6. Conclusions
6.1 Summary and Predictions
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6. Conclusions
In the following chapter, the findings of the current thesis will be summarized, the research questions will be answered and a conclusion will be given. An attempt to predict possible changes and shifts, based on the collected and presented data will also be made.
The question stated in the introduction, that are to be studied and answered in this section were the following: comparing the size and the population of the Peoples’
Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, we can clearly conclude that the relationship - more specifically the political relations - between is an asymmetric one, but can the same be said about the current economic and military state and economic and military relations of the two territories? In other words, is the asymmetry of the economic and military development and connection of China and Republic of China (ROC) as big as their size and population difference? An addition question can be added: what part does the third actor of the Cross-Strait relations, the United States of America play in this asymmetric connection?
6.1 Summary and predictions
In the process of finding possible answers to the questions above, the theories of asymmetric connections and triangular asymmetric relations were used. Both were originally designed to describe non-symmetrical connections through aspects of politics and the international sphere. However, this current thesis made an attempt to analyze presumable asymmetric relations in the economic and the military sector.
In the field of politics, the theories can be lined up with the bilateral and triangular connections, which served as the focuses of the study. This was proven by Brantly Womack, placing his own thoughts into practice, and by the chapter of this thesis, dedicated to describing the political asymmetry between Taiwan and China. An additional proof given to support the unequal connections is specified in Yu-Shan Wu’s work, where he states that the ROC can never be equalized, will never be equal with the mainland. (Wu 2000) That is the reason why, under the broader concept of the power asymmetry theory, either bandwagoning or balancing can describe the
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option for studying the bilateral connection between the two parties.Status quo is constant and undisturbed, however attitudes towards the other side are shifting and moderating, to which Beijing’s changing approach is a suiting example.
The thought of forceful “liberation” of the island from the Kuomintang’s rule shifted to a planned peaceful unification. However, tensions occasionally still dictate the intonation of the relations. The isolation of the ROC in the international community, the latest, third Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96, the Democratic Progressive Party’s governance and the Anti Secession Law passed by the CCP in 2005 are all examples around which heated conflict between the two parties could have escalated from.
Brantly Womack characterizes the connection as it being “locked in enmity”.
(Womack 2010, 395) This statement may be too harsh or not peaceful enough to typify the current connection of the Taiwan and China. The relation has shifted a lot since the events listed above took place.
Peacefulness characterizes the connection, but it has not reached the status of acknowledgment for deference yet, or AFD as it has been described in the chapter of triangular asymmetry of Beijing, Taipei and Washington. The US has been able to achieve such relations with the two Asian actors, but such level of trust has not been reached yet in Cross Strait connections.
Predicting the route that the relations considering this sector will take is rather difficult. One reason among many is the rising PRC’s plans and future. According to Michael D. Swaine, China is fighting to regain its previous, great power that it possessed in the past centuries. Beijing aims to achieve this most importantly via the two sectors of focus, the economy and the military and its diplomatic connections.
(Swaine 2010) This opinion has a somewhat hostile intonation. This was mentioned to raise the issue of the possibility of the PRC gaining what it wants using its growing forces and power. As noted in the military chapter, some do fear the military advancement of China, but according to others, Beijing would lose too much if it was to take nonpeaceful steps and actions.
Less hostile predictions have also been made. Similarity between Taiwan’s economic development in the second half of the twentieth century and changes that China has gone through the past years and is still experiencing has been noted. As a result, some conclude that, as part of a spillover effect, after the economy, the political sector will also shift, just as Taiwan’s did, calling forth the democratic system that
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maybe even likely according to these studies. As mentioned before, a process like this may also drive Taiwan and its citizens to accept and support unification with the mainland.It is not merely China and its rise that make foreseeing the future difficult and uncertain. As it has been discussed, changes of governments, different parties and leaderships that lead the main actors of this connection have the ability to shift their views and approaches on the relations, which may also cause changes in the steps and actions they take related to the connection. The democratic buildup of two of the parties in the relations, Taiwan and the US, lead to these conclusions. With elections every several years and the results that may lead to different party’s victory can change the course of the connections. The PRC not being a democratic state does not invalids this thought concerning China. In Beijing, shifting in leaderships, new leaders gaining the power and new figures setting the route of the PRC may also be the source of such changes.
On an additional note, the different arguments that can be brought up in defense and in opposition to the introduction of Taiwan’s and China’s connection into the framework of the asymmetric connection have to be mentioned. In opposition, it can be said that the ROC cannot be considered a state, but merely a province of the PRC, following Beijing’s views. However, despite the fact that in Womack’s theory both parties are most likely accepted states of international community, it cannot be concluded that the theory may only be applied to territories that are full members of international community. As the triangular connections theory has been applied to Taiwan by Womack himself, there should be no uncertainty if the ROC can or cannot be studied in the framework of that concept.
Examining the economic power and sectors of both China and Taiwan, the conclusions of an asymmetric connection existing in this sphere were made. Proven by numbers and by the data, it could be summarized that the PRC is performing outstandingly in all the mentioned sectors, leaving the ROC behind. Reasons for this were given in the named chapter and its conclusion, while the fact of Taiwan’s advantage in the information technology and computering branches was stressed. The economic and trade connections that link the island and the mainland, further support the difference in power and capabilities between Beijing and Taipei. Non-symmetric relations are formed in this sector, which are evidence to both the theory of
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asymmetric connections being able to describe spheres beyond the political one – the economic sector in this case – and for the economic relations between China and Taiwan to be concluded as being an asymmetric one.
There is, however, one aspect of the economic connections of the Cross Strait relations that does not seem to fit into the theoretical framework set by Womack. As described in the related chapter, dependence or interdependence is more and more characteristic of the connection across the Taiwan Strait. It affects Taiwan, which can be lined up with the basic concept of the thesis, but China depending on the ROC can also be proven. In the theory, the greater A is stronger than the smaller b in almost connections without question will be possible to make.
Predicting future changes is difficult, not just in this sector, but in other ones as well. Structural shifts may occur that could result in unforeseeable changes and situations. One thing, however, is clear and seems to be stable enough to serve as bases of predictions. As emphasized by Yih Chyi Chuang as well, the economy is the source of peace and non-violent connections across the Taiwan Strait. The status quo and actual relations between Taipei and Beijing are dynamic and are capable of changing rapidly, but it is mostly due to the economic sector, that a possible, military conflict would not start or would not be forced between China and Taiwan. (Chuang 201428)
Asymmetry in the military sector was also proved and concluded in the given chapter of the current thesis. Despite the fact that modernizational processes are undergoing both in Taiwan and in China, but the latter in gaining the upper hand.
Beijing is also allowing its military to use larger and larger funds, while a process of budget cuttings can be noted in the ROC’s case. Another main point raised in the summary of the chapter on the military can be referred to here. Current studies and articles no longer compare the Chinese military with the Taiwanese one. The question they ask no longer is the victor in a possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The focus
28: Information gathered during the interview with Yih Chyi Chuang was included in this paragraph.
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has shifted to the comparison of the PLA and the US’s military. As a result, it can be concluded that China’s army has been so successfully modernized and managed that it is compared to the largest and possibly most advanced military in the world. This shows clear signs of the ROC’s grave disadvantage.
To further strengthen the fact of asymmetry of this sector, the tables of the appendix taken from the Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, comparing the capabilities of both sides will be examined here. (See Figure 1.1 - 1.3) The tables confront three different areas: China itself, the Taiwan Strait area of the mainland or the location of weaponry in the PRC that can easily reach the island and Taiwan.
Ground forces, the navy and the air force are all given separate tables. One common tendency can be noted that connects the different branches of military: of every listed weaponry Taiwan owns less than China. In most categories, the ROC possesses less than half of the amount under the PRC’s commend. As a comparison, in most cases, Taipei’s capabilities cannot even be confronted with the ones Beijing stations close to the Taiwan Strait. In other words, according to these tables, Taiwan would not even be able to defeat the fraction of People’s Liberation Army that is posted in territories closest to the island.
With this additional study and the conclusion given at the end of the military chapter it can be concluded that the military connection between Taipei and Beijing is an asymmetric one as well.
Throughout the thesis, these three sectors have been heavily separated. For this reason, the importance of linkage and connection between them has to be emphasized.
Politics and the political sphere influence every other, presently discussed – economy and military - or disregarded sector – social and environment. Policies, aims and methods used to achieve these goals all depend on the governing parties and politicians. They can focus on certain issues and neglect others. For this reason, the political sphere often takes the upper hand in the issues involving given sectors.
However it is not just the political sphere that can be connected to different ones.
The two discussed spheres are interlinked as well. The question of the military budget can be taken as an example. With a better performing economy, the state is wealthier. With these additional funds, the military budget of the country can be increased, presumably creating a more advanced and better equipped army. China is a possible example for this. The limitations in trade set by Taipei, touched upon in the
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Cross Strait trade subchapter of the economic chapter, can also be listed as an example.
Some of the restrictions are still valid because of security reasons. With these, the ROC is securing its economic advancement or the given areas are linked to the army, making it the keeper of military secrets, which cannot be leaked.
As a final summary, after stating the Cross Strait relation is asymmetric in every studied sector, it can be concluded that besides the general non-symmetry between the two actors, asymmetry in the studied sectors and asymmetry of capabilities characterizes and influences the relation between Taiwan and China. In other words, China can be identified with the greater actor, A in Brantly Womack’s theory of asymmetric connections, while Taiwan is taking the role of the weaker b in the same concept. However, it must be noted that this asymmetry is not as big as the general difference given in the population, the territory and the role in the international community.
This statement is supported by the professors who were interviewed. Yih Chyi Chuang stated that China is indeed greater, especially in the economical sector. This can be concluded despite the fact that its GDP per capita level is low, as it was mentioned in the related chapter of the current thesis. Taiwan can be identified as the smaller party, which proves the existence of asymmetry between the two actors.
(Chuang 201429)
Chia-Hsiung Chiang emphasizes the existence of the asymmetry in capabilities and sees non-symmetry as proven between China and Taiwan. In the international community, the ROC wishes to be treated as an equal and relevant actor, a separate identity and not as part of the PRC. (Chiang 201430)