Chapter 2 Theoretical Overview
2.7. New Security Concept in Structural Realism
2.7.2. The NSC is the Extension of “Five Peaceful Principles”
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each other because they are composed of sovereign units; thirdly, there is power distribution among units in the international system in which the variety of combination determines the variation of structure. Finally, the function of international system is composed of homogeneous states by interactive behaviors.
Therefore, we can understand that the NSC of structural realism is a concept of combining system and power, especially emphasizes the international affairs for the purpose of pursuing “security.” To sum up, the security concept of structural realism is composed of the concepts of system, power, and cooperation.
If we carefully examine and scrutinize China's NSC, it is easier to perceive that in fact, it also has the concept of realism. For example, China always emphasizes that security is obtained by means of cooperation, and emphasizes that security will be obtained by following the rules of equilibration of each country, and therefore each side should cooperate with one another in order to reach security on the basis of mutual benefit. Although China's NSC is not exactly like realism, it especially puts emphasis on the impacts of system and power, which is the realm the NSC should reach.
2.7.2. The NSC is the Extension of “Five Peaceful Principles”
Talking about China's status in the international system, China's leaders, from all periods, are following the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” which is put forward by Chou Enlai in 1955. The five principles are:
1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;
2. Mutual non-aggression;
3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit and;
5. Peaceful coexistence.
Since 1990s, all Chinese leaders including Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu
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Jintao have also followed the five principles as the basic claims of diplomacy or national security. China's “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” in fact, is a concept of “comprehensive” security.47
Because firstly, the three principles of “mutual non-aggression,”
“non-interference in each other's internal affairs,” and “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity” emphasize that each country has an independent characteristic and each country should have both independent sovereignty and inviolable characteristic as well. The direction of neo-realism is to execute the individual doctrine of every country, considering the interconnection of the international affairs depends on individual realm, multi-level negotiations, foundation of international regulations and institutions, which greatly help them to realize the possibility of cooperation. In fact, China's five principles of peaceful coexistence are put forward based on the trend of international development, hoping to maintain the rights of independence and sovereignty under international pressures, which is similar to the theory of neo-realism or the classical realism--the only analysis unit that the countries concerned is the international politics.
Secondly, the principles of “mutual benefit” and “peaceful coexistence” are the claims of liberalism based on the direction of individualism, thinking that the establishment of international affairs is conducted among states, furthermore the establishment of international institutions and norms can also be reached through different levels of negotiations and competitions, especially by the interdependence among nations, which helps it easier to realize the possibility of cooperation. The
47 黃財官，「中共『新安全觀』戰略研析與作為」，陸軍學術雙月刊 491 (桃園： 2007)：42。
[Huang Caiguan, Zhonggong “Xinanquanguan” Zhanlveyanxi Yu Zuowei (The Strategic Analysis of China’s New Security Concept), Lujun Xueshushuangyuekan (Army Bimonthly) 491 (Taoyuan: 2007):
42.]
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incarnation of liberalism is the so called “strategic benefit,” so as to focus on cooperation under the framework of “institutionalization.”48
Finally, China's five principles of peaceful coexistence are the synthesis of realism and idealism. However, the primary concerns of the five principles of peaceful coexistence are “independent country” and “national security” as premises, and then referring to “cooperation” and “mutual benefit.” In addition, both
“cooperation” and “mutual benefit” are the preconditions of one country's consideration of interest. Therefore, the neo-realism still covers most of China's five principles of peaceful coexistence. So as to say, that China's NSC is inherited by the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and is a synthesis security concept. The cooperative atmosphere in the theory still regards national interest as its prerequisite.
So, the background of strategic new security concept is derived from the view point of structural realism.
Therefore, China’s engagement with Central Asian states is a part of its NSC diplomacy which is focused on issues of internal security against the “three evils” and economic growth, in order to build a peaceful and steady surrounding. With the decline of Russian influence in this region, China also employs the five principles of peaceful coexistence to establish bilateral relations with the Central Asian states in order to consolidate its foothold in this area. This initial foothold resulted in the developments of both China’s grand strategy and a regional security organization that have caught the attention of Western observers. In brief, China’s intension to pursue interests of stability, security, economic development, and energy in Central Asia will
48 David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (Zhejiang: People University Publisher, March 2001), pp. 85-114.
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balance U.S. influence in order to maintain a geo-strategic advantage in this region.
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Chapter 3
China and Central Asia
Since the Central Asian states have become independent in 1991, the great powers have changed their Central Asia policies because of the special geography and the abundant energy resources in this region. When the September 11 Event occurred in 2001, the international situation entered the era of “terrorism” and “war on terrorism.” At the same time, the United States founded the coalition of anti-terrorism through Eurasia continent and later entered Afghanistan in 2002, which affects the Central Asian geo-politics and economy. The War on Terrorism (WOT) makes the Central Asian region to become an arena for great powers in the international stage.
Especially, on July 5, 2005, the SCO summit was held in Kazakhstan during which many representatives encouraged Uzbekistan to expel the U.S. military forces from its territory due to the Andijan riot.49 From the development of those events mentioned above, it makes the scenario more complicated for those great powers to compete with each other in this region. In particular for the great powers, like China, Russia, and the United States have the most influences in the region in terms of interests of geo-strategy. In this chapter, I would discuss the interactions among China, Russia, and the United States after the September 11 Event. Should the power interactions among the three powers be confrontational and restrictive, or should it be cooperative to reach mutual benefits? We will find the answers in this section.
49 Elizabeth Wishnick, p. 18.
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3.1. China's Security Concern in Central Asia
China’s influence and culture have been a part of Central Asia since ancient times. This chapter begins with China’s historical presence in Central Asia in order to establish a framework of its strategic interests within the region. The elements of security and stability, economic development, energy, and a new strategic environment after 1991, provide the foundation for China’s development of its “grand strategy” which produced a regional multilateral organization that has allowed China to currently maintain significant influence in the region. The topic presented in this chapter is to provide a clear understanding of Chinese influence in Central Asia and the strategic importance of this region. The aforementioned infers to China’s Xinjiang province which represents the gateway of great power competitions in Central Asia.
3.1.1. China’s Historical Presence in Central Asia
China’s presence in Central Asia began over 2,000 years ago in the Chinese Han Dynasty. Officially, Xinjiang is said to have been a part of China since it was first incorporated into the Han Dynasty (202 BC- 220AD) during the reign of Han Wudi (147 BC- 87 BC).50 Seen as a gateway to the west, China secured land routes and established trade with the Roman Empire. Known as the “Silk Road,” this route allowed Chinese products—primarily silk—land access to Western and Middle Eastern countries. The development of the Silk Road coincided with the Han’s western empire expansion and encountered with a Turkic nomadic tribe in Central Asia known as the Xiongnu—a people who had ties with the Huns. Encountering with the Xinongnu to secure the Silk Road led to Chinese expanding its control further into
50 Hasan Haider Karrar, The New Silk Road Diplomacy: A Regional Analysis of China’s Central Asia Foreign Policy, 1991-2005 (Montreal: McGill University, 2006), p. 9
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Central Asia in order to maintain a gateway to the west. The Han Empire eventually collapsed due to internal conflicts and led to China’s loss of Central Asia in 220 A.D.51
The reunification of China under the Tang Dynasty (581-902 A.D.) brought Central Asia into the forefront as a potential source of economic and cultural trade.
During this period, China began to expand its influence deeper into Central Asia than the Han Dynasty, eventually coming into direct contract with the Muslim people of greater Turkmen—a diverse Islamic group consisting of Arab, Tibetan and Uighur.52 A battle between the Muslims and China in 751 A.D.—the battle of Talas—led to Tang Dynasty’s defeat and increased Arab control of the region. China’s defeat in the battle and the subsequent instability led to the fall of the Tang Empire and the control of Central Asia.53
By the time the Ming Dynasty replaced its Mongol Yuan predecessor in the late fourteenth century, however, the futility of demarcating a stable frontier along the boundless steppes and deserts of Central Asia was recognized by Beijing. If Central Asia could not provide China with the desired buffer, then the vast lands beyond them would. As a result of this realization, the policy shifted under the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), eventually alternating between aggressive military campaigns against the Mongol and Turkic tribes as well as ambitious government-sponsored commercial efforts— the latter aimed primarily at exchanging a relatively abundant Chinese commodity, tea, for a much-needed natural resource that Chinese historically proved
51 孫壯志，「國際新格局中的中亞五國」， p. 60.
52 于海波，後冷戰時期俄美中三國中亞政策比較研究，(北京中國中央黨校：2007)，頁 14。[Yu
Haibo, Houlengzhashiqi Er Mei Zhong Sanguo Zhongya Zhengce Bijiaoyanjiu (Russia, U.S., and China’s Central Asia policy after Cold War) Zhongguo Zhongyangdangxiao (Beijing: China’s Communist Party School, June 2007): 14.]
53 于海波，p. 15.
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incapable of producing internally, cavalry horses—both of which were attempts to impose order along the border areas. In addition, the Ming rulers, especially the Yongle Emperor (1402–1424), set about systematically to ward off the threat of any unified Mongol resurgence or other encroachment from the steppes against the security of their empire by carefully balancing the forces of the various tribes against one another in a rather sophisticated framework.54
China’s internal stability during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) led to a territorial expansion campaign into Central Asia. After gaining control of Taiwan and Tibet, Qing seized control of “Chinese Central Asia” in 1757 after defeating the Mongol and Uighur army.55 Qing rule was minimal as she allowed religious and local leaders to maintain relative control of the region. The expansionist campaign by the Qing coincided with Russian expansion into Central Asia and led to a series of battles from 1751-1881 that resulted in a treaty with Russia over disputed territory.56 In 1884 Xinjiang, translated to new territory, was formally incorporated into Qing Empire but the Manchu Dynasty was weakening and it subsequently collapsed in 1911.57
The successor republican government was not strong either; under this circumstance, the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to back the Uighurs of Xinjiang in establishing a Kazakh and Uighur East Turkestan Republic in 1933. This attempt was suppressed by the Chinese government, only to be re-established in 1944 and the Soviets managed to control the Ili region until 1946. Xinjiang finally reverted to Chinese rule toward the end of the Chinese Civil War and was constituted as the
54 J. Peter Pham, “Beijing’s Great Game: Understanding Chinese Strategy in Central Eurasia,”
American Foreign Policy Interests 28 (2006): 53-55.
55 Hasan Haider Karrar, p. 11.
56 Hasan Haider Karrar, p. 10.
57 Russell Ong, “China’s Security Interests in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey 4 (December 2005):
426.
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Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after the Communist Party took power in 1949.58
With the decline of Russian influence in Central Asia in the late 1980’s and the eventual independence of Central Asian states in 1991, China’s interest in this region began to reemerge after 80 years of limited contact.
3.1.2. The Overview of Central Asia's Geo-strategy
Central Asia has been a heartland in Eurasia continent which does not only connect the Eurasia and the Middle East, but also connect China and its west land.
After the Cold War, the United States brought both the European and its power influences into this area, moreover it turned Central Asia into a strategic position in terms of geo-politics and geo-economic as well. In fact, the geopolitical expert Mackinder indicates that:
“Who rules the Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island controls the world.”59
In the early 20th century, the Tsarist Russia and British empires were struggling for supremacy in Central Asian region, especially to include Afghan region. It was at the time, the Afghanistan was of primary interest for the two empires, which was firstly called the “great game.”60 Nowadays, the geo-political importance of Central Asia has been highly evaluated again, not only because of its importance of the natural resources but also because of the great potential it will cause in the
58 Russell Ong, p. 426.
59 Halford John Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Wikipedia.org, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Geographical_Pivot_of_History, (accessed: 20101201)
60 Farrukh Irnazarov, Strategic Importance of Central Asia: The New Great Game between the United States and Russia (Copenhagen NIAS, April 2006), p. 8.
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international politics and economical effects in the future. Therefore, to Central Asian peripherals, controlling the business route and fortune in Central Asia means controlling the convenience of doing business and the abundant energy supplies. On the contrary, the abundant natural resources in this region is the capital for Central Asian states to fight for, and so do other great powers in terms of keeping their interferences on political, economy, and sovereignty issues which become the source of contradictory and power imbalance. We know that when talking about developing or seizing natural resources, we often think of the competitions in geo-political and international politics, especially in Central Asia, the petroleum and natural gas have the geo-strategic importance that makes itself the heartland within international environment. On the other hand, the natural resources in Central Asia will become a focus under regional competition and geo-political strategy.61 So, there are scholars claim that under the realm of geo-politics, Central Asia is located in the “heartland” in regards of oil and natural gas, whoever controls Central Asia's natural resources will gain the leading position in the international geo-strategy.62
To sum up, the domination of Central Asia's natural resources in the 21th century is related to the competitions among the great powers from Europe, America, and Asia.
Therefore the energy issue has become the key element in redefining the international political status in the post-Cold War era. What is different from the past is the competitions for Central Asia's energy might change the international status among China, Russia, and the United States in the foreseeable future.
61 孫壯志，「中亞五國的地緣戰略地位」，東歐中亞研究 4 (北京: 2000): 65。[Sun Zhuangzhi, Zhongyawuguo De Diyuanzhanlvediwei (The Geo-strategic Status of Five Central Asian States) Dongou Zhongyu Yanjiu (East European Russian and Central Asia Studies) 4 (Beijing: 2000): 65.]
62 徐小杰，新世界的油氣地緣政治 （北京：社會科學文獻出版社，1998 年 4 月），頁 34-35。
[Xu Xiaojie, Xinshijie De Youqidiyuanzhengzhi (The Oil Geo-politics in the New World) Shehuikexuewenxianchubanshe (Beijing: Social Science Literature Publisher, April 1998), pp. 34-35.]
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3.1.3. China’s Security Issues toward Central Asia
China's western region is adjacent to Central Asia within which the security issues are in connection with China's economic development and national security.
For a long time, Beijing has felt threatened by the terrorism development in Central Asia especially in its XUAR. In order to keep economic growth, energy and strategic interests, Beijing needs to obtain the preconditions of realizing its strategic and energy objectives in Central Asia, which is based on the internal stability in XUAR. Thus, I will put emphasis on three dimensions including politics, economy, and ethical problems in this section.
Political Security
China had territorial disputes with the USSR before it collapsed, and both sides had fought a few wars. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the main concern for China’s security issues toward Central Asian states was the border dispute between XUAR and Central Asia. Beijing’s main concern here lies in territorial security issue which has become annoying for both China and Russia. In this context, Beijing wanted to grasp this opportunity to build good relationships with its peripherals including Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to make the border issue more peaceful.63 In 1996, two important agreements were signed to deepen military trust in their border regions, and also to reduce military forces deployed in the border areas. These agreements provided that each side was to refrain from staging military exercises directly against the other. By doing so, Beijing has demilitarized and stabilized border with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It is obvious
63 Lowell Dittmer, pp. 14-15.
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for Beijing to know that border stability has been the center of its economic development plans and foreign policy priorities. In addition, China’s diplomacy in Central Asia aims to prevent the region from becoming a distraction from its internal development and more importantly foreign policy goals. Just like Ramakant Dwivedi says “there is a major emphasis given to the periphery in Chinese strategic thinking.
Its peripheral security has the following two goals: (1) to maintain stability within its territory adjoining the boundary and to ensure the security and economic welfare of its people; and (2) to ensure peace and stability on the border by promoting a belt of good neighborliness and friendship.”64
Economic Security
China’s fast economic growth has been pushing itself to seek for more petroleum with stable reserves. Yet Central Asia happened to meet this requirement of being rich in mineral wealth, especially in oil reserve. In other words, China’s main economic interest in the region is energy. China has evolved into an oil importer ever since 1993, importing about 40 to 45 percent of its oil needs.65 Furthermore, it is the world has become the second largest oil importer and consumer of energy since 2003, accounting for 40 percent of the increase in world oil demand since 2000. As about 60 percent of China’s current oil import is from the Middle East, and roughly 80 percent of them passes through the 600-mile long Straits of Malacca, whose security depends on the U.S. Navy based on consideration of the constrains of Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC), and the potential conflicts across Taiwan Straits, the SLOC
China’s fast economic growth has been pushing itself to seek for more petroleum with stable reserves. Yet Central Asia happened to meet this requirement of being rich in mineral wealth, especially in oil reserve. In other words, China’s main economic interest in the region is energy. China has evolved into an oil importer ever since 1993, importing about 40 to 45 percent of its oil needs.65 Furthermore, it is the world has become the second largest oil importer and consumer of energy since 2003, accounting for 40 percent of the increase in world oil demand since 2000. As about 60 percent of China’s current oil import is from the Middle East, and roughly 80 percent of them passes through the 600-mile long Straits of Malacca, whose security depends on the U.S. Navy based on consideration of the constrains of Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC), and the potential conflicts across Taiwan Straits, the SLOC