Chapter 3 China and Central Asia
3.4. China’s Central Asia Policy after September 11
3.4.3. China Uses SCO as A Platform of anti-Terrorism
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noninterference in domestic affairs of SCO members and proclaim the right for sovereign states to choose their own model of development free of external pressures, especially from the United States.120 Nevertheless, any sign of differences among the two powers would have an impact on the workings of the SCO and Central Asia.121
3.4.3. China Uses SCO as A Platform of anti-Terrorism
After the 1990s, the Central Asia is threatened by terrorism while China, Russia, and Central Asia states formed leader summit in SF to solve the security problem on boarder disputes. In 1998, the Shanghai Five Almaty summit took note of principles of combating terrorism, and then in 2001, when the SCO was established, all member states signed “The pact to battle three forces” which clearly stated the consensus of combating international terrorism. After the September 11 Event, the member states of SCO signed “the declaration by the heads of the SCO member states” also stated that the members would cooperate in the combat against terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism (also called the “three forces”), furthermore to include issues of illegal drug trafficking, weapons trading, and illegal immigrations at the same time. In addition, the leaders signed the “SCO agreement on the regional anti-terrorism organization,” and then to create an executive council to govern the anti-terrorism center in Tashkent.
China's Intention of Joint Military Exercise
Under the framework of SCO, the military cooperation of every member state is regarded as the most concrete operation of anti-terrorism. China and Tajikistan held
120 Elizabeth Wishnick, p. 29.
121 Ramakant Dwivedi, p.154
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the military exercise called “Code One” in 2002, and then China held another 7 bilateral and multilateral military exercises with the member states of the SCO such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan for the following years.
Especially, the largest joint anti terrorism military exercise is “Peace Mission 2007.”
From “September 11” to the present, terrorist activities occurred in Central Asia, we find out that the characteristics of terrorism are including exploding, assassination, kidnapping, hijacking, and suicide car or human bombings etc., which are small scale, invisible, and lethal. The purpose of China's participating in the anti-terrorism military exercise under the framework of the SCO is to utilize the opportunity to train joint exercise ability with other member states of SCO, and invest in a large scale of weapons and personnel in order to use simulation and experience of military exercise to try to gain the scenario of a real war.
Generally speaking, there are four strategies behind China’s military mindset: (1) strategy of threatening. In order to achieve the political goals, China needs to use military exercises to show its military strength to the outside world, and to reach a consensus domestically; (2) the experience of having scenarios of “real war.” The best way to prepare a war is to simulate one in order to realize what situations should be faced during real wars; (3) military exchanges. Through military exercise and military diplomacy, it is easier for two countries to understand each other, friendship, cooperation, and mutual development, especially by warship interview which is on the basis of military exchanges; and (4) military transformation. We can amend combat guidance, combat data sheet, and tactical guidance during the military
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exercises.122
For example, Peace Mission 2007, carried out during the period of August 8 to 17, 2007, which was the largest SCO joint exercise in the organization's six-year history. By analyzing China's military structure during the exercise, we see the China mobilized its Army Combat Groups and Air Force Combat Groups to join the anti-terrorism exercise within Peace Mission 2007. China's Army is consisted mainly of mechanized infantry brigades carrying out anti-terrorism mission instead of using Companies as combating units, like they did in the past. As to the Air Force, China sent out its new combat fighter jets like J-7 and FC-1, and the training objects include counter air operations, close air support for the ground forces to counter terrorism, bombing operation, air dropping forces, and helibone operations, etc., the exercise is deemed as a perfect Joint Ground Forces Operation.123
As for China, the biggest problems are issues of Tibet turmoil, Xinjiang independence, and Taiwan Strait issue. On the one hand, China wants to show its military strength by carrying out anti-terrorism exercises. On the other hand, Beijing also shows its determination of taking the responsibility of anti-terrorism in the international community. Therefore, in order to understand China's strategic intention behind the anti-terrorism military exercise under the framework of SCO, we have to pay close attention to its direction of future development.
122 “Pay Attention to China’s Strategic Implication of Maneuvering SCO Joint Military Exercise,”
Military News, August 1, 2007, available at:
http://news.gpwb.gov.tw/newsgpwb_2009/news.php?css=2&rtype=1&nid=21630.
(accessed:20110220).
123 “We have to pay attention to China’s Strategic Intention in case of Anti-Terrorism,” Military News, August 13, 2007, available at:
http://news.gpwb.gov.tw/newsgpwb_2009/news.php?css=2&rtype=2&nid=22557, (accessed:20110220)
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Summary
China’s strategy in Central Asia is to consolidate its legitimate possession of peripheral territory expansion and to maintain the regional stability at the same time.
For Beijing, the key questions are whether political stability will prevail in Central Asia and whether its rapid growth can be sustained. Therefore, Beijing has focused on the issues of strengthening its political, security, economic and energy cooperation with Central Asian states, in order to meet the goals of securing its national interest, and further to peacefully rise as a regional power. In this context, China especially puts efforts on counter Uighur separatist and terrorism organizations such as the ETIM and Islamic Organizations of Turkistan who have conducted a series of bombing in China’s Xinjiang province since 1997. In addition, with Russian influence decreasing in this region, Beijing simultaneously shifted its policy to establish bilateral relations with the Central Asian states based on its five principles in order to consolidate its position in this region.
After September 11, 2001, however, the penetration of the U.S. influence into Central Asia not only prevents China from expanding its influence, but also traps China from going out, thus effectively containing China’s rising. In this perspective, Beijing is making emphasis on the developments of political, economic, and infrastructural links among Central Asian states, so as to strategically control Central Asian region and its Xinjiang province. Because Beijing is concerned about its peaceful rise under a security environment on its western flank, the SCO is used by China as embodiment of regional cooperation focusing on both economy and security.
Beijing has endeavored to establish multiple regional and global relationships in order to counter U.S. primacy in the international system. Subsequently, China and Russia have successfully coexisted under the framework of SCO, and they also cooperate
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with Central Asian states to curb the “three evils,” trying to integrate regional military powers and to cooperate on security issues. Moreover, China and Russia have further their cooperation on regional security issues of economy, energy, and infrastructure of Central Asian states, which best illustrate China’s Central Asia foreign policy.
In sum, China’s strategic considerations of maintaining regional stability, economic development, and getting access to energy continue to drive the goals of decreasing U.S. influence in order to maintain geo-strategic advantages in the region.
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Chapter 4
China’s Strategic Calculations after September 11 in Central Asia
After September 11, 2001, China’s interests in Central Asia also changed depending on the interaction with the United States and Russia while three major players pursue different strategic considerations in this region. For China, security has been an important consideration ever since September 11, 2001, and the Chinese saw an advantage of U.S. presence in the region to counter terrorism. Furthermore, Beijing also perceives the importance of this region in terms of providing access to energy, and contributing to Beijing’s maritime strategy.
For the United States, the importance of Central Asia is growing, focusing on GWTO, ensuring energy security, and promoting democratic reform. Finally, Russia views Central Asia as its backyard due to its former Soviet historical status, considering reestablishing itself to become a global power again.
4.1. The U.S.-China-Russia's Counter Terrorism in Central Asia
The U.S. has successfully accessed to Central Asia by WOT. After the U.S. got the decisive victory in Afghanistan War, it tended to squeeze its greatest competitors--China and Russia, out of this region. Today the U.S. is still the only super power in the world, and in order to counter the U.S. threat, China has to cooperate with Russia while competing with each other at the same time. Yet for both
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China and Russia, the relationship will be relatively cooperative than competitive.
4.1.1. U.S.-China anti-Terrorism
Even before September 11, 2001, the U.S. interests in Central Asia were growing.
But the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have however dramatically increased U.S. security interests in this region. As the former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that it is important that U.S. forces be located in places where they are wanted, welcomed, and needed. Building new relationship with states, including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, George and Azerbaijan as logistical forwarding area, are vital to the war against terrorism.124 When the U.S. approaches each Central Asian states to initiate security cooperation on the issue of countering terrorism, there is no explicit objection for either Russia or China. Today, the U.S. influence in Central is decreasing while China’s influence in the region has dramatically increased as its ties with the Central Asian states have deepened. It appears that the United States may need China’s help to achieve its goals in Central Asia over the long-term more on the issue of Global War on Terrorism.125
On the one hand, the United States needs to stabilize Afghanistan and combat terrorism of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Furthermore, Washington hopes to use Central Asian region as a permanent base for the use of Afghanistan destabilization. In the context of the GWOT, certain missions become priorities insofar as work with their armed forces are concerned, including counter-terrorism as a vital objective. On the other hand, China would like to stabilize its borders with Central Asia and Russia without being annoyed by outer sources of instability, which leads to crushing outside
124 Stephen J. Blank, After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2005), pp. 1-2.
125 Lowell Dittmer, pp. 16-18.
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support for Uighur separatism within its Xinjiang province. Under this circumstance, it is evident that both China and the U.S. share the same strategic goals of security and stability in Central Asia, particularly on the issue of counter-terrorism. On August 25th 2002, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Armitage, publicly claimed the ETIM is a terrorist organization while paying his visit to China; it is obvious that the U.S.
intended to exchange strategic interests with China. In other words, Washington is asking Beijing to share international affairs such as the “Six Party Talks,” and
“anti-terrorism,” meanwhile Beijing intended to fight and reduce the threats of separatism in its west region by cooperating with the United States.126
However, there are still some areas where China and the United States are not aligned on the issue of anti-terrorism. For the United State, it wanted to take the leading role in Central Asia for the expansion of “coalition of anti-terrorism,” indeed, the United States has already got deeper involvement with Central Asian region under the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). After September 11, 2001, the United States intensified its concern for gaining access to distant theaters, and therefore a quest for basing and logistics in Central Asian region entails a growing search for allies or at least robust strategic partnerships with like-minded states. Meanwhile, China aggressively enhanced SCO as a counter-terrorism center to cut off the sources of external threats to China, and cooperating with Russia and Central Asian states to strike the forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Even though the SCO has upgraded China’s military profile considerable through combined exercises, its platform remains an openly anti-American one, and China’s perception of the U.S.
military presence in Central Asia is openly hostile, taking it as a real threat and
126林麗香, p. 23.
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The intension of China is to exclude the U.S. from SCO led by China and Russia, and to enhance both of its military support and arms sales to Central Asian states.127 By conducting joint military exercises with the members of SCO, China will suppress internal threats within Central Asia and combating outside support for rebellious Uighurs within its Xinjiang province.128
4.1.2. U.S.-Russia Anti-Terrorism
The U.S. military presence in Central Asia in pursuit of its GWOT has created frictions in relations with Russia and China. For Russia, such friction is inevitable, but it can be combined with prudent cooperation in areas of shared interests. In this case, it does not necessarily reflect fundamental disagreements about the nature of the war against terrorism or the pursuit of security interest in Central Asia. Russia is closely aligned with the U.S. definition of the terrorist threat. She understands the complex security challenges associated with the phenomenon of Islamism. In this context, Russia confronts a major threat of jihadist terrorism in areas adjacent to and within its borders which it is in the U.S interests to help it contain. Therefore, Washington and Russia have opportunities to coordinate their Central Asian policies on the basis of their common strategic interests.129
On the other hand, by joining the ally of anti-terrorism, Moscow gets the
127 張如倫，「美國圖謀中亞之戰略意涵」，國防雜誌 1 (龍潭: 2002): 37。[Chang Rulun, Meiguo Tumou Zhongya Zhi Zhanlveyihan (The U.S. Strategic Intentions toward Central Asia) Guofan Zazhi (Defense Journal) 1 (Lontan: 2002): 37.]
128 蔡忠誠，「九一一事件後美『中』俄在中亞的競逐」，國立政治大學碩士論文 (台北：2005
年 4 月)，頁 105。[Tsai Zhongcheng, Jiuyiyishijianhou Mei “Zhong” E Zai Zhongya De Jingzhu (The Competition among U.S., China, and Russia in Central Asia after the 911 Event), GuoLi Cheng Chi DarXue Lunwen (NCCU thesis), (Taipei: March 2005), p. 105.]
129 R. Craig Nation, U.S. Interests in the New Eurasia (Carlisle Barracks, P.A.: US Army War College, Mar, 2007): 113-115.
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leverage on the issues of anti-missile, expansion of NATO, and obtains financial assistants from the West, while curbing Caucasian region, Central Asia, and its southern regions to improve relationship with the United States.130 Consequently, because Russia joins the allies of anti-terrorism, the United States and western countries will not criticize Russia on the issue of Chechnya for violating human rights.131
In addition, there are some issues remained to be considered in terms of the cooperation between Russia and the U.S. on anti-terrorism because the United States challenged Russia's status in Central Asia by projecting its power in the region. In 2004, the Bush administration was resumed, and reiterated its determination on anti-terrorism which was deemed as a long-term war, and all aspects show that the United States will station in Central Asia for a long period of time. For example, after the Afghanistan war started, in 2004 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told Central Asian states that “stability in this region is of paramount importance and vital to national interest.”132 In other words, the United States will have long term interests in Central Asia and the magnitude is too big to be imagined. We can easily tell the U.S. intensions and calculations by seeing the decision-making officials in Washington emphasizing the importance of Central Asia since its presence in the region. It would also lead to a sharp political division, even alienation between Moscow and Washington, for beyond where the Russians would feel it safe to go.
Yet a much more threatening possibility would be destabilization of Central Asia.
130 于海波, p.137.
131 Mao Huei-Ming, “The U.S.-China-Russia Strategic Triangle Relationship-Since the Beginning of the Bush Administration,” Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, p. 94, available at:
http://www2.tku.edu.tw/~ti/Journal/8-3/834.pdf. (accessed: 20110227)
132 Stephan J. Blank, “U.S. Interests in Central Asia and The Challenges to Them,” p.1.
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This could result from an Islamist-led domestic uprising in the Central Asian states against the authorities. In Moscow’s perspective of view, the reason might be caused by the United States sponsored democracy promotion, undermines the legitimacy of the authoritarians of each Central Asian states. Another danger of a deteriorating war in Iraq led by the United States lies in the prospect of thousands of experienced jihadists finding their ways into north Caucasus and into Central Asia threatening the status quo there.133 From Moscow’s perspective, such a war would have the tremendous destabilization in its southern neighborhood. It would lead to a fissure between Moscow and Washington, not to mention the Russians would feel it safe to cooperate with the United States.
4.1.3. Sino-Russia Anti-Terrorism
After the independence of the Central Asian states, China and Russia not only shared a new strategic buffer zone but also had the same interests in the region because both Beijing and Moscow faced the threats from terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism. Therefore, it is necessary for China, Russia, and Central Asian states to cooperate to fight against the “three evils” in order to safeguard the security for themselves and to gain the stabilization in Central Asia. However, the influence caused by the “three evils” has been increasing in China and Russia's backyard, which seriously threatened China and Russia. Furthermore, Beijing and Moscow especially fear of restive minorities and ethnic separatism in their border territories supposed by Islamic fundamentalist movements in Central Asia. Indeed, China has Xinjiang independent issue and Russia has Chechnya independent issue as
133 Dmitri Trenin, pp. 40-41.
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well. In this respect, Beijing and Moscow had come to share similar views regarding stabilization on Central Asian region, which also makes Beijing recognize that it is beyond one country’s power to deal with issues like terrorism and separatism. Thus, China’s strategy is to put emphasis on common interests in economic development, security, stability and anti-terrorism through its bilateral relations with Central Asian states, which correspond to the principle of “non-interference” in other states’ internal affairs, making Beijing appear as a reliable partner from the perspective of the region’s remaining authoritarian leaders.
Consequently, China and Russia share similar views not only regarding separatism issues in Central Asia, but also of the terrorism issue in contemporary international systems. Therefore, these shared interests led to contribute to the establishment of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership announced by Jiang and Yeltsin in 1996.134 For example, China declared that Chechnya was a “domestic affair of Russia” while Moscow stated Xinjiang is an “inseparable” part for Beijing. In this context, the strategic partnership is developed on the basis of common security interest between Beijing and Moscow and led to the formation of SF as a regional
Consequently, China and Russia share similar views not only regarding separatism issues in Central Asia, but also of the terrorism issue in contemporary international systems. Therefore, these shared interests led to contribute to the establishment of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership announced by Jiang and Yeltsin in 1996.134 For example, China declared that Chechnya was a “domestic affair of Russia” while Moscow stated Xinjiang is an “inseparable” part for Beijing. In this context, the strategic partnership is developed on the basis of common security interest between Beijing and Moscow and led to the formation of SF as a regional