Chapter 3 China and Central Asia
3.1. China's Security Concern in Central Asia
3.1.1. China’s Historical Presence in Central Asia
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
3.1. China's Security Concern in Central Asia
China’s influence and culture have been a part of Central Asia since ancient times. This chapter begins with China’s historical presence in Central Asia in order to establish a framework of its strategic interests within the region. The elements of security and stability, economic development, energy, and a new strategic environment after 1991, provide the foundation for China’s development of its “grand strategy” which produced a regional multilateral organization that has allowed China to currently maintain significant influence in the region. The topic presented in this chapter is to provide a clear understanding of Chinese influence in Central Asia and the strategic importance of this region. The aforementioned infers to China’s Xinjiang province which represents the gateway of great power competitions in Central Asia.
3.1.1. China’s Historical Presence in Central Asia
China’s presence in Central Asia began over 2,000 years ago in the Chinese Han Dynasty. Officially, Xinjiang is said to have been a part of China since it was first incorporated into the Han Dynasty (202 BC- 220AD) during the reign of Han Wudi (147 BC- 87 BC).50 Seen as a gateway to the west, China secured land routes and established trade with the Roman Empire. Known as the “Silk Road,” this route allowed Chinese products—primarily silk—land access to Western and Middle Eastern countries. The development of the Silk Road coincided with the Han’s western empire expansion and encountered with a Turkic nomadic tribe in Central Asia known as the Xiongnu—a people who had ties with the Huns. Encountering with the Xinongnu to secure the Silk Road led to Chinese expanding its control further into
50 Hasan Haider Karrar, The New Silk Road Diplomacy: A Regional Analysis of China’s Central Asia Foreign Policy, 1991-2005 (Montreal: McGill University, 2006), p. 9
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Central Asia in order to maintain a gateway to the west. The Han Empire eventually collapsed due to internal conflicts and led to China’s loss of Central Asia in 220 A.D.51
The reunification of China under the Tang Dynasty (581-902 A.D.) brought Central Asia into the forefront as a potential source of economic and cultural trade.
During this period, China began to expand its influence deeper into Central Asia than the Han Dynasty, eventually coming into direct contract with the Muslim people of greater Turkmen—a diverse Islamic group consisting of Arab, Tibetan and Uighur.52 A battle between the Muslims and China in 751 A.D.—the battle of Talas—led to Tang Dynasty’s defeat and increased Arab control of the region. China’s defeat in the battle and the subsequent instability led to the fall of the Tang Empire and the control of Central Asia.53
By the time the Ming Dynasty replaced its Mongol Yuan predecessor in the late fourteenth century, however, the futility of demarcating a stable frontier along the boundless steppes and deserts of Central Asia was recognized by Beijing. If Central Asia could not provide China with the desired buffer, then the vast lands beyond them would. As a result of this realization, the policy shifted under the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), eventually alternating between aggressive military campaigns against the Mongol and Turkic tribes as well as ambitious government-sponsored commercial efforts— the latter aimed primarily at exchanging a relatively abundant Chinese commodity, tea, for a much-needed natural resource that Chinese historically proved
51 孫壯志，「國際新格局中的中亞五國」， p. 60.
52 于海波，後冷戰時期俄美中三國中亞政策比較研究，(北京中國中央黨校：2007)，頁 14。[Yu
Haibo, Houlengzhashiqi Er Mei Zhong Sanguo Zhongya Zhengce Bijiaoyanjiu (Russia, U.S., and China’s Central Asia policy after Cold War) Zhongguo Zhongyangdangxiao (Beijing: China’s Communist Party School, June 2007): 14.]
53 于海波，p. 15.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
incapable of producing internally, cavalry horses—both of which were attempts to impose order along the border areas. In addition, the Ming rulers, especially the Yongle Emperor (1402–1424), set about systematically to ward off the threat of any unified Mongol resurgence or other encroachment from the steppes against the security of their empire by carefully balancing the forces of the various tribes against one another in a rather sophisticated framework.54
China’s internal stability during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) led to a territorial expansion campaign into Central Asia. After gaining control of Taiwan and Tibet, Qing seized control of “Chinese Central Asia” in 1757 after defeating the Mongol and Uighur army.55 Qing rule was minimal as she allowed religious and local leaders to maintain relative control of the region. The expansionist campaign by the Qing coincided with Russian expansion into Central Asia and led to a series of battles from 1751-1881 that resulted in a treaty with Russia over disputed territory.56 In 1884 Xinjiang, translated to new territory, was formally incorporated into Qing Empire but the Manchu Dynasty was weakening and it subsequently collapsed in 1911.57
The successor republican government was not strong either; under this circumstance, the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to back the Uighurs of Xinjiang in establishing a Kazakh and Uighur East Turkestan Republic in 1933. This attempt was suppressed by the Chinese government, only to be re-established in 1944 and the Soviets managed to control the Ili region until 1946. Xinjiang finally reverted to Chinese rule toward the end of the Chinese Civil War and was constituted as the
54 J. Peter Pham, “Beijing’s Great Game: Understanding Chinese Strategy in Central Eurasia,”
American Foreign Policy Interests 28 (2006): 53-55.
55 Hasan Haider Karrar, p. 11.
56 Hasan Haider Karrar, p. 10.
57 Russell Ong, “China’s Security Interests in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey 4 (December 2005):
426.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after the Communist Party took power in 1949.58
With the decline of Russian influence in Central Asia in the late 1980’s and the eventual independence of Central Asian states in 1991, China’s interest in this region began to reemerge after 80 years of limited contact.