4. Security issues and the military asymmetry of the Cross-Strait
5.3 US-China-Taiwan political and military connections
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
80
5.3 US-China-Taiwan political and military connections
Under this heading the whole of the US-China-Taiwan relations will be examined including the military aspect of this connection.
As a basic description of the relation, the connection between the three parties can be seen as a relationship held together by compromises. Womack describes these compromises as the following: the PRC is officially and diplomatically recognized by the United States, but Washington will militarily respond if Beijing seeks to reunite Taiwan using force. The ROC is provided by military weaponry by the US and its protection, but it does not have the North American state’s official recognition.
Furthermore, Taipei would have to face both the US and China if it solemnly tried to push for independence. (Womack 2010) This is what happened under the presidency of Chen Shui-bian.
Washington, using its hegemonic power, has constantly to fight to maintain the status quo and the “no use of force, no independence” policy of the relation, which neither Taipei nor Beijing is pleased about. In the prior’s point of view, without the US it could fight for larger international recognition. In the latter’s opinion, if not for Washington’s protection, the PRC could have already reunited Taiwan. Additionally, Washington has not much to gain from this triangular connection, while the costs it has to pay to maintain the status quo are quite high, making it the unwilling pivot.
(Womack 2010)
The US’s support of Taiwan has been an AFD relationship for the past more than fifty years and can be traced back to the 19th century and in the beginning was connected to the Kuomintang and not the islands themselves. As the party moved to the islands of Taiwan, the relation continued on and flourished as the communist expansion was to be stopped by Washington, making the protection of Taipei’s territories rather symbolical. The outbreak of the Korean war made the relation an even stronger and tighter one. A treaty alliance was established and official diplomatic ties connected the ROC and the US. At times the relationship and especially Taiwan’s involvement as was intense that Taipei could have its way even if the US did not necessarily support the actions and decisions made by the ROC. The second Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958 can be taking as example, when the ROC government enforced
‧
Washington to support the defense of two of Taiwan’s offshore islands. Nevertheless, Taipei could not always have its way as events just a few years after 1958 and not so long ago, under the presidency of Chen Shui-bian show. Hence the ROC’s deference towards the US is correlatively great. (Bergsten et al. 2008, Womack 2010)
However in time, the involvement of China into the international community became inevitable. Connections with China were slowly established – doubly so as the US realized that a linkage to the PRC would be in Washington’s best interest -, but the ties with Taiwan were not cut, for various reasons, including the reputation and the credibility of the US to its other allies. The security of the ROC continued to be an important factor for the US government. In 1979, official diplomatic connection between Washington and Beijing was established23, ending the same official relation between Washington and Taipei, but not the unofficial ties and the connection through arms sales. (Bergsten et al. 2008, Womack 2010)
As an indication, coming for the Congress of the US, that the promise of protecting Taiwan will be kept, in 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was passed. The act states that no forceful or nonpeaceful actions towards Taiwan will be left unanswered and that unofficial connections, including commercial and cultural ties will be tended.
However the act itself does not specify in what way these nonpeaceful actions and threats will be answered and retaliated, leaving a quite large range of possibilities in Washington’s hands. The presently ongoing arms sales were also stated and promised in the TRA, for the ROC to be able to sustain “a sufficient self-defense capacity”, emphasis a “defensive character” of these arms sales, instead of an offensive one.
(TRA 1979, 2) In the 1980s, further clarifications, including the constant reduction in the amount of weaponry sold to Taiwan, were made, some to Beijing’s leverage.
(TRA 1979, Bergsten et al. 2008)
Since the end of the Cold War, the environment that the above described events took place, changed in many ways.
As for the PRC, an AFD connection between Beijing and Washington formed slowly, which was not possible in the previous decades. Both domestic – the Tiananmen Square incident or massacre – and international – the demise of the USSR,
23: As the official connection between the PRC and the United States was formed, another strategic triangle was established, with the Soviet Union as the third actor. In this relationship, China tried to take the position of the pivot, or X as described in subchapter above. This ambition was never realized.
Furthermore, in the 1980s, the features of the triangle changed, making it a ménage à trois and so no pivot was needed to secure and monitor the strategic triangle. (Womack 2010)
‧
attitude towards the relationship and the importance of winning the US’s friendship.The connection between Beijing and Washington is multilayered, linking several areas of the governments and the societies together, from environmental questions to counterterrorism. This also means China does not want to – at least openly - challenge the United States, its position and hegemony, which is proved by the actions that Beijing took in the third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995 and 1996, where China avoided initiating a direct conflict with the US. As for Washington’s concession in this part of the strategic triangle is acknowledging the one-China policy, enforced by Beijing.
However the US is always ready to halt China whenever Washington feels that Beijing crossed a line it was not supposed to, including possible actions against Taiwan.
(Bergsten et al. 2008, Womack 2010)
Limitations and setting up red lines that are not to the crossed not only restrains the PRC’s actions but the US’s as well. In the three no’s policy, introduced under the Clinton government, the US set the barriers for itself not to aid Taiwan’s independence, to continue acknowledging the “one-China principle”, while not advocating the “two Chinas” principle and no to assist the ROC’s acceptance into an intentional organization where statehood is one of the conditions of joining. As a result of these limitations but the ongoing arms sales, at times the US finds itself in a difficult situation when it has to define the nature of its connection to Taiwan.
(Bergsten et al. 2008)
As for the ROC, the rise of China and the significance of the relations to Beijing for Washington made Taiwan a somewhat less important matter and responsibility for the US. Nevertheless, the support is still alive and ongoing – as proven by the still effective TRA and other military-to-military cooperation between the ROC and the US -, as the protection of the area is still high among the US’s priorities and as the protection of the now democratic Taiwan became emblematic. With the prior one, the US wants to reassure its allies in the area of its continuous support and attention, especially against the rising PRC. Abandoning Taiwan or even altering the current the arms sales would get the other states of the region anxious and worried about the future. With the latter, Washington wants to set an example for China for the state’s possible future transition. (Bergsten et al. 2008, Rosen-Wang 2011, Womack 2010)
As already indicated above, the constant changes in Taiwan’s politics and the actions and point of views of Taiwanese politicians can also be somewhat
‧
uncomfortable for the American government, as under the Chen administration, fearing a possible de facto declaration of independence and voicing the intention to join the United Nations as a separate member. The US had to devote more of its attention to the territory, while it could have focused on other pressing issues, changing the intonation of the connection, at least for the time being. In the eyes of the US, Ma Ying-jeou’s election bought a change with itself, stability, in which Washington expects less surprises. (Bergsten et al. 2008, Womack 2010)
China’s attitude towards Taiwan and the way Beijing treats Taipei is also seen by many in the US as an example of how the now rising PRC will deal with future conflicts that it will find itself in. A possible move or sudden action by China may also indicate that it plans to shift the current order in the region, which Washington could leave unanswered. (Bergsten et al. 2008)
The views of China’s connection to Taiwan as an example to Beijing future attitude towards other countries may be disproved. The PRC sees its connection to the ROC as a domestic affair, it, however, views its connections with other states as international affairs. For this reason, it cannot necessarily be concluded what Beijing’s future attitude will be like. However, this is a hypothetical question and as so as factors vary in the future, this could or could not be China’s future attitude. (Chiang 201424, Yuan 201425)
Discussing the US’s protection of Taiwan, it must be mentioned that the ROC is not the only territory that Washington feels responsible for in the region. In two of these states, Japan and South Korea, has US military presence. Forces were withdrawn from Taiwan in 1979. These countries have flourishing economic connections with China.
These two factors do not weigh each other out like they at times seem to do in US-China-Taiwan’s case. It is the US-Taiwan military relations that can be majorly effected by the China-Taiwan economic connections. The main concern is a tighter Taipei-Beijing relation compromising the weaponry system that is provided by Washington. (Rosen-Wang 2011)
Placing the US-China-Taiwan triangle directly into the theory described above, we can conclude that Washington, the pivot X, has reached an AFD connection with both weaker sides, keeping their interests in mind, while China, Y, and Taiwan, Z, have accepted the US as the hegemon actor in the triangle. Washington did not gain this
24: Information gathered during the interview with Chia-Hsiung Chiang was included in this paragraph.
25: Information gathered during the interview with Yi Yuan Chiang was included in this paragraph.
‧
position. It can rather be said that the situation formed around it, leaving the US with the pivot’s position. Washington’s efforts, however, does not bring them closer to resolving their own hostile relations and building their own AFD connection, leaving a source of tension. The US tenaciously tries to push the parties towards a peaceful resolution and stabilize the situation, while both sides try to gain the full support of Washington, making the triangle, as mentioned above a triple asymmetric one. (See Figure 4.3) The efforts to make the US tilt to either side have been unsuccessful and can be hard for Washington to handle. (Womack 2010)
As for the current standing of the triangular connections, a softening process can be noted, with positive developments in all three individual bilateral connections, with the emphasis on the Taipei-Beijing relation which is moving closer to an AFD state.
The most important factor of this drive was the Kuomintang’s and Ma Ying-jeou’s win in the 2008 elections. The hostile connection that characterized Beijing’s and Taipei’s connection through the years the island was governed by the Democratic Progressive Party changes to an amicable toned relation, which is headed and it heading towards the establishment of an AFD connection. This was welcomed by both the PRC and the US. (Womack 2010)
Besides Taiwan’s domestic shifting, the military developments and modernizations is a factor that is presently altering the structure of this asymmetric triangle. Despite the expectations that military asymmetry between Taiwan and China can be touched here, it is the US that more and more apprehensively studies these modernizations. It is especially to Beijing’s submarine and missiles that Washington pays prominent attention to. The Chinese marine and anti-satellite and anti-ship missiles could easily alter the strategic balance between the two states in the foreseeable future. These shifts make it less likely for a quick American answer if Beijing decides to cross over the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, defending the island would cost more to Washington, raising the already high expenses that it dedicated to this cause, making the unwilling pivot even more reluctant. (Womack 2010)
The issue of Washington abandoning the ROC can be raised here. Among the indirect reasons supporting the view that the US has to withdraw from its position of
“protector of Taiwan” is the fear that with the ROC and the PRC tightening its relations or even shortly unifying, Beijing will be able to lay its hands on US military and technology secrets which were exported to Taiwan via the weaponry sold in the arms sales. (Rosen-Wang 2011)
‧
keeping the peace and protecting Taiwan in this case have risen. As a result, X may decide to withdraw from its position. (Womack 2010) As an outcome, the structural change is either grave or the triangle as a whole may cease to exist.Farther areas of defense have not been mentioned in the description, areas where the US dreads both China and Taiwan or just the latter. Cybersecurity is one of these specific areas. In case of the ROC, it is not direct attack from Taiwan that Washington fears, but indirect attacks carried out by Chinese hackers, who are often sponsored by the government, who assault American networks via Taiwanese made computer systems. The ROC itself has to dread these potential attacks, since some aim the island directly and not a third state’s network system. (Rosen-Wang 2011)
Another branch that concerns the US is the semiconductor import from Taiwan.
These products are widely used in the military products produced in the North American county and the weaponry sector heavily relies on the Taiwanese import. The US fills a certain defenselessness in this area, which would worsen if the unification of the island and the mainland was to happen. According to some, in this case Beijing could easily compromise semiconductor products, such as microchips. (Rosen-Wang 2011)
Yet another related concern is Taiwanese contribution to the PLA’s technological modernization. It is through the investments and the migration of firms from the ROC to the mainland that might start and contribute to this process, which would increase in the case of closer relations between Taipei and Beijing. (Rosen-Wang 2011)
These above listed fears of the US somewhat contradict what has been stated about the pivot X in the description of the theory. X would like to see Y and Z tighten its connections, hence the state of AFD can be reached between them. Nevertheless, in these situations closer Taipei-Beijing relations would increase these dreads. Taking these areas, it can be stated that a more harmonious connection across the Taiwan Strait would increase angst and not make X, the United States more at ease.
Besides the US dreading China, the PRC also fears the US. In Beijing’s point of view, Washington is attacking the basic Chinese principles and is working on undermining the peace that presently reigns in China. Beijing also fears that the US will feel more and more threatened by the PRC, especially in the Asia Pacific region.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
86
Despite these dreads, the CCP also know how fruitful the connection between Beijing and Washington is.