2017, Daniel C. Sneider, a lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, told New York Times reporters, “They (Japanese) understand that the Chinese see themselves as the natural hegemon, and in the Chinese worldview, the Japanese should be subordinate to them.”54 The report added that when Mr. Trump was in Beijing, Mr. Xi made clear his ambitions for China to replace the United States as the dominant power in the Western Pacific. “The Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States,” Mr. Xi said to Mr. Trump beside him, an assertion that some in the region and Washington see as shorthand for China’s taking advantage of an American retreat.55
According to the theory of offensive realism, “the ultimate goal of great powers is to achieve regional hegemony and block the rise of peer competitors in distant areas of the globe. In essence, states that gain regional hegemony act as offshore balancers in other regions.”56 Confronted by Chinese aggressive rise, the United States has to take the role of an offshore balancer in the Pacific-Asia-India arena as the strategic concept used in the analysis of offensive realism in international relations suggests. Furthermore, it represented a strategy in which great powers use favorable regional powers to check the rise of potential
53 “Xi: Pacific Ocean is big enough for China, US,” News24, May 17, 2015, accessed January 15, 2019, https://www.news24.com/World/News/Xi-Pacific-Ocean-is-big-enough-for-China-US-20150517.
54 Motoko Rich and Jane Perlez, “Seeing U.S. in Retreat Under Trump, Japan and China Move to Mend Ties,”
The New York Times, November 16, 2017, accessed August 26, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/world/asia/seeing-us-in-retreat-under-trump-japan-and-china-move-to-mend-ties.html.
55 Ibid.
56 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton), 236-237.
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hostile powers. This strategy stands out in stark contrast tothe U.S.’s dominant strategy, liberal hegemony.
Offshore balancing calls for a great power to withdraw from onshore positions and focus its offshore capabilities on the key geopolitical regions of the world, such as Europe, the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and Northeast Asia, etc. The grand strategy of “offshore balancing” permits a great power to maintain its power without the costs of large military deployments around the world. However, offshore balancing, as its name implies, is a grand strategy that can only be pursued by island states on the edges of the key geopolitical regions like Eurasia and by isolated great powers, such as the United States. Furthermore, a state pursuing offshore balancing should first seek to pass the buck to local powers and only intervene if the threat is too great for the other powers in the core regions of the world to handle. In the peripheral regions, an offshore balancer should not worry about developments.
America Passing the Buck
There are several allies or coalitions that the U.S. may rely on when pursuing the
“buck-passing” strategy against China. When caught between the conflicts and competitions of the two giants, these states must also seek ways to survive and best defend their own national interests. Specifically, the author looked at the following states or political coalitions that the U.S. may try to pass the buck to.
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1. Asia-Pacific
The “Indian Pacific” was originally a geographical concept that spanned the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. The “Indian Pacific” used by Trump means that India, the United States and other major Asian democracies, especially Japan and Australia, will jointly contain China in the new framework of growing “Cold War” concern.57 The geopolitical changes brought about by China’s rise are the main reason why Washington is committed to promoting the India-Pacific Alliance, and the Indian Pacific Strategy aims to hedge China’s diplomatic and security policy behavior.
In the context of a relatively weakening of U.S. dominance and the increasing shift of geopolitical and economic gravity to the Indio-Pacific, the aim is to reshape alliances and partnerships in response to China’s rise. The goal of Trump’s return to the “Indian Pacific Strategy” is very clear—the “Indian Pacific Strategy” is an extension and revision of the
“Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy.” The aim is to contain China’s rise and safeguard U.S.
leadership in the region.
2. Japan
As an important ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan plays an important role in the conception and promotion of the Indian Ocean. In addition to its own sense of insecurity as an island nation, Japan is so clearly united with India and the United States because of Japan’s and concern and vigilance for China’s growing economic and military capabilities.
57 Dingding Chen, “The Indo-Pacific Strategy: A Background Analysis,” ISPI, June, 4, 2018, accessed March 29, 2019, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/indo-pacific-strategy-background-analysis-20714.
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3.India
India has always been a country with strong national ambitions and one of the most important advocates of the “Indian Pacific Strategy” concept. While India can take this opportunity to promote the rationality and rationalization of its interests in Southeast Asia, it surely will try to expand its presence in East Asia, strengthen its political, economic and military cooperation with the United States and its allies, and comprehensively enhance India’s influence in international affairs.
4. Australia
Australia was one of the first countries to introduce the concept of the “Indian Pacific Strategy.” In the 1960s, Australia discussed its influence in the “India” region to avoid the difficulties it encountered during the Cold War. Today, Australia actively welcomes the
“Indian Pacific Strategy” advocated by the United States and emphasizes its important position in the U.S. “Indian Pacific Strategy”, not only because Australia wants to strengthen U.S.-Australian trade relations, but also hopes to improve its presence and interest in Southeast Asia.
5. Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia is a key area to link the “Indian Ocean” with the “Pacific.” Indonesia and Singapore are supporters of the “Indian Pacific Strategy” concept. Due to the location advantage of Indonesia and Singapore itself, the concept of “Indian Pacific Strategy” will give them an opportunity to enhance their strategic position. Both Indonesia and Singapore are caught between China and the United States. On the one hand, they are afraid of
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regional order changes brought about by the rise of China. On the other hand, they do not want to lose their economic opportunities from the investment of China.
All in all, the “Indian Pacific Strategy” is still only an idea. Its starting point is to establish a hedge against China’s economic and military rise and rebuild regional order. The effectiveness of the Pacific strategic future is uncertain, especially in the United States, Japan, India and Australia, which have not improved the coordination and joint adoption of policies and strategies.
6. The Five Eyes Alliance
The origins of the Five Eyes Alliance, often abbreviated as FVEY, dates back to the Atlantic Charter in the post-World War II era. It brings Anglophone states including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States together to form the world’s most complete and comprehensive intelligence alliance.58 The initial purpose of the alliance was to monitor the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, but turned its focus on monitoring private communications in recent years. The activities of the FVEY is largely obscured to the public, and only became somewhat more recognized after Edward Snowden leaked highly confidential information from the U.S. National Security Agency in 2013.59
The Five Eyes is a powerful alliance which the U.S. can rely on in its attempts to check China’s rise. While China’s international strategy for influence and investment is expanding, the Five-Eye Alliance increases cooperation with countries such as Germany and Japan to
58 J. V. Tossini, “The Five Eyes–The Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere,” November 14, 2017, accessed March 8, 2019,
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/.
59 Eric King, “Snowden Spyware Revelations: We Need to Unmask the Five-eyed Monster,” The Guardian, November 26, 2013, accessed July 30, 2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/26/snowden-spyware-five-eyed-monster-50000-netwo rks-five-eyes-privacy.
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address the specific issues of foreign interference. China’s international strategy is prompting closer coordination and a real expansion of intelligence sharing.
To discuss China’s foreign activities in the past years, talks have been held between diplomats, intelligence officials and heads of government. For example, on October 4, 2018, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence at the Hudson Institute in Washington accused Beijing of meddling in the domestic arena by “rewarding or coercing American businesses, movie studios, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists and local, state and federal officials.”60
Although U.S. President Trump signaled that he is prepared to fight against China alone, his government members are working behind the scenes to bring the coalition together to counter Beijing.61 The strengthening of the five-eye network will be another blow to China’s hopes of convincing European countries to distance themselves from Washington and move closer to Beijing.