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which highlights the already important and obvious consequences of energy club in SCO.
On the other hand, the U.S. factor is Russian main concern on energy issue in Central Asia. Accordingly, Moscow curbs Kazakhstan from supporting the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline while the US is urging Kazakhstan to join this project.
Russia even signed an accord with Bulgaria and Greece to construct a Burgas-Alexandropulis pipeline as a rival to counter BTC while the U.S. purpose is to promote the idea of pipelines bypassing Russian territory.167
Under this circumstance, Moscow has been actively providing cooperation with energy rich Central Asian states, like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as partners to build a new natural gas pipeline alone Caspian shore from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to Russia’s support to consolidate their authoritarian government in power, while Russia needs to steadily maintain the present regime by dominating Central Asian gas and oil. Therefore, Russia needs to preserve control of transportation routes of Central Asian energy resources, so as to influence this region.168 Players in this region are interested in getting access to Central Asian energy resources and try to break Russian monopoly. Therefore, Moscow always takes into consideration the U.S. factor.
4.4. Summary
The interests of Central Asia among the United States, China, and Russia can be
167 Aitmakhanov Nurzhan, p. 58.
168 Aitmakhanov Nurzhan, p. 61.
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divided into three aspects: (1) anti-terrorism, (2) geo-strategy; and (3) competition for energy resources. On the issue of cooperation on counter terrorism, the war on terrorism is the focus of the U.S. at present, while China and Russia are taking this chance to strike Xinjiang's independence and Chechnya problem. Therefore, there are common interests among the U.S., China, and Russia on the issue of cooperation to counter terrorism, by different calculations and different methods. On the aspect of geo-strategy, all of the U.S., China, and Russia have actively plotted to take the leading role in dominating Central Asia according to strategic situation after September 11, 2001.
The leading role of Central Asia has been exchanged between Russia and the U.S.
for many times. At the time of “Color Revolution,” the U.S. has swift and fierce offensive to which Russia has barely reacted. After SCO asked the U.S. Army to leave Central Asia, China and Russia shifted their strategies from defensive to offensive.
Since the end of July 2004, the U.S. frequently sent Minister of Defense Rumsfield to visit Central Asia to persuade Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan into cooperation with the United States. But before the U.S. Secretary of State Rice visited Central Asia, the Central Asian states draw nearer to Russia in the SCO summit meeting, because of both China and Russia basically have the same policy toward Central Asia, while Russia puts more emphasis on military cooperation with Central Asian states on the prerequisite of non-interference of the domestic affairs of Central Asian states. At present, in order to develop relations with Russia, it is a trend for Central Asian states to be alliance with Russia, which shows that Russia has recaptured the leading right of Central Asian affairs.
The United States has been promoting democracy, freedom, and human rights values in Central Asian states, which benefit the people in Central Asia; it not only
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produces potential threats and challenges to the regimes of Central Asian states, but also makes the leaders of Central Asian states become vigilant about the direct threat to the vital interest of the regime of Central Asian states directly. As a result, facing the U.S. challenges, China and Russia temporarily occupy the leading position in the competition of Central Asia. All Central Asian states are willing to get benefits from the competitions among the U.S., China, and Russia. Moreover, the U.S. has strong military and economic powers and the superiority of political influence, which makes Central Asian states impressive and greatly benefit from energy investments, economic aids, and military build-up provided by western countries. In other words, the situation of political turbulence has been normal in Central Asia. In the long run, the competition combinations of the U.S., China, and Russia will still go on.
Another important issue we should pay attention to is that China’s strategy in Central Asia has been defined as diversifying its source of energy, seeking access to energy resources through Central Asian states. Beijing has sought to achieve this strategic consideration through the extension of modern infrastructure throughout Central Asian states with connection of the possible Pakistan’s Gawdar port located in the Indian Ocean without passing through the Malacca Strait, taking risks enforced by the United States. However this strategy has been significantly affected by the implications of the September 11 terrorist attack in 2001, and the subsequent U.S.
military projection and political influence in Central Asia. The United States has taken further steps to build a strategic ring of encirclement in China’s neighboring regions.
By establishing forward military bases in Central Asia, the United States is to contain China in the name of counterterrorism. Why China picks up Central Asia as its strategic competition arena? It is because the U.S. policies of maintaining its worldwide military presence as efforts to control the energy lifeblood of a rising
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China, which serves U.S. national interests regarding the energy issue and the vulnerability of the other country as “energy weapon.” This vulnerability has made China to actively pursue energy security. In order to prevent the possibility of other great power’s using the energy as a weapon to counter China’s further rise, Beijing must thwart some countries’ attempts to contain on the energy issue and hinder China’s rise. Consequently, Beijing has to unfold effective bilateral or multilateral cooperation on energy sources. Further, it has to develop new markets, promote energy cooperation and find new transportation routes. In other words, Beijing wants to have stability, prosperity, and development with energy supply countries, so as to diversify sources of energy, build a strategic reserve, and build naval or air capacity so it has the capability to project power in the Malacca Strait. In this case, getting access to Pakistan’s Gwader port is the best solution. In order to do so, China needs to stabilize Central Asian region.
Therefore, both China and Russia have common interests in reducing U.S.
influence in Central Asia. In this perspective, the SCO provides a mechanism within which Beijing can pursue those interests shared with Russia and the Central Asian states, in particular, with regard to securing access to energy resources, and ensuring a stable political-security environment.
In sum, since the September 11 Event occurred in 2001, Central Asia’s importance has evolved one step further, and become significant as a pivotal arena of international security in which great powers like China, Russia, and the United States are competing for the energy resources. This is primarily because of the enhanced strategic importance that has superseded the Central Asian geographic isolation which has become a point of attraction for many big powers’ national interests. With regard to China, since the September 11 terrorist attacks, it has steadily been expanding its
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security links with Central Asia. It is also worth taking note of the fact that despite Beijing’s effort to encourage increased economic interaction with the region, the dynamics of the local powers in the region compel China to increase its security and military maneuvers in the region as a priority. In economic terms, this increasing security perception makes China to look at Central Asia as a region of great opportunities of diverting its energy routes. Therefore, in the given context, it is necessary for many around the globe to understand the dynamics of Central Asian politics carefully and proceed accordingly.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
In order to find the answers of China’s strategic considerations in Central Asia after the September 11 Event, there are three questions needed to be answered. 1.
What role does Central Asia play to China? 2. What are China’s intensions to dominate Central Asia? 3. What is China’s strategy after September 11 after the U.S.
deployed military and expanded its influence in Central Asia?
Central Asia has been at the crossroads of the East and the West for a long time, where is also China’s western back door next to its Xinjiang province. Normally, we call it as a bridge linking China to the South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. In this regard, Central Asia has become the grounds for a clash of great powers, including China, Russia, and the United States. Therefore, Beijing has tried very hard to control Central Asia while exerting other powers out of this region. Beijing’s strategy is to use Central Asia as a supporting element to ensure national interests, especially to improve energy security and national security by countering the three evils in its Xinjiang province. Economically, Beijing could reduce its dependency on vulnerable maritime supplies of energy and countering the three evils in its Xinjiang province. In order to achieve these goals, China has developed a cooperative relationship with Russia and Central Asian states within the framework of SCO, enhancing security and influence in its western region and further to achieve its “ peaceful rising.”
In addition, Central Asia also plays a platform where China and Russia have common interests in reducing the U.S. influence in Central Asia. Although there are
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competitive elements existing between the two great powers, each considers its best interests in order to enhance the capacity of influencing Central Asia. For China cooperation with Russia serves its benefit by using SCO as a platform to enhance China’s military security in Central Asia as one of the elements of peaceful rise in the long run.
For China, Central Asia provides with a platform of pursuing its strategy of peaceful rise while calculating the security of its western flank. As aforementioned, China is in a stronger position in the region for the time being, and attempts to strengthen its influence both in Central Asia and Xinjiang. The purpose of Beijing’s engagement in Central Asia is to take this place as an energy hub. Although China has succeeded in resolving long standing border disputes, it also focuses on the military cooperation and curbs separatist movements within its Xinjiang province. Increasing politico-strategic-economic cooperation between Central Asian states and China has enormous implications for Beijing itself. Beijing considers Central Asia as its important western flank with a high importance given to its geo-political and geo-economic interests. Besides, Central Asian oil and gas reserves also provide an attractive energy diversification option for China.
In the longer term, China’s security interests will be using Xinjiang as a springboard to defend its interests in Central Asia. After the September 11 Event, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia had provided Beijing with an opportunity to further its wider military strategic planning to extend its influence from Central Asia to Indian Ocean. Firstly, China has prioritized economic cooperation with Central Asian states in order to maintain its balance of power with Russia and the United States. Secondly, China’s geo-political calculation is to contain India’s rising in the future by facilitating the linkages between Pakistan and Central Asian states. While
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absorbing the interaction with the United States, China also learned how to obtain a beneficial position within Central Asia. In this context, Beijing would consider development extra regional capacities to enhance its position. Thus, SCO has become a framework of improving bilateral political, economic and military relations with Central Asian states and diversifying its access to the region’s energy resources. Thus, China’s priority in Central Asia is to maintain its economic stability and to avoid damaging its peaceful rise. Finally, China’s strategy in Central Asia has been defined by the endeavor to assure and achieve its national security while sovereignty and territorial integrity are significant national priorities, continuing economic and social development and maintaining its status on the world stage are also strategic priorities.
Therefore, any causes to undermine China’s economy inhabit its flow of strategic natural resources, provoke it’s public, or even undermine its international influence are considered threatening to China’s national security. This strategy has been significantly affected by the implication of the September 11 Event, and the subsequent projection of U.S. military and political influence into Central Asia.
Since September 11, 2001, the great powers in the world have taken anti-terrorism as an excuse to deploy military bases around the world. In Central Asia, each great power has excuses to establish policies needed to ensure its national interests. In fact, the competitions among Sino-U.S.-Russia in Central Asia have apparently emerged. Meanwhile, each player has sought to either bilateral or multilateral mechanism to cooperate or to curb each. Indeed, the competitions between China and the U.S. remain the same, except for issue of anti-terrorism. Both China and U.S. practically handle the issue of anti-terrorism. The U.S. cooperated with Pakistan in order to invade Afghanistan, while China accepted the fact that U.S.
military deployment in Central Asia. Beijing’s practical behavior may earn chances to
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cooperate with the U.S. to exchange with U.S. position on Taiwan issue, and earn its reputation as a responsible power in the world community, while suppressing the terrorism. In sum, Beijing tries to enhance its international influence by cooperating with Central Asian states, thus to maintain political stability and share economic interest, and blocking military powers from getting into the region.
To sum up, the rise of China is the primary factor for changes in Central Asia security environment. After September 11, 2001, China’s core objective was to sustain economic development and enhance comprehensive national power. Driven by the rapid growth of its comprehensive national power in recent years, China has been actively engaged in Central Asia regional affairs and provided countries in the region with assistance in order to extend its influence.
A realist perspective can be employed to understand Sino-Russia-U.S. strategic competitions and cooperation. According to both classical and neo-realist theories, a uni-polar world order is inherently unstable, and the emergence of a sole dominant power will lead other powers to oppose the hegemony. Since the September 11 Event has occurred, however, China’s fear of U.S. presence has intrigued Beijing’s response to become a major influence in Central Asia as soon as possible based on this region’s proximity and the potential for Beijing’s strategic needs. Thus at this time, Beijing’s goals for its influence in the region has been summarized as sustainable policies to promote national security and regional stability, and further to compete for influence of the region and its resources, which are keys for sits peaceful rise. When the United States shifted its strategy of gravity from the Middle East to the Southeast Asia and East Asia, to enhance its influence in economic, political, and military focuses, China, on the contrary, is enhancing its political influence in Middle East and Central Asia because Beijing wants to occupy the economic vacuum left by the United States. The
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purpose of China’s strategic consideration is “Energy.” It needs huge amount of oil, and natural resources to support its thriving economy. Therefore, China’s strategic calculation in Central Asia is focusing on oil and gas which increased Moscow’s anxiety over the future development shared with Russia countering the United States.
In order to sustainably keep Beijing’s influence in Central Asia, China’s strategic plan is to enhance the infrastructure in Central Asian states to meet the “New Silk Road”
plan. The eventual goal is to connect Iran and Turkey, making China directly getting access to the Middle without passing Malacca Strait. In the foreseeable future, Beijing’s political and military power will continue to grow, gradually changing the status quo of geo-strategic situation and regional security in Central Asia.
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