Chapter 4: Trump and the U.S.-China Military Relations
4.2 The U.S. Military Strategy Under Trump’s “Make America Great Again”
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partner countries’ political and economic dependencies, its long-term geopolitical implications must be given careful scrutiny.
Trump administration in Washington seems to have kept its distance from the project and has not formulated a clear-cut policy on it. Nonetheless, in Washington’s view, BRI does have negative implications for U.S. interests in Asia. It is emboldening countries that have a clear anti-U.S. stance like Iran and Russia or that are interested in reducing the U.S.
leverage in the region, such as Pakistan. For example, China is getting increasingly involved in regional security and defense initiatives as the multilateral talks on Afghanistan organized by Russia. In general, currently Washington mainly perceives BRI as a threat to its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. But according to the logic of offensive realism, the author believes that BRI will be a physical manifestation of this China’s Military ambition in Global Scale, as long as the connection between economic and military goals is seamed together and wrapped in interlacing fashion.
4.2 The U.S. Military Strategy Under Trump’s “Make America Great Again”
American post-Cold War policy toward China built on the expectations that economic liberalization would have begot political opening has failed to change China in the ways the United States intended or hoped. Washington was justified in making a change in its view toward Beijing.
On the contrary, China’s behavior has intensified across a range of domains. Beijing is flexing its maritime military muscle, whether by reneging on its promise not to militarize the islands in the South China Sea or unprofessionally closing on a U.S. destroyer
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in international waters.27 Chinese political influence operations in Australia and New Zealand28 or moves at the U.N. Human Rights Council29 are challenging free and open societies abroad. Since the dynamic buffering has changed in the Asia-Pacific area, U.S.
military policy to China must be focused on adjusting to the change as well.
Since the Cold War, American administrations have experienced the worldwide fluctuations in which “animating principle behind its policy and national security strategy”
is urgently wanted. For instance, George H.W. Bush had to grapple with “the vision thing”30 in the turbulent and hostile world at the end of Cold World. Barack Obama proposed a military and economic “rebalance” to Asia though his narrative regretfully failed to frame those policy prongs for a massive shift in international circumstance. The United States must propose a broader view of global military strategy. Being alleged as an unconventional and inexperienced President, Trump distinguishes himself from his predecessors in the distinct change in rhetoric and tone.
To rally nations that share concerns around Chinese economic practices or creeping revisionism, the Trump administration has been calling for a “free and open Indo-Pacific”
(FOIP), a broader vision for Asia built around the concept of a strong coalition of like-minded regional democracies extending from Japan in the east to India in the west. The aim of FOIP is to defend against the ways a rising China ostensibly threatens the
27 Clark Mindock, “Chinese ship comes ‘within 45 yards’ of US destroyer in South China Sea,” October 2, 2018,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-navy-ship-chinese-luyang-destroyer-uss-decatur-sout h-china-sea-a8564201.html.
28 Rob Schmitz, “Australia and New Zealand Are Ground Zero for Chinese Influence,” NPR, October 2, 2018, accessed March 13, 2019,
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/02/627249909/australia-and-new-zealand-are-ground-zero-for-chinese-influence . 29 Ted Piccone, “China’s Long Game On Human Right,” Brookings, September 28, 2018, accessed April 6, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/09/24/chinas-long-game-on-human-rights/.
30 Elizabeth N. Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (New York: Cornell University Press), 191.
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rules-based international order, universal liberal values, and free access to the maritime global commons.
However, the strategic foundation should be bolstered by the consistency and continuity of Washington’s economic policy as well as its attitude toward allied nations that see their national interest compatible with that of the United States. After all, according to the logic of offensive realism, the economy precedes the military.
1. America’s Greatest Advantage Against China is Slowly Eroding
For several years, Pentagon officials have been alerting the PRC’s growing military capabilities, paying particular attention to how Beijing can narrow the technological gap between the two countries.31 Nevertheless, as Nouwens pointed out, China’s goal of regional power is set at 2035, and a more global role will be envisaged by 2049. Apart from the potential Taiwan scenario, China does not have an urgent need to become a military competitor, rivaling the United States.”32 In addition, officials and experts often notice that the U.S. is still at the forefront of key capabilities: the training and doctrine of war fighters.
American soldiers, sailors, pilots and marines can think on the fly and make decisions under pressure. This is the ability for the branches to coordinate efforts on the battlefield, regionally or globally.33
31 Aaron Mehta, “The Pentagon is Planning for War with China and Russia—Can it Handle Both?” January 30, 2018,
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/01/30/the-pentagon-is-planning-for-war-with-china-and-russia-can-it-handle-both/.
32 Aaron Mehta, “America’s Greatest Advantage Against China is Slowly Eroding,” February 15, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/02/15/americas-greatest-advantage-against-china-is-slowly-ero ding/.
33 Elizabeth N. Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (New York: Cornell University Press), 51.
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A senior DIA official told reporters that China is significantly narrowing the gap in technology, but he pointed out “there is more than just technology involved; there’s experience, there is command structure, there is training, there is proficiency.”34 Similarly, Meia Nouwens, a Chinese military expert with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, claimed that “The greatest advantage that the U.S. has at the moment over the PLA (the People’s Liberation Army) is that the U.S. has been working on doctrine, training, professionalization for a lot longer than the PLA, with actual experience to back it up.”35 However, as Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated a series of military reforms in an attempt to strengthen joint operations and planning—reforms may lead the PLA to become a more formidable force, which is why Aaron Mehta would say, “America’s greatest advantage against China is slowly eroding.”
The PLA leadership is aware of its shortcomings and Chinese officials have been publicly talking about the need to improve training. While it is difficult, if not impossible to determine the exact time when China will directly challenge the U.S., it is widely agreed that the PLA will transform into a force capable of joint operations within the next two decades.
However, the conflict between the great powers, now and in the future, are an extension of their political, economic and military competition, and it is no longer restricted by territories. The military status of the superpowers is concentrated in this long-term large-scale power competition, but it does not necessarily determine the outcome.
Especially in the competition with China, the American doctrine must be projected to meet
34 Aaron Mehta, “America’s Greatest Advantage Against China is Slowly Eroding,” February 15, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/02/15/americas-greatest-advantage-against-china-is-slowly-ero ding/.
35 Ibid.
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the changes in the next few decades and combine political, social and economic factors with military factors. Limited, carefully tailored projection forces, combined with the strategic intercontinental projection power for long-term goals, are the key to this vision.36
2. China Facing the Trump Presidency
Trump’s seeming unpredictability, and penchant for muscular showdown, has dramatically altered China’s risk calculations, forcing Beijing to constantly revisit its strategic assumptions.37 When Donald Trump was elected President of the United States in November 2016, the world was curious about how he would put into practice the many radical foreign policy ideas that he had proposed during the presidential campaign. Now that Trump has kept up his hawkish rhetoric on China, observers paid special attention to how he would change the U.S.-China relations and how Chinese President Xi Jinping would respond. The result of such dynamics will have far-reaching implications for the world.
In December 2017, President Donald Trump delivered his National Security Strategy, in which he identified China as one the greatest security threats to America.38 President Trump’s statement that “We will promote a balance of power that favors the United States, our allies, and our partners” wedge in with Mearsheimer’s argument that “Offensive realism predicts that states will be acutely sensitive to the balance of power and will look for opportunities to increase their own power or weaken rivals. In practical terms, this means that states will adopt diplomatic strategies that reflect the opportunities and constraints
36 Steve F. Kime, “A 21st-Century Military Doctrine for America,” Joint Force Quarterly 88, January 10, 2018, accessed February 21, 2019, doi:10.21236/ada443852.
37 Richard Javad Heydarian, “Trump is Forcing China to Reassess its Strategy,” The National Interest, October 20, 2018, accessed January 30, 2019,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/trump-forcing-china-reassess-its-strategy-33917.
38 Elliott Abrams, “The Trump National Security Strategy,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 26, 2016, accessed December 26, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/trump-national-security-strategy.
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created by the particular distribution of power.”39 Trump’s seeming unpredictability and penchant for muscular showdown has dramatically altered China’s risk calculations, forcing Beijing to constantly re-examine its strategic assumptions.
However, as Lawrence Solomon pointed out in his article “The strategy behind Trump flattering China and praising Kim Jong Un.”40 He allows them to save face with their own people as their power recedes. Trump needs Putin and Xi Jinping to temper their ambitions for their countries and themselves. Because they would not retreat willingly, Trump uses the superior economy and military of the United States to force them to comply. By praising their abilities to represent the interests of their country, he allows them to save face when their power fades. Trump wants to win, but spares the enemy a loss of face.
Lawrence Solomon also reminded that “To bring China to heel, Trump sent its economy reeling by levying steep tariffs and threatening to follow up with steeper ones still.
Militarily, he is confronting Chinese belligerence with resolve unseen in previous administrations—this week he sent two guided-missile destroyers past Chinese manmade islands in the South China Sea in defiance of Chinese claims—and is forcefully backing Japan, Taiwan and other Chinese adversaries.” “Neither is he irrational nor erratic in his approach to foreign policy. Rather, Trump is relentlessly rational, focused on the deal he wants to strike, and on maximizing his chances of success.” In coercing autocrats to make a change, Trump will whip his sticks, but will also dangle the carrot. Trump will wield his sticks but also dangle carrots.
39 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 329.
40 Lawrence Solomon, “The strategy behind Trump flattering China and praising Kim Jong Un,” Financial Post, February 15, 2019, accessed February 16, 2019,
https://business.financialpost.com/opinion/lawrence-solomon-the-strategy-behind-trump-flattering-china-and-praising-kim-jong-un.
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3. U.S. Military Strategy and Spending in the Trump Years
U.S. foreign policy before 2001 highlighted the focus of integrating China into the international community. However, as Beijing became an important global power, the situation has changed. It was the Chinese economic prominence that led President Obama President Obama’s 2011 pivot toward Asia, designed to counter China’s growing influence.
Obama’s NSS (both 2010 and 2015) has cautiously accepted China’s rise to prominence, attempting to develop Beijing into a strategic partner that will not pose a threat to the U.S.-led Pacific security structure.
Trump’s pessimistic attitude toward U.S.-China relations has led to a shift in geopolitical strategy. The U.S. armed forces need to innovate and invest in breakthrough capabilities and improve immediate readiness. The most impressive is the defense strategy of the early 2018, which prioritizes the competition of big powers and deter wars in the Middle East and South Asia.
Today’s U.S. military is large enough to meet the legitimate demands of continued commitment and competition among big powers, as long as it is ready, modernized, and able to cope with the various networks, anti-satellite and other asymmetric attacks that future rivals will definitely adopt. Changes may occur unexpectedly in military technology in the next 20 years; therefore, it is critical to be ready to make appropriate changes to U.S.
and its allies’ weapons, military operations, wartime preparations, and defense budget priorities.
The Trump administration is proposing $750 billion for national defense for fiscal year 2019. Of the $750 billion, $718 billion is for the Defense Department and $32 billion is for national security programs performed by the Department of Energy’s nuclear laboratories
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and other agencies.41 The White House said the Space Force will “initially realign existing space forces and materiel from the military services and will scale up responsibly and deliberately over the next several years.”
On April 12, 2019, President Donald Trump and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) made several announcements to accelerate 5G deployment in the U.S.
President Trump says that “The race to 5G is a race America must win” and “It’s race that we will win.”42 The White House explained that President Trump believes that America must invest in visionary projects, and even dominate industries of the future, so as to remain as leader in the 21st century.
The president puts a special emphasis on the nature of the entrepreneur by saying, “It’s private sector driven and private sector led.”43 Building high-speed networks across the United States will transform the way Americans work, learn, communicate and travel. 5G will mean faster wireless speeds and has implications for technologies like self-driving cars and augmented reality. The rollout had started in the U.S. and South Korea a week ahead of the announcement at the White House on April 12, 2019, but the efforts will take years.
The most important background factor to accelerate 5G deployment is its implication for military application. The United States must be second to none in the cutting-edge technology to sustain its hegemonic status. That is the reason why President Donald Trump says the race to build 5G is one America must win because the investments will have impacts on American military capacities for the coming decades. This competition for 5G
41 Sandra Erwin, “Trump’s 2020 Budget Increases Defense Spending by 5 Percent, Funds Space Force,”
Space News, March 11, 2019, accessed May 17, 2019,
https://spacenews.com/trumps-2020-budget-increases-defense-spending-by-5-percent-funds-space-force/.
42 Todd Haselton, “President Trump Announces New 5G Initiatives: It’s a Race ‘America Must Win’,” CNBC, April 12, 2019, accessed April 20, 2019,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/12/trump-on-5g-initiatives-a-race-america-must-win.html.
43 Ibid.
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deployment represents a tacit contrast between ways of looking at the relation of the United States and the PRC, a hegemon and a rising power. The logic of offensive realism is obviously more competitive in reality.
4. Breaking the Mold: Trump’s China Policy
Prior to Trump, American presidents in the post–Cold War era have largely avoided adopting an explicitly competitive strategy towards China.44 The Trump administration’s recently released of the National Security Strategy (NSS) strongly indicates that this is about to change. Following the NSS released on December 18, 2017, and Donald Trump’s statements at Davos on January 26, 2018, tensions between China and the U.S. have only increased. According to President Donald Trump’s discourse, these competitions require the United States to reconsider its policies over the past two decades - based on the assumption that engagement with competitors and their integration into international institutions and global commerce will make them benign actors and trusted partners. In most cases, this premise proved to be wrong.45
Although the NSS seems like a far cry from Trump’s electoral rhetoric, the stage is set for quite a few turbulent years between the U.S. and China. For at least 4 years to go, the Trump course should be navigated by the international community by focusing on the administration’s actual policy decisions and what the unconventional President tweets.
Actually, in addition to trade-related agreements, President Trump has abandoned many mission-oriented international treaties and institutions, including the Paris Climate
44 Ian Ona Johnson and Ionut Popescu, “The Missing Element in Trump’s NSS: A Competitive Strategy,” The National Interest, January 3, 2018, accessed January 22, 2018,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-missing-element-trumps-nss-competitive-strategy-23898.
45 “Breaking the Mould: Trump’s China Policy,” Institute for Security and Development Policy, February 2018, accessed March 20, 2018, http://isdp.eu/publication/breaking-mould-trumps-china-policy/.
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Agreement, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Even strategic agreements such as the Iranian nuclear deal, the Medium-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have also encountered the threat of being abandoned.
Mearsheimer pointed out in his article “Trump Should Embrace a Realist Foreign Policy,” that rather than trying to garrison the world and spread democracy as his predecessors did, the Trump administration should focus on maintaining the balance of power in the three regions vital to U.S. security: Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf.46 East Asia and Europe are important because they are important wealth centers and have long been home to other big countries in the world. The Persian Gulf is a core strategic interest because it produces about 30% of the world’s oil, an important resource for the global economy. The main goal of the United States in these regions should be to prevent the rise of regional hegemon.
Trump should also work together to improve relations with Russia, which is not a serious threat to U.S. interests. In fact, these two countries should be allies because they have a common interest in fighting terrorism, ending the Syrian conflict and preventing Iran (and other countries) from acquiring nuclear weapons. Most importantly, the United States needs Russia to help contain the rising China. Given the history of competition between Russia and China and the long-term borders they have, Moscow is likely to join this effort once Washington has given up its wrong foreign policy to push it closer to Beijing.
46 John J. Mearsheimer, “Trump Should Embrace a Realist Foreign Policy,” The National Interest, November 27, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trump-should-embrace-realist-foreign-policy-18502.
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