不對稱政治與兩岸關係 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文. 立. 政 治 大 Master’s Thesis. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 sit. io. er. Nat. 不對稱政治與兩岸關係. n. Politics of Asymmetry and the Cross-Strait Relations a. iv l C n hengchi U. Student: Julia Arday Advisor: Tse-Kang Leng. 中華民國 103 年 7 月 July 2014.

(2) 不對稱政治與兩岸關係 Politics of Asymmetry and the Cross-Strait Relations 研究生:于芝雅. Student: Julia Arday. 指導教授:冷則剛. Advisor:Tse-Kang Leng. 國立政治大學 治 政 大. 學. ‧ 國. 立 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 碩士論文. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. A Thesis. engchi. i n U. v. Submitted to International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies National Chengchi University In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master of Arts. 中華民國 103 年 7 月 July 2014.

(3) ACKNOWLEDGMENT. I would like to thank and express my greatest gratitude to my advisor, Professor Tse-Kang Leng, who helped and guided me through the whole process of thesis writing, aiding me in finding the topic which suited me the most and which was intriguing to research and study. I would also like to thank my department, the International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies of the National Chengchi University, and its professors for the past two years. I am grateful for the knowledge and. 政 治 大 Last but certainly 立 not least, I would like thank my family and my. experience that I have gained in the classes and outside of them.. ‧ 國. them.. 學. friends for their endless love and support. I would not be here without This leaves only one more person to thank: “There’s always something. ‧. to look at if you open your eyes!”. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i. i n U. v. Julia Arday Taipei, Taiwan.

(4) ABSTRACT. The basic aim of this current thesis is to place the connection between China and Taiwan into Brantly Womack’s concept of asymmetric connections. The main question of the study is if the relations across the Taiwan Strait are an asymmetric one and if so, does this connection fit into the framework of the mentioned theory. The presence of non-symmetry or the lack of it is to be proven uniquely through the sectors of economy and military, by comparing the two actors in these spheres. With the step of. 政 治 大 democratically governed 立 territory in the study, not just the limitations of taking these two sectors as the basis of the examination and including a. ‧ 國. 學. the original concept will be broadened, but a gap will be filled that has existed in the field. Additionally, a third party, the United States is introduced into the connection between Beijing and Taipei. The nature of. ‧. the study of the relations will change from bilateral to triangular. As a. y. Nat. result, the concept of asymmetric triangle will take the place of the. er. io. sit. asymmetric connections theory for the duration of one chapter.. al. n. v i n C asymmetry, hasymmetric i U e n g c hconnection,. Keywords:. asymmetric triangle,. economy, military, Cross-Strait relations, China, Taiwan, United States. ii.

(5) 摘要. 本文研究目的在於以 Brantly Womack 的不對稱關係理論,來研究 兩岸關係,並測試其理論的有效性。有關不對稱關係理論,原本以經 濟及軍事面向為分析焦點。本論文則將民主及主權等相關理論列入分 析範疇,並使得不對稱理論的研究範圍擴大。此外,有關第三方的角 色,尤其是美國的角色,也納入了論文的討論與分析。因此,不對稱. 政 治 大. 關係的研究,也將從雙邊關係,拓展到三邊關係。本論文將對不對稱. 立. 的三角關係,作出了理論及政策上的貢獻。. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iii. i n U. v.

(6) TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 1.1 Research purposes ............................................................................. 1 1.2 Broader theoretical background ........................................................ 2 1.3 Description of the asymmetric connections theory ........................... 7 1.4 Hypothesis and framework of analysis .......................................... 17 1.5 Research methods........................................................................... 18 1.6 Additional notes ............................................................................. 20. 政 治 大. 2. Historical summary and placing the Cross-Strait relations into the framework of the asymmetric connections theory.................... 21. 立. 2.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 21. ‧ 國. 學. 2.2 Brief historical summary of the connection between China and Taiwan ............................................................................................ 21. ‧. 2.3 Placing the Cross-Strait relations into the framework of the asymmetric connections theory ..................................................... 25. sit. y. Nat. 3. The asymmetry of the economical connection between China and Taiwan ......................................................................................... 33. io. n. al. er. 3.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 33. i n U. v. 3.2 Agriculture ..................................................................................... 37. Ch. engchi. 3.3 Industries ........................................................................................ 37 3.4 Investment ...................................................................................... 42 3.5 Economic connection between China and Taiwan ........................ 44 3.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................... 48 4. Security issues and the military asymmetry of the Cross-Strait relations ............................................................................................. 53 4.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 53 4.2 The military power of China .......................................................... 54 4.3 The military power of Taiwan........................................................ 64 4.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................... 70. iv.

(7) 5. The role of the United States in the connection between China and Taiwan ......................................................................................... 73 5.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 73 5.2 The concept of asymmetric triangles ............................................. 74 5.3 US-China-Taiwan political and military connections .................... 79 5.4 US-China-Taiwan economic connections ..................................... 86 5.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................... 91 6. Conclusions ......................................................................................... 94 6.1 Summary and Predictions .............................................................. 94 6.2 Possible contributions .................................................................... 99 7. Bibliography ..................................................................................... 103. 治 政 大 112 8.1 Appendix I: Figures ..................................................................... 立 8.2 Appendix II: Questions asked during the conducted interviews .. 127. 8. Appendix ........................................................................................... 112. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. v. i n U. v.

(8) LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1 Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces .................... 112 Figure 1.2 Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces ....................... 113 Figure 1.3 Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces ........................... 114 Figure 2.1 Taiwanese exports to China by category, 1993-2009 ............ 115 Figure 2.2 Taiwanese imports from China by category, 2000-2009 ....... 116 Figure 2.3 Cross-strait merchandise trade, nominal and adjusted flows, 1991-2009 ................................................................................................. 116. 治 政 大 117 1997-2009 ................................................................................................. 立 Figure 2.5 Number of annual cross-strait visitors, 1987-2009 ................ 118 Figure 2.4 Taiwanese foreign direct investment into China by sector,. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 3.1 Taiwan’s Defense Budgets, 1994-2013 ................................. 119 Figure 3.2 Taiwan’s Defense Budgets, 1994-2013 ................................. 119. ‧. Figure 3.3 Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles [owned by the People’s Republic of China] ............................................. 120. y. Nat. sit. Figure 4.1 Strategic Triangles and Roles ................................................. 121. al. er. io. Figure 4.2 X-pivoted ST [Strategic Triangle] as Perceived Through. n. Power Asymmetry ..................................................................................... 122. Ch. i n U. v. Figure 4.3 Inherent Tension in the WBT [Washington-Beijing-Taipei]. engchi. Triangle ..................................................................................................... 122 Figure 4.4 Top Trading Partners [of the United States] – February 2014: Total Trade ................................................................................................ 123 Figure 4.5 Top Trading Partners [of the United States] – February 2014: Imports ..................................................................................................... 123 Figure 4.6 Top Trading Partners [of the United States] – February 2014: Exports ...................................................................................................... 124 Figure 4.7 Composition of US merchandise trade deficit, 1994-2009 .... 125 Figure 4.8 Foxconn revenues, 1996-2009 ............................................... 126. vi.

(9) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS A2: Anti-access. MR: Military Region. A2/AD: Anti-access and area-denial. NCCU: National Chengchi University. warfare. ODM: Original design manufacturer. AFD: Acknowledgment for deference. PLA: People’s Liberation Army. APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic. PLAAF: People’s Liberation Army Air. Cooperation. Force PLAN: People’s Liberation Army. ASAT: Anti-satellite weapon. Navy 治 政 ASEAN: Association of Southeast PPP:大 Purchasing power parity 立 Asian Nations PRC: People’s Republic of China ASBM: Anti-ship ballistic missile. ‧ 國. 學. R&D: Research and development. BMD: Ballistic missile defense. ROC: Republic of China. CCP: Chinese Communist Party. SAM: Surface-to-air missile. CIA: Central Intelligence Agency. SEZ: Shenzhen Special Economic. Nat. Zone. sit. DPP: Democratic Progressive Party. SLOC: Sea lines of communication. er. io. ECFA: Economic Cooperation. al. SMF: Strategic Missile Force. n. Framework Agreement. Ch. i n U. FDI: Foreign domestic investment FTA: Free trade agreement. y. ‧. AVF: All-volunteer force. v. SOC: Special Operations Command. e n g c h iSOE: State-owned enterprise. GA: Group Army. ST: Strategic triangle. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. TAF: Taiwan Air Force. IC: Integrated circuit. TMD: Theatre missile defense. ICBM: Intercontinental ballistic missile. TRA: Taiwan Relations Act. IMF: International Monetary Fund. US: United States of America. IT: Information Technology. WBT: Washington-Beijing-Taipei. KMT: Kuomintang. WTO: World Trade Organization. MPC: Military Police Command. vii.

(10) 1. Introduction. 1.1 Research purposes. The following study targets to place the economic and military connection of Taiwan and China into the asymmetric connections theory. The reasons this connection could be placed into this concept are quite clear. It is easy to associate China as the greater, stronger state, referred to as state A in the following summary of Brantly Womack’s asymmetric theory and Taiwan as the smaller, weaker one, state b. As stated by governmental statistics, Beijing controls a. 政 治 大 square kilometer. Taiwan’s 立 territory is as large as less than 0.4% of China’s territory. territory of about 9 596 960 square kilometers, while Taipei governs around 35 980. In 2012, China’s population reached an estimated more than 1.374 billion people,. ‧ 國. 學. while 2012 estimated population of Taiwan was 23.315 million, less than 2% of the mainland’s population. The territory and population differences affect the difference. ‧. of natural and human resources as well. However the ratio of Taiwan’s economy and. y. Nat. military power compared to that of the mainland’s shows less distinction than the. sit. difference between the territory and population, considering which in the long run,. er. io. Taiwan wouldn’t be above to compete with China. (Wang 2006). al. n. v i n C(PRC) Peoples’ Republic of China Taiwan,Uwe can clearly conclude that the h e nand hi c g relationship - more specifically the political relations - between is an asymmetric one, The research question is the following: comparing the size and the population of the. but can the same be said about the current economic and military state and economic and military relations of the two territories? In other words, is the asymmetry of the economic and military development and connection of China and Republic of China (ROC) as big as their size and population difference? An addition question can be added: what part does the third actor of the Cross-Strait relations, the United States of America play in this asymmetric connection? The reasons and the purposes of the current thesis have to be given. A gap in studies and academic writing has to be filled that has existed. Since the concept of asymmetric connection was summarized, such relations between China and Taiwan have not been studied. With power asymmetry and other non-symmetry based 1.

(11) thoughts, the connection across the Taiwan Strait has been examined, but these examples only reached into the sphere and topics of politics and foreign affairs and connections. Economic and military asymmetry has not been studied, at least not thoroughly. It is the lack of this perspective that is to be filled with the proceeding study.. 1.2 Broader theoretical background. As noted before, the theoretical background of this current thesis will be the based on asymmetric connections theory. However other concepts and theories have to be listed and summarized, in order to prove and determine that Womack’s thoughts are. 政 治 大 In one of his articles 立published, Stephen M. Walt emphasizes the importance of. fitting to fully describe and analyze the connection between Beijing and Taipei.. ‧ 國. 學. viewing events of the real world through the abstract theories, as these concepts can be guides, helping with understanding the evolving events and assisting in making predictions for future developments. This opinion is also shared by Yu-Shan Wu, who. ‧. stresses the importance of the guidance that theories can provide. (Walt 1998, Wu. y. Nat. 2000). sit. The connection between China and Taiwan – and additionally the triangular. er. io. relations of the PRC, the ROC and the US – has also been studied and explained. al. n. v i n C balance of power focuses on the distribution andhthe e n g c h i U and the structure around which. through the viewpoint of the major international relations theories. Neo-realism, which. the system of the international community is built up, especially the anarchic nature of this system, in which actors can only rely on themselves. According to this theory, Taiwan is somewhat of a problem in the balance of power, as the balance is unstable when there are more than two actors involved in a situation and as the island would need the US’s aid against an attack it receives from the mainland. However this help may not be guaranteed. Another reason behind the ROC’s problematic status is the possibility that it may misinterpret the shifts in the balance of power and so take dangerous actions for the sake of its own protection. This would also work against Taipei’s goals as it may push Washington and Beijing towards a partnership – which fits into the neo-realist thought as a cooperation of great powers to jointly manage the world order. (Acharya 1999) 2.

(12) Taking the summary above, it can be concluded that the neo-realist theory considers Taiwan as a problematic, somewhat irrelevant, small actor. This is the reason why not this concept was chosen. The aim was to use a theory where Taiwan is seen as an actor of equal importance and with which its connection with the mainland can be studied. The liberalist school of thought mostly focuses on the concepts interdependence – particularly economic one - and democratic peace, which both prevent military conflicts to evolve between actors. The prior – which can also be labeled as complex interdependence - is of high importance when looking at Cross-Strait relations, as the economic interdependence that connects the PRC and the ROC raises the costs of a possible conflict, may damage the existing system and connections to third parties and. 治 政 大and would possibly push other relations of China, which are important to Beijing 立 states to take Taiwan’s side, especially the ones that are located in the region and have so contributes to the peaceful nature of the relation. It would blemish economic. ‧ 國. 學. tightening trade connections with the ROC. The interdependence – besides its role of safeguarding peace – draws Taiwan closer to the mainland, which is viewed as a. ‧. negative tendency by many. (Acharya 1999, Chiang 20141). The democratic peace theory states that democratic countries tend not to fight wars. Nat. sit. y. against each other. In the case of Cross-Strait relations – as Taiwan is democratic, but. al. er. io. China cannot be listed as one – it is other democratic countries support given to the. n. ROC in a possible conflict that can be discussed. As mentioned above, this support. Ch. i n U. v. cannot be guaranteed because as much as the PRC relies economically on countries, so. engchi. do they depend on China as well and not just in the area of economy. As economic interdependence, the democratic peace theory also has a negative effect on the relations. With its democratic identity, the government and citizens of Taiwan feel that the gap between the democratic ROC and the non-democratic PRC are more unlike than they were in the past and so unification is rejected even more. According to this point of view, unification could be easier achieved if the mainland had the same form of government. Democracy on Taiwan prevents it to take sudden and harsh steps against China, but it also makes the connection unstable as the policies and actions of the different parties that govern may vary. (Acharya 1999). 1. : Information gathered during the interview with Chia-Hsiung Chiang was included in this paragraph.. 3.

(13) The liberalist theory, both the interdependence and the democratic peace theory, have often been used to study the connection between Taipei and Beijing. It is for this reason that another, less known and used theoretical background for this current thesis. One aspect of the liberalist theory that has not been described above – liberal institutionalism – has not been given much attention when it comes to connection between the PRC and the ROC. The reason is quite simple: Taiwan is not a member of a great number of such organizations. This being the case, it cannot interact with China in these platforms, so studying the connection from this point of view would be to no use. The third major international relations theory, constructivism, sees connections between actors as arrangements or social constructions – the arrangement between. 治 政 大of their unlike identities – which their – at times conflicting – identities. It is because 立 they are unwilling to change – that Taiwan and China have their differences. This. China, Taiwan and the US – and explains connections between actors according to. ‧ 國. 學. theory stresses the importance of interactions, where the two sides can express their point of views, so the other party may be aware of them, act and maybe change. ‧. according to them. It also emphasizes the importance of agents in the relationship who act on behalf of the involved parties and perform “speech acts”. The argument that. y. Nat. sit. tries to disprove this concept states that there is communication and interaction across. al. er. io. the Taiwan Strait, but that has not brought the parties any closer to each other. Other. n. reasons that can be listed as causes for constructivist way not being successful are the. Ch. i n U. v. ever growing militaries that make the actor fear each other and the fact that equally. engchi. high leveled meetings never took place between the PRC and the ROC. (Acharya 1999, Zheng 2001) Studying the individual interactions would be too vast for a thesis like this and the connections have already been described and discussed by other studies. Besides the main international relations theories, smaller concepts describe and explain the Cross-Strait relations. Nine minor concepts can be listed, which are divided into three groups: focusing on Cross-Strait interaction dimension, domestic and international system dimension. (Wu 2000) Only concepts under the Cross-Strait interaction dimension will be discussed below. The reason being the theory of asymmetry is listed among them and this way it can be compared against other, similar concepts.. 4.

(14) Under the interaction group, the divided-nation model can be listed, under which once unified nations get separated. According to one thought under this theory, no matter how long it takes, the unification is unavoidable, as the entities shift closer it each other. The will to unify and common culture and language aid the shifting, to which Germany and Vietnam are the examples. When the connection across the Taiwan Strait was placed into this concept, several factors were noticed that make it questionable if the relation between Taipei and Beijing fit into this theory. One of these was the fact that the PRC and the ROC were not separated by foreign forces or events, as was or is the case in several other divided nations’ history, but a domestic event, the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Beside this, other differences are the lack of recognition and equality, which could be. 治 政 In integration theory, it is the common culture大 and economic interests that bring 立 states closer together. The European integration is a perfect example to demonstrate. found in other examples. Also the desire to unify is not given on both sides. (Wu 2000). ‧ 國. 學. the concepts of this theory. Later on, as in the case of the European integration, and part of the spill over effect, the integration also takes root in the political sector. It is. ‧. this spill over effect that many fear in the case of Taipei-Beijing connections, as political integration may follow the close economic ties. The integration theory. y. Nat. sit. stresses the positive effects that the economic connection between Taiwan and China. al. er. io. has and the ones that a possible political integration would have. It also emphasizes. n. that the spill over to the political sphere may never happen or if it does, it would not. Ch. i n U. v. necessarily form close political ties. However the integration theory does acknowledge. engchi. that the integration may not always be in the smaller party’s interest. (Wu 2000) It is important to mention that difference between integration and unification. If unification is to happen, Taiwan would like it to be done through a gradual approach, meaning that the ROC is to integrate first and then be unified with the PRC. Beijing – especially with the “one country, two systems” concept - rather pushes a holistic approach, where integration would follow unification. (Wu 2000) As the final theory under the Cross-Strait dimension category, Wu discusses the power asymmetry – or simple asymmetry – theory. As the concept will be thoroughly described below, only thoughts additional to that will be discussed here. Wu studies the concepts of bandwagoning and balancing, which describe the attitude of a smaller state to a larger one, just as the theory of asymmetry, in a situation where the weaker state cannot be the greater’s equal. The concept of power asymmetry and the 5.

(15) separation of bandwagoning and balancing can all be listed as part of the broader realist theory. (Chiang 20142, Wu 2000) Under bandwagoning, the steps and actions taken by the weaker party are correlated to the wishes and needs of the greater state and are mostly in the stronger state’s interest. The sovereignty of the smaller state is not absolute, as the greater party is able to influence the weaker’s decisions. However this form of relations guarantees a peaceful connection. The stronger state will not start a conflict with a state that acts according to its interest. Bandwagoning has a long past in the history of international relations. For this reason, scholars tend to think that taking a bandwagoning route is more likely behavior than balancing – and additionally, as the weaker an actor is, it is more likely to bandwagon than to balance -, not that there are not countless examples. 治 政 大free-riding, as it will rely on its trusted, may eventually turn into the smaller state 立 allies to come its aid if necessary. (Walt 1987, Wu 2000) for the latter one as well. Bandwagoning, if the ally or allies may be unquestionably. ‧ 國. 學. Balancing refers to the willingness of the weaker state to defy the grater state by strengthening its army or by allying with a third state, which can and will take the. ‧. smaller’s side if necessary. According to Walt, the main principle of balancing is the latter one, as most alliances are formed to balance the power of a great state. The. Nat. sit. y. reasons for balancing against a stronger power lie in the state’s determination to. al. er. io. protect themselves from a greater, even if they have to take the risk of trusting other. n. actors. For this reason, states tend to ally with other parties who are not strong enough. Ch. i n U. v. or not likely to dominate them. It can be concluded that the hostility between the states. engchi. is high and additionally, the weaker party has to rely on an ally. Nevertheless, the sovereignty of the smaller is assured and its decision making is not subordinated to the greater state’s wishes. However the decision to take part in a balancing process may also hurt the weaker’s aims, as it may be influenced by other, somewhat stronger allies. (Walt 1987, Wu 2000) Walt notes that besides power, the amount of the threat and the particular principles that cause a state to fear another one are factors that play important roles when a state is to decide if it was to balance or bandwagon. Different circumstances, especially peace or wartime, will also influence the steps that parties will take. Balancing is likely to make the international system more peaceful, as stronger states will probably. 2. : Information gathered during the interview with Chia-Hsiung Chiang was included in this paragraph.. 6.

(16) want to seem less threatening not to frighten possible future allies. In the case of bandwagoning, the opposite is true. To make smaller states chose the route of bandwagoning, greater actors will try to seem more powerful and threatening. For this reason, the level of hostility and the willingness to use force will also be higher. States also have to be careful when choosing to follow either, above listed path. Making the wrong choice may severely damage the actor and will also have a major effect on the international system. The number of available allies may also influence this decision. It is no use balancing if there are simply no available allies. Besides, making allies also depends on the state’s system of connections and ability to make new connections and strengthen existing ones. (Walt 1987) Three conclusions to the Cross-Strait relations can be drawn from the description. 治 政 Beijing are ruled out. The ROC is it is clear that equal relations between Taipei and 大 立 building a balancing connection, as the difference between the two parties’ economic above. As the connection can be labeled as either a balancing or a bandwagoning one,. ‧ 國. 學. position is great. The US’s support, which it gives to Taiwan, is another reason that the Taipei-Beijing relations are a balancing one. (Wu 2000, Yuan 20143). ‧. Other scholars are in different point of view when the question of whether Taiwan is balancing or bandwagoning is asked. They state that Taiwan is bandwagoning with. Nat. sit. y. both China and the US and is not looking to balance with the prior one. (Chiang 20144). er. io. Yet other state that the connection can be labeled as both balancing and bandwagoning, with more emphasis on the previous one. (Yuan 20145) The difference between the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. opinions can be caused by several factors, including different point of views. Yet. engchi. another explanation may be the different time and situation of Taiwan at the time this question was discussed. As mentioned above, international factors and the difference of times can also influence the decision of an actor to balance or to bandwagon. These also have an effect on the Taiwanese government’s decisions, steps and actions.. 1.3 Description of the asymmetric connections theory In the following section, Brantly Womack’s theory of asymmetric connections, the theoretical basis of this current thesis, will be described. 3. : Information gathered during the interview with Yi Yuan Chiang was included in this paragraph. : Information gathered during the interview with Chia-Hsiung Chiang was included in this paragraph. 5 : Information gathered during the interview with Yi Yuan Chiang was included in this paragraph. 4. 7.

(17) When determining asymmetric connections, a consistent definition can be found in China among Unequals: asymmetric relationships are connections “…in which the smaller power cannot reasonably expect to defeat the larger power in a contest of capabilities, but is substantial enough so that its resistance to the larger power can frustrate the larger’s attempt to impose its unilateral preference.” (Womack 2010, 23) There are certain asymmetric relations that have a history of hundreds of years’, which is a result of them being dynamic, constantly changing and unable to resolve by either side. (Womack 2010) According to Womack, the first thing required to understand asymmetric politics is to differentiate between asymmetric and symmetric connections. When connections between states are concerned, symmetry is assumed, which however is not equality.. 治 政 大do to B, B might likewise do to way as another state acted towards it: “what A could 立 A”. (Womack 2006, 78) Countries in this situation have the ability to understand each. With symmetry, it is only supposed that one state has the capability to react the same. ‧ 國. 學. other, as they can place themselves in the other’s “shoes”. However, not all relations are symmetric. In several of these situations an asymmetric connection can be. ‧. observed, where stronger A is capable of doing things to smaller b to what b cannot react in the same way. Instead of being viewed as asymmetric, a majority of relations. y. Nat. sit. can be categorized as unequal. As the most common form of connection, it can be. al. er. io. stated that the international community of states is built up of hierarchical unequal. n. relationships, based mostly on negotiations and occasionally on force. (Womack 2003, 2006, 2010). Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Another difference between symmetric and asymmetric connections is that in the latter the relationship is more important for b than for A, as b has more to gain or lose with its relations to A. As b will be more concerned about its connections to A, it may misinterpret A’s actions. Comparing symmetric with asymmetric connections, in the latter, placing themselves into the other state’s shoes may not work or may be misleading. (Womack 2003, 2006) When A’s predominance over b is discussed, hard and soft power are both concerned. A’s power is greater, so it will attract smaller states, which is a major part of its soft power. However attractiveness doesn’t just come for size and power, A has to promote common values and goods to earn it. (Womack 2006) A is more powerful than b, but still cannot force its will upon b. If A would try and dominate b, that would cause b to fight for its survival, and its will to fight would be 8.

(18) stronger than A’s will to dominate. Even if A defeats b, it probably will not be able to control b’s territory, moreover defeating b would affect A’s relations to other states. In other words elimination of b is very rare. Nor is vanquishing b’s army and overthrowing its government more likely. As for the above mentioned reasons, it’s very likely that A won’t try to overpower b, but b has no chance to overwhelm A, so it can concluded that asymmetric relations are long lasting. An open conflict would harm both sides in some way, so the best solution for both states is to keep the asymmetric relationship, maximize their benefit from it as much as they can. Equilibrium is reachable in these kinds of connections and once it is reached, it is sustainable. (Womack 2003, 2006, 2010) However it must be stated that even a normalized asymmetric relations cannot be. 治 政 大is small – as it was little to gain given to b by A compared to A’s general concerns 立 from the relationship and doesn’t have to fear b at all -, which is the exact opposite in the same as a symmetric or even unequal connection between two states. The attention. ‧ 國. 學. b’s case, which devotes lot of its attention to A - especially if A and b are neighboring countries -, despite the fact that it cannot influence A’s actions. Every area of the. ‧. connection will be influenced, even trade between the two states, as the exposure of b will be bigger, being the result of capacity differences. In other words, b is more. y. Nat. sit. influenced by the connection, which is also visible in international events affecting. er. io. both sides, as they have greater influence on b than as on A. (Womack 2006, 2010) A’s lack of attention given to the relationship with b can also be labeled inattention.. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. In a lot of cases, this lack of attention is not intentional, it is merely the result of A has. engchi. several other equally or more important relations and responsibilities in the international sphere. In other situations, A’s decision to avoid b and the possible problems that occur in the connection, is voluntary. However determining how much attention A should give to b is hard to answer. A state dedicates more attention to other states, which it can expect a threat from or generally who are capable of threatening it. Since b doesn’t possess this kind of power or strength, a negligible attention can be expected. It is even likely that A will not have coordinated policies directed towards b or existing policies wouldn’t going in the same direction, if there is no strong national attention. A’s government wouldn’t want to waste energy and recourses. (Womack 2006, 2010) A will have three concerns towards b, if b is as above described – not a treat and not given a lot of attention by A. First of all, A will look into its prior history with b 9.

(19) and b’s attitude in the past. A will be generous with b, if this past is friendly, and will most likely bully b and pressure the other state if this history is hostile in A’s view. Another factor is b’s role in the international community. b may not be strong enough on its own to act for or against A on alliance with different states. A’s and b’s connection can also be strengthened in the international sphere, if both of them are part of and participate in the same regional and world organizations. The third factor is A’s policies towards b and their compatibility with A’s general foreign affairs policies. (Womack 2003, 2006) Generally about these concerns, it can be said that A’s policies are less likely to shift in either direction or change as easily as b’s policies towards A can. More specifically A’s attitude is not likely to change if it determines b as hostile. Same can. 治 政 大merely try to push b back into its seen as hostile, A will not react belligerently, it will 立 place. If events turn into a crisis, with b in its center, A will rather be blaming b’s. be concluded is A’s view is that b is friendly towards it. Even if b’s actions could be. ‧ 國. 學. alliances than b itself and be more concerned about the regional and global effects of the crisis. Most likely it will be called a “problem of b” or “b problem”, but A may not. ‧. be concentrating on b’s actions and statements. (Womack 2006). As in most cases A’s attitude towards b can be summarized in one word, which is. y. Nat. sit. inattention, b implements the politics of overattention. b is aware how important its. al. er. io. relations to A are and also knows that the other party is stronger, which leads to its. n. overattention. It gives this asymmetric connection more thought and attention, as it. Ch. i n U. v. works in figuring out A’s thinking and possible future actions. As doing so, it uses up. engchi. a lot of resources and energy, which leads overattention on b’s side. This is important for b because it knows how vulnerable it is and so any changes in A’s policies, either towards b or generally towards the international sphere, can have major effects on the weaker state. b must prepare for these possible changes. (Womack 2006) A major difference in the attitudes is that A will tend to trust and build on the current atmosphere of the connection, while b will not be able to trust it completely, however friendly it may be. For this reason b will always be nervous, suspicious and calculating. As a result, b will seem colder and more distant towards A in their communication and because of its known vulnerability, b will have a constant illfeeling. (Womack 2006) As described above, A’s policies towards will not be very well coordinated, which is not true in the weaker state’s case. b will have clear straight forward and collected 10.

(20) policies towards the stronger party, as a result of the greater attention its leaders given to A. Even so, b’s policies will change more frequently than A’s, which can be seen as stable. The reason behind this is the goal of b’s leaders to keep pace with any changes that A’s leadership is about to implement or has already done so. (Womack 2006) As the weaker party in the relations, b will try to lower its exposure to A’s capabilities. There are different methods b can achieve this. One of them is through multilateral organizations and agreements. Associations like these not only allow the two sides to regularly meet, but as members, countries also have to agree to and follow the same set of regulations. Another method for b is to join with other small or smaller states of the region with similar interests. Here b can express its possible concerns, while not threatening A. A possible, third method is the boldest one: here b allies with. 治 政 大relationship with A will be more However, it has to be pointed out that most likely C’s 立 important for C than its ties to b. This is a possible prediction for the future, an another stronger power C, which can be either a closer or a more distant connection.. ‧ 國. 學. alliance like this would also bring instant changes: A will feel threatened and would declare the situation a crisis. A final method is b developing nuclear weapons. In this. ‧. scenario, it is assumed that A already possesses nuclear weapons. This would create a certain equality between A and b, even though actually usage of nuclear weapons. Nat. sit. y. would be a “mutual suicide”. (Womack 2006, 84). al. er. io. After looking at the possibilities of A and b in an asymmetric relationship, the. n. expectations that each side has for the other can be discussed. A wants b to respect its. Ch. i n U. v. power and to deal with their disagreements according to the asymmetry. In other. engchi. words, in A’s point of view b should be deference. b can lack this deference if b thinks it was more power than it actually does or if it allies with other states, to counter A’s power. In both of these cases A will feel threatened by b and its actions. b expects A to acknowledge its autonomy. By doing this, A sets up boundaries for itself that it will not cross. This secures b, which would fill threatened and exposed without them. (Womack 2006) A sensitive relationship connects the concepts of deference and autonomy. Deference is only an option for b if its survival isn’t threatened by A, as acceptance of autonomy is required for deference. If A is capable to threaten b and is actually doing so, b’s only options are to either surrender or attempt fighting the greater state. A’s acknowledge of the weaker state’s autonomy is only within their asymmetric connection and so it is not absolute. Expectations of deference and autonomy can also 11.

(21) lead to demands that endanger the relations of the two states. b’s autonomy will be threatened by A’s demand of deference, which can be seen as a demand for submission. b’s demand of autonomy, which can be viewed as b’s attempt to assert powers equal to A’s, will make A feel challenged. With each side strongly demanding what it wants and judging that the other party is not willing to bend to these demands, a conflict can easily develop between A and b. (Womack 2003, 2006) As the greater power, A can attempt to threaten b towards greater deference. This threatening can take the form of bullying, especially if A is forcing a certain behavior on b by a matter that is essential to the smaller state. These actions by A, through seen as threats, aim to remind b of the asymmetric connection to A and its place in this relation. b may feel that with these bullying actions, which can reach the stage when. 治 政 大 2006, 85) Besides bullying, question of how far A would go to get its way” (Womack 立 A’s constant changes in its attitude towards the weaker state’s autonomy will also. they resemble acts of war, exceed certain boundaries and will make b raise “the. ‧ 國. 學. make b uneasy. (Womack 2006). b’s disadvantage in power results in it not having enough strength and capabilities. ‧. to make the stronger state acknowledge the weaker’s autonomy, but in a way it can cause A to doubt that b is still aware of its situation in the asymmetric relationship.. Nat. sit. y. The weaker state’s constant struggle to earn formal equality to A, its illusion of. al. er. io. becoming a powerful actor and imagined hostile actions taken by A, can bother the. n. greater country and strengthen its above described doubt. This doubt may evolve into. Ch. i n U. v. a security threat posed either by b or b and its allies. (Womack 2006). engchi. Misperceptions can cause a vicious circle of actions to run over and over again in an asymmetric relationship, with the possibility of an actual war as the cause of actions and reactions from the other side. Predictions, fear, misjudged actions and behavior will constantly keep this circle going around. (Womack 2006) It can be seen from the above described that managing and maintaining an asymmetric connection for both the stronger and the weaker side can be rather difficult and at times dangerous. However a harmonious relationship benefits not just the directly participating sides, but the contemporary world order as well, which is made up of a constantly increasing number of asymmetric connections. At times, a lot has to be given up in a normalized relationship is to be achieved, with A recognizing b’s autonomy and the smaller state showing deference, as mentioned above. However deference is usually not given unless recognition is granted and vice versa. First a 12.

(22) mutual respect should develop between the two sides, which isn’t necessarily friendship. (Womack 2006, 2010) The relationship can be viewed as especially dangerous when A and b both view the connection from their point of view or from their perspective, as they are so different. A crisis can develop as a result of A’s exasperation and b’s paranoia, the negative complementarities of the relationship. Despite the difficulties and the tensions, in several cases, participants of asymmetric connections were able to manage equilibrium. Furthermore, stability is more common among state in an asymmetric connection, which is owned to the common sense that they practice while handling the relationship. (Womack 2006, 2010) Management of an asymmetric bilateral connection can be separated into three. 治 政 大 Besides this, establishing “a creating neutral areas of possible conflicts, of contention. 立 sleeve of normalcy” will decrease the possibility of misunderstandings and the. categories and should start with the creation of neutralized zone – the first category -,. ‧ 國. 學. building up of conflicts caused by misreading the other side’s actions. (Womack 2006, 89) The possibility of a conflict is reduced “by removing potentially divisive issues. ‧. from immediate political attention”. (Womack 2006, 90) This can be achieved through institutionalized negotiations and through “cooling down” hot issues that could lead to. y. Nat. sit. disagreement and possibly a conflict. (Womack 2006, 2010). al. er. io. The second category is multilateral buffering of bilateral asymmetries, through. n. which the tension between the parties can be reduced, by neutralizing the issue or by. Ch. i n U. v. involving a broader framework for it. As the two side’s tension is framed into a. engchi. multilateral structure, A is content to see b being built into the framework of the international community and b’s pretention for its boundaries and separate identity are met as well. Besides, all of this is being dealt with in through a wide range of discourses and through institutions. (Womack 2010) The third category of managing asymmetric conflicts discusses the new circumstances and issues that arise and alter the surrounding of the relations, and so cause frictions and tensions. In today’s post-Cold War era many of these new situations present themselves. In this age, a lot of connections between different states can be viewed as asymmetric relationships. One way to avoid the escalation of this problem is if both of the sides acknowledge that the relationship’s foundations are solid, so the changes will not have a major affect on them. This can be reached through rituals, mostly diplomatic rituals. These meetings are not only considered as 13.

(23) meeting of heads of the states, but also symbolize the respect that the opposite sides have for each other and symbolize the importance of the relationship. Through important for both parties, as they reduce the possibility of conflicts, the ritual of meeting is especially relevant for weaker b as with these meeting A acknowledges b’s autonomy. (Womack 2006, 2010) Another important aspect that is often needed for the asymmetric connection to be harmonious is the guarantees and reassurance that both sides require from the other party. China’s and Vietnam’s relationship is an example, built on such guarantees. (Womack 2006, 2010) If a harmonious connection is to be reached, both of the sides have to agree that their relationship and the common interests involved in it, are more important than the. 治 政 This normalcy can be reassured by two ways.大 One of them is through constant 立 diplomatic connections, later rituals that are formed in the connection of the two sides. differences that the parties have, the different interests. (Womack 2010). ‧ 國. 學. This way, A and b both can let the other side know that this connection as an important one and both side can emphasis the importance of common interest. A ritual. ‧. like this can be an example of the above mentioned a sleeve of normalcy, an outer sleeve. If this sleeve, the ritual, is strong, it can keep the tensions from escalading and. y. Nat. sit. this way may even stop the development of a possible conflict. Regular visits of. al. er. io. leaders and connections of the lower levels of politics all are part of and contribute to. n. the strengthening of diplomatic rituals and connections. (Womack 2003, 2006). Ch. i n U. v. Precedent and history is the other sleeve to a normal connection between a greater. engchi. and a smaller state. Here the past of the relationship is taken as a base of predicting the future of the asymmetric relations. If the past connections were peaceful, the relations were normal, then predictions of war and views that the other side has hostile intentions will not be widespread. Even if these views are logical and can be corroborated, they will not be generally accepted. (Womack 2006) Besides bilateral sides of connections of weaker and stronger states, multilateral aspects of the relations should be discussed as well, which effect the management of asymmetric connections. Under multilateral aspects, multilateral relations, institutions and arrangements can be described. Four factors can be listed under multilateral aspects of asymmetric relations. First, besides bilateral, multilateral diplomatic rituals can be also studied. Examples are Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meetings. Second, according to 14.

(24) Womack is the “regional commonsense expectation of continuity”. (Womack 2006, 91) Third, with examples of institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, multilateral organizations create commissions to deal with common problems that its members face. Finally, multilateral institutions are adequate places to express problems. (Womack 2006) Multilateral aspects of asymmetric connections can also be influenced by the greater power being the largest actor in their region and so the center of attention. Even if the separate powers of the surrounding smaller states added up exceed the capabilities of the greater, it continuously possesses their attention. This scenario can also be true in a global level, if A is a major player international politics. It is likely to receive responses to its actions, as it is under persistent surveillance of the smaller. 治 政 大(Womack 2010) and the will to become a leading power in the world. 立 Turning the attention back to the bilateral asymmetry relations, either one or both states. This situation is even more complex if the greater power has the capabilities. ‧ 國. 學. sides of the connection being members of organizations can contribute to the building of a peaceful asymmetric relationship. Other states are also present and represented on. ‧. these meetings, which particularly important for the weaker party. However, since A is a more important actor in the international community, its influence will be greater. y. Nat. sit. and it will have a better position to coordinate. Another important contribution of the. al. er. io. connections to other states to the relations of the weaker and the stronger state are the. n. regional and global strategies and foreign policies. Both states will try to synchronize. Ch. i n U. v. their asymmetric relationship to their foreign policies and their connections to other. engchi. states, which may result in peaceful advancement of asymmetric connections. (Womack 2006, 2010) A final aspect that has to be mentioned under the topic of outer factors influencing an asymmetric relation is globalization. With every state interrelated in today’s world, connections simple cannot be purely bilateral anymore. There are various international standards that are accepted and followed by the majority of the states. (Womack 2003, 2006) The asymmetric theory can be placed among and can be compared with different international relations theories. One of the differences between the western international relations theories and the current discussed theory is the hegemonic cycles concept which the latter one doesn’t include. A normalized asymmetric connection doesn’t become cyclic and isn’t necessarily out of balance. If b’s 15.

(25) boundaries are respected by A and A’s order by b, then the normalized relationship can be kept alive. However, it is this mutual respect that can unstablize A’s and b’s connection. Asymmetric relations can eventually also become cyclic, but the asymmetric theory rather focuses its attention on the relationships possible harmonizing and on their possible collapse. (Womack 2010) As already briefly described above, new situations and circumstances can impose danger to the asymmetric connection. It can also create new such relations and interfere with the recognized ritual of the already existing ones. The end of the Cold war and the post Cold war era has already been mentioned, but this new circumstance may not necessarily be one coming from the international level. It may be caused a shift in the region where the asymmetric connection is located or by domestic changes. 政 治 大. and domestically spreading new, mostly political, ideas in either A or b. (Womack 2010). 立. It has to be mentioned that besides Brantly Womack, asymmetric connections have. ‧ 國. 學. been studied by other scholars and experts as well. The above quoted Yu-Shan Wu can be listed as one. The Taiwanese scholar has several works focusing on power. ‧. asymmetry and non-symmetric connections, both in English and Chinese. One additional note that has to be added is the difference between the theory of. y. Nat. sit. asymmetric connection and the theory of asymmetric conflict. The first one, as show. al. er. io. above, rather discusses the connection between stronger A and weaker b in peaceful. n. times, while asymmetric conflict theory studies the possible conflict or war between a greater and a smaller state6.. Ch. engchi. 6. i n U. v. : This topic has been explicated in several studies and articles, but three of them can mentioned as the mayor essays dealing with the topic of asymmetric warfare: “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict”. World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), p. 175-200 by Andrew Mack, which is the very first work that discusses this phenomenon, Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict”. International Security, Vol. 26 No. 1 (Summer 2001), p. 93-128, in which the author reflects on the earlier article and places the theory into a modern perspective and Paul, T.V.: Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994. Other essays, particularly the ones written after 9/11, apply the theory while discussing the war against terrorism, see: van Fenema, Paul C.: Expeditionary Military Networks and Asymmetric Warfare. In: Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos - Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, edi. Caforio, Giuseppe, Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley, 2009 and Echevarria II, Antulio J.: The Symmetries of Asymmetry: Myths Surrounding the Notion of Asymmetric War. In: Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos - Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, edi. Caforio, Giuseppe, Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley, 2009. 16.

(26) 1.4 Hypothesis and framework of analysis. The hypothesis of the following thesis serves as a suppositional answer to the above stated questions: An asymmetric connection exists between China and Taiwan. This term generally describes the relationship, but it is also true to the individual sectors of the relations, more specifically the economic and the military sectors of the connection. The disparity of these sectors however is not as big as the general asymmetry between the PRC and the ROC. To answer the a question stated in the beginning of the current chapter, the asymmetric connection theory has to be studied first, which was first described in Brantly Womack’s article, titled Asymmetry and Systemic Misperception: China,. 政 治 大 No. 2, June 2003, p. 92-119). Later, the same scholar summarized his thoughts in 立. Vietnam and Cambodia during the 1970s (The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26,. China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge University Press, New. ‧ 國. 學. York, 2006) and China among Unequals: Asymmetric Foreign Relations in Asia (World Scientific Press, Singapore, 2010).. ‧. The builtup or in other words the framework of analysis of the current thesis can be. y. Nat. shortly summarized as the following: The first part of the current study, discussing the. sit. theory itself will be based on the above mentioned publications. It will also included. er. io. descriptions of other concepts, which can also serve as theoretical frameworks for a. al. n. v i n C h across the Taiwan In the second chapter, the relations e n g c h i U Strait will be placed into the. study on Cross Strait relations, some similar to the theory of asymmetric connections.. theory of main focus. This section will serve as a short study of the political asymmetry, or rather the asymmetry of the two actors in the international sphere. This subchapter will strictly take the description of the Womack’s concept as its basis. Preceding this section, a brief introduction to the history of the relation between Beijing and Taipei will be given. As the timeframe of this thesis is the present and the near past, the summary will focus on the last decades of the connection. Besides, it will look into the basis of the relationship. The following sections will describe the current economic and military state and the relations of the PRC and of Taiwan. In both chapter, a short introduction to both China’s and Taiwan’s economical and military past and present will be given. These aim to serve as basis or as context where the following subchapters can be placed into. 17.

(27) In the economical section, comparative section of agriculture, industry and investments will be discussed, succeeded by a subchapter on the economic connection across the Taiwan Strait. The military chapter will follow a different buildup. Here the military of the two parties will be separately described and in the conclusion section – which also follows the economic chapter - compared. The proceeding chapter will explore the United States’ part in this connection. As a third member is introduced, a triangular perspective replaces the previous bilateral one, which has to be placed into the frame of the asymmetric connection theory. This section will take the framework of this current thesis, with a political-military, an economical and a conclusions subchapter following the theoretical description. In the final part, conclusions will be drawn, the findings of the thesis will be. 治 政 大 tendencies will be made in the the possible outcome and the future of the described 立 finishing chapter.. summarized and the research question will be answered. Additionally, a prediction of. ‧ 國. 學. The question may be asked why are - besides the overall, political connections economical and military relations between Beijing and Taipei studied in this research.. ‧. The political sector can be compared through placing the connection into the exact concept described by Brantly Womack. For the latter two sectors can be contrasted by. y. Nat. sit. the data available on economy and the military. Other sectors that could have been. al. er. io. studied – according to sectors discussed as the areas of connection between states by. n. Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde in Security: A New Framework of. Ch. i n U. v. Analysis (Lyenne Rienner Pub, Boulder, 1997) - are the social and the environmental. engchi. sectors. However finding disparity between two states in these sectors is not likely.. 1.5 Research methods. Two main methods of research will be used to study the asymmetric connection between China and Taiwan. The primary source will be a selection of literature reviews. Both first and second hand materials and data are to be used. Despite the fact that second hand materials will dominate the sources of the literature review, first hand data will also be of importance and so will also be used. This is especially so since in a lot of cases the mere fact of asymmetry is possible to deduct just by looking. 18.

(28) at the data. This is particularly so in the economic and military sector which – as above described - will be main focuses of this study. However since a lot of pure data cannot be analyzed or maybe not even understood by laic individuals, who are not specialist of the given topic, studies and articles conducted and written by those who are adept of the specific topics are possibly the best sources of data. With these second hand materials, not only access to pure data is gained, but the comments of the experts and their explanations on the findings may also be studied. Second hand materials also have to be viewed critically, as individual opinions, bias views and not necessarily scientific thoughts can also be inserted into expert studies. This does not mean that the data in the first hand materials are all free of. 治 政 It is mostly through the literature review, the 大 primary methodology used in the 立 thesis, that the theory will be put into practice. The collected data and reflections on manipulation or distortion, but of course they are still the most reliable sources.. ‧ 國. 學. them will be collected, studied, compared and as a result the existence or the nonexistence of asymmetry will be concluded. For the general comparison, the theory. ‧. will be used directly, as the connection between Taipei and Beijing is placed into the framework of the concept. As for the chapters on economy and military, the word-to-. Nat. sit. y. word usage of the theory will not be as useful. In Brantly Womack’s description,. al. er. io. neither the economy nor the military sector are dealt with specifically, for which. n. reason in these parts, the basic meaning and definition of the word asymmetry will be applied.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The second type of methodology used to gather information for the following study will be interviews conducted with experts in the area of economy and military especially where the Cross-Strait relations are concerned. Their views and knowledge will contribute to the whole of this current thesis, as well as data gathered from the above described, mostly second hand materials will be confronted by questions posed to the interviewees. The data gained this way will be added to the literature review. Also any contradicting points will be elaborated, compared and confronted with the content of the second hand materials.. 19.

(29) 1.6 Additional notes An additional note has to added in the introduction chapter of this current thesis. In the upcoming descriptions both the names of China and Taiwan will be used several times shortly after one another. To avoid constant repetition, China will also be referred to as the People’s Republic of China, or the PRC for short, and the mainland, as all the land across the Taiwan Strait is controlled by the Chinese government. In Taiwan’s cases, synonyms such as the Republic of China, or the ROC, and the island will be used. As it is well known, Taiwan does not consist of merely one island, but for the sake of simplicity, Taiwan will be referred to as the island.. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 20. i n U. v.

(30) 2. Historical summary and placing the Cross-Strait relations into the framework of the asymmetric connections theory. 2.1 Introduction. The following, shorter chapter aims to summarize two questions: the brief recapitulative section on the history of the conflict between Taipei and Beijing and placing the two mentioned territories’ connection into the asymmetric connection theory. The latter is supposed to serve as a descriptive part of the political asymmetry between the PRC and the ROC. Domestic political asymmetry cannot be discussed.. 政 治 大 the theory that serves as the basis of this current thesis. This is only possible in the 立 There is not comparative ground for political contrasting, at least not in the context of international sphere. This will be done through Womack’s concept that has been. ‧ 國. 學. described in the previous chapter. In other words, the general relations between China and Taiwan will be placed into the theory of asymmetric connections.. ‧. y. sit. io. n. al. er. Taiwan. Nat. 2.2 Brief historical summary of the connection between China and. Ch. i n U. v. In the following chapter, the current and near-past aspects of the economical and. engchi. military relations of the territories on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will be discussed. Of course, the sections will include brief introductions of the history and the development of the given areas, but the focus will be the present situation. This will especially be true in the military section, where the main point of interest will be the latest modernizational steps taken by both Taipei and Beijing which contribute to the strengthening of both armies. For this reason, it has to be here in separate chapter, that a short summary of the history of events that formed the currently studies relationship into what it is today has to be given. The earliest decades of the discussed connection can be described as rather hostile times. According to Yu-Shan Wu, the policies in every possible area of the two sides were the complete contrary of the other in the connection that was embedded in the Cold War. Nothing proves this more clearly than the first two Taiwan Strait conflicts 21.

(31) in 1954-55 and in 1958. On the mainland, different plans were made thought to years for “liberating” or reuniting Taiwan. Same plans on invasions were constructed in Taipei, destroying the communist rule on the mainland. These intentions can be labeled as the continuation of the Chinese civil war, but on the sides of the Taiwan Strait, making China – as mentioned in the introduction chapter – a divided nation. An actual conflict could have broken out at any given time. The level of hostility has decreased since then. These peaceful developments were broken during the third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96. (Copper 1997, 2013, Wu 2000) In the previous decade, Chen Shui-bian’s and the DPP government’s actions caused frictions between the two parties, but peaceful connections were restored under the Kuomintang (KMT) rule and Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency.. 治 政 hostility. The PRC’s rightful or not rightful claim 大 of the islands and the ROC’s legal 立 status are all questioned as a result of this. Scholars from the mainland only view Different views on the recent history of China are among the sources of the. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan’s history since and in context of its connections to the other side of the Taiwan Strait. These interactions and elementary administrative system established on the. ‧. island are the reasons they give for Beijing’s right to reunify Taiwan. Shared culture is another factor that is often bought up to support the assured connection between the. y. Nat. sit. mainland and the island. (Copper 1997). al. er. io. Taiwanese exports are divided by their opinion on this subject. Several studies. n. emphasize the early migrations from China and the Manchu rule, but no significant. Ch. i n U. v. evidence of organized Chinese colonization or occupation has been found before the. engchi. Manchu rule. (Copper 1997) Nevertheless, it can be stated that recently lot of attention has been given to the research of the island’s early history, presumably broadening the group who acknowledge the connection between the two territories but do not necessarily see tight relations interlinking the mainland and the island in early historical times. Another dividing matter is the rightfulness of the Japanese occupation. Chinese experts tend to characterize the Treaty of Shimonoseki as an unjust conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese War and the Japanese rule on the island following that. Taiwanese scholars tend to disagree with these thoughts. These differences in opinions may seem to have little importance, but they have a major impact on the views of many. (Copper 1997). 22.

(32) The legal status of Taiwan following the Second World War is also a debated point. The main question here is the succession of the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. The island was given the prior as the latter did not exist yet at that time. But on the mainland, the ROC’s rule was replaced by the PRC, making the status of Taiwan questionable. (Copper 1997) In the following decades, the ROC found itself in a very difficult situation, with the majority of the countries in the world, originally having connections with Taiwan, establishing official relations with Beijing. These were the first steps taken towards Taiwan’s isolation in the international community. According to Chinese scholars, with this the foreign governments acknowledged that the island belongs to the PRC, strengthening Beijing’s claim. This was followed by expelling of the ROC from the. 治 政 majority of the remaining states cutting their ties大 with Taiwan. (Chen et al. 2005, 立 Copper 1997, Tien 1989) United Nations and the PRC taking Taipei’s place in the organization, with the. ‧ 國. 學. The US remained the only greater power that still had official relations with Taipei. But Washington’s slow connection building with the PRC foretold the faith of the. ‧. island. The 1972 Shanghai Communiqué aimed for “the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as. Nat. sit. y. on other matters of interest to both sides”. From 1973 Washington had quasi-official. al. er. io. relationship with both governments. This was followed by the establishment of official. n. relations between Washington and Beijing in 1978 and the cutting of such ties with. Ch. i n U. v. Taipei. (Copper 1997, Rubenstein 1999, Shanghai Communiqué 1972) However the. engchi. Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was passed in 1979, which is discussed in the chapter of this thesis, describing the triangular connections of US-China-Taiwan. Taiwanese scholars emphasis the already mentioned fact that the PRC did not exist at the end of the Second World War and the treaties signed that ended the Japanese rule did not specify to whom the island should be returned or given to. They also state that Beijing never took actual steps to invade the main island of Taiwan, only the smaller ones that were or are under the jurisdiction of Taipei, proving that the PRC has no claim over the island. The ROC also qualifies for all the criteria of a nation state: territory, population, government – which is stable in Taiwan’s case – and international, diplomatic recognition. (Copper 1997) The fulfillment of the last listed criteria can be questioned as the ROC is only recognized by a handful of states and its participation in international organizations is also limited. 23.

(33) Looking at the recent events and evolution of the connection, as mentioned above, hostility was followed by tightening of the ties that connect the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. In the beginning, Taipei was solemnly committed to this notion. It wanted for the US and the international community to have a positive impression of the ROC by the willingness to open towards Beijing. Domestic reasons – shifts in both Taipei’s and Beijing’s political sphere – and international causes – the end of the Cold War – contributed to the changing in the nature of Cross-Strait relations. The flow of goods, people and investments increased, transportational ties were established, economic integration deepened with time, radical point of views and actions of the governments on both sides were ceased and negotiations started. China moved towards to ides of. 治 政 大 and Beijing’s Association for Organizations – Taipei’s Straits Exchange Foundation 立 Relations Across the Taiwan Strait - were founded to coordinate the tightening of the peaceful unifications and Taiwan proclaimed the end of the war with the mainland.. ‧ 國. 學. connection. (Copper 1997, 2013). Wu notes that the PRC adopted the system that used to characterize Taiwan, when. ‧. Mao Zedong’s totalitarianism shifted into Deng Xiaoping’s authoritarian system. Meanwhile the ROC started its development into the capitalist democracy that it is. y. Nat. sit. today. (Wu 2000). al. er. io. However the above listed different point of views influence the relations in several. n. matters including the sovereignty of the ROC, where Taiwan views itself as a nation. Ch. i n U. v. state, while China sees it as one of its provinces. It is the reason the concept of “one. engchi. country, two systems” was introduced, if the two territories were to be reunited. According to this formula, under the rule of Beijing, Taiwan would be able to maintain the system and builtup that it currently possess, but limitations would be set, especially considering its foreign and defense sectors. Taiwanese politicians and scholars reject this proposal, list numerous areas were the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could limit Taiwan’s promised freedom if this system was to be established on the island and came up with possible plans of their own, for example the framework of “one nation, two equal governments”. (Copper 1997, 2013) The connection since then was gone through “ups and downs”. After issues of smaller scale of both negative and positive intonation like the “1992 consensus” and Lee Teng-hui’s “Go South” policy, the third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96 influenced the connection. This was followed by meetings of more peaceful nature and the 24.

數據

Figure 1.1: Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces

Figure 1.1:

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces p.121
Figure 1.2: Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces

Figure 1.2:

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces p.122
Figure 1.3: Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces

Figure 1.3:

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces p.123
Figure 2.1: Taiwanese exports to China by category, 1993-2009

Figure 2.1:

Taiwanese exports to China by category, 1993-2009 p.124
Figure 2.2: Taiwanese imports from China by category, 2000-2009

Figure 2.2:

Taiwanese imports from China by category, 2000-2009 p.125
Figure 2.3: Cross-strait merchandise trade, nominal and adjusted flows, 1991-2009

Figure 2.3:

Cross-strait merchandise trade, nominal and adjusted flows, 1991-2009 p.125
Figure 2.4: Taiwanese foreign direct investment into China by sector, 1997-2009

Figure 2.4:

Taiwanese foreign direct investment into China by sector, 1997-2009 p.126
Figure 2.5: Number of annual cross-strait visitors, 1987-2009

Figure 2.5:

Number of annual cross-strait visitors, 1987-2009 p.127
Figure 3.2: Taiwan’s Defense Budgets, 1994-2013

Figure 3.2:

Taiwan’s Defense Budgets, 1994-2013 p.128
Figure  3.3:  Medium  and  Intercontinental  Range  Ballistic  Missiles  [owned  by  the  People’s Republic of China]

Figure 3.3:

Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles [owned by the People’s Republic of China] p.129
Figure 4.3: Inherent Tension in the WBT [Washington-Beijing-Taipei] Triangle

Figure 4.3:

Inherent Tension in the WBT [Washington-Beijing-Taipei] Triangle p.131
Figure  4.2:  X-pivoted  ST  [Strategic  Triangle]  as  Perceived  Through  Power  Asymmetry

Figure 4.2:

X-pivoted ST [Strategic Triangle] as Perceived Through Power Asymmetry p.131
Figure 4.4: Top Trading Partners [of the United States] – February 2014: Total Trade

Figure 4.4:

Top Trading Partners [of the United States] – February 2014: Total Trade p.132
Figure 4.6: Top Trading Partners [of the United States] – February 2014: Exports

Figure 4.6:

Top Trading Partners [of the United States] – February 2014: Exports p.133
Figure 4.7: Composition of US merchandise trade deficit, 1994-2009

Figure 4.7:

Composition of US merchandise trade deficit, 1994-2009 p.134

參考文獻

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