Chapter 3 China and Central Asia
3.3. China’s Central Asia policy before September 11
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the military and political affairs of Central Asia, it may become an Islam alliance with Central Asian states, which has abundant strategic natural resources like oil and gas, to connect to the Caspian Sea, therefore endangers the U.S. strategic energy interests in this region. As a result, one of the U.S. strategic objectives is to suppress Iran from becoming a great power in Central Asian region.103
3.3. China’s Central Asia policy before September 11
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, China had to redefine its strategic and foreign policy objectives in Central Asia. Structurally speaking, there are three aspects of China’s strategic considerations regarding to stability and security, economic development, and especially the energy requirement.
3.3.1. Stability and Security
For China, the stability of Central Asian states is a key factor after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which means a pivotal role of Central Asia for security along China’s western borders is showed up again, due to Beijing’s perception of vulnerability along its remote western borders is further exacerbated by the emergence of an open Central Asian frontier. But the main driver for China’s emphasis on security along its western borders is the concern over instability in Xinjiang. From this point, Beijing’s foreign regional policy focuses on three Central Asian states that border the Xinjiang province—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In order to maintain stability and security within Xinjiang, China realized that their top priority is to contain the influence of Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic-Turkic activities in
103 張延廷，「中亞發展現況與中國大陸在該區的區域戰略」， p. 7.
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China through the support of Central Asian states.104 There are two actions China has applied in order to meet this primary objective, the first action taken by China was to settle border disputes with all three states that shared 3,000 km. of its western border.
China and Kazakhstan signed a protocol to demarcate and delimit 1,740 km. boundary between the two countries; The Kyrgyz singed two protocols in 1996 and 1999 to settle their boundary disputes; Tajikistan and China signed an agreement in May 2002.
Under this agreement, Tajikistan ceded 1,000 sq. km. of territory to China in return of China’s withdrawal of 28,000 sq. km of Tajik territory.105
Since incorporating Xinjiang in 1759, the Uighur minorities have resisted China’s control because Central Asia much closer to the over 7 million Muslim, ethnic-Turkic Uighur than the ethnic Han Chinese. Therefore, Beijing sees the XUAR as especially vulnerable to separatism and anti-Chinese influences. The second action taken by China is to begin a migration program of its Han Chinese population in order to establish and maintain government control in the 1950s. The migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang intrigued tensions between the Uighur minority and Beijing in 1970’s. During this period, the spread of Islam led to the region having the highest number of mosque in the world in the mid1980’s.106
With this religious change, radical Islamic ideology begins to emerge with the opening of schools and practices of religious activities not supported by Chinese.
Radical Islamic ideology eventually led to the unification of Uighur separatist and terrorist organizations, such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Islamic Organization of Turkistan that took actions against Beijing government by
104 Boris Z Rummer., ed., Central Asia—A Gathering Storm (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2003), p. 178.
105 Ramakant Dwivedi, pp. 146-147.
106 Roy Allison and Lena Johnson, ed., Central Asian Security—The New International Context (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2001), p. 161.
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conducting a series of booming in Xinjiang from 1997 to present.107
Therefore, Islam is tightly controlled both in Central Asia and China. Although China established harsh military and governmental actions against these organizations, the fact is the radical Islam is still rising by external support like Afghanistan and Pakistan (training and economic assistance) rather than from Central Asian states.
Beijing is less concerned about the religious extremism as it is concerned by separatist nationalism due to many Uighur nationalist leaders outside China is by no means religiously radical. Thus, China has put emphasis on the struggle against separatism and terrorism, and the religious extremism is only a part of its strategy.
In this context, gaining the Central Asian states’, especially with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism within Xinjiang is China’s Central Asia strategy prior September 11, 2001.
3.3.2. Economic Development
The independence of Central Asian states in 1991 caused China to extend its hands into this region. Beijing views its western region as a hard issue to be overcome on the basis of Xinjiang’s historical background with Central Asian states. In order to solve the separatism issue, Beijing had to apply economic reform in this region while maintaining the stability and unity at the same time. Because Xinjiang is connected with Central Asia as a “Eurasia continental bridge,” the economy shall be developed by direct trade relations with neighboring Central Asian states, increasing an opportunity to fully develop the preserved oil and gas resources in the region.
107 Richard Giragosian, “The Strategic Central Asian Arena,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 1 (Washington: Spring 2006): 133-153.
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In this context, economic interaction offered China a significant leverage to induce Central Asian states against religious or ethnic based groups who supported anti-government organizations in Xinjiang.108 Beijing’s long-standing state-building policies in Central Asia is one part of its Great Western Development Project which is an attempt to simultaneously integrate Xinjiang with Central Asian states in economic terms, while establishing security and cooperation with its Central Asian neighbors.109 In 1992, the Xinjiang local government was allowed to open its borders for economic activities. The internal manifestation of this strategy is focusing on expanded Central Asian trade and economic developments resulting in a majority of all business activities conducted in Xinjiang while increasing the region’s dependency on Xinjiang as the trading center for Central Asia, increasing investment for the exploitation of Xinjiang’s potential energy resources, encouragement of cotton cultivation and primary products (including food), increasing trade and economic investments in Central Asia are focused toward Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, opening borders to trade with Central Asian states, and to invest in infrastructure linking to Central Asian states.
On the other hand, the external manifestation of this approach is to maintain an economic presence in Central Asia through trade by the extension incentives for border trade and improvement of infrastructural links. Beijing views Investments in infrastructure (railways and roads) have allowed itself to maintain trade with Central Asian states that include a potential rail between Xinjiang and Uzbekistan passing Kyrgyzstan.110 Furthermore, loans to Central Asian states such as Kyrgyzstan and
108 Mark Burles, p.14.
109 Gaye Christofferson, “Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning,” The China Quarterly 133 (March 1993): 130-151.
110 Bates, Gill, China’s New Journey to the West: China’s Emergence in Central Asia and Implication
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Tajikistan to purchase Chinese commercial goods are on the purpose of supporting Beijing’s policy against the “three evils” in Xinjiang. Although trading volume is relatively low for China compared to other regions, China views economic developments of Xinjiang and Central Asia as an imperative linkage to stabilize the region against Islamic fundamentalism.
3.3.3. Energy Requirement
China, being the world’s second largest oil consumer after the United States, has been attaching high priority to accessing oil and gas reserves in the Central Asian states since exceeding its energy self-sufficiency in 1993. Because 85 percent of China’s imported oil passes through the Indian Ocean, Malacca Strait, and the South China Sea. Thus, any interference in this “strategic passageway” by nations trying to contain China or by pirates or terrorists intent on disrupting the global market could halt nearly all of China’s energy supply. Consequently, Beijing has to diversify its energy imports to lower dependence on the Middle East. However, most of the domestic energy resources in China are located in the northern and northwest province (Xinjiang Region) which has made stability/security of these areas vital to China’s economic prosperity.
There are several methods to be taken in consideration in order to diversify the sources of energy imports and increase the share of oil and gas imports from Russia and Central Asia. After the Central Asian states gained their independence, China began economic and trade negotiations with energy rich states along the Caspian basin in order to establish a foothold in the energy market. Needles to say, Beijing’s priority in Central Asia is to cooperate with energy-rich states including Kazakhstan
for US Interest (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2003), p. 29.
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and Turkmenistan. Beginning in 1997, China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) purchased 60.3 percent of the shares in the Akyubinsk project in Kazakhstan increasing to 85.6 percent in 2003.111 China and Kazakhstan also agree to establish an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea into Xinjiang with further distribution into eastern China. China established similar energy deals with Turkmenistan to establish a natural gas pipeline into Xinjiang, and the CNPC brokered deal to construct oil pipelines connecting into Kazakhstan line from Turkmenistan. In addition, Beijing is planning on construction of a rail way line linking Uzbekistan and Xinjiang province via Kyrgyzstan, which clearly demonstrates Beijing’s political and economic commitments to ensure oil and gas supply from the Central Asian states.