4. Security issues and the military asymmetry of the Cross-Strait
4.3 The military power of Taiwan
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The PRC sees its space program as a vital sector of an up-to-date military and so it becomes one of its focuses of attention. Another reason for his emphasis is the contribution that the space program could give to the A2/AD strategy, to fight off a possible hostile attack before it gets too close to Chinese territories. (Annual Report to Congress 2013, Canan 2013)
As noted in the introduction, cyberspace is another area of warfare that China is planning on strengthening its abilities and capabilities in. This warfare includes invasions of other states’ governmental and private computer systems, widely involving computers in military operations and spying and collecting information on other states and their affairs from data stored on computers and computer systems.
One of the many ways that this profits the military is through the weapon designs and technologies – weaponry and communicational - that can be and are stolen. The official reason given for the need of developing the cyberspace section of the military is defense from other states’ similar actions. (Annual Report to Congress 2013, Canan 2013)
4.3 The military power of Taiwan
The principal goal of Taiwan’s military and defense system is to preserve the peace between Taipei and Beijing, while China is also a constant source of threat. As the result of this stability, Taiwan can enjoy the present quasi-autonomy, build its economy, which are threatened by China’s reunification efforts. However, at the same time it has to consider how to respond to this possible threat. Besides defending the island against the greater state on the mainland, the military has to respond to any threats, mostly likely from the sea or through the air given the geography of the ROC - that Taiwan may face. The threatening or cutting of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) would possibly cause the biggest damage to Taiwan and its economy, as besides a negligible amount of trade conducted via air, most of Taiwan’s connections and trade are maintained through the sea. Still no other menace is as serious or could be compared to the one China represents. (Cole 2006, Copper 2013, Murray 2013)
The modernizational process that was described under the chapter on China’s military has taken root on the other side of the Taiwan Strait as well. In Taiwan, however, it has a longer history and can be traced back earlier than the Chinese
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modernization is the realization that no matter how big the Taiwanese army is, it will never as large as the number of personnel Chinese army can or could have. So advancement in weaponry was seen as a way of balancing the PLA. This, however, presented the problem of the source for this modernization. The US was and is Taiwan’s only weapons supplier and it declined Taipei’s request to sell it particular weaponry like fighter airplanes and weapons used against submarines. By this time, the ROC obtained means to build its own weaponry, especially fighter planes. (Copper 2013)When it comes to the PLA and its might, Taiwan’s biggest fear is the missiles that China possesses and positions towards the island, with their numbers constantly growing. These weapons could destroy essential military and public establishments.
With such capabilities, the PRC would also be able to cut off the island from all its connections. Washington is willing to provide the ROC’s army with defense capabilities which could protect Taiwan. (Copper 2013)
It must be noted here, that most of the weaponry sold to Taipei can be characterized as offensive capabilities. As such, not all of them have the ability to be used for a potential attack. However, attacking the mainland has not been planned on the island for the past decades. Many think that the weapons provided by the US are out of date.
This can be labeled as false, but it has to be mentioned they are not as advanced as the threat that Taiwan is facing and should be able to respond to. (Chiang 201420)
The most recent security policy of Taiwan was drafted under Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency. It was decided that the ROC’s army bulitup should be changed, while the ongoing modernizational process. One of the reasons was the plan to maintain positive relations with the mainland. As mentioned in the introductions, this meant reducing the number of personnel in the army and cutting the time of the compulsory military service, which will most likely be ended in the upcoming years. As part of the advancement in the maintained modernizational process, a notable percentage of the military budget was spent on the air force and the navy, trainings and highly advanced weaponry. (Copper 2013)
Turning the attention to Taiwanese military buildup, the ground forces function as the base of the military’s structure. The rest of the military is often defined by it, while
20: Information gathered during the interview with Chia-Hsiung Chiang was included in this paragraph.
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often a foreign model and the equipment is used by the army all originate from abroad.
One of the reasons for the army having a vital position can be traced back to the twentieth century and the constantly preparations of attacking the mainland. This reasoning still exists today, but the probability of the army being used for such actions is significantly smaller today. (Cole 2006)
The army is divided into combat, combat support and service support units. Under this broad separation, further division is implemented, as different corps and brigades, for example Army Corps, Air Cavalry Brigades, Armed Brigades and Special Warfare Brigades, are organized. Territorial division is also used in the organization of the ground troops. Most of the biggest island is separated into three areas: North-Central, Southern and Eastern. Hualian, Matzu, Jinmen and Penghu are also separate but smaller units. (Cole 2006)
Just like the PRC’s army, the ground forces branch of the military on the other side of the Taiwan Strait is going through modernization. The goal here is to improve both the mobility and the fire power of the troops. The focus of the modernizations is to update the obsolete weaponry that is presently used. Alongside the physical update, modernization of strategies is also needed, as the preparations to get the army ready for reaching the mainland and engaging in ground combat are altered to the warcraft of halting the enemy before it sets foot on the islands of Taiwan and defending these territories. (Cole 2006)
Two factors stand in the way of further modernizations. One of them is the question of where would these weapons and equipment originate from. The only state is presently selling weaponry to Taipei is the United States, which sales are opposed by Beijing. As mentioned in the chapter on the economical asymmetry between China and Taiwan, Taipei does produce weaponry for its military, but these productions are rather limited and are not able to meet the needs. The other problem that has to be tackled by the military is the budget cuts. With less funds, the modernizations are hard to maintain. (Cole 2006)
Taiwan, as China, has special forces and units in its military. The Military Police Command (MPC) is particularly unique for the position that serves in the structure of the island’s security and which differs from the standing of these units in other military forces around the world. Its uniqueness comes from the fact that this branch can also act as a supplementary police force, if a situation requires it. Other
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responsibilities are similar to other nation’s MPC units, for example guarding services, enforcing military disciple and law and aiding the combat forces. (Cole 2006)
Units of Special Operations Command (SOC) are also organized within the army of the Taiwanese military. Attack, ground forces and aviation brigades both belong to this section. The ground brigades are trained to be used for political purposes, fighting behind the lines of the enemy and organizing guerilla combat. As of recently, counterterrorist and fighting terrorism were added to the list of responsibilities of these units. (Cole 2006)
The air force branch of the military of Taiwan (TAF) serves to protect the airspace over the islands. A more distant goal is to dominate the air over the Taiwan Strait.
This includes “detecting, identifying, and monitoring” (Cole 2006, 105) objects flying by and over the area under Taipei’s jurisdiction and protecting the sea-lane. The air force operates on nine airbases, all of them located on the main island, and has additional facility in Taipei. The inner division of the TAF is the following: it consists of six aircraft wings that are used for tactical combats. Operations, logistics and artillery defense are the selected purposes of the individual wings. (Cole 2006)
The modernizations in this branch are needed more than they are in the other sections of the military. Several planes and other equipment would be required by the air force to be truly capable of what is expected from it. Among others, Taiwan lacks anti-aircraft missiles and aerial refueling tanks. Warning networks and up-to-date communicational and intelligence utensils needed to be gained. Further problems that are to be tackled not just by the TAF, but other air forces as well, is the lack of fully trained pilots and the fact that even the qualified pilots could not participate and test their skills in actual combat. (Cole 2006)
The significant difference in the number of aircrafts and missiles owned by the PRC and by Taiwan is so great that in a substantive combat situation, the TAF would most likely be defeated by China’s air force. The maximization of the resources on the island would balance the situation to some extent, but that would still not guarantee the victory of the Taiwanese forces. (Cole 2006)
The Taiwanese navy is a rather antinomic branch of military. It was never considered to have an important part of the protection of Taiwan, despite the territory would suggest it would be thought of as an essential section of the military. Almost all of Taipei’s trade and other connection to other states and territories are maintained via
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the sea, which would be another reason for the government to feel the need to own a great naval fleet. (Cole 2006)
The ships of the fleet are spread out in several harbors, including Keelung, Kaohsiung and on Penghu, while the headquarter is located in Tsoying. The personnel can be divided according to the duties they are assigned to, either being land-bases and on sea personnel. The ships and weaponry of the navy can be separated into five major groups: the basic fleet, the rather big fleet of amphibious vehicles, the supply and oiler ships, the missile boats and the submarines. The coast guard can be mentioned under this branch, but it does not belong strictly under the naval forces. The main duties of this branch are protecting the coast and to be prepared to participate in and aid other branches of the military in almost any given type of warfare, including air, surface and submarine warfare. An additional, quite imperious threat that Taiwan has to prepare for is a possible mine warfare. With this, the island’s sea connections could completely be cut-off. That is the reason behind Taipei paying close attention to this threat among others, with ships capable of laying and disarming underwater mines.
(Cole 2006)
One of the areas where the navy needs strengthening is in its submarine section.
Plans have been drawn up, according to which Taiwan would manufacture its own submarines. The lack of funds for this project and the fact that purchasing them from the US would prove to be easier and sometimes even quicker – despite the fact that these purchases sometimes take more than half a decade – than Taiwan producing its own ones. Either by purchase or by production, any growth in the number of submarines under the command of the Taiwanese navy could contribute to the tipping of delicate balance between the PLA’s navy and the one under Taipei’s command. against the PLA’s similar section. New ships would have to be bought and the missiles current owned by the Taiwanese army are not enough either. (Cole 2006)
Unlike China, Taiwan does not possess nuclear weapons. For reasons of balancing, it would seem justified for the island to wish to develop and build nuclear weapons.
Taipei has all the capacities needed, including the technology and the funds. Despite
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earlier plans, the ROC ceased its nuclear program, satisfying Washington’s wishes with this step. It is however capable to start the developing process again, in other words if the ROC wished to have nuclear weapons it could develop or would already possess them. As mentioned, the US and other states would not support this move and most likely the citizens of the island would not either. Taiwan would also be able to produce chemical and biological weapons if they would be needed. (Chiang 201421, Copper 2013, Yuan 201422)
As mentioned, Beijing possesses nuclear weapons and Taiwan is not efficiently protected against a nuclear attack. Nevertheless, China is not likely to use its nuclear capabilities, as stated by Chinese leaders, especially not against a territory without such weaponry. Even if it does, other nuclear states would come to the ROC’s aid, as stated in the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Threat. (Copper 2013)
The only thing that Taipei can show for in the military’s space section is a satellite system that, among others, is used for military reasons and the surveillance of the mainland. (Cole 2006)
As for the future plans of Taipei concerning the military section of Taiwan, a volunteer military system is to be created. The preparations have already started and the end of 2014 was set as the year when the transition to the all-volunteer force (AVF) should be completed. Due to delays, this will not be accomplished, pushing the completion date to 2015 or beyond. The reasons for the downsizing of the military personnel, mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, is partly because of the changes that the creation of the AVF draws. (Murray 2013)
As a result of the budget cuts and despite the modernization that the Taiwanese military is going through, in the view of experts and among others US military officials, it is likely that the readiness and fighting capability of the military will see a sudden downfall. As for other currently existing and possible future shifting in this sector, the ROC’s military is more and more focused on possible non-traditional security threats, instead of concentrating its energy on a “traditional” war. Furthermore, Taipei is building asymmetric military systems against a possible Chinese attack. With these, the aim is rather to detect an attack and play a defensive role. These asymmetric equipments and weaponry are rather cost-efficient and the systems are less vulnerable than the traditional military weaponry. Besides the present peaceful connections across
21: Information gathered during the interview with Chia-Hsiung Chiang was included in this paragraph.
22: Information gathered during the interview with Yi Yuan Chiang was included in this paragraph.
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the Taiwan Strait, the reason behind the need to adapt this strategy is the realization that the ROC is less and less capable of keeping up with the speed of the growth and modernization of the PLA. (Bergsten et al. 2008, Murray 2013)
The Kuomintang (KMT) government’s plan is to keep the military budget the same, in other words no further budget cuts are planned. As the next upcoming elections will be held in 2016, it is until then that this policy will be certainly valid. The reason given by Ma Ying-jeou’s government for this decision is the constantly strengthening peaceful nature of the Cross Strait connection and Taipei’s plans to successfully build its soft power over the Strait. (Murray 2013)
4.4 Conclusion
Concluding the chapter on the military, it can be stated that despite the modernizations that Taiwan is funding, the island cannot, does not keep with the growing power of the mainland. As mentioned above, the majority of these advancements are more and more defense orientated. If an actually conflict was to emerge, Taipei soon had no choice, but to hold the PLA forces back until military aid for the US arrives, not being capable to engage in full combat with the PRC forces.
(Cooper 2013)
Parallel to the decreasing of Taiwan’s military might, with the strengthening, Beijing is becoming more advanced and powerful. The threat increases, for example the PRC owns more updated and a larger number of missiles, which can be coordinated better, making it easier of China to destroy essential Taiwanese institutions and forces while they are still on the island. (Kearn 2014) As the PLAAF possesses more evolved and bigger quantity of fighter, striker aircrafts and modern submarines, with which it can disable the island’s forces that have survived the preceding missile bombardment.
Evidence of the growing gap of strength between the PLA and the ROC’s military are given in the appendix section with figures that compare the present weaponry and capabilities owned by Beijing and that owned by Taipei. (See Figure 1.1 - 1.3) This gap is likely to get bigger given the future plans set by the CCP. Major steps of modernization are to be accomplished by 2020. In other words, the previously described advancements are just the first steps taken towards greater plans. The plans
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(Agnihotri 2011, Annual Report to Congress 2014)
Regarding the difference between the capabilities and the quasi-scenario that was described above, David W. Kearn Jr. concludes that Chinese forces are already capable or very close to it to annihilate the Taiwanese military before the US army has the time to gather its forces around the island and aid Taiwan. (Kearn 2014)
It must be noted here that the upgrading done by the PRC does not only target Taiwan and its forces. An example for this is the currently developed Anti-Access (A2) system, which will reach beyond the borders of the Taiwan Strait. China has also against the ROC. It would bring the US, Japan and Taiwan closer together. Beijing is against these plans. (Annual Report to Congress 2013, Canan 2013, Copper 2013)
John F. Copper gives a list of options that Taiwan has, as it is becoming clear that its military powers are not equal or no match for to China’s. One of these possible actions is to search for other allies. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was one of these potential allies. The relations between Beijing and Moscow were not flourishing and the USSR was limitedly willing to militarily aid Taiwan. Presently, as the Soviet Union collapsed more than two decades ago, this is no longer an option. Additionally most likely a connection like this one would have cause problems in the relations between Taipei and Washington. Japan is still considered as a possible ally. The
John F. Copper gives a list of options that Taiwan has, as it is becoming clear that its military powers are not equal or no match for to China’s. One of these possible actions is to search for other allies. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was one of these potential allies. The relations between Beijing and Moscow were not flourishing and the USSR was limitedly willing to militarily aid Taiwan. Presently, as the Soviet Union collapsed more than two decades ago, this is no longer an option. Additionally most likely a connection like this one would have cause problems in the relations between Taipei and Washington. Japan is still considered as a possible ally. The