4.2. US-China-Russia's Geo-Strategic Deployment in Central Asia
4.2.2. China's Strategic Interests in Central Asia after September 11 . 92
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
4.2.2. China's Strategic Interests in Central Asia after September 11
China and Central Asian states share a border of more than 3,000 km. long.
Therefore the political situations of the states will definitely influence China's national interests.
Security Interest
The turmoil and separation movement occurred in Xinjiang are considered to having relations with ETIM, al-Qaeda organization, and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has influenced China's national security situation and its western region. For example, Tajikistan's civil war and Uzbekistan's terrorist movement not only damaged the economy interactions with other countries but also made China's west region feels unrest. At present, the U.S. garrisons stationed in Central Asia have threatened Chinese government because Xinjiang is adjacent to the region, which threatens China's traditional security on its western region.
Economic Relationship
China has imported a great amount of natural resources, are lack in domestic, from Central Asia because of its abundant strategic resources, we can predict that the amount of oil and gas imported by China will increase in a large amount in the future, which will help to solve China's difficulty of acquiring natural resources in the long run. So, China hopes that Central Asia can become a regional partner of economic cooperation as well as become one of its pluralistic sources of energy in order to ensure sufficient energy needed by China's economic development and to realize the
Political and Economic Relations with Central Asia after 911 Incident) Zhanwang Yu Tansuo (Prospect and Research) 4 (Taipei: 2003): 11.]
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
strategic goal of pluralistic energy supply.144 Geographic Interest
Central Asia is the second land bridge of Asia-European continents, which is the only road leads to Europe and China's western region. It is necessary for China to cooperate with Central Asia so as to develop its west region and to consolidate China's rear part. China's priority is to stabilize its strategic rear region, which meet China strategic interests.
In a word, Central Asia's security situation will directly influence China's northwest security situation, therefore Beijing enacted several practical laws to counter strategic interests of Central Asia, they are as the followings: (1) to strike terrorism, separatist, and extremism; (2) to maintain the regional stability; (3) to promote the prosperity in the region; (4) to guarantee the good relation of both sides;
(5) to prevent Central Asia states from being affected in the fields of economy, politics, security, and foreign affairs by other powers; (6) to make military alliance with Central Asia states without hostiles in military affairs; and (7) to control the supply of energy in Central Asia.145
Therefore, China is willing to set up regional security mechanism with Central Asian states and Russia, which is beneficial to the national security of Central Asian states and to China's national security as well. So China uses SCO as a regional organization to deal with Central Asian states, and takes it as a practical method to
144 趙華勝，「中俄美在中亞能否合作?」，戰略與管理 2 (北京: 2004): 94。[Zhao Huasheng, Zhong E Mei Zaizhongya Nengfou Hezuo (Can the U.S., China, and Russia Cooperate in Central Asia?) Zhanlve Yu Guanli (Strategy and Management) 2 (Beijing: 2004): 94.]
145 趙華勝，p. 96.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
realize its Central Asia policy. By doing so, Beijing can accomplish the following goals: (1) to utilize SCO as a tool to effectively maintain Central Asia security, (2) further expand economic cooperation, which is the function of consolidating good relation, (3) to strengthen and develop civilian cooperation, cultural exchanges, and to enhance mutual trust, eliminate misunderstanding and doubt caused by each other, (4) to unite all members of SCO, and oppose to any big powers from sabotaging China's realization of strategic interest in the region; and (5) to prevent the un-conventional Central Asia powers from harassing China, damaging the relationship between China and Central Asia states, and hampering China's modernization progress.
China's Geo-Strategic Consideration in Central Asia
Russia's leaning to the West has caused the strategic triangle relation between the U.S., China, and Russia to change, on the one hand, the U.S. strengthens the military alliance with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan while using their military bases to extend its military power to China's backyard, which leads to the strategy of squeezing China and changes China's surrounding environment against China's interest. On the other hand, China carries out high-level reciprocal visits, and anti-terrorism joint military exercises through SCO to expand the cooperation aspects including economy, politics, technology, and military. And security with the purpose of containing the U.S.
influence in Central Asia. Therefore, it is temporary for China and the U.S. to hide the contradictions of both sides on the issue of anti-terrorism, but for the long-term national interest, those contradictions will surface eventually for both sides.
4.2.3. Russia's Strategic Interests in Central Asia after September 11
Russia considers Central Asia as its backyard in which any turbulence in this region will endanger its national security.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Following the September 11 Event, the U.S. forces entered Central Asia, which challenges and squeezes Russia's strategic space in Central Asia, this makes the competition of Central Asia competitive. But in competition for Central Asia, Russia has three advantages of culture, geography, and humanity, further, it is easier for Russia to protect and maintain its interests with the privilege of economic maneuver compared with other big powers. As a result, Russian interests in Central Asia are all-around, and embodied in the fields such as economy, security, nationality, and military affairs.
Security interest
First of all, Central Asia is a natural fortification for Russia to prevent the expansion of western powers, and to stop the NATO from getting in. It is not only one of the main pass ways for international terrorist and extremism to filtrate in Russia, but also a buffer zone where Russia takes precautions against the expansion of Islamic extremists. Especially, Russia sees China as a “strategic partner” because of Russia's intension to enhance its influence to Central Asia. In addition, Central Asia is very close to the so called “Golden Crescent” where is one of the world's main drug factories. These drugs enter Russia through Central Russia, causing a serious threat to Russia's security interests, and Russia takes Central Asian states as a “firewall” to blocking the drug expansion.
Economic Benefits
Central Asian states are rich in strategic natural resources, and the proportion of raw materials in the export from the Central Asian states to Russia was about 70
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
percent,146 especially, mineral products (like iron, copper, and lead) and agricultural products (like cotton and wool), which are the critical material sources needed by Russian enterprises that are helpful for Russia to create employment opportunities, while Central Asian states are main consumer markets of Russian industrial products.
The mutual commercial benefits are interdependent by both sides and are helpful to stabilize the economy. Russia's economy which has been weak and tottering over the past ten years,147 and it hasn't collapsed completely because of the strong support from its energy. Although Central Asian states are rich in natural resources, and its routes of pipeline has been controlled by Russia. However, Central Asian states have created diversified routes of pipeline to export its energy over the past years, which not only caused Russia losing money but also become a competitor to Russia on the international energy market. So, Russia started to change its energy policies and to cooperate with Central Asian states instead of resistance. Participating in exploiting and transferring the energy from Caspian Sea, Russia has found new economic interests in this region again.
Ethical Concerns
The Russian-speaking people who live in the CIS countries will be regarded as Russian citizens by Russia. It is because Russia pays much attention to the legitimate rights and interests of external Russian citizens. There are around 10 million Russian citizens live in five Central Asian states, and these people were cherished in the past,
146 Vladimir Paramonov and Aleksey Strokov, Russia and Central Asia: Current and Future Economics Relations (England: Shrivenham, Block D., JSCSC, Defense Academy of the U.K., July 2006), p. 5.
147 何衛剛，「俄羅斯外交政策的新焦點—中亞戰略利益」，中華戰略學刊 4 (台北: 2004):
102-103。[He Wei Gang, Eluosi Waijaozhengce De Xinjiaodian—Zhongya Zhanlveliyi (The New Focus of Russia’s Foreign Policy—Central Asia Strategic Interest) Zhonghuazhanlve Xuekan (Chinese Strategy Journal) 4 (Taipei: 2004): 102-103.]
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
now they are dominated and antagonized by Muslims. Therefore, Central Asia accentuated its value in terms of Russia's concerns over its citizens within this region.
Military Interests
The Baikonur base in Kazakhstan was once Russia's largest space center and launching site. Russia's first ICBM, the SS-6, and the first satellite were first launched on the base. After Russia's “pro-West” policy has been obstructed, Russia became aware of the crisis of disappearing of its Central Asian interests, and dropped the defensive Central Asia policy which was formed after September 11, 2001, and then resume and develop the impact on the region. Russia not only changes its attitudes to Central Asia, but also sees them as foreign countries. Besides, Russia has also expanded the scope of cooperation and strengthened the intensity of relations with Central Asian states, making obvious progress so far.
In political cooperation, Russia seeks to establish close strategy alliance and cooperation with Central Asian states: (1) to strengthen multilateral political cooperation with Central Asian states within CIS system; and (2) to promote the development of bilateral relations with Central Asian states by frequent bilateral visits with the leaders of Central Asian states. Russia makes Central Asian states turn back to it by means of economic interests and equally treating methods.
In economic cooperation, in May 2005, Russia and some Central Asian states constituted Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC), which shows the economic integration of Russia and Central Asian states is making progress. In light of the positive attitude on SCO, Russia not only resumes its influence on Central Asia, but also makes it an important channel for Russia to communicate with Central Asian states.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
In the military cooperation, the CSTO members including Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan made a decision to build up Rapid Reaction Forces of Central Asia to combat terrorism in May, 2001, which shows Russia, Central Asia states, and other CIS members have made progress on military cooperation. Building up a new military base in Kyrgyzstan in October, 2003, Russia dispatched fighter jets to station in the base, which is a indication of Russia geo-politics maneuvering to prevent other great powers from gaining strategic dominance in this region.
Russia Consolidates its Traditional Power in Central Asia
After the September 11 Event, Putin, president of Russia, rapidly joined the alliance of anti-terrorism led by the United States, and admitted the U.S. military to enter Central Asia in order to exchange interests with Washington. Moscow hopes to prevent the Washington from withdrawing Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) to access to WTO with assistance from the U.S., to delay NATO from expanding eastward, to rearrange the debt plan which pays Paris Club in arrears of former Soviet Union, and to loosen U.S. criticism to Russia on the issue of Chechnya.148
But those issues have caused Russia and the United States to compete with each other in Central Asia while greatly impacting Russia's traditional Central Asian interests which include the pro U.S. inclination of all five Central Asian states, the U.S. involvement in the development and transportation of Central Asian energy, and the change of political democratization in Central Asian states, making it harder for Russia to regenerate the status as a big country from the past, and making Russia's
148 范軍，「美國 : 從中亞到南高加索」， 國際政治 ( 北京 : 2002): 95 。 [Fan Jun, Meiguo:
Congzhongya Dao Nangaojiasuo (The United States: From Central Asia to South Caucasus) Guojizhengzi (International Politics) (Beijing: 2002): 95.]
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
strategic space became smaller and smaller.149 The competition between Russia and the U.S. has been evolving from halting and contenting at the beginning to restricting and equalizing various outside forces in Central Asia.
Although it is difficult for Russia to avoid the U.S. deployment of power from getting in Central Asia on the basis of its power, Moscow has continuously strengthened the traditional relation with Central Asia states to expand the presence of military and politics as a key method to encounter the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russia reinstated Kant military base which is in Kyrgyzstan in 2003, on 16th October, 2003, Putin took a visit in Tajikistan and signed an agreement to build a military base in Tajikistan capital Dushanbe, which is Russia's largest military overseas at present.150 We can see that Russia is aggressively to do it's best to consolidate the traditional relations and effectiveness in Central Asia. The declaration of SCO leaders led by China had been passed on July 25, 2005, which required the specific time table of U.S. withdrawing from Central Asia. On November 21, 2005, the last U.S. Army withdrew from Khanabad Air Base of Uzbekistan. Russia and Uzbekistan formally signed the “Treaty of Russia-Uzbekistan Alliance” one week before the withdrawal of U.S. Army, which not only shows the relation between Russia and Uzbekistan has been Upgraded from “strategic partners” to “strategic alliances,” but also shows Russia can't wait to fill the vacancy left by the U.S. Army departure.151 If the U.S. Army evacuation from Uzbekistan is the case of Domino Effect, the threat to Russian back door will be removed. But the United States has
149 何衛剛，「美俄在中亞的戰略競爭」，中華戰略學刊 (台北: 2004): 84。[He Weigang, Mei E Zaizhongya De Zhanlvejingzheng (The US Strategic Competition in Central Asia) Zhonghuazhanlve Xuekan (Chinese Strategic Journal) (Taipei: 2004): 84.]
150 Dan Brughart, p. 4.
151 Stephen Blank, “Rethinking Central Asia Security,” p. 34.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
coveted for Central Asia for a long time, how could Washington easily give up its strategic plan of Central Asia? The best interest serves the U.S. is to maintain its military presence in Central Asia, whether on the basis of dealing with China and Russia or form the perspective of global hegemony. In sum, the struggle of both sides will still be sustained, and the subsequent result is worth observing.
4.3. US-Sino-Russia's Energy Consideration in Central Asia
After the Central Asian states achieved independent, the abundant oil and gas reserves have become the focus of international community at one time. As shown of competition of natural resources have been disclosed in Central Asia.
The petroleum resource in Central Asia is widely spread, especially in the Caspian Sea where is called by “the Second Middle East,” the oil reserve is estimated to be about 200 billion barrels, accounts for 8 percent of the total reserves in the world.
After the independence of Central Asia states, the unique geo-politics and geo-economics factors in the Caspian Sea area have been becoming the new focus of great powers' benefits and international capital competition all the time.152
Because the pipelines of oil and gas were totally monopolized by Moscow in the former Soviet Union era, Central Asian states still heavily rely on Russian oil routes and still have to pay a great amount of transit tax. Therefore, the western countries led by the U.S. advocate to build pipelines winding Russian territory while China suggests building a pipeline to open a new route which starts western wards from
152 Chen Jeou-Lin, “The World Oil Competition and Future Direction,” China Network, August 29, 2002, available at: http://big5.china.com.cn/chinese/jingji/224719.htm, (accessed: 20110227).
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
China to Kazakhstan. Actually, the construction of Sino-Kazakhstan pipeline had been accomplished at the end of 2005, which puts into production reaching 10 million tons every year and brings great benefit to the development of China's West Region. While the competition of the exit of energy pipelines among the U.S., China, and Russia has reached the climax, Russia endeavors to safeguard its traditional influence in Central Asia based on geographical reason. Russia doesn't want to suffer economic losses caused by diverting the pipelines from the original route where in Russia's territory.
On the other hand, the U.S. does not want the pipelines totally monopolized by Russia, damaging its energy security. As a result, the U.S. has actively intervened by the competition of oil and gas at the end of the 20th century.153