行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫 成果報告
從「勞動模範」到「民意代表」？中國大陸地方人大代表
的角色變遷(第 2 年)
研究成果報告(完整版)
計 畫 類 別 ： 個別型 計 畫 編 號 ： NSC 97-2410-H-004-095-MY2 執 行 期 間 ： 98 年 08 月 01 日至 100 年 07 月 31 日 執 行 單 位 ： 國立政治大學國家發展研究所 計 畫 主 持 人 ： 趙建民 計畫參與人員： 博士班研究生-兼任助理人員：張鈞智 博士班研究生-兼任助理人員：吳瑟致 博士班研究生-兼任助理人員：裴幸謙 報 告 附 件 ： 赴大陸地區研究心得報告 出席國際會議研究心得報告及發表論文 公 開 資 訊 ： 本計畫可公開查詢中 華 民 國 100 年 11 月 04 日
中文摘要： 改革開放前的人民代表大會往往被視為「橡皮圖章」，人大代 表則多為「勞動模範」。人民代表大會在歷經 80 年代的制度 化改革之後，已經具有不同的氣象，地方的基層人大代表在政 治參與上也有了不同的認知，當選人大代表之後，更是以「維 權」為己任。 人民代表大會在歷經 30 年的制度化改革之後，似已具有不同 的氣象，地方的基層人大代表在政治參與上也有了不同的認 知。種種跡象顯示人大代表的角色與功能似已開始轉變。地方 人大代表出現以下三種較為顯著的變化：在代表功能方面，從 勞動模範逐漸變為「受託人」；在立法功能方面，在審議過程 中從旁觀者逐漸成為「建議人」；在監督功能方面，逐漸從無 奈者蛻變為「把關人」。 「地方自治者，國之礎石也。礎不堅則國不固。」相較於台灣 政治發展過程中，民眾自力救濟場面中的民意代表身影，中國 大陸的人大代表似乎也開始面對類似的場景，選舉法規及其配 套的改革或為下一階段政治改革之主要目標。
英文摘要： China’s People’s Congress, previously regarded
as ’rubber stamp’, has quietly been transformed into one of the most important channels for resolving the conflicts stemming from increasing discrepancy between the party-state system and the society at the local level. ’Take complaints to the higher echelon of the government hierarchy’ has been in the rise in recent years and quite a few Chinese nowadays treat the
People’s Congress as an authoritative institution for the maintenance of their rights.
Based on relevant studies on the role of legislators this study puts local deputies into different
typologies. The role of representatives of the
People’s Congress is switching from a honorary labor to a agent of the people in representative function, from an onlooker to one who tries to propose
recommendation in legislation, and from one who can not exercise his (her) duty of supervision to a gatekeeper of the public interest.
It is concluded that the role of representatives of the People’s Congress are changing and they are trying to be devoted to representing the public opinion. Revising election rules and laws may be the next step the People’s Congress should implement.
行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫
行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫
行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫
行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫
成 果 報 告
成 果 報 告
成 果 報 告
成 果 報 告
□
□
□
□期中進度報告
期中進度報告
期中進度報告
期中進度報告
從「勞動模範」到「民意代表」？
中國大陸地方人大代表的角色變遷
計畫類別：
個別型計畫 □整合型計畫
計畫編號：NSC 97－2410－H－004－095
－MY2
執行期間： 97 年 8 月 1 日至 100 年 7 月 31 日
執行機構及系所：國立政治大學國家發展研究所
計畫主持人：國立政治大學國家發展研究所 趙建民 教授
成果報告類型(依經費核定清單規定繳交)：□精簡報告
完整報告
處理方式：
除列管計畫及下列情形者外，得立即公開查詢
□涉及專利或其他智慧財產權，□一年□二年後可公開查詢
中 華 民 國 100 年 10 月 28 日
1 中文摘要 改革開放前的人民代表大會往往被視為「橡皮圖章」，人大代表則多為「勞動模範」。人民代表大 會在歷經 80 年代的制度化改革之後，已經具有不同的氣象，地方的基層人大代表在政治參與上也有了 不同的認知，當選人大代表之後，更是以「維權」為己任。 人民代表大會在歷經 30 年的制度化改革之後，似已具有不同的氣象，地方的基層人大代表在政治 參與上也有了不同的認知。種種跡象顯示人大代表的角色與功能似已開始轉變。地方人大代表出現以 下三種較為顯著的變化：在代表功能方面，從勞動模範逐漸變為「受託人」；在立法功能方面，在審議 過程中從旁觀者逐漸成為「建議人」；在監督功能方面，逐漸從無奈者蛻變為「把關人」。 「地方自治者，國之礎石也。礎不堅則國不固。」相較於台灣政治發展過程中，民眾自力救濟場 面中的民意代表身影，中國大陸的人大代表似乎也開始面對類似的場景，選舉法規及其配套的改革或 為下一階段政治改革之主要目標。 關鍵詞：地方人大代表、政治參與、人大監督、受託人、建議人、把關人
英文摘要
China’s People’s Congress, previously regarded as “rubber stamp”, has quietly been transformed into one of the most important channels for resolving the conflicts stemming from increasing discrepancy between the party-state system and the society at the local level. “Take complaints to the higher echelon of the government hierarchy” has been in the rise in recent years and quite a few Chinese nowadays treat the People’s Congress as an authoritative institution for the maintenance of their rights.
Based on relevant studies on the role of legislators this study puts local deputies into different typologies. The role of representatives of the People’s Congress is switching from a honorary labor to a agent of the people in representative function, from an onlooker to one who tries to propose
recommendation in legislation, and from one who can not exercise his (her) duty of supervision to a gatekeeper of the public interest.
It is concluded that the role of representatives of the People’s Congress are changing and they are trying to be devoted to representing the public opinion. Revising election rules and laws may be the next step the People’s Congress should implement.
Keywords: local people’s congress, transformation of role of people’s representatives, functions of local
3 一、前言 多數的人大代表是所謂的「兼職代表」。代表的選定不是由代表的本身角色而來，而是根據其工作 成績和表現來決定。所以各級人大代表基本上包括兩大類：一類是某行業領域的先進工作者，另一類 是政府高官；前者往往只注重在本職工作中做為表率，後者則在既是主人又是公僕的角色衝突中成為 「掛名代表」。 然而要發揮人大代表的代表功能，行使人民代表大會的相關職權，人大代表應當是一 定意義上的「政治家」和「社會活動家」，應當具有德才兼備、代表選民、調查研究、獨立思考的從政 能力。但是一般而言，自行參選人大代表者面臨的選舉制度並不友善。 傳統的「取樣式」的代表產生方式，過多考量代表的「界別」，以至於代表功能不彰。尤其改革開 放和社會轉型之後，不僅使生產方式有了深度變革，也使傳統的階級身份、階級信念發生了瓦解。所 以現在已經很難再按照傳統式的「階級」板塊來對社會成員進行簡單的劃分，而是形成了多元化、自 主化、個性化、世俗化的「社會公眾」，從而產生了多元複雜的自由、權利和利益訴求。相對應的人大 代表選舉機制亦應有所相應的調整，以適應下層建築的變化，例如 2010 年 3 月選舉法的修改將城鄉人 大代表名額比例由原本 4:1 修改為 1:1，以保障農村人口的基本利益。 除此之外，農民進入城市打工以及流動人口的選舉權更有待解決，在強調高參與率的中國大陸而 言，的確成為一個兩難的問題。以深圳市為例，該市有超過 300 萬的非戶籍常住人口，但深圳市在第 十屆廣東省人民代表大會中只分配到 23 名，因為列入計算的只有 132 萬戶籍人口，並不包括上述的 300 萬人口。而整個中國大陸的流動人口將近 1.3 億人，如何使流動人口可以行使選舉權？農民工是 否也有機會被選舉為人大代表？即成為迫切的議題。 因此，在快速的社會變遷當中，人大代表的角色是否發生相應的變化，抑或仍受到黨國體制的限 制而無法改變，本研究由此問題意識出發提出相關說明。 二、研究目的： 本研究針對中國大陸地方人大代表的角色變遷進行分析，目的在於了解 2006~2007 年人大換屆選 舉後，地方人大代表角色的最新發展，以及在城鄉抗議、維權上訪過程中，地方人大代表之角色與功 能。2011 年中國大陸各級人大代表進行換屆選舉，各地大量出現「獨立候選人」（自荐參選者），惟本 計畫時限已無法再行延長，該議題則不列入研究範圍之內。 以下舉出一個發生於廣東的案例：
位於韶關市區南部的大寶山礦年產鐵礦 140 萬噸，年煉銅能力達 800 噸，但幾十年來礦區排放大 量有毒有害生產污水，使地處下遊的上壩村深受其害。昔日的清水河變成了污水河，大片良田變成荒 地。 由於問題長期得不到有效解決，廣東省部分人大代表在省人大會議上先後提了四次議案或建議。 2004 年的省人大會議上，人大代表們面對面詢問在場的有關部門領導，沈演泉、丘北先等代表還提出 「約見相關職能部門」。代表們的「較真」引起了政府的重視，廣東省政府副秘書長徐尚武為此率省經 貿委、國資委、水利廳、國土廳、環保局等部門負責人一起趕赴污染現場。約見會僅開了兩個小時就 定下了方案，一年多後水庫建成，多年懸而未決的難題迎刃而解。「沒想到約見會規格這麼高、規模這 麼大、效果這麼好。」 本研究擬結合地方人大的功能進行相關的分析，並嘗試將相關的案例予以「類型化」，以國外有關 代議士角色的研究進行地方人大代表的角色歸類。 三、文獻探討： 2007 年 8 月，上海復旦大學《中國政府與政治研究中心》舉辦了一場研討會。美國紐約城市大學 政治學教授夏明在會中指出，無論從深度廣度看，中國人大制度都存在許多待改進之處，例如如何推 進中國選舉，如何強化人大對政府的監督。「但當人們對人大提出更高期望時，黑幫勢力對各級人大的 侵蝕卻令人始料未及！」 他認為過去二十年黑幫勢力已在中國社會興起，有土生土長的「自發型」， 海外滲透而生的「滲透型」，也有傳統幫會組織死灰復燃的「復興型」。 有學者認為只有改革人大制度，讓人大代表擁有選民和選區，實施人大專業化和常任職，同時要 求執政黨權力和政治責任緊密結合，才能遏阻黑道勢力滲透。中共常以西方資本主義國家選舉的「黑 金政治」作為批判的對象，然而所謂的社會主義民主，也出現了黑道在政治過程中的影響力逐漸增加， 而且因為權力相對集中，操作政黨提名到當選的過程更為容易。 「社會主義民主政治」往往強調社會主義之特殊性，本研究則試圖整合不同類型的案例，較全面 的分析中國大陸地方人大代表的角色。並在中國大陸邁向「小康社會」前的民主化動力較強之階段， 解析地方人大所發揮之功能。
5 是可能變成保守官僚的工具。第二種可能，則是具有黨的中央委員會委員身份的最高蘇維埃代表與進 步的政府官僚之間結成聯盟，此種聯盟可能提升最高蘇維埃的決策功能。第三種可能是最高蘇維埃逐 步演化成議會，不過這種機率相當低。最可能的發展是漸進地提升最高蘇維埃的調查權、監督權及立 法權，扮演賦予經濟及法律制度合法性的角色。香港的鄭宇碩教授則認為：前蘇聯和東歐國家的領導 人，於 60 及 70 年代已在不同程度體會到若要維持政治穩定與經濟成長，必須讓不同利益的表達與匯 集較為制度化，亦即須加強代議機關與其所代表的選民的聯繫。 北京的中國社會科學院於 1997 年到 2000 年進行「地方人大代表選舉研究」的重點研究課題，中 國社會科學院政治學研究所與全國人民代表大會常務委員會辦公廳聯絡局、民族委員會等單位合作成 立「地方人大代表選舉研究課題組」，並得到香港城市大學當代中國研究中心的資助，對於 1997~1998 年的縣級人大代表換屆選舉調查分析。該課題組設計了兩份問卷，「地方人大代表選舉選民問卷」600 份；「地方人大代表選舉代表問卷」400 份。研究成果出版「直接選舉：制度與過程：縣（區）級人大 代表選舉實證研究」一書。「世界與中國研究所」則是非官方研究單位中具影響力者，該所參與了四川 步雲鄉的鄉長直接選舉試點，之後在 2003 年的基層人大代表選舉亦進行調查，並出版「中國選舉制度 改革」一書。該所所長李凡並廣泛走訪各地的自薦參選者，提供競選策略等支持。四川省的都淦、尹 萬邦等對於地方人大制度的研究亦頗具成效。 深圳大學的鄒平學教授是較早對於代表制度進行分析的大陸學者，他認為代表制度現存的不足和 缺陷可以通過制度的健全和完善加以彌補，並將不同觀點大致分類如下： 第一種觀點認為「從代表同選民（或選舉單位）的關係來說，代表不應是全體人民代表。在採取 地域選舉的情況下，每一個人民代表基本上是本選區或本地域的群眾意志和利益的代表者。在採取職 業選舉或按階層選舉的情況下，則每一代表仍是本行業或者本階層的群眾意志和利益的代表者。每個 代表聯繫選民和接受監督往往以本選區為限，外選區是不能對他（她）進行罷免的。」這種觀點意味 著人大代表由誰選舉，從哪裡選出，就應對誰負責，為誰服務。這種觀點在部分人大代表中頗有贊同 者。現在一些人大代表反復強調自己要代表自己的選區或選舉單位，強調特定選區選民或選舉單位的 利益。有些選區、選民或者選舉單位對代表提出強制性的要求，甚至出現有的代表團要求本代表團的 全體代表，在某些表決中要一致採取贊成、反對或棄權的立場。 第二種觀點認為人大代表應代表其所在單位、部門、行業（界別）的利益。理由是人大代表對自
己工作和生活的單位、部門、行業最熟悉，各方情況瞭解得也最多，同所處的群眾聯繫也最密切，最 易瞭解周圍群眾的意願和呼聲，發現重大問題和重要情況，因而也能最有效地代表他們的利益。實踐 中也確實普遍存在這樣的現象：人大代表所在的單位、部門、行業的領導和群眾，經常通過口頭或書 面的方式向人大代表提出委託，要求他們向本級人大及其常委會反映這些委託，促成有關部門解決他 們的相關利益問題。 第三種觀點認為人大代表應代表全體人民的利益。無論是直接選舉還是間接選舉產生的人大代 表，也無論是單位、部門、界別的人大代表，只能是代表全體人民的利益。 第四種觀點認為代表一經選舉產生，人民就應給予他絕對的信任權，代表也應當較之一般選民有 更高的政治素養和參政、議政、督政的能力，他應具有完全的自由判斷和抉擇權。他在參政議政過程 中完全依個人的良知與能力來判斷和抉擇。他有權採取他認為合理和明智的行為。如果強調一位代表 處處要考慮全國人民的意志和利益或時時要受制於選民或選舉單位的約束，那何不乾脆利用民意測驗 來決定任何問題，而不需要代表了。 另外，相關的研究期刊論文尚有汪淑娟，「人大代表的角色歸屬」；黃璟，「人大代表制度理論及代 表角色身份初探」等文。近年來，地方維權運動風起雲湧，若干人大代表成為維權先鋒，新聞性的報 章雜誌亦出現相關的報導，例如：「勇為百姓亮劍維權的布衣青天—專訪深圳市人大代表楊劍昌」、「上 海一位人大代表的維權尷尬」、「人大代表應做公民維權先鋒」等採訪性文章。 在國外的研究方面，James Barber 曾對美國康乃狄克州州議會進行研究，並把代議士分為四種類 型：旁觀者（spectator）、自炫者（advertiser）、無奈者（reluctant）與立法者（lawmaker）。Kevin O’Brien 在 1994 年的文章中，將中國人大代表分為靜默者(inactive)、代理者(agency)、抗議者 (remonstrator)三種角色。本研究亦希冀透過案例分析與田野調查，對中國大陸地方人大代表的類型 予以分類，並描述其變遷過程。
四、研究方法：
本計畫擬主要採用結構功能途徑，並輔以社會學的角色理論，用以檢視中國大陸在經濟發展之後， 基層政府結構中的地方人大角色變遷，在政治改革滯後的狀況下，地方人大代表之角色及其功能。 在研究方法（research method）方面，本計畫希望以實地調查法，蒐集較為顯著的案例。文獻資料則7
包括國內出版的專書及期刊論文、中國大陸出版的專書、資料匯編、期刊論文、報紙及網路資料。為 了平衡資料來源出處的可信度，除中國大陸新華社、人民日報、中國青年報之外，海外媒體的報導亦 是資料蒐集的重點，例如自由亞洲電台、美國之音及大紀元報導。
五、結果與討論
愈來愈多的地方人大代表不願成為「旁觀者」，而願意為地方利益「發聲」、「代言」，亦有維權人 士透過「另選他人」、「微博發帖」等方式成功當選人大代表。在上述有關地方經濟發展的案例以及環 保議題的案例，可說最為顯著。 本研究以上的分析可發現，地方人大代表出現以下三種較為顯著的變化：在代表功能方面，從勞 動模範逐漸變為「受託人」；在立法功能方面，在審議過程中從旁觀者逐漸成為「建議人」；在監督功 能方面，逐漸從無奈者蛻變為「把關人」。需要強調的是，中國大陸各省的差異仍大，有些地方的人民 代表大會被「邊緣化」，人大代表成為「失語者」。 人大制度改革以「維持一黨統治」為前提，以致於「穩定」的重要性似大於「發展」。選舉是任何 一個民意機關或權力機關擁有權威的前提，目前縣級人大以上的人大代表和常務委員會委員還是間接 選舉產生，即使是直接選舉，黨委也會運用各方面的影響力進行干預，以貫徹組織意圖。選區劃分的 方式也制約了競選機制的形成。這種狀況常出現在城市裡的人大代表選舉，因為選區以單位劃分，單 位和居住區形成二元結構，公共事務的討論變成了單位事務，自薦參選者（獨立候選人）無法進入選 民的工作單位進行宣傳，草根產生的「政治家」、「社會活動者」當選難度相當高。 換言之，本研究指出雖然在政治過程當中，人大代表的角色有所轉變，地方人大的職能也持續強 化，但這些改變能必須在中共所允許的範圍當中發生，獨立候選人這種代表社會多元意志的聲音仍受 到黨國體制的重重壓制。 有學者建議在「後稅費時代」，於鄉鎮一級實行常任人民代表競爭性直接選舉，並由常任代表組成 鄉鎮人民代表會議，以討論和決定鄉鎮社區的重大事務，並對於日常行政事務進行監督。 但目前此種 進步的主張，卻仍未被接受。 值得注意的是，在城市化過程中，有些鄉鎮被改制成街道辦事處。鄉鎮作為一級政權，設有人大 主席團，區人大常委會的許多工作在鄉鎮依託鄉鎮人大機構貫徹落實，鄉鎮民主法制建設頗為有聲有 色。而街道不是一級政權，沒有人大工作機構，在區人代會閉會期間，區人大常委會佈置的工作在街 道只能靠一名聯絡員承辦，很多事情無法進行。 於是有些地方因應改制設立了「街道人大工作委員 會」。有些地方則在街道成立了「人大工作站」，每個月開放一次，每次由兩位代表輪流出席。 「工9 作委員會」或「工作站」的模式仍然有利於開展人大工作，但與民主國家中地方議會民意代表的運作 方式則有所差異。區人大代表若能於各自選區成立代表服務處，人大常委會應當鼓勵並支持其所需經 費，但目前的政策顯然並不希望出現具有「個人魅力」的代表。 有學者提及政策鼓勵常委會委員的專職化，但是人大代表在考量最大可能的「參與」之下，仍無 專職化的趨勢。但是如此的制度運作，往往使得地方人大更像是另一套行政系統，無助於公民意識日 益增長的社會發展。 基層人民代表大會的發展面臨困境，人民的參政意識提高，代表的議政意識亦增強，但目前的制 度卻不利於積極參與者的當選。「和諧社會」若需進一步發展，地方人大代表的功能以及配套改革似為 不可或缺之要項。
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13 年），頁 93~97。 徐勇。「村民自治的成長：行政放權與社會發育—1990 年代後期以來中國村民自治發展進程的反思」。 華中師範大學學報 華中師範大學學報 華中師範大學學報 華中師範大學學報（（（人文社會科學版（人文社會科學版人文社會科學版）人文社會科學版））（武漢）） ，第 44 卷第 2 期（2005 年 3 月），頁 2~7。 徐勇。「村民自治的深化：權利保障與社區重建—新世紀以來中國村民自治發展的走向」。學習與探索學習與探索學習與探索學習與探索 （哈爾濱），第 4 期（2005 年），頁 61~67。 徐勇。「社會動員、自主參與與政治整合—中國基層民主政治發展 60 年研究」。社會科學戰線社會科學戰線社會科學戰線社會科學戰線（長春）， 第 6 期（2009 年），頁 19~26。 徐勇。「現代國家的建構與村民自治的成長—對中國村民自治發生與發展的一種闡釋」。學習與探索學習與探索學習與探索學習與探索（哈 爾濱），第 6 期（2006 年），頁 50~58。 蔡芳宏。「構建互不隸屬的基層政府體制：基於鄉鎮財政的視角」。農村經濟農村經濟農村經濟農村經濟（四川），第 4 期（2010 年），頁 17~19。 任寶玉。「財政下鄉：農村基層政府的財政合法性問題」。華中師範大學學報華中師範大學學報華中師範大學學報（華中師範大學學報（人文社會科學版（（人文社會科學版人文社會科學版人文社會科學版））））（武漢）， 第 46 卷第 5 期（2007 年 9 月），頁 17~22。 任榮喜。「預算監督與財政民主：人大預算監督權的成長」。華東政法大學學報華東政法大學學報華東政法大學學報華東政法大學學報（上海），第 5 期（2009 年），頁 101~108。 管榮開。「鄉財縣管不宜急於推行」。農村財政與財務農村財政與財務農村財政與財務農村財政與財務（北京），第 8 期（2004 年），頁 27~28。 張勤等。「鄉鎮基層政權空心化：原因、危害與治理」。民辦教育研究民辦教育研究民辦教育研究民辦教育研究（西安），第 4 期（2010 年），頁 29~33。 張松等。「農村稅費改革涉及的幾個深層次問題」。當代經濟研究當代經濟研究當代經濟研究當代經濟研究（長春），第 10 期（2003 年），頁 60~64。 張寶鋒。「治理理論與社會基層的治道變革」。理論探索理論探索理論探索理論探索（太原），第 5 期（2006 年），頁 120~123。 張康之。「對『參與治理』理論的質疑」。吉林大學社會科學學報吉林大學社會科學學報吉林大學社會科學學報吉林大學社會科學學報（長春），第 47 卷第 1 期（2007 年 1 月），頁 83~70。 蔣永穆等。「農村稅費改革後鄉村治理模式的嬗變及其走向—四川省射洪縣農村基層組織建設的調查與 思考」。農村經濟農村經濟農村經濟農村經濟（四川），第 3 期（2005 年），頁 13~15。 駱翔翔等。「論我國農村基層公共權力的制約和平衡」。特區經濟特區經濟特區經濟特區經濟（深圳），第 8 期（2009 年），頁 48~50。 姚莉。「論鄉鎮政府的社會治理能力：現狀、改革及啟示—以浙江強鎮擴權為例」。經濟與社會發展經濟與社會發展經濟與社會發展（南經濟與社會發展 寧），第 10 期（2008 年），頁 60~63。
姚莉。「基於城鄉公共服務一體化行政體制改革的理論分析與模式探討」。改革與戰略改革與戰略改革與戰略改革與戰略（南寧），第 2 期 （2010 年），頁 82~86。 施從美。「文件政治：當下中國鄉村治理研究的新視角」。江蘇社會科學江蘇社會科學江蘇社會科學江蘇社會科學（南京），第 1 期（2008 年）， 頁 96~102。 郭正林。「中國農村二元權力結構論」。廣西民族學院學報廣西民族學院學報廣西民族學院學報（廣西民族學院學報（（哲學社會科（哲學社會科學版哲學社會科哲學社會科學版學版）學版）））（南寧），第 23 卷第 6 期 （2001 年 11 月），頁 53~61。 郭正林。「中國農村權力結構的制度化調整」。開放時代開放時代開放時代開放時代（廣州），第 7 期（2001 年），頁 34~40。 郭亞杰、周潔。「社區建設：背景、模式和發展趨勢」。學習與探索學習與探索學習與探索（哈爾濱）學習與探索 ，2004 年第 6 期，頁 43。 金太軍等。「村民自治背景下鄉村關係的衝突及其對策」。中國行政管理中國行政管理中國行政管理中國行政管理（北京），第 10 期（2000 年）， 頁 55~59。 金太軍。「從行政區行政到區域公共管理—政府治理形態嬗變的博弈分析」。中國社會科學中國社會科學中國社會科學中國社會科學（北京），第 6 期（2007 年），頁 53~67。 姜曉萍。「行政問責的體系建構與制度保障」。政治學研究政治學研究政治學研究政治學研究（北京），第 4 期（2007 年），頁 70~76。 周松強。「鄉村社會治理變遷與多中心民主協作治理制度的創新─以浙江省溫嶺市村級民主懇談會為 例」。理論與改革理論與改革理論與改革理論與改革（成都）， 第 5 期（2005 年），頁 50~52。 周梅燕等。「鄉鎮公共預算改革的起步與思考—上海市南匯區惠南鎮『公共預算制度改革』案例研究」。 人大研究 人大研究 人大研究 人大研究（北京），第 11 期（2008 年），頁 23~28。
國科會補助專題研究計畫項下赴國外
國科會補助專題研究計畫項下赴國外
國科會補助專題研究計畫項下赴國外
國科會補助專題研究計畫項下赴國外(
((
(或大陸地區
或大陸地區
或大陸地區
或大陸地區)
))
)出差或
出差或
出差或
出差或
研習心得報告
研習心得報告
研習心得報告
研習心得報告
日期： 99 年 5 月 16 日
一、國外(大陸)研究過程
此次前往地區包括北京、天津、上海等地，與多位人大研究學者針對人大組 織架構、人員組成和立法與監督功能進行深入的訪談。二、研究成果
相對於全國人大在胡錦濤時期的發展抱持較為審慎的態度，多數學者對於地 方人大發展抱持較為樂觀的看法，例如某個地方人大的座談會當中，在場的 20 位地方人大工作者僅有 1 位認為人大仍是橡皮圖章，1 位認為人大職權雖無限 縮，但亦無明顯進展，18 位認為有明顯進展。 地方人大制度化的發展與地方人大有意識地提高自身專業化程度、擴充自身 資源與人力、社會關注度升高等因素有關。首先，地方人大代表在就職之前必須 接受某些課程訓練，以瞭解人大工作項目，天津甚至成立了人大代表培訓學校，計畫編
號
NSC 97－2410－H－004－095
－MY2
計畫名
稱
從「勞動模範」到「民意代表」？中國大陸地方人大代
表的角色變遷
出國人
員姓名
張鈞智
服務機
構及職
稱
政治大學東亞研究所
出國時
間
99 年 5 月 5
日至
99 年 5 月
16 日
出國地
點
北京、天津、上海
附件五以加強人大代表的專業知識；其次，地方人大積極擴充資源和幕僚機構，比如成 立數個工作委員會，另外，在某些地方也出現少數專職委員，其薪資由地方人大 常委會支付，地方人大工作得以有較多的進展；最後，社會對於人大工作的關注 度也有明顯提升，不但地方媒體對於重要法案有大篇幅報導，民眾有意願藉由參 與立法聽證的方式發表意見，甚至出現人大履職的評鑑制度，這些都加強了地方 人大的制度化發展。 總的而言，地方人大制度正朝向專家政治方向發展，強化人大在立法和監督 工作過程的重要性，但對於地方人大代表能否發展成為民意的發聲筒，相關研究 工作者意見紛歧，以開放直選為例，學者擔憂競選過程中民眾素質低落和賄選問 題等問題，這些對地方人大角色轉變產生窒礙的作用，地方人大角色的轉變仍待 現有的體制創新和固有觀念的轉變。
三、建議
國內針對中國大陸人大研究此一重要議題，並無研究團隊進行相關研 究，未來應有組織性的與對岸人大研究者進行交流，以瞭解此一議題的最新 動態。四、其他
本計畫案研究成果撰寫為 “Fair Trade? Institutionalization, Specialization, and
Autonomy in Reforming China’s Legislature” 一文，已於 2010 年 9 月 4-7 日美國
政治學會年會發表，但由於本人因故無法出席會議，謹由共同作者張鈞智代表出 席本次會議，張鈞智君之前曾為本計畫助理，但本計畫並未支付張君出國開會經 費。謹附上會議論文。
Fair Trade?
Institutionalization, Specialization, and Autonomy in Reforming
China’s Legislature
Chien-min Chao, Ph. D. Distinguished Professor
Graduate Institute for Development Studies National Chengchi University
Taiwan Chun-chih Chang
Ph. D. Candidate
Graduate Institute for East Asia Studies National Chengchi University
Visiting Student Researcher University of California, Berkeley
Paper to be delivered at the 106th American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, September 4-7, 2010, Washington, D.C.
2 Abstract
This paper tries to find out if China’s political system is becoming more specialized and institutionalized in the reform era by examining the structure of the legislative committees. After examining changes made to the composition of the NPC committees, the paper concludes that the policy of rejuvenation has actually made it hard for the seniority system to take root. The average time served by members of the legislative committees is on the decline, adding additional challenge to the stability of the institution. Although size of the committees has been enlarged and daily
operations have been regularized, the autonomy of the legislative committees is obviously still fragile. While the party’s presence might not be as predominant as before, 80% of the committee members are still CCP party members. In general the level of education among committee members is pretty high, but professionalism remains a distant goal. The same old rule of proportional representation under which different segments of the population is proportionally represented is still in place, sapping the efforts of professionalization. Overall, it is found that specialization and institutionalization are still restricted. In the foreseeable future, it is not unimaginable that more professionalization might accrue but it is long way off towards the goal of being a full-fledged legislature of which autonomy is an essential part.
Key words: National People’s Congress, Permanent Committees, Institutionalization, Specialization
After thirty years of reforming its economic system and integrating its market with the outside world China’s political system remains basically “resilient
authoritarianism” (Nathan 2003), with its National People’s Congress (NPC) deemed as a rubber stamp. However, changes have been made to the Chinese legislature for two reasons: First, there is a need for a functional legal environment so that China’s vibrant capitalistic market economy won’t be dragged down as a result of institutional deficiencies and constraints; and second, rampant political malfeasance needs to be checked lest the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party erode to a point beyond salvation. And one of the most salient components of this managed reform has been with the NPC’s permanent committees. Their functions, both in the area of legislation and supervision, have been visibly invigorated (Dowdle 1997, 123; O’Brien 1990, 148-156; Tanner 1999).
However, despite the increasing importance of the NPC in general and its permanent committees in particular the legislative organ in China remains in great “Chinese characteristics,” refusing to follow the footsteps set by many other
previously developmental authoritarian states such as Taiwan and South Korea where the legislature bore the task of articulating interests often conflicting in nature as the society was getting more pluralistic and liberalized. Where is China’s legislature headed? Will China’s lawmaking body continue to be as compliant and subservient as it has been acting as an extended arm of the executive branch? Would it replicate the experiences set by its East Asian neighbors and gradually evolve into an institution which the administrative branch dares not to ignore? Is it possible that some sort of “Chinese characteristics” might materialize as it has been the case in the economic arena?
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specialized and institutionalized in the reform era by examining the structure of the legislative committees. The paper examines changes made to the composition of the NPC committeessince the Ninth NPC, held in 1998, when the committee system was basically formed after two decades of evolution and development.1 The paper
concludes that although progress has been made towards the goal of
institutionalization as the committees are meeting more frequently and regularly and more rules have been enacted to facilitate the making of decisions in the legislative organ, the policy of rejuvenation has actually made it hard for the seniority system to take root. The average time served by members of committees is also on the decline, adding additional challenge to the stability of the institution. Although size of the committees has been enlarged and daily operations have been regularized, the autonomy of the legislative committees is obviously still fragile. While the party’s presence might not be as palpable as before, 80% of the committee members are still party members.
In general the level of education among committee members is pretty high, but professionalism remains a distant goal. The same old rule of proportional
representation under which different segments of the population is proportionally represented is still in place, sapping the efforts of professionalization. Overall, it is found that specialization and institutionalization are still restricted. In the foreseeable future, it is not unimaginable that more professionalization might accrue but it is long way off towards the goal of being a full-fledged legislature of which autonomy is an essential part.
Development of the NPC’s Permanent Committees
1
While the number of NPC committees were increased with each NPC congress it was stabilized at nine at the 9th NPC congress.
When the NPC was formed and held its first congress in 1954 there were only
two committees, the Ethnic Affairs Committee and the Bill Committee, to provide legal assistance to the arguably biggest legislative structure on earth. As Mao’s regime became more mobilizational in orientation these two legislative establishments were pummeled just as the rest of the power structure during the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution. After Mao’s demise, in the wake of debating writing of a new constitution in 1982 it was decided that permanent committees were to be made part of the reformulation to help with reconstructing of a new legal system that had quickly become hallmark of Deng Xiaoping’s reform policies. Six committees were established in 1983 as a result of this new drive of institution-building and
legalization: the Law Committee (formerly Bill Committee), the Ethnic Affairs Committee, the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee, the Education, Science, Culture and Public Health Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee. During the 7th NPC Congress, held in 1988, another committee, the Internal and Judicial Affairs Committee, was created. The Environment Protection and Resources Conservation Committee (renamed Environment and Resources Committee in 1994) was added to the 8th NPC’s Congress in 1993, and at last, in 1998 at the 9th NPC Congress, the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee was founded (Cai 2003a, 243-250; Zhou 2005).
Each committee has its own area of jurisdiction (see Table 1) but in general legislative committees are responsible for introducing and reviewing new bills and acts, scrutinizing questions and queries presented to the NPC and its Standing Committee (NPCSC), researching, making contacts, and investigating cases (Jiang 2002, 293-295). However, the division of labor among committees is not very clear-cut and their work load is not consistent. Responsibilities prescribed for the committees are not well-defined. While some committees may be made accountable
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to many administrative agencies, others may only have to face one or two agencies. It is not unusual for some committees to only review a bill once every few years. This institutional weaknesses will no doubt affect the effectiveness of the NPC (Yin, et al., 2003). Among the NPC committees, the Law Committee stands out as the most important. The Committee has the power to “universally review all bills” (tongyi shengyi) after it is reviewed by a relevant committee and presented to the NPC or its Standing Committee.
[Table 1 is about here]
According to Article 35 of the NPC’s Organic Law, members of the legislative committees as well as their leadership are to be nominated by the Presidium and approved by the NPC congress. Only NPC delegates are eligible for the nomination. When the NPC is not in session, the NPCSC can only fill in “individual deputy chairman” and “part of the committee members” and candidates for these
supplementary elections shall be nominated by the NPCSC Chairman’s Meeting and approved by the NPCSC plenary meeting. In reality, the list is prepared by the NPC’s CCP Party Committee and handed over to the Presidium. The Presidium will then give the list to the delegates and get finalized after discussion and “fermentation” (yunniang). The delegates will then vote on the final list (Chen 2008).
Institutionalization and Specialization
In a pioneering work, Samuel P. Huntington (1965; 1968) tried to establish the relationship between institutionalization and political stability. To him,
institutionalization is the process by which an organization and procedures “acquire value and stability.” The level of institutionalization of a political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations
and procedures. Nelson W. Polsby (1968) came up with three characteristics for an institutionalized organization: First, it is relatively well-bounded, differentiated from its environment. Its members are easily identifiable and its leaders are recruited principally from within the organization. Second, the organization is relatively complex. Its functions are internally separated on some regular and explicit basis. There is a division of labor in which roles are specified. There are regularized patterns of recruitment of roles. Third, the organization tends to use universalistic rather than particularistic criteria of conducting its internal business. Procedures and rules are followed. If an organization is autonomous enough to decide its own leadership rather than being decided by others, leadership positions are being filled internally and according to set rules such as seniority, the average term limit is relatively lengthy and members of the organization are recruited according to well-defined rules, then the organization is more institutionalized.
This paper contends the issues of institutionalization and specialization in China’s NPC by examining the composition of its permanent committees. As China’s market economy is becoming more complex and its integration with rest of the world heightened it is inevitable that new institutions are developed and their functions more specialized. However, institutionalization is easier in quantitative terms in the NPC as meetings are being held more regularly, more internal rules are written to facilitate smooth operations and more bills are made into laws, than in qualitative terms. Past experiences show that most newly appointed NPC committee leadership are outsiders and there is also difficulties nurturing a seniority system there (Chao 2002).
Since lawmaking requires processing wide array of information and uncertainties is virtually name of the game, specialization is important in the process as
professional opinions can help reduce uncertainties.It is not efficient, nor feasible, to have the whole chamber involved in the reviewing of bills. This is why legislature
8
is willing to delegate powers to the permanent committees where professionalism can be derived through division of labor with sufficient channels of information and large staff at hand. The existence of functioning specialized committees has become bell-weather to gauge the status of the legislature in that political system (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; 1989; Krehbiel 1991).
However, scholars differ on both the definition and measurement of
specialization. Frequency of communication between the legislative committees and the administrative branch, the interactions between committees and the legislative chamber, stability of the assembly and legislative performance have all been singled out as indicators. As with the permanent committees themselves some focus on the study of the committees as a whole while others choose to explore behaviors of committee members (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1997). The latter approach pays more attention to background of the members, how behaviors of committee members are affected by the interests of the constituencies, and how the work at the committees influence professionalism of the committee members, and so on (Asher 1974, 66-67). Concentrating on the composition of the legislature, Richard Sisson (1973, 17-38) argues that legislative personnel tend to have two different thinking: First, they like to emphasize the linkage between committees and the environment and hence, people with different backgrounds will have to be represented so that mobility can be maintained. Second, to keep the organization young and rejuvenated a mechanism to rotate leadership must be in place.
On the issue of specialization it is found that the average age of the NPC committee members continues to come down and this trend, along with higher level of education, suggests that the chronic problems of aging and incompetence for those committee members who often find the assignment last leg of their political career before retirement might be gradually eliminated. In the future, efforts should be
shifted to recruitments who might possess more expertise so that professionalism of the committees can be beefed up. Overall, the paper finds that a combination of reasons including a less manipulative CCP, easy access of information,
departmentalism, and growing pluralistic trend in the society have all contributed to the increase of specialization at the NPC’s committees.
Empirical Data
Using data obtained from NPC’s website (www.npc.gov.cn),Renwu Online (www.renwuonline.com), and China Vitae (www.chinavitae.com) the following section attempts to delineate the characteristics of the NPC committees and in the process gauge the degree of institutionalization and specialization. Altogether, demographic data of 680 committee members were compiled and analyzed.
Skewed Institutionalization
In this paper the issue of institutionalization is basically tackled from the angles of stability, internal complexity and coherence. Specifically, the ratio between new recruits and senior members, whether seniority is considered when filling up the vacated leadership posts, the average time committee members served, and the ratio of the CCP party membership and non-party membership at the legislative committees are issues of concern.
Table 2 shows that the overall size of the committees has been on the rise, testifying to the resolve for shaping a better legalistic environment as modernization in China is in full swing. The 10th NPC committees had a membership of 235, a gain of 25 relative to the previous NPC, and the size was kept constant at the 11th NPC. It is not surprising that it is thosecommittees which are not political in nature and whose tasks have great bearings on people’s livelihood, such as the Financial and
10
Economic Affairs Committee and the Environment and Resources Committee (gained 8 and 7 additional members respectively or roughly 30% of their total size at the 10th NPC Congress) that have been given the priority for upsizing. The Internal and Judicial Affairs Committee and the Law Committee were also benefited, gaining six and five new members respectively, as the fight against corruption has been
heightened as a central task by the government. The downsizing of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee (lost six seats or 23% of the original membership) is understandable as the focus of the government now is rightfully domestic agenda but the same thing happened to the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee is somehow a conundrum. China’s rural area was undergoing unprecedented restructuring at the turn of the new century in the wake of huge unrest unleashed by the humongous rates of taxes and fees imposed by the local governments, and stability in the rural sector has been of great concern to any regime in China’s long history.
It is worth noting that while both members and leadership of the committees gained strength at the 10th NPC, it is the leadership (the deputy chairmen of the committees) that took the lion’s share of the enlargement, acquiring eleven additional vice chairmanship in both of the 10th and 11th NPC. The development is intriguing given that membership of the committees was downsized at the 11th NPC to make room for the leadership enlargement (the 11 membership lost was exactly the number gained by the leadership). What is the rationale behind the tradeoff? What does this mean for the NPC committees in the wake of reinforcing their work? These questions remain to be answered. As far as institutionalization is concerned, the message is a mixed one. While a more refined division of work is possible as a result of the strengthened leadership, the reform also demonstrates the propensity to give more precedence to the leadership instead of the rank-and-file. It also unveils weakness in the drive towards institutional stability as the fundamental structure of the committee
system remains in fluid.
The augmentation of both leadership and rank-and-file members, along with other developments, suggests that the committee system was buttressed at the 10th NPC Congress. Given the pace of neck-breaking growth of the economy and the need to strike a balance between development and environmental protection it is
commendable that more resources are channeled into relevant legislative committees. Furthermore, the number of committees has finally been set at nine after nearly two decades of expansion and this is a good first step in building a stable legislative committee system. However, given the huge responsibilities endowed to the
committees, such as the Education, Science, Culture and Public Health Committee, the failure to gain additional resources says volume of the priorities of the government. This lends legitimacy to the accusation that China is still a developmental state which opts more for the development of its economy.
[Table 2 about here]
While gaining significantly in size especially at the leadership level the NPC committees are also losing some of their membership for various reasons in no small scale. Table 2 shows that at the 10th NPC eleven new members and fourteen vice chairmen were added to the roster. However, the newly-acquired eleven members were all lost at the 11th NPC. Table 3 shows additional membership lost when the NPC is not in session. A better fortified leadership could certainly increase legislative efficiency and it might also help with professionalization and stability but only a small fraction of those taking the new leadership posts actually came through internal promotion. The boundary of the committees is still tenure as outside penetration (especially from the CCP party) remains a common practice. This tradition bodes ill
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for the establishment of a seniority system.
In general, the NPC’s committees are more institutionalized in terms of
convening of the meetings, more regularized recruitment of members and leadership, and more rules have been written on which their daily operations are based, but problems remain abundant. One month before the holding of the 11th NPC Congress in March, 2008, three deputy chairmen, Ren Maodong, Wu Ritu, and Ni Yuefeng, were appointed, indication of lack of respect for the NPC as an institution.
[Table 3 is about here]
For the NPC committees to be stable it is imperative that a certain proportion of its membership is staying there on a longer term basis. Table 4 illustrates that the establishment of the seniority system is on the reverse trend. Overall, the ratio of senior members, as opposed to new members, not only has not increased it is actually on the decline. During the period under scrutiny it went down nearly five percentage, from a third of its membership (33.2%) in the 9th NPC to 29.8% at the 10th NPC Congress and fell further to 28.9% at the 11th NPC. Second, the nine committees are equally divided on the development of the seniority system with half of them moving in that direction and another half remain dormant. The Education, Science, Culture and Public Health Committee is the only committee that has been able to maintain a seniority ratio above 30% consecutively for all the three congresses under review. Most of other committees have only been able to do that on two terms.Both Law Committee and the Ethnic Affairs Committee have been able to keep that record only once. Given the importance attached to the Law Committee in its role to “review all bills universally” it is incomprehensible as to why the committee has not been able to catch up with the trend.
Table 5 further alludes the problem of continuity. Roughly 70% of the NPC committee members only serve one five-year term. Only a privileged few (4.4% of the membership) has the chance to serve three terms. Even fewer (0.4% of the total membership) have the honor to continue to serve for the fourth term. None in the 9th and 11th NPC committees ever serves more than three terms. The poor state of
continuity is harmful to the stability and institutionalization of the committee system.
[Tables 4 & 5 are about here]
The paper then tabulates the average time that committee members serve in their respective committees. Since the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee was created at the 9th NPC Congress in 1998 the data for the committee is not as complete as other committees, the tabulation covers data collected only for the other eight committees. Since a term extends a period of five years if a member serves only one month his average term is counted as 0.017 (1/5×12).
Table 6 shows the maximum, minimum, and average terms served by committee members. Data suggest all committee members at the 9th NPC finished their first term. However, some left for other appointments in the following two NPC congresses. (see Table 3) This trend highlights growing importance of the legislative committees: They are no longer a place to hoard semi-retired politicians; members might also be
promoted owing to their performance at the legislature. Average time served in the committees declines from 1.4 term (or about 6.8 years) to 1.26 term (or about 6.2 years), a reduction of eight months. One member at the 10th NPC only served as short as 0.1 term, or about six months.
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The paper then proceeds to gauge the autonomy of the NPC committees by tallying the percentage of CCP party members as opposed to non-party members. The findings are interesting: While the presence of the CCP has edged up slightly the same trend goes to the Democratic Parties. It is the non-party representation that has been expensed. Roughly, the ratio for the tripartite membership is about 13:2:1. It is worth mentioning that the percentage of CCP membership at the committees (hovering at about 80%) is about 10% higher than its representation at both the NPC and the NPCSC. (Cai 2003a, 220, 233) This is another proof of the resilience of the party-state structure.
[Table 7 is about here]
Specialization
The paper analyzes the demographic data of the committee membership
including age, education and professional background and concludes that statistically there is quantum leap of professionalization at NPC committees.
Table 8 and Table 9 show that while committee members are getting younger the dominant group has been the one with the age between sixty and sixty-nine. The trend of aging continues as nearly 61% of the committee members at the 11th NPC aged above 60. This is despite a reduction of nearly four years on average than five years earlier. This is encouraging for the NPC where huge quantity of senior politicians reaching the age of retirement takes refuge as a reward to their loyalty and service to the country. However, the trend towards rejuvenation might also compromise the endeavors of establishing a seniority system. It is argued that in order to deliberately keep the committees rejuvenated and maintain a balance between the senior and junior members even well-performed members of the NPCSC are often replaced with
no other reasons but age (Jiang 2004).
[Tables 8 & 9 are about here]
The Statute Governing the Selection of the Leadership Cadres in the Party and the State (dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaoli),promulgated in 2002, demands education be a major consideration in the selecting and recruiting new cadres for leadership posts. Table 10 shows that 86.2% of the committee members had college education and above at the 9th NPC and the figure grew dramatically at the 10th NPC to a whopping 97.5%. The trend continued to climb upward to 98.3% at the 11th NPC with 47.7% of the membership possessing post-graduate degrees. This development will no doubt work in favor of the consolidating of professionalism.
[Table 10 is about here]
Although the level of education has been visibly raised, problems arose when we were trying to gauge competence, another crucial element of professionalization, of the NPC’s committees. First, since the duties of the legislative committees are only loosely defined and some committees, the Education, Science, Culture and Public Health Committee for one, have been endowed with duties in a more diversified fashion it is not easy to judge if a committee member is professionally competent. Second, it is not uncommon that an official experienced wide array of party and state duties in what is known as the cross-section appointment (jiaocha renzhi) before coming to serve in the NPC committees. This creates additional hazard for identifying profession. To overcome afore-mentioned problems this paper has acted on the
followings: First, we examine the responsibilities each committee is officially prescribed (listed on Table 1) and match those state agencies whose functions might
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be somehow related. A corresponding network between the state agencies and legislative committees is thus formulated. Second, among the posts that a committee member might have served previously only those at the deputy ministerial level and above are to be counted as past experiences. Third, if a member is found to have no corresponding government agency to match his professional identity then this person is given a code 0 and treated as a non-professional. In any rate, every member of the committees is provided with a code number and then a cross-tabulation is rounded out.
[Table 11 is about here]
Table 11 shows that a good proportion of the committee members are
professionals, averaging over 60% at the three congresses, although there is a slight decline over the years. Table 12 is detailed breakdown of the professional background of the NPC committees. Data suggest that different committees have different makeup of professionals. Those who have worked with the State Council have good
representation at all committees but the Law Committee, the Ethnic Affairs
Committee, and the Overseas Chinese Committee. Considering the major task of the Law Committee is to review and make laws it is puzzling why the presence of the State Council has been so minuscule (between 5 and 12%). The only other
committees which have such weak State Council influence are the Ethnic Affairs Committee and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee. It is interesting that people with NPC background is only valued by the Law Committee. By the same token, CCP background members are visible only at the Internal and Judicial Affairs Committee and local presence is felt only at the Ethnic Affairs Committee. Those with experience in the legal departments (the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s
