2. Historical summary and placing the Cross-Strait relations into
2.3 Placing the Cross-Strait relations into the framework of the
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campaigns of the candidates of the presidential elections of 2000, where slogans of peace were popularized. Chen Shui-bian’s presidency bought another era of hostilities with itself. The president claimed that there are two sovereign states in the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and a referendum will be set to decide the future of the island.
Chen was reelected in 2004, promising to push for the ROC’s complete independence and setting a referendum discussing Taiwan’s United Nations membership. Beijing’s reply involved both international and domestic sphere. The prior was seeking the US’s help against Chen, while the latter one was passing of the Anti-Secession Law, claiming that the PRC is willing to use force if Taiwan does declare its independence.
However Beijing was also willing to imply more peaceful means. (Copper 2013) In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential elections, with the slogan of “no independence, no unifications, no war”, which he lived up to in the coming years.
Peaceful relations were restored. The connection went beyond restoring and a strengthening process started, of which the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is a perfect example. (Copper 2013)
2.3 Placing the Cross-Strait relations into the framework of the asymmetric connections theory
The following section can be set apart from the other chapters and subchapters of this thesis. It will differ from them as no citations will be given in the paragraphs below. The summary of Brantly Womack’s theory in the introductory chapter will be taken as basis and the relations across the Taiwan Strait will be placed into the concept through that section. Mostly no citations will be used as no specific book, article or study will serve as the source of the following subchapter. Nevertheless, at the end of the section, a footnote will gather the main works that have possibly contributed to the writing of this subchapter. The reason behind this change is that despite the fact that this current thesis is not a pure economical study, nor a military one, political aspects are deemphasized. However these sectors that are dealt with separately here in reality are heavily interlinked. As a result, the political sphere influences the ones emphasizes in the upcoming chapters, which makes it necessary to, however limitedly, focus on it.
One of the definitions of asymmetric conflicts states that “…the smaller power cannot reasonably expect to defeat the larger power in a contest of capabilities, but is
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considering especially the economic sector. Taiwan often lacks the capabilities and resources that are given in the mainland, however Taipei is still strong enough to defy Beijing. Another given definition, where capabilities are discussed again, has a rather militaristic focus where A is capable of doing things to b, to which b cannot give a similar answer. This can be demonstrated with the figures of the appendix and the sizes of the armies can be compared there. (See Figures 1.1 - 1.3) Beijing owning nuclear warheads but Taipei lacking this weaponry makes this the biggest difference and a threat that the ROC would not be able to reply to. It has to be noted that this difference in capabilities is not only limited to the military sphere, but can influence the economic one as well, with the dependence on the mainland growing for Taiwan.Another general statement given about the nature of asymmetric connections – the relations being more important for b than they are for A - is true in the case of Cross Strait reactions. It is especially true under Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, when more and more attention is devoted to the mainland, which is also driven by the growing dependency. It must be added, however, that this could also be explained by Taiwan’s small diplomatic circle. If this was bigger, possibly more attention would be given to other states. China has other concerns besides Taiwan and maintains diplomatic relations with great majority of the states of the international community. As examples, the growing attention given to the African continent or, as reported, the energy deal recently signed between the PRC and Russia. (Johnson 2014) But it must be emphasized that the connection is never neglected by either side.
The question of attention is thoroughly discussed in Womack’s work and in the summary as well. Other deductions that can be made is that since Taiwan is possible more influenced by the connection, it gives it more attention, despite the fact that it cannot necessarily have an effect on Beijing’s decisions and actions, especially if Cross Strait relations are not concerned in the specific question. Additionally, the influence is noticeable in every area of the connection, just mentioning the economy and military sector besides the political one.
Womack’s description of A’s inattention, however, cannot be equated with the PRC’s attitude. China does pay attention to Taiwan and the relations across the Taiwan Strait. It does have a coordinated policy towards the ROC and their affairs.
And maybe most importantly, the national attention is also high, contrarily to the
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summary, as the population of China express an attitude, pay attention and would like to reunify the island, as in their point of view it is the last remaining reminder of the century of humiliation that the mainland suffered through.
The general introduction of the theoretical summary mentions, misinterpretations are possible in an asymmetric connection. No example of this has presented itself so far in relations between Taipei and Beijing. Statements and actions were all correctly interpreted, though not all may have been welcomed.
A is more powerful than b, but it still cannot force its will upon the smaller. This is true, as Taiwan would officially be a province of China is Beijing could force its will upon the island, while the ROC would have fought for its survival. Another point made is A being incapable to control the land of b even after it occupied it. This may not be true taking the current connection. Beijing would be able to control, if it would wish to do so. The above described plans of a “one country, two systems” frame could be implied, were – on paper – the PRC would not interfere in domestic questions of the island and Taiwan would also be allowed to keep its military forces, but China would be in control of the ROC’s foreign affairs sector.
Attacking and possible occupying b would cause other states to express their disproval of A’s actions. This is true. As discussed in the introduction chapter, Taiwan being a democracy would urge other democratic countries to disaccord China’s actions.
Needless to say, the US would come to the ROC’s aid, if force would be used to unify the island with the mainland. Also connected to influences that Taiwan’s democratic system has on the relationship is the shifting of the policies that may occur. A’s policies will tend to change less than b’s do. Depending on the party that wins the elections in Taiwan, the policies and attitude towards the mainland may change. The point of view of Beijing is less affected by shifts in the leadership, but of course different leaders and leaderships may have various approaches. An addition reason for any shifts in the ROC’s polices may be the attempt to keep up with the changes in China’s attitude.
A’s attitude is not likely to be belligerent even if b adopted a hostile approach, to which Chen Shui-bian’s presidency is an example. No matter how hostile the relations got, China never used force to repress Taipei. Womack also notes that even in a crisis, A is more likely to blame b’s alliances instead of b itself. The third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96 selves as an example, with the US getting involved. It must be noted that
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Beijing also held Lee Teng-hui, the president of Taiwan – not just the United States - responsible for the outbreak of the crisis.
An open conflict, as stated, would harm both sides, which is true in the present case as well. For this reason, asymmetric connections are long lasting. The parties settle with the circumstances. Taiwan’s and China’s current situation has not changed in the past decades, colored with minor tensions and overtures. The future, however, is questionable. Opinions about the Taiwan’s and the Cross Strait connections future also vary among Taiwanese. As visible on the graph constructed using the survey of the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, majority wishes to keep the connection’s present status and maybe decide about the succeeding buildup in the future, which would mean a long lasting asymmetric relationship. (NCCU Election Study Center, 2014)
It is true for this connection that even a normalized asymmetric connection cannot be the same as a symmetric relation. However in the present connection’s case this may have other bases and reasons. One of them is Beijing considering this relationship as a domestic affair. Given only this fact, the difference between this asymmetric connection and for instance China’s other connections have to be categorized differently. Also connected to the characteristics of asymmetry is the fact the b knows how important the relationship is but still cannot trust A completely. Acknowledgment of the importance is there in Taiwan’s case – particularly in the Ma administration -, but fear and a level of distrust can be felt in the connection. Nevertheless b’s colder and more distant attitude towards A than A’s approach towards b cannot be sensed in the Taiwan-China relations.
b is trying to be less exposed to the influences it receives from A. This is true in the present case, but the economic, the politics and the military sphere must be differentiated here. In the first one this does not seem to be true, but in the latter two’s case yes. Joining and participation in multilateral organizations are an example to the attempt to reduce the influence. Taipei has been trying to join such organization, with little success, as China is constantly working on keeping Taiwan out of organizations were a requirement of the membership is statehood or in other words sovereignty.
However its efforts were not unanswered everywhere. Womack sees b’s willingness to take part in these organizations as to look for venues were it can meet A and regulations are set for both of them, which also influence the connection between them.
As a conclusion, international organization will not be a place where the mainland and
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the island could strengthen their relationship. In other words, multilateral aspects cannot be studies here, apart from the role of Washington.
Besides this, Taiwan’s reasons for wanting to participate include getting more deeply involved in the international community. Despite the fact that above it was mentioned that in the economic sector no attempts of breaking free are visible, one can certainly be listed: the free trade agreements or FTAs that Taipei signed with New Zealand and Singapore.
Other possible ways to decrease the level of exposure is through b joining other smaller states in the area with similar aims and purposes – in Taiwan’s case no such country could be found and China’s influence on these states is probably too great for them to turn their backs to Beijing – or to ally and include a third party into the connection, another strong state C. This is what happened in the Cross Strait relations, as it is demonstrated in a following chapter of the current thesis. Taiwan has a strong ally in the US. But as predicted by Womack, eventually C could find that its connections to A are more important than its alliance with b. Ideas of Washington possible leaving Taiwan to build closer connections with Beijing prove Womack’s forecast.
A final possibility to reduce exposure is through b developing or gaining nuclear weapons, create a certain equality between the parties, as A presumable already possesses them. This does not seem like a possible option in the ROC’s case, which will be explained in the military chapter.
A certain level of deference is expected by Beijing from Taipei and the PRC does emphases its military power but there are no other tokens that would suggest that China wants Taiwan to respect its power. In return for this deference, b expects A to acknowledge its autonomy. In the current case, Beijing acknowledges Taipei’s autonomy to a certain way. It acknowledges that reunification is in order, but it views the island as one of its provinces. Expecting complete deference – unification - or total acknowledgment of autonomy – independence - can be a major source of a conflict between A and b, as it happened under the Chen administration. A can push or bully b into greater deference, while reminding b of the nature of the asymmetric connection and b’ place in it, which China pushed for in the mentioned period. However conflict is not guaranteed. The level of deference and autonomy did not change severely since 2008, after Chen Shui-bian and the governance of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), but no such confrontation has formed since then.
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connections, but no such ritual has formed in the present case yet or at least not at a high level of the government. Besides present and future rituals, the past has also a say in the forming of the connection. The parties will be more cautious if they have a past full of conflicts and tensions. As examined above, the past does have a major role in the present of the PRC-ROC relations and the point of views of the actors.However a harmonious relationship can benefit not just the involved parties but other states in the region and also in the wider international community. Peaceful Cross Strait relations give the US one less problem to worry about and Southeast Asian states close to the Taiwan Strait would possibly also suffer from a serious conflict between the mainland and the island. Peace can be kept and the possibility of a conflict is reduced “by removing potentially divisive issues from immediate political attention”. (Womack 2006, 90) This is a process that is presently going on in the Cross Strait relations.
As already mentioned, more importantly A’s connections to other states and the opinions and reactions of these countries or the international community as a whole may influence the asymmetric connection. Interrelations are an important characteristic of today’s international connections. In other words, bilateral relations are not purely bilateral anymore. Third parties may easily interfere verbally or with actions. The influence of third states is even more likely to be emphasized if A cherishes, relies on these connections and finds them important – as China does its economic connections to other states - and if the greater party is a regional or global power. As China is such a power – making the basic setup of the asymmetric relations more complex - it will be closely watched by other states of the community and it will receive responses to its actions, especially from fellow greater states.
Besides inner factors and actions, changes in the international sphere and community can also influence the asymmetric connection. It is especially the great shifting that may affect the relations. The Taiwan-China connection already lived though one major change: the end of the Cold War, with still both actors acknowledging the importance of the relations across the Taiwan Strait. What may make the next possible change a great challenge for the Cross Strait relation is the prediction that China might be an important or a center player and beneficiary of this
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shift. The rising of the PRC and future hegemonic position that it may gain will have grave effects on the connection.
In the last paragraph of the theoretical summary, the concept of asymmetric conflicts is mentioned. This could be another theory through which the Cross Strait relations could be examined. As war is in the focus of the concept, it could not be used to describe the present status of the relations between Taipei and Beijing. Such study would only be useful if the now peaceful connection turned into a hostile one and a conflict would commence. The theory itself examines the circumstances and predicts possible outcome according to them. It may as well foresee the result of a war across the Taiwan Strait. References and a list of the most important works applying this theoretical framework have been given in the previous, introductory chapter7.
As a conclusion, it can be summarized that in most of the above listed points, Brantly Womack’s description of the characteristics of an asymmetric connection could be lined up with that of the Cross Strait relations. They could describe past or current events and processes in the Taiwan-China connection, which were given as
7: No citations and references were given in the subchapter above. For this reason, a list of books and articles that have or may have indirectly helped in the writing of this section and the forming of the point of view expressed in this subchapter will be given below. As a similar list was given in the introductory chapter related to the theory of asymmetric conflicts, works discussing that concept will not be listed again.
Chen, Yi-shen; Hsueh, Hua-yuan; Li, Ming-juinn; Hu, Ching-shan: Taiwan’s International Status:
History and Theory, Taiwan Advocates, Tamsui, 2005
Copper, John F.: “The Origins of Conflict across the Taiwan Strait: The Problem of Differences in Perceptions”. Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6 Issue 15, 1997, p. 199-227
Cooper, John F.: Taiwan- Nation-state or Province?, Westview Press, Boulder, 2013 Dillon, Michael: Contemporary China – An Introduction. Routledge, Abingdon, 2009
Hu, Weixing: “Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait Relations: a punctuated equilibrium model”. Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 21, Issue 78, 2012, p. 933-953
Hung, Chien-Chao: A History of Taiwan, Il Cerchio Iniziative Editoriali, Rimini, 2000 Jacques, Martin: When China Rules the World. Penguin Books, London, 2012
Keng, Shu; Chen, Lu-huei; Huang, Kuan-bo: “Sense, Sensitivity, and Sophistication in Shaping the Future of Cross-Strait Relations”. Issues & Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4, December 2006, p. 23-66
Leng, Tse-Kang: The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy And Development Across The Taiwan Straits. Westview Press, Boulder, 1996
Rubinstein, Murray A.: Taiwan- A New History, M. E. Sharpe, New York, 1999 Shirk, Susan L.: China- Fragile Superpower. Oxford University Press, New York, 2008
Sutter, Robert G.: U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Plymouth, 2010
Tien, Hung-mao: The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1989
Wang, Gabe T.: China and the Taiwan Issue, United Press of America, Lanham, 2006
Zheng, Shiping: Making Sense of the Conflict Between Mainland China and Taiwan. In: Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, edi. Kubálková, Vendulka, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2001
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examples to the conformity between the concept and the actual set of the Taipei-Beijing relation. There were other factors that could not describe the current connection. They were completely invalid or were not able to characterize the relation and the behavior of the parties well enough. The number of these non-applicable
examples to the conformity between the concept and the actual set of the Taipei-Beijing relation. There were other factors that could not describe the current connection. They were completely invalid or were not able to characterize the relation and the behavior of the parties well enough. The number of these non-applicable