中國中亞政策之研究：以911事件對中國之戰略意涵 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 中國中亞政策之研究：以911事件對中國之戰略意涵. ‧. A Study on China’s Central Asia Policy—The Strategic Implication of the September 11 Event for China. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Student: Tseng Yinglun Advisor: Professor Wang Dingshu. 中華民國一百年六月 June, 2011.

(2) 中國中亞政策之研究：以911事件對中國之戰略意涵 A Study on China’s Central Asia Policy—The Strategic Implication of the September 11 Event for China. 研究生: 曾英倫. Student: Tseng Yinglun. 指導教授: 王定士教授. Advisor: Professor Wang Dingshu. 立. 治政國立政治大學大. ‧ 國. 學. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. Nat. n. al. er. io. A Thesis. sit. y. ‧. 碩士論文. iv. Submitted to International C h Master’s Program U n in Asia-Pacific Studies. engchi. National Chengchi University In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in China Studies. 中華民國一百年六月 June, 2011.

(3) Acknowledgements To my supervisor, Professor Wang Dinshu, whose invaluable comments and support made this thesis viable in its present form. I would like also to express my gratitude to Professor Fu Jenkun and Professor Lean Honyi for their time and precious advices. A special thank goes to L.T. Colonel May Zizong whose help was invaluable at many aspects. And, finally, I would like to thank all of my friends, especially Barbora Ilanovska and my senior colleague Hsieh Mingfon, their encouragement. 政治大. not only makes me have faith and get back on my feet again after giving. 立. up this writing, but also leads me to the completion of the thesis.. ‧ 國. 學. Especially, the organizational help by my wife Hsieh Shumin who was highly appreciated. Without their enormous help there is no deeply. ‧. interlaced with this work.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v.

(4) i. Abstract The September 11 Event has turned Central Asia into a complex geo-strategic position, creating a status of new balance of power. At the same time, great powers also have tried to dominate the region by establishing diplomatic relationships with the Central Asian states, which is highly challenged to China’s traditional interests and strategic calculations in Central Asia. While China continues to play a crucial role in terms of its intention and approach toward future Central Asia. 政治大. development, the other two great powers, Russia and the United States,. 立. will certainly exert influence in this region as well. Especially, the. ‧ 國. 學. U.S.-led War on Terrorism has immediately changed the original strategic. ‧. landscape of Central Asia, compressing China’s strategic space created since post-Cold War. Consequently, China has taken flexible foreign. y. Nat. io. sit. policies in response to U.S. containment. Also, China and Russia have. n. al. er. formed a strategic partnership to balance U.S. influence. Therefore,. iv. n states are based on four China’s strategic considerations of Central Asian C hengchi U. aspects as follows: (1) Xinjiang independence issue; (2) maintaining stability of its western borders; (3) energy need; and (4) the balance of power in Central Asia. With well management of Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO) as a platform, China has successfully maneuvered its strategic calculations in Central Asia, creating a truly multi-polar world system best served to its national development in the long run. Key words: September 11 Event, War on Terrorism, China’s Strategic Calculation, Central Asia, Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

(5) ii. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 1.1. Motivation and Purpose of the Study ...................................................... 1 1.2. Hypothesized Proposition and Framework of the Study ......................... 3 1.3. Framework of the Study .......................................................................... 5 1.4. Literature Review .................................................................................... 6 1.5. Research Method ................................................................................... 18 1.5.1. Content Analysis ....................................................................... 18 1.5.2. Historical Comparative Research .............................................. 19. 政治大 Classical Realism .................................................................................. 21 立 The Development of Waltz's Structural Realism .................................. 23. Chapter 2 Theoretical Overview.......................................................................... 21 2.1.. 學. ‧ 國. 2.2.. 2.3. The Value of Waltz's Structural Realism .............................................. 25 2.4. The International Relations Theory and Security Concept ................... 27. ‧. 2.5. New Security Concept and Structural Realism ..................................... 30. Nat. sit. y. 2.6. The Basic Theory of China’s New Security Concept ........................... 31. al. er. io. 2.7. New Security Concept in Structural Realism ........................................ 32. n. 2.7.1. The Concept of Cooperative Security ....................................... 32. Ch. i Un. v. 2.7.2. The NSC is the Extension of “Five Peaceful Principles” .......... 34. engchi. Chapter 3 China and Central Asia ....................................................................... 38 3.1. China's Security Concern in Central Asia ............................................. 39 3.1.1. China’s Historical Presence in Central Asia.............................. 39 3.1.2. The Overview of Central Asia's Geo-strategy ........................... 42 3.1.3. China’s Security Issues toward Central Asia ............................ 44 3.1.4. Opportunity and Predicament for Central Asian States............. 47 3.2. The SCO Role for the Security of Central Asia .................................... 50 3.2.1. Background of SCO .................................................................. 51 3.2.2. Sino-Russia-Central Asian States Interactions in SCO ............. 52 3.2.3. The Future Prospect of SCO...................................................... 62.

(6) iii 3.3. China’s Central Asia policy before September 11 ................................ 65 3.3.1. Stability and Security ................................................................ 65 3.3.2. Economic Development ............................................................ 67 3.3.3. Energy Requirement .................................................................. 69 3.4. China’s Central Asia Policy after September 11 ................................... 70 3.4.1. Sino-U.S. Cooperation............................................................... 70 3.4.2. Sino-Russia Cooperation ........................................................... 74 3.4.3. China Uses SCO as A Platform of anti-Terrorism .................... 76 Chapter 4 China’s Strategic Calculations after September 11. in Central Asia 81. 4.1. The U.S.-China-Russia's Counter Terrorism in Central Asia ............... 81. 政治大 U.S.-Russia Anti-Terrorism....................................................... 84 立 Sino-Russia Anti-Terrorism ...................................................... 86. 4.1.1. U.S.-China anti-Terrorism ......................................................... 82 4.1.2.. 學. ‧ 國. 4.1.3.. 4.2. US-China-Russia's Geo-Strategic Deployment in Central Asia ........... 88 4.2.1. U.S. Strategic Interests in Central Asia after 911 ...................... 88. ‧. 4.2.2. China's Strategic Interests in Central Asia after September 11 . 92. Nat. sit. y. 4.2.3. Russia's Strategic Interests in Central Asia after September 11 94. al. er. io. 4.3. US-Sino-Russia's Energy Consideration in Central Asia .................... 100. n. 4.3.1. China’s Energy Strategy in Central Asia................................. 101. Ch. i Un. v. 4.3.2. US Energy Strategy in Central Asia ........................................ 103. engchi. 4.3.3. Russia’s Energy Strategy in Central Asia ............................... 105 4.4. Summary ............................................................................................. 107 Chapter 5 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 112 Bibliography.

(7) iv. List of abbreviations ABM. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. BTC. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. EURASEC. Eurasian Economic Community. SLOC. Sea Lines of Communication. CIS. Commonwealth of Independent States. CSTO. Collective Security Treaty Organization. CNPC. China National Petroleum Corporation. ETIM. East Turkestan Islamic Movement. GWOT. Global War on Terrorism. National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group. n. al. Ch. y. er. New Security Concept. sit. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. io. NSC. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Nat. NATO. International Continental Ballistic Missile. ‧. NATCG. ‧ 國. IMU. 學. ICBM. 立. 政治大. i Un. v. PRC. People’s Republic of China. SCO. Shanghai Cooperation Organization. SF. Shanghai Five. TAP. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan. UN. United Nations. USEUCOM. United States European Command. USSR. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. WMD. Weapons of Mass Destruction. WOT. War on Terrorism. XUAR. Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. engchi.

(8) v. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v.

(9) 1. Chapter 1 Introduction. 1.1. Motivation and Purpose of the Study Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were five new independent states have emerged, namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which is the most commonly defined as “Central Asian region” where is a. 政治大. landlocked region encapsulated by Russia in the north, Iran and Afghanistan in the. 立. north-south trade and transport crossroads. 1. 學. ‧ 國. south and China in the east. The Central Asian region is also an age-old east-west and With the decline of Soviet Union. ‧. influence in Central Asia, this region has become an attractive share for many neighboring countries, including Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and. y. Nat. al. er. io. an arena for regional great powers.2. sit. China, to compete for economic interests and political influences, making this region. n. iv n C U toward Central Asia, and At the same time, China changes h e its n gnational c h i strategy. draws up new plans for building relations with Central Asian states. In 1994, the Chinese premier Li Peng, made a twelve-day visit to the four Central Asian states, during which he gave a new impetus to China’s Central Asia policy in four points: 1.. 1. China and Central Asian states are close neighbors sharing common borders. So maintaining good-neighborly relations on peaceful co-existence is seen by China as an important policy objectives for securing a stable, long term, and peaceful. 孫壯志，「國際新格局中的中亞五國」，東歐中亞研究 4 (北京: 1999): 60。[Sun Zhuangzhi, Guoji Xingejuzhong De Zhongyawuguo (Five Central Asian States in the New International Pattern) Dongou Zhongyu Yanjiu (East European Russian and Central Asia Studies) 4 (Beijing: 1999): 60] 2 Dianne L. Smith, Central Asia: A New Great Game? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 1996), pp. 3-7..

(10) 2 2. 3. 4.. external environment. Developing economic cooperation and trade is seen as mutually beneficial and will contribute to common prosperity. Respecting the independent choice of the Central Asian peoples and non-interference in their internal affairs. Respect for other countries’ independency and sovereignty and promoting peace and regional stability.3 Those principles mentioned above illustrate the basic pattern of China’s attitude. toward Central Asian affairs. It is in this direction that Beijing can eliminate threatening powers from the region and maintain the security of its western frontline. Moreover, Beijing not only hopes to access to the abundant resources in Central Asia so as to accelerate prosperity of its western region, but puts emphasis on. 治政 “non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs” 大 in order to exclude the Central 立. Asian states from being influenced by the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. ‧ 國. 學. (XUAR); Beijing’s priority is to block the influence of the United States in Central. ‧. Asia, especially after the terrorist attack on the U.S. territory on September 11, 2001,. sit. y. Nat. and its consequence operational success in Afghanistan war when the U.S. has. io. al. er. expanded its influence in the region. To sum up, China’s strategy toward Central Asia is very clear: (1) maintaining political stability in Central Asia; (2) exploring Central. n. iv n C Asia’s natural resources, (3) blocking of the United States in Central h e the n ginfluence chi U Asia;4 and (4) finally to maintain the balance of power in the region.. As we all know, Central Asian region has been China’s strategic backyard since ancient times. While China’s national power is now ascending, it is likely to have the potential of becoming a regional hegemony, and of course it also has the ambition to. 3. Kulbhushan Warikoo, “Central Asia and China: the Changing Equation,” Central Asia on Display: Proceedings of the XII Conference of the European Society for Central Asian Studies, ed. Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek and Juila Katsching (Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2004): 472. 4 林麗香，「中亞地區：中共、美國的新勢力範圍」，共黨問題研究 1 (台北： 2002): 20-21。 [Lin Lixiang, Zhongya Diqu: Zhonggong、Meiguo De Xinshilifanwei (Central Asia: China and the New Influence Scope of the United States) Gongdang Wenti Yanjiu (Studies in Communism) 1 (Taipei: 2002): 20-21.].

(11) 3 become one; however, after the September 11 Event, 2001, China saw the U.S. military presence in Central Asia as a threat of its prosperous economy established since 1978. Therefore, Beijing needs to find counter measures to rebalance the dynamic of Central Asia status changed by the United States. In order to find out how China can achieve the strategies mentioned above, the following questions will be answered: 1. What role does Central Asia play to China? 2. What is China’s intention to dominate Central Asian states? 3. What is China’s strategy after September 11 after the U.S. deployed military and expanded its influence in Central Asia? 4. How do other great powers respond to China’s peacefully developed influence in Central Asia?. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 1.2. Hypothesized Proposition and Framework of the Study. ‧. However, the answers to the questions mentioned above are likely that although. sit. y. Nat. China’s national power is ascending with the extraordinary economic growth for the. al. er. io. past three decades, yet it still cannot surpass the U.S. due to the reality of domestically. n. iv n C U hand, Beijing intends to take h eAsia. military power projecting into Central n g On c hthei one. weak political and military status. That is why China decides to adapt to the U.S.. this chance to fight the “East Turkestan” in its Xinjiang province, and to stabilize its western region. On the other hand, Beijing also intends to prevent the rollback of Moscow’s power from getting into Central Asia again. Although the course of China’s strategy toward Central Asia seems more stable than in other areas of Chinese foreign relations, there are significant uncertainties clouding the longer term outlook. For one thing, perspectives divided on China’s long term goals in the region and how these goals could lead to a major change in Beijing’s approach to the region. Some emphasize strongly that the prevailing Chinese interests.

(12) 4 in regional stability and energy trade will remain core determinants of China’s Central Asia policy, and will reinforce continuity in Beijing’s behavior we see today. However, others argue that recent accommodating and moderate Chinese policies and behaviors presage the creation of an emerging Central Asian order dominated by Beijing that will be reminiscent of the Sino-Central Asian states relationship during the strong dynasties in Chinese history. Furthermore, China’s influence in Central Asia depends heavily on the power and policy of Russia. Russian weakness in the 1990s provided the opportunity for. 政治大. China’s expanding influence in Central Asia and the foundation of Russian inclination. 立. to cooperate closely with the rising China on trade, including arms trade, and a variety. ‧ 國. 學. of international issues. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia has endeavored to rebuild elements of national strength and to use them to reassert its interests in. ‧. Central Asian region. Thus far, the Russian relationship with China generally has. Nat. sit. y. remained cordial and cooperative, even the Sino-Russia competition for influence in. n. al. er. io. Central Asia over other issues continues. If China were to be seen to seek regional. i Un. v. dominance in Central Asia, Russia might adopt more competitive and perhaps. Ch. engchi. confrontational policies that would have major impacts on China’s existing policies to the region. Interestingly, if Russia successfully pursues a more assertive leadership role in the region, Chinese leaders presumably would be forced to choose between accommodating the rollback of Russian power and possibly losing Chinese equities and influence, or resisting the Russians from advancing on this region. Since 1991, political cooperation between China and the Central Asian states has been improved and has been very positive and beneficial for both sides. Historically speaking, similar relations were established during the tributary relations shared by China and Central Asia when China was very generous with money and gifts in.

(13) 5 exchange for regional stability and trade from both sides. However, China’s expansion of influence in Central Asia slowed down somewhat after September 11 Event, 2001, when the Washington became a competitor to Beijing in the region. Politically and militarily relations between China and the Central Asian states have, however, not changed that much since 2001, yet after 2002 the economic interactions between Central Asia and China have increased immensely. Despite the fact that Washington has a great deal to offer and that most states in the region would rather not to cooperate with Russia or China, many states are also aware of the fact that the U.S.. 政治大 proximity and economic interdependence. This makes China a crucial player to 立 will eventually leave and China will always be present due to the geographical. counter balance against Russia in the long term.. Nat. sit. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 1.3. Framework of the Study. io. al. er. This study is designed based on the above mentioned logical related. iv n C chapters including an introduction h and e anconclusion. g c h i UChapter 1 provides an overview n. sub-propositions and its outlines will be derived as the following logical related. of the study for the readers. Especially, I will focus on literature reviews absorbed from different grounds held by different specialists or authors to find out China’s calculations of interest and national strategy toward Central Asia. Chapter 2 explains the theory I will apply in this study, including a comparison of two most prominent sets of competing assumptions about behaviors of states in the international system. One is realism, and the other is China’s New Security Concept (NSC) theory. Therefore, we shall briefly outline the core assumptions of the two approaches to do comparisons and contrast, particularly in terms of where they lead us.

(14) 6 in the strategic analyses. Chapter 3 catalogues China’s strategic interests in Central Asia. I will start from the historical relations between China and Central Asia. In addition to China, there are also other great powers changing their Central Asia policies at the time when the Soviet Union collapsed. Before the September 11, 2001, China’s interests were focused on stability, energy, and commercial activities in Central Asia. After the September 11 Event occurred, the international situation entered the era of terrorism. When the United States decided to found the “coalition of anti-terrorism” and to. 政治大. launch war on Afghanistan in 2002, the Central Asia’s geo-politics and economy had. 立. also been changed ever since. Meanwhile, China has tried to cooperate with Russia. ‧ 國. 學. and the United States to counter terrorism. Beijing finally seeks to SCO as a platform by which is deemed as the best way to counter terrorism.. ‧. Chapter 4 discusses China’s strategic considerations after September 11, 2001,. y. Nat. er. io. sit. toward Central Asia. During this time, the War on Terrorism (WOT) makes Central Asian region become an arena for great powers competition in the international. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. society. From the development of those events mentioned above, it makes the scenario. engchi. more complicated for those great powers to compete with one another in this region. Secondly, the great powers, like China, Russia, and the United States, have the most influences in the region based on each player’s interests of geo-strategy. Then, the competitions among China, Russia, and the United States after the “September 11 Event” will also be analyzed in this chapter. Finally, chapter 5 will be my conclusion.. 1.4. Literature Review Since the disintegration of Soviet Union, all five Central Asian states have.

(15) 7 became independent, which makes China to change its Central Asia strategy and create new ways to deal with Central Asian states. In the context of the state, strategy is the employment of specific instruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own—possibly conflicting—objectives.5. The purpose of the study is to provide an analysis of. China’s strategic foreign policy toward Central Asia using three of the four elements of national power (Diplomatic, Economic, and Military) as a model. The fourth. 政治大 beyond the scope of this monograph. 立. element of national power (Informational) is not presented in this study and goes 6. ‧ 國. 學. Hu Yuanjai, in his article “China’s Strategic Foreign Policy toward Central Asia,” explains that Central Asia is the so called “Silk Road” in ancient times, and it is also a. ‧. gateway to the Western world from Chinese perspective. The history of interaction. Nat. sit. y. between China and Central Asia could be traced back to Chinese Tang Dynasty.. n. al. er. io. Although China has culture exchange with Central Asia, the confrontations never. i Un. v. stops due to culture differences. Therefore, China called this region as “border. Ch. engchi. trouble” (Ben Huan) to which China ever since pays close attention on the basis of national defense. Second, Central Asia is one of the land bridge connecting Asia and Europe. The internal challenge for china to manage in Central Asia is to blockade the expansion of the so called “East Turkmenistan” movement in its Xinjiang province. Therefore China’s strategic goals in Central Asia can be concluded as follows: (1) to avoid instability in Central Asia, (2) to strike separatism movement, (3) to make sure. 5. Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), p. 5. 6 Harry R. Yarger, p. 5..

(16) 8 the accessibility of energy; and (4) to maintain its economic growth. However, Beijing has utilized the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the platform to realize those strategic goals. Mark Burles in his book, Chinese Policy Toward Russia and The Central Asia Republics, states that there are four considerations provide the foundation for China’s policies to the Central Asian states in the post-Cold War: (1) the desire for stability on China’s frontier and border provinces, (2) the desire to enhance the economic development of specific inland regions, (3) the desire of growing energy needs; and (4). 政治大. the concerns over China’s relative positioning the post-Cold War strategic environment.7. 立. The importance of each of these factors varies according to China’s. ‧ 國. 學. perception of each state’s economic prospects, potential to affect China’s domestic stability, energy endorsement, and relative strategic significance. The four elements. ‧. mentioned above provide a basic framework for understanding China’s potential. Nat. sit. y. future policies toward Central Asia states. However, it is possible that as China’s. al. n. change as well.. er. io. economic political and military power grows, its priorities in Central Asia might. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Charlie L. Pelham in his thesis, US and China Competition for Influence in Central Asia—A Comparative Analysis, he shares the same view with Mark Burles in terms of China’s interests in Central Asia after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. Further, he indicates the evolution of China’s grand strategy in Central Asia, which can be traced back to the development of the “Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence” between China and India in the 1950s.8. 7. With the guiding principles articulated by. Mark Burles, Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics (Santa Monica: RAND, ISBN: 0-8330-2731-X MR-1045-AF, 1999), p. 5. 8 The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” are: 1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial.

(17) 9 Chinese former Premier Li Peng,9 China’s development of grand strategy began to take form beginning with settling border disputes, security issues and establishing economic ties with its border states. In 1996, Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan formed the Shanghai Five (SF) and sign a series of treaties that also applied the five principles of peaceful coexistence in maintaining trust and confidence among them. By 2001, the Shanghai Five evolved into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) due to the increasing terrorism, separatism, and extremism activities in this region. The main goals presented in the founding declaration of the. 政治大 multinational and regional. SCO in 2001 are also based on China’s five principles of peaceful coexistence to facilitate its function as a. 立. security organization. 10. Therefore, China’s economic strategy is to focus on stability in the region and energy. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. development.11. Vladimir Paramonov and Oleg Stolpovski in their article, Chinese Security. Nat. sit. y. Interests in Central Asia, also illustrates that the sudden change in the geo-political. n. al. er. io. configuration in and around Central Asia caused by the collapse of the Union of. i Un. v. Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) surprised China. Not only does China regard the. Ch. engchi. situation as a new opportunity, but also as a set of potential threats to its own security.. integrity; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit and; 5) peaceful coexistence. 9 Lee Peng’s speech of his vision of bilateral relation between China and Central Asia are: (1) Unswerving commitment to good-neighbor relations and peaceful coexistence; (2) Development of mutually beneficial cooperation and promotion of common prosperity; (3) Respect for the choice of the people of each country and nonintervention in the internal affairs of the other party; and (4) Respect for the sovereignty of each state and the promotion of regional stability. 10 The declaration of the SCO in 2001 are: (1) Strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborliness and friend ship among member states; (2) Developing their effective cooperation in political affairs, the economy, and trade, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environmental protection and other fields; (3) Working together to maintain regional peace, security and stability; and (4) Promoting the creation of a new international political and economic order featuring democracy, justice and rationality. 11 Maj. Charlie L Pelham, US and China Competition for Influence in Central Asia—A Comparative Analysis (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2007), pp. 27-54..

(18) 10 Therefore, China is making constant adjustments to the assessment criteria with respect to the threats to its interests in the region and, accordingly, to the calculations of reactions to them. Therefore, there are three key factors that can be identified as China’s potential threats in Central Asia by looking at the development of the situation in and around this region: (1) collapse of the USSR; (2) instability in Afghanistan; and (3) strengthened U.S. presence. First, in the realm of collapse of the USSR, Vladimir and Oleg extended three sub-problems faced by China: (1) intractability of border and territory questions; (2) high level of military presence in. 政治大 solve the problem left by collapse of the USSR, China needs to concentrate on 立. border districts; and (3) increasing manifestation of Uighur separatism. In order to. resolving problems inherited from the Chinese-Soviet era.. ‧ 國. 學. Second, in the realm of instability in Afghanistan, China faces new threats in the. ‧. forefront: (1) international terrorism; (2) Islamic radicalism and extremism; and (3). Nat. sit. y. drugs trafficking. However, in the late 1990s, Beijing carried out even more active. n. al. er. io. cooperation with the Central Asian states. Further, China made strategic partnerships. i Un. v. with Russia on the basis of its historic presence in the region. Third, in the realm of. Ch. engchi. the strengthened U.S. presence, China gave priority to the threats resulting in one way or another from the scales of the U.S. presence. Those threats are as follows: (1) the appearance of a large U.S. military contingent in the region; (2) the veiled U.S. political interference; and (3) the expansion of U.S. economic presence. Finally, with the support of the SCO and close partnership with Russia, China is able to use its strategy of involvement in the resolutions of all security problems, attempting to develop close relations with the Central Asian states and achieving its strategic goals which mainly relate to preventing the further strengthening of the presence of U.S..

(19) 11 and its allies, and opening up the rich natural resources of Central Asia.12 In the article, Tensions in Sino-Central Asian Relations and their Implications for Regional Security, Adiljan Umarov and Dmitriy Pashkun illustrate China’s new strategy toward Central Asia. However, China’s engagement with Central Asia can be broken into four broad and overlapping categories. First, China recognizes the strategic importance of Central Asia and its potential impact on global events. Second, on the economic side, China understands the important role Central Asia can play in its future economic development, especially as a supplier of vital energy resources.. 政治大. Third, China has a security and political interests in making sure the individual states. 立. of Central Asia develop in a way that does not threaten China, such as through the. ‧ 國. 學. establishment of radical governments. Finally, China recognizes that a multilateral approach to cooperation, in addition to stable bilateral relations, can help both China. ‧. and the region as a whole achieve their shared interests.13. y. Nat. er. io. sit. For Richard Weitz in her article, China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion?, she has expressed some specific. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. opinions about China’s goals in Central Asia. First, in the realm of politics Chinese. engchi. authorities worry most about the spread of hostile ideologies such as liberal democracy and Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, both for their direct local effects and for their potential threats over consequences for China’s territory, especially the ethnic separatism concern in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Consequently, China has relied on diplomatic initiatives and. 12. Vladimir Paramonov and Oleg Stolpovski, Chinese Security Interests in Central Asia (England: Shrivenham, Block D, JSCSC, Defense Academy of the U.K., May 2008), pp. 1-11. 13 Adiljan Umarov and Dmitriy Pashkun, Tensions in Sino-Central Asian Relations and their Implications for Regional Security (England: Shrivenham, Block D, JSCSC, Defense Academy of the U.K., January 2006), pp. 4-5..

(20) 12 security and other assistance to induce Central Asian governments to curb separatist activities by Uighur or “East Turkestan” activists. Secondly, China’s growing energy needs represent another force driving its increased interest and involvement in Central Asia. A combination of a booming economy and declining domestic energy production has resulted in China’s importation of an increasingly large percentage of its oil and natural gas. Although China still acquires the bulk of its oil imports from the Persian Gulf and Africa, Chinese policymakers have sought to enhance their access to energy resources from Central Asia as well as Russia. Thirdly, besides. 政治大 enhance commerce between its relatively impoverished northwestern regions and 立 securing access to the region’s energy resources, Chinese officials also desire to. their Central Asian neighbors.14. ‧ 國. 學. Also in the Wlizabeth Wishnick’s article, Russia, China, and the United States in. ‧. Central Asia: Prospects for Great power competition and Cooperation in the Shadow. Nat. sit. y. of the Georgian Crisis, she notes that firstly, China views Central Asia as a test case. n. al. er. io. for its aim to create a multi-polar world based on a “democratic” vision of. i Un. v. international affairs in which a variety of states wield influence and counter-balance. Ch. engchi. U.S. power. Secondly, China places a priority on stability over democratic change and upholds the priority of noninterference in domestic affairs of SCO member states and proclaims the right for sovereign states to choose their own model of development free of external pressures. Thirdly, China is committed to combating what the Chinese term the “three evils” of separatism, terrorism, and extremism. It is worth remembering that the Shanghai Five began meeting at a time when Russia was. 14. Richard Weitz, China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), pp. 51-64..

(21) 13 focused on threats related to Chechnya, while some separatists in Xinjiang used violence in the 1990s to pursue their goals. Fourth, China sees the goals of economic and security cooperation in the SCO as interconnected and places a priority on the economic cooperation, especially focusing on energy sector. Finally, China has pursuing a “Go West” strategy to develop its western provinces, including Xinjiang. Beijing also has alleged that Uighur terrorists were fighting in Afghanistan and Chechnya. After the Chinese contended that the leader of one Uighur group, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), had ties to Osama Bin Laden, both the United. 政治大 conflating separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang, the Chinese government is to limit 立. States and the United Nations (UN) listed it as a terrorist organization in 2002. By. activities by Uighur groups in their countries, as well as to crack down on legitimate. ‧ 國. 學. religious activity within Xinjiang. Beijing’s effort to develop Xinjiang’s energy. ‧. industry, coming at a time of mounting concern about energy security, has let Chinese. y. sit. io. n. al. er. Central Asia.15. Nat. energy companies to seek out new projects for exploration and pipeline delivery in. i Un. v. Alexander G. Larin in his article “Russia Plus China: Removing The U.S.. Ch. engchi. Superpower From Central Asia?” he supposed that the China’s strategy in Central Asia and within SCO has three objectives: (1) in the economic sphere: to get access to raw materials and energy resources of the region and to promote its commodities on the regional markets; (2) in the security sphere: to eradicated or at least to minimize separatism and other current threats; to counter the possible growth of U.S. political and military presence in the vicinity of north-western borders of the People’s Republic. 15. Elizabeth Wishnick, Russia, China, and the United States in Central Asia：Prospects for Great Power Competition and Cooperation in the Shadow of the Georgian Crisis (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), pp. 27-35..

(22) 14 of China (PRC); and (3) as a precondition for, and concomitantly as an implication of economic and security objectives to strengthen China’s political influence.16 In Richard Giragosian’s article “The Strategic Central Asian Arena,” he believes that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has been an important element in China’s security consideration. Structurally, there are three pillars to China’s security with regard to Central Asia. The first, rotted in Chinese history, is the recognition of the pivotal role of Central Asia for security along China’s western borders. Second, the economic implications of an open Central Asian region posed. 政治大. several new considerations for Chinese security. Third, it is the linkage for Central. 立. Asia to the ever-expanding Chinese sense of its role as an important player in global. ‧ 國. 學. security.17. ‧. Lowell Dittmer in the article “Central Asia and the Regional Powers,” says that China’s interests in Central Asia stems from the dawn of the post-Soviet era. The first. y. Nat. er. io. sit. concern is border dispute which was culminated in the summit meeting in April 1996 among the five states to ratify and consolidate their shared borders, and the. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. “agreement on mutual reduction of military forces in the border region” at a second. engchi. summit the following year in Moscow. Secondly, China’s continued interest in the aftermath border settlement was stimulated by the emergence of separatist agitation on behalf of an independent Xinjiang, or “Eastern Turkistan.” Especially after the September 11 Event, Beijing set up a National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group (NATCG) with a secretariat led by Hu Jintao to lead a campaign against the “three forces” of national separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism in. 16. Alexander G. Larin, Russia plus China: Removing the U.S. Superpower from Central Asia (Taipei, Tamkang Journal of International Affairs): 88. 17 Richard Giragosian, “The Strategic Central Asian Arena,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 1 (Washington: Spring 2006): 133-153..

(23) 15 connection with which began to solicit cooperation from neighboring governments to control their ethnic minorities more effectively. Finally, China has also expressed a lively economic interest in Central Asia, partly as an economic incentive to China’s backward, landlocked western provinces corresponding to the lucrative opening of the east coast to foreign trade but mainly a an avenue for China’s recently accelerated pursuit of sources of energy.18 However, Robert Sutter in his article “Durability in China’s Strategy toward Central Asia-Reasons for Optimism,” he says that the varied Chinese interests and. 政治大. goals in Central Asia have involved. First, on the border and security issues, China. 立. has sought to demarcate, demilitarize and stabilize borders with Russia, Kazakhstan,. ‧ 國. 學. Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Border stability has been a key issue to Chinese development plans and foreign policy priorities. China also has sought to curb outside. ‧. supports to separatists in Xinjiang province. It sees a common ground with regional. Nat. sit. y. governments in working against terrorist and criminal elements. Second, in the. n. al. er. io. economic sphere, China’s main economic interest in the region is energy. China has. i Un. v. sought growing amounts of oil and gas abroad and Central Asia—especially. Ch. engchi. Kazakhstan appeared as a promising partner. Third, in the regional position, China’s engagement with Central Asia, and specifically the SCO, is part of China’s overall effort to foster a stable and productive international environment around China’s periphery while fostering a more widely accepted Chinese leadership role. Therefore, Beijing’s relations with Central Asia also aim to legitimate Chinese positions on major international issues, strengthen relations with Russia, and serve as a counter to U.S.. 18. Lowell Dittmer, “Central Asia and the Regional Powers,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4 (Washington: Winter 2007): 7-22..

(24) 16 power and influence. China’s diplomacy in Central Asia aims to prevent the region from becoming a distraction from China’s internal development and more important foreign policy goals.19 Ramakant Dwivedi in his article “China’s Central Asia Policy in Recent Times,” also emphasizes that while China has been contiguous to Central Asia since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, it has a great opportunity to influence developments in this region. He says that China’s interests in Central Asia have widened from stability at the borders to encompass energy security, geo-politics and. 政治大. combating extremists, terrorists, as well as separatist forces. 20. 立. Further, China’s. Central Asia policy is to rest upon on countering terrorism, religious extremism, and. ‧ 國. 學. Uighurs’ independence, bilateral and regional economic cooperation, military cooperation, and countering the influence of major powers inimical to China and. ‧. Central Asia’s multilateral security arrangement. Finally, China has taken major. Nat. sit. y. initiatives in order to secure its core geo-political and geo-economical interests. These. n. al. er. io. include border dispute resolutions, reduction of military forces in the border regions,. i Un. v. deepening military trust, good neighborliness, friendship cooperation agreements, and. Ch. engchi. the SF initiative which later became the SCO which plays in balancing the role of major power in Central Asia.21 Yitzhak Shichor in his article “China’s Central Asian Strategy and the Xinjiang Connection: Predicaments and Medicaments in a Contemporary Perspective,” interpreted China’s strategic objectives and performance in Central Asia on two. 19. Robert Sutter, “Durability in China’s Strategy toward Central Asia-Reasons for Optimism,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly1 (Washington: Winter 2008): 3-10. 20 Ramakant Dwivedi, “China’s Central Asia Policy in Recent Times,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4 (Washington: Winter 2006): 145. 21 Ramakant Dwivedi, p. 146..

(25) 17 different levels: the official and explicit; and the unofficial and implicit. On the one hand, China’s official and explicit objectives are: (1) the struggle against terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, that became known as the “three evils”—all directly related to Xinjiang and reflected Beijing’s perceptions of Xinjiang’s potential or actual problems; and (2) not directly associated with the three evils the fourth objectives introduced the struggle against hegemony in Central Asia – namely against the penetration of U.S. influence and presence. On the other hand, China’s unofficial and implicit strategy in Central Asia is positively aimed at gaining political influence, security guarantees, economic presence and energy resources.22. 立. 政治大. Michael Clarke in his article “China’s Integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia:. ‧ 國. 學. Securing a “Silk Road” to Great Power Status?” he illustrates that China’s integration of Xinjiang not only serves core internal functions but also increasingly is. ‧. seen to contribute to China’s strategic position in international affairs. In particular, he. Nat. sit. y. suggests the integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia grants China significant. n. al. er. io. security, economic and strategic benefits that serve two purposes—the consolidation. i Un. v. of China’s control of Xinjiang and the expansion of Chinese power in Central. Ch. engchi. Asia—which contribute to Beijing’s quest for a “peaceful rise” to great power status.23 Ablat Khodzhaev in the article “The Central Asia Policy of the People’s Republic of China,” emphasizes that China considers Central Asia to be a vital zone on which its own internal security in Xinjiang depends, but also as a source of income and of. 22. Yitzhak Shichor, “China’s Central Asian Strategy and the Xinjiang Connection: Predicaments and Medicaments in a Contemporary Perspective,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 2 (Washington: Summer 2008): 64. 23 Michael Clarke, “China’s Integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia” Securing a “Silk Road” to Great Power?” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 2 (Washington: Summer 2008): 89-111..

(26) 18 low-cost raw materials, a market for its goods, and a corridor to Europe and the Middle East. As a result, China’s strategy in Central Asia is framed around the concept of turning Central Asia into an accessible and safe region for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as strengthening its presence in the region without eliciting opposition from Russia. Furthermore, the SCO can be a guarantor of a balance of interests in Central Asia only if its activities involve all countries interested in developing relations with the Central Asian region.24. Other Chinese scholars. characterize the establishment of the SCO as a success of China’s diplomacy and a. 政治大 China in the region, and is considered to be a Chinese channel for participation in the 立. means to promote its Central Asian strategy. It creates a balance between Russia and. Central Asian state’s affairs. Implementation of economic ties based on bilateral. ‧ 國. 學. agreements cannot satisfy all of China’s economic needs, especially in the delivery of. ‧. goods and energy; however, such issues can be solved within the framework of the. sit. y. Nat. SCO. On this basis, Beijing also aims to use the SCO to control the process of. io. al. n. region is thus very far-reaching and multifaceted.25. Ch. engchi. er. isolating Xinjiang from the influences of Central Asia. The notion of security for the. i Un. v. 1.5. Research Method 1.5.1. Content Analysis In this article, content analysis is applied to collect relative research data, and put emphasis on Chinese and English periodical and literature according to the topic. In. 24. Ablat Khodzhaev, “The Central Asia Policy of the People’s Republic of China,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 1 (Washington: Spring 2009): 9-28 25 Ablat Khodzhaev, p. 21..

(27) 19 order to analyze and research on relative literature of China and Central Asian states relationships, this study seeks to provide relevant evidence from different resources available in the libraries and on the Internet, namely, journal articles, news articles and published books related to Central Asia affairs, especially taking the U.S. War College publications as the basis of geo-political calculations. In addition, journals from the Republic of China (ROC) Army publishers are also included as an important reference of Taiwanese perspective in terms of China’s strategic calculations after September 11, 2001. Of course, much of the materials are focused on comparisons. 政治大. among China, Russia, and the United States competitions and cooperation in Central Asia.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. 1.5.2. Historical Comparative Research. ‧. We can observe and analyze a certain period of time or event, and compare the causes and effects comparative research: before and after an event, which means we. y. Nat. er. io. sit. use an event as main idea of a research. In this article, I would discuss the regional security of Central Asia and to discuss the cause and effects of September 11 Event in. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. terms of China, Central Asia, and the United States, finally to analyze and compare. engchi. the interactions between China and the Central Asian states. Besides, in an attempt to analyze the questions about how China faces the situation after September 11, 2001 and the following U.S. presence in Central Asia, the thesis needs to apply in-depth studies of critical literature and a comparative and an analytical case study to guide and support the construction of hypotheses. Because this study is a non-experimental research, the qualitative method is adopted in order to support the construction of hypotheses. The method involves literature readings and the results are descriptive rather than predictive. In other words, this study aims to.

(28) 20 analyze the rising Chinese influence in Central Asia, and how the United States and Russia maintain their hegemonies over this region. From the perspectives of realism and structuralism theories, there will be an analysis of how China reacts to the U.S. presence in Central Asian region, especially after September 11, 2001.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v.

(29) 21. Chapter 2 Theoretical Overview. Before we get to understand China’s interests toward Central Asia, we have to know what China’s national strategy is. According to David Jablonsky, national strategy involves all elements of national power. Those elements can be horizontally broken down into four categories: political, economic, psychological, and military.26. 政治大. Furthermore, national strategy is based on national interests with specific national. 立. goals, and then we will know national policy under the guidelines of national strategy. ‧ 國. 學. concept. The following paragraphs will help to clarify the definitions among theories applied in this study. There are four elements consist of the concern in this study:. ‧. sit. io. er. Nat 2.1. Classical Realism a. y. classical realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism and their relation with security concepts.. n. iv l C n U h e n realism g c h isi the According to Ole R. Holsti, classical most venerable and persisting. theory of international relations, it provides a starting point and baseline for comparison with competing models. While “power” plays an important role in classical realism, the correlation between relative power balances and political outcomes is often less than compelling, suggesting the need to enrich analyses with other variables where three assumptions are derived as follows: (1) state is the center. 26. David Jablonsky, J.Boone Bartholomees, Jr. ed., “Theory of War and Strategy,” U.S. War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2008), pp. 8-9..

(30) 22 of nation state behavior. The research of international affairs takes nation state as a “unit,” other units like individual, group, and international organizations are the secondary units;27 (2) there are practical options. The interactions between nations in the international system are considered on the basis of national interest; therefore one nation will carefully assess the costs from various options, in order to gain the maximum interests; and (3) power is capability. The system basically relies on self-help by the individual states because the world is anarchy. The more power one has, the more the state is able to achieve its goals and objectives; the less power one has, the more that state may be subject to the whip of other states.28. 政治大. 立. The classical realism scholar, Hans Morgenthau argues that human natural is the. ‧ 國. 學. key explanation of nation-state behavior. In his view, human natural is fixed and unchangeable, and it is inherently focused on the quest for even more power.. ‧. Consequently, conflict among people competing for power is inevitable. Since states. Nat. sit. y. are simply aggressions of individual humans and statesmen are the leaders of those. n. al. er. io. groups, nation-state will exhibit this same lust for power in their behavior with one. i Un. v. another. No matter what one does, this lust for power anchored in human natural will. Ch. lead to some inevitable conflicts.29. engchi. From the basic theories of classical realism discussed above, we can understand that classical realism is expanded from the perspective of “altruism,” and tends to view the world based on conditions of competitions, conflicts, and anarchy status in the international system. As a result, the research of international relations will focus. 27. Hans J. Morginthau, Politics among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace (New York Knopf, 1978), p. 8.; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p 94.; Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict (Berkley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 28. 28 Hans J. Morginthau, p. 25. 29 Hans J. Morginthau, p. 25..

(31) 23 on power and interest as the core elements, the concepts of “altruism” and “moral” will make state suffer from big loses. However, the main characteristics of structural realism are assumed identical to realism, admitting the international situation is anarchy, and the international relations are in state centric status. It also puts emphasis on order, restriction, and cooperation in the international system, focusing on the function of economy in the international relations. Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics, published in 1979, has for the first time put forward the theory of “structural” theory and later became the. 政治大. original theory of structural realism. Waltz's structural realism is using the framework. 立. of international system and power distribution, including nation-state, power, and. ‧ 國. 學. interest from classical realism, as the basis of analyzing the external behaviors of nation-state. Although structural realism respects the power, it also values power as a. ‧. tool by which to reach the goal of national security. As a result, there produces two. Nat. al. er. io. sit. y. essentials in the international system, one is unity and the other is the system itself.30. n. iv n C h e nStructural 2.2. The Development of Waltz's g c h i URealism Waltz’s theory of structural realism is likely to serve to raise consciousness about the importance of the systematic context within which international relations take place. Accordingly, how structural realism defines the international system will be analyzed from four dimensions. The first dimension is system structure theory. Waltz thinks there are two. 30. Robert Keohane, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” Neo-realism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 322-345..

(32) 24 variables in the system, one is structure, and the other is unit.31. In the structure of. the international system, the behavioral body of many nation states uses their own “power” to determine the order in the system. However, in the international system, the structure is consisted of each unit; formally speaking, every nation state has its power of sovereignty and is equal to each other, and there is also no need to obey the arrangements of other states. The international system is anarchic and decentralized, but in the anarchy international system, the structure is defined by the capabilities among units, the distribution of capabilities is a form of power distribution, which. 政治大 power distribution. In brief, the power distribution determines the structure of 立 indirectly leads to the variation of system structure according to the variation of. order will lead to variation of structure.32. 學. ‧ 國. international system, and the order of each unit makes up structure, the change of In fact, the variable determines the. ‧. international structure is power distribution in the international system, and different. sit. y. Nat. power distribution will produce different international structure, however, different. io. n. al. er. international structure and state will determine the external behaviors of states.. i Un. v. Second, there are three key elements that construct system structure: (1) the. Ch. engchi. international system is anarchic rather than hierarchical; (2) the international system is composed of sovereign units, each unit is formally equal and therefore the functions that they perform are also similar; and (3) the distribution of capabilities is among units in the international system. Waltz thinks that the former two elements are constant, but the third one is in a changing state, because the functions of units are similar as long as the system remains anarchic. Therefore the structure of the international system is not in static status but dynamitic, the structure can change the. 31 32. Kenneth Waltz, p. 79. Kenneth Waltz, p. 80..

(33) 25 behavior of units, therefore change the result of interactions among units in the international system. Third, the biggest difference between classical realism and structure realism is the definition of power and security.33. Classical realism regards pursuing power. between states as the purpose of each member in the international system. Morgenthau even proposes power is equal to interests, and power is equal to purpose.34. On the other hand, Waltz thinks that the final goal of state is to acquire. security by power which is only one method of gaining security. Waltz proposes new. 政治大. power concept different from classical realism, also he gives it new function and. 立. concept. He regards the structure is formed according to power extent in system. ‧ 國. 學. which changes the structure. Furthermore, the variation of power and power distribution among states will help both structure forming and the variation of. ‧. structure.35. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Finally, Waltz thinks balance of power theory is one of the important components of structural realism while power is only a method rather than the purpose. It is not. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. the purpose of nation state to seek for maximum power, rather, it seeks the equally. engchi. power distribution. If we scrutinize the true meaning is to the equally power distribution among big states. He even thinks the distribution of power under a bipolar system will lead to the equilibrium and stabilization of the international system.36. 2.3. The Value of Waltz's Structural Realism. 33 34 35 36. Kenneth Waltz, pp. 112-121. Kenneth Waltz, p. 8. Kenneth Waltz, pp. 123-128. Kenneth Waltz, pp. 161-170..

(34) 26 The biggest difference between classical realism and structural realism is first, classical realism is to scrutinize the operation of international powers from the point of state and human nature without discussing the levels within the system. Second, classical realism does not discuss issue of power distribution in the international system, but it focuses on the operation of power equilibrium in the international society. However, Scholar Stanley Hoffmann points to three main distinctions between classical realism and Waltz's structural realism. First, classical realism focuses on nation state level, stressing that the world is anarchic, however structural. 政治大 interdependent on the interactions of international politics and economy. Second, 立 realism focuses on system level, thinking that the international relation is. classical realism focuses on the research of national interest and power, but structural. ‧ 國. 學. realism puts emphasis on the distribution of power among states, advocating the. ‧. analysis of structure. Third, classical realism emphasizes the possibilities of national. sit. y. Nat. conflict instead of the possibility of international cooperation, and ignores the. io. al. er. cooperation of international institutions; structural realism, on the contrary, advocates. iv n C emphasis on the possibility of international h e n g cooperation, c h i U and paying attention to the n. the combination of international conflict and international cooperation, putting. function of cooperation facilitated by international mechanism.37 Waltz's structural realism has been the leading model which provides a useful framework for understanding the collapse of the post-World War I international order, the World War II, and the Cold War. It is also applied by international scholars who study international relations.. 37. Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order-American Foreign Policy since the Cold War (Montreal: McGraw-Hall Book Company, 1980), p. 188..

(35) 27. 2.4. The International Relations Theory and Security Concept Peace and security have been the core issues in the international relation studies. From the West point of view, three perspectives shall be discussed in order to understand international security theory, they are as the follows: (1) there is analysis of security theory in the study of International Relations; (2) the issue of security will not disappear; on the contrary, it becomes more and more important in the future; and (3) security policy should be established on the basis of theoretical analysis in the long run.. 立. 政治大. In other words, the issue about peace and security has been a critical issue in the. ‧ 國. 學. international relation theory. The international relation theory has been evolved from. ‧. classical realism to many types which also intrigue the evolvement of “security. sit. y. Nat. concepts.” Therefore, by looking into the variations of the security concepts within. io. al. er. the frame of the development of international relation theory, it is helpful to know the. iv n C concept, which provides a wider view h e for i U discuss security theory after n gusctohfurther n. causes of the evolvement of security concept and the thesis of different security. the end of Cold War.38. Realism and Traditional Security Concept “Security” is the primary condition of survival and development in human society, and is one of the main issues in the international relation theory. Further, it. 38. 倪世雄，「冷戰後國際關係理論的新發展」，當代國際觀係理論 (台北：五南出版社，2003 年 ) ，頁 564 。 [Ni Shixiong, Lengzhanhou Guojiguanxi De Xinfazhan (The Post Cold War International Relation Theory and Development), DangDai Guojiguanxi Lilun (International Relation Theory) (Taipei: Wunan Publisher, 2003), p. 564.].

(36) 28 also represents national security in the international relation studies. On the other hand, classical realism argues that all nations pursue power, and the national interests are defined by power which is the guarantee of acquiring national interest. However, realism presumes that anarchy is the feature in the international system, the international system is a self-help system because anarchy, and self-help will necessarily lead to power politics resulting in military competition, balance of power, and global wars. In other words, the military power is the main element that affects national security. The traditional national security is military security, a zero-sum. 政治大 the other country's security is another country's insecurity. 立. game, which means one country's security is the insecurity of the others. As a result, 39. ‧ 國. 學. Neo-Realism and Its Security Concept. ‧. Kenneth Waltz developed theory of neo-realism (defined as structural realism) on the basis of realism theory, shifting human nature from self-interest to the. y. Nat. er. io. sit. international structure formed by state to state interactions. The biggest difference between neo-realism and classical realism is that classical realism defines power as a. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. goal followed by nations; however, neo-realism uses power as a tool in international. engchi. relations. For example, all states possess some level of military power, and each state has the option of threatening or using the power. To some extent, each state must be concerned with the power capabilities of other states. Therefore, what concerns the states is security instead of power. To neo-realists, the characteristic of the international politics is not necessary be endless conflicts and wars, rather, there exists. 39. 倪世雄，「冷戰後國際關係理論的新發展」，當代國際觀係理論 (台北：五南出版社，2003 年 ) ，頁 564 。 [Ni Shixiong, Lengzhanhou Guojiguanxi De Xinfazhan (The Post Cold War International Relation Theory and Development), DangDai Guojiguanxi Lilun (International Relation Theory) (Taipei: Wunan Publisher, 2003), p. 564.].

(37) 29 limited cooperation among all nations. What really concerns the neo-realist is the issue of relative gain. From the perspective of neo-realist, what worries neo-realists is the distrust among nations during the process of cooperation. As a result, both realism and neo-realism hold the speculation that it is not only lack of trust, but also full of misunderstandings in the international system.. Neo-Liberalism and Independence with Neo-Realism. 政治大 perspective of the security concept. Neo-liberalism pointed out the function of 立. Both neo-realism and neo-liberalism share some assumptions, particularly on the. Institution among nation behaviors in the anarchy international system, and the. ‧ 國. 學. absolute gain of security cooperation within the system. Not only does neo-liberalism. ‧. assure the existence of mutual interest, but also the share of group interest in the long. sit. y. Nat. term. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye are neo-liberalism scholars who argue that. io. al. er. realism ignores the fact of international cooperation in the international system,. iv n C development of institutionalized society h e ningthec hinternational i U system. Specifically, the n. explaining that realism not only ignores the function of institution but also the. extent of interdependence among politics and economics, mutual conflicts, mutual competitions, and regional cooperation are constantly increasing, contributing huge efforts to the international system. 40. In addition, the domestic affairs are. internationalized, making it harder for classical realism to meet the requirement of international cooperation.. 40. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 2000), p. 12..

(38) 30 To sum up, the biggest difference between neo-realism and neo-liberalism is that the former precludes the possibilities of cooperation between states based on the distrustful relations of states, resulting the norm of zero-sum game; however the latter ensures the existence of cooperation based on the marginal costs and benefits, and under this circumstances, non-zero-sum game is normalized, therefore the international security can be gained by nations in the international system.. 2.5. New Security Concept and Structural Realism. 政治大 Why does China put forward New Security Concept? (NSC) From the end of last 立. century, China combines both of its foreign and security policy in response to the. ‧ 國. 學. rapid growth of comprehensive national power. China's NSC puts emphasis on. ‧. economy, technology, society, culture, and environment protection which become the. sit. y. Nat. core of this idea. The new security concept especially focuses on the importance of. io. al. er. economic security while China also thinks that all countries have to cooperate with. iv n C U for “mutual interests” which framework of NSC each and everyhcountry e n gshould c h istrive n. each other in order to reach the goal of mutual prosperity. Furthermore, under the. means on the basis of one country's national interests and economic security, there will be more and more mutual interests through the process of combining two countries' interests in the international society. 41. Meanwhile, it is the main. consideration of security cooperation, maintaining the regional stabilization, and global prosperity and peace. As a result, the NSC holds a position of enhancing. 41. 黃財官，「中共『新安全觀』戰略研析與作為」，陸軍學術雙月刊 491 (桃園： 2007)：46。 [Huang Caiguan, Zhonggong “Xinanquanguan” Zhanlveyanxi Yu Zuowei (The Strategic Analysis of China’s New Security Concept), Lujun Xueshushuangyuekan (Army Bimonthly) 491 (Taoyuan: 2007): 46.].

(39) 31 regional cooperation with the other countries without against the third party, under the basic principles of equality and peace including multilateral security mechanisms, multilateral security dialogues, mutual security negotiations, nonofficial security dialogues, and to accelerate economic security cooperation.42. 2.6. The Basic Theory of China’s New Security Concept China brought up the strategic concept of “New Security Concept” after the cold. 政治大 like “one superpower and many big powers” which equals the multi-polarity system, 立. war in the international politics. The international framework after the Cold War is. in which the relationship between superpowers is the main framework of analyzing. ‧ 國. 學. international politics that have two elements:. ‧. First, multi-polarity can be used as a route or a method to analyze questions. In. Nat. sit. n. al. er. They put emphasis on dialogues and negotiations so as to show the. io. common goals.. y. other words, every country has to cooperate with each other in order to achieve. i Un. v. importance of international regulations. Therefore, the new security concept has a. Ch. engchi. synthesis color of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. On the one hand, the neo-realism highlights the priority of security in the international affairs, and to obtain power is to ensure security. On the other hand, the neo-liberalism lays emphasis on the importance of regulation and cooperation in international politics, so that each country would achieve the goals of “security” and “cooperation” by following international regulations, rules, and hierarchy. Thus, not only does China constantly pursue the goal. 42. 邱坤玄，「中共對冷戰後美日安全關係的認知與新安全觀的形成」，東亞研究 2 (2004): 22。 [Qiu Kunxuan, Zhonggon Dui Lengzhanhou Meirianquanguanxi De Renzhi Yu Xinanquanguan de Xingcheng (China’s Understanding of US-Japan Relation after Cold War and its Formation of New Security Concept) Dongya Yanjiu (East Asia Study) 2 (2004): 22.].

(40) 32 of power on the basis of its new security concept as a core, but also place emphasis on the new security issues including economy, technology, society, culture, and environment. Therefore, China's NSC is a combination of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Second, the motive of NSC is to build relationships among great powers. The international politics of neo-realism is to show both the capability and intention of each country, by doing so to enable great powers to have special interests and status in the great power politics. China has been making much of building “strategic partners”. 政治大. with great powers in the international society by the extension of NSC. So, the. 立. essence of China's NSC is based on its national interests with much more realism. ‧ 國. 學. characters.. ‧. To sum up, from the two international theses mentioned above, we know that NSC is not just a new theory, but also a synthesis of “cooperative” and. y. Nat. er. io. sit. “competitive” international theory which is derived from the consideration of national “security” and “interest.” Thus, the NSC enhances every country's. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. cooperation and security in the regional and international community on the basis of peace and equality.. engchi. 2.7. New Security Concept in Structural Realism 2.7.1. The Concept of Cooperative Security Former Secretary General Javier Solanna describes the process of restructuring a new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a root and branch transformation.

(41) 33 aimed to create a new alliance inspired by the premise of “Cooperative Security.”43 It is necessary for nations to cooperate with each other, have dialogues, and build a security mechanism on the basis of cooperation in order to solve the security problems existing among themselves. “Cooperative Security” is built on the basis of mutual cooperation, especially putting emphasis on one nation's military preparation, strategic deployment, and hostile assessment of the enemy, etc., so as to interact with each other to solve existing problem of “security dilemma.”44. Meanwhile, it is also. critical to accentuate the importance of presentation diplomacy, which is to take. 政治大 aggravating the security situation to become unsolvable. Moreover, no country can 立. necessary measures to relief a crisis before the confrontation occurs instead of. solve its security problem on its own without help from other nations under the. ‧ 國. 學. circumstances of the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), but cooperation. ‧. with each and every country in the international society. In fact, cooperation security. sit. y. Nat. is a form of collective security, but is more practical than and easier to be realized. io. n. al. er. compared to “balance of power” or building a cooperative world order.45. i Un. v. Structural realism concentrates on the structure of the international system.46. Ch. engchi. Waltz thinks that firstly, the contemporary system is anarchic and decentralized rather than hierarchical; despite of the difference in many aspects, each unit (state) is formally equal. Secondly, the character of the units in the anarchic system is similar to. 43. R. Crag Nation, J.Boone Bartholomees, Jr. ed., “Some Basic Concepts and Approaches in the Study of International Relations,” U.S. War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2004), p. 61. 44. Robert H. Dorff, “Some Basic Concepts and Approaches in the Study of International Relations,” U.S. War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, ed. J.Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), p. 9. 45. Robert H. Dorff, “Some Basic Concepts and Approaches in the Study of International Relations,” op. cit., p. 9. 46 Robert H. Dorff, “Some Basic Concepts and Approaches in the Study of International Relations,” op. cit., p. 3..