市場自由化與公司治理對公司價值及投資限制的影響─跨公司分析

行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫 成果報告

市場自由化與公司治理對公司價值及投資限制的影響─跨

公司分析(第 3 年)

研究成果報告(完整版)

計 畫 類 別 ： 個別型 計 畫 編 號 ： NSC 98-2410-H-004-197-MY3 執 行 期 間 ： 100 年 08 月 01 日至 101 年 07 月 31 日 執 行 單 位 ： 國立政治大學財務管理學系 計 畫 主 持 人 ： 周冠男 計畫參與人員： 博士後研究：李芸綺 報 告 附 件 ： 國外研究心得報告 赴大陸地區研究心得報告 出席國際會議研究心得報告及發表論文 公 開 資 訊 ： 本計畫可公開查詢

中 華 民 國 101 年 11 月 27 日

中 文 摘 要 ： 自 1980 年代末期開始，許多新興國家開始實行資本市場自由 化，使得大量的資金流入，同時也引起了眾多學者的研究興 趣。此外，已經有許多文獻指出個別公司治理優劣對於公司 績效有重要的影響。較佳的公司治理與公司營運績效及市場 評價有顯著的正向關聯。因此我們計畫以新興市場公司為樣 本，研究公司治理品質對市場自由化於公司股價表現與財務 限制的影響。然而就我們所知，在這些研究當中，卻幾乎沒 有探討個別公司治理結構將如何與金融市場自由化所造成的 衝擊產生相互影響。在本計畫中，藉由納入公司治理因素， 我們試著瞭解金融市場自由化之財富效果與對公司財務限制 的影響。我們蒐集新興國家的公司為樣本，於計畫的第一 年，分析股票市場自由化對公司股價表現的影響，計畫第二 年研究股票市場自由化對公司財務限制的影響，第三年則研 究銀行業自由化對公司財務限制的影響。我們證明公司治理 為研究新興國家股市及銀行業自由化效果時，所必須考量的 重要因素。 中文關鍵詞： 公司治理；新興國家；財務限制；金融市場自由化；股價表 現 英 文 摘 要 ： 英文關鍵詞：

行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫

成果報告

□期中進度報告

市場自由化與公司治理對公司價值及投資限制的影響─

跨公司分析

計畫類別：



個別型計畫 □整合型計畫

計畫編號：NSC

98-2410-H-004-197-MY3

執行期間：98 年 8 月 1 日至 101 年 7 月 31 日

執行機構及系所：政大財管系

計畫主持人：周冠男

共同主持人：

計畫參與人員：李芸綺，康聖豪，李心錡，劉彥甫

成果報告類型(依經費核定清單規定繳交)：□精簡報告 完整報

告

本計畫除繳交成果報告外，另須繳交以下出國心得報告：

赴國外出差或研習心得報告

赴大陸地區出差或研習心得報告

出席國際學術會議心得報告

□國際合作研究計畫國外研究報告

處理方式：

除列管計畫及下列情形者外，得立即公開查詢

□涉及專利或其他智慧財產權，□一年□二年後可公開查詢

中 華 民 國 101 年 10 月 30 日

附件一

計畫中文摘要： 自 1980 年代末期開始，許多新興國家開始實行資本市場自由化，使得大量的資金流入， 同時也引起了眾多學者的研究興趣。此外，已經有許多文獻指出個別公司治理優劣對 於公司績效有重要的影響。較佳的公司治理與公司營運績效及市場評價有顯著的正向 關聯。因此我們計畫以新興市場公司為樣本，研究公司治理品質對市場自由化於公司 股價表現與財務限制的影響。然而就我們所知，在這些研究當中，卻幾乎沒有探討個 別公司治理結構將如何與金融市場自由化所造成的衝擊產生相互影響。在本計畫中， 藉由納入公司治理因素，我們試著瞭解金融市場自由化之財富效果與對公司財務限制 的影響。我們蒐集新興國家的公司為樣本，於計畫的第一年，分析股票市場自由化對 公司股價表現的影響，計畫第二年研究股票市場自由化對公司財務限制的影響，第三 年則研究銀行業自由化對公司財務限制的影響。我們證明公司治理為研究新興國家股 市及銀行業自由化效果時，所必須考量的重要因素。 關鍵詞： 資本市場自由化，公司治理，新興市場，股價表現，財務限制

計畫英文摘要：

Many of the emerging economies have experienced liberalization of their capital markets since the late 1980s, inducing massive amounts of capital inflow, and at the same time giving rise to broad academic interest. Most of the prior studies on financial market liberalization focus on the aggregate change in the cost of capital (Stulz, 1999; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry, 2000a), little evidence is available on whether firm values are increased and whether financial constraints are effectively lifted in the post-liberalization period, at firm level. The importance of the firm-level corporate governance quality on firm performances has been well documented in the literature. The better corporate governance is highly correlated with better operating performance and market valuation. To the best of our knowledge, few of these studies, if any, have examined how a firm’s corporate governance structure would interact with the impact of financial market liberalization. In the first year’s project, we examine the role of financial market liberalization on the wealth effects. We find significant influences of corporate governance on the effect of market liberalization events. Market responses to stock market and announcements are more favorable and valuable for firms with better corporate governance. Further, we find that firms with better corporate governance quality experience a greater release of their financial constraint following the stock market and the banking sector liberalization. Overall, we find that corporate governance is an important factor affecting firm performances and their financial constraints after both the stock market and banking liberalization in emerging markets.

Keywords：Market Liberalization, Corporate Governance, Emerging Market, Stock Price Performance, Financial Constraint

1. Introduction

The impact of financial market liberalization has been subject to extensive studies in the literature. However, to the best of our knowledge, few of these studies, if any, have examined how a firm’s corporate governance structure would interact with the impact of financial market liberalization. We examine the role of financial market liberalization on the wealth effects and the lifting of financial constraints at firm level, considering the influences of corporate governance structures. Since most of the prior studies on financial market liberalization tend to focus on the aggregate change in the cost of capital (Stulz, 1999; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry, 2000a), little evidence is currently available on whether firm values are increased and whether financial constraints are effectively lifted in the post-liberalization period, at firm level.

In this project, we first examine the role of financial market liberalization on the wealth effects at firm level, considering the influences of corporate governance structures. In the second year, we expand the study to the effect of corporate governance structures on the release of financial constraints after market liberalization. Finally, we examine the impact of banking liberalization on the wealth effect of shareholders. To the best of our knowledge, few of these studies, if any, have examined how a firm’s corporate governance structure would interact with the impact of financial market and banking liberalization in emerging countries. Thus we believe that our study makes valuable contributions to the extant literature.

2. Literature Review and Hypotheses

Since most of the prior studies on financial market liberalization tend to focus on the aggregate change in the cost of capital (Stulz, 1999; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry, 2000a), little evidence is currently available on whether firm values are increased and whether financial constraints are effectively lifted in the post-liberalization period, at firm level. Furthermore, the importance of firm-level corporate governance quality on firm performances has been well documented in the literature. Mitton (2002) shows that the firm-level differences in variables related to corporate governance had a strong impact on firm performance during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. Stock price performance is positively associated with measures of corporate governance quality. For a sample of Korean firms, Joh (003) documents that firm with a high disparity between control rights and ownership rights showed low profitability. We thus propose to study the

impact of stock market liberalization on the stock price performances for firms with different corporate governance structures in the emerging economies. We expect that firms with better corporate governance quality will perform significantly better than those with worse quality after the stock market liberalization. We further hypothesize those firms with a better corporate governance quality before stock market liberalization will experience a greater release of financial constraints following the liberalization. Finally, the banking sector is an important funding source for firms, but there has been little attention on the effects of banking liberalization on firm value and how corporate governance structure will interact with its effects. Based on the previous literature on the wealth effects of banking liberalization and corporate governance, we hypothesize that firms with better corporate governance will experience a more positive stock price performances after the banking

liberalization events.

3. Data

We study both the stock market and banking liberalization events. It is generally difficult to identify the exact dates of financial liberalization because capital market liberalization strategies come in many forms. One form of stock market liberalization is the removal of barriers to direct investment in some financial instruments or all classes of shares in an emerging stock market. Another form of stock market liberalization is the introduction of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) which allow stocks to be traded in developed markets. The other form of stock market liberalization is the listing of country funds that have the potential of reducing barriers with more efficiency to liquidity and information. Most of the prior studies have focused on the impacts of the first liberalization events, regardless of the different forms of liberalization. We will examine all three main types as well as the first event of the stock market liberalization.

Bekaert and Harvey (2000, 2004) and Henry (2000a) provide detailed information on the important economic events of financial liberalization in the emerging financial markets. Our stock liberalization dates are obtained from these studies. We follow Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000a) and use the month of the liberalization event as the event date. Our event windows are thus based on months instead of days.

For banking liberalization, we follow Laeven (2003) and build the banking liberalization indexes representing the number of banking liberalization events that an emerging country had experienced. Six liberalization events of banking reform are obtained, which include interest rates deregulation (of both lending and deposit rate), reduction of entry barriers (both domestic and foreign banks), reduction of reserve requirements, reduction of credit controls (such as direct credit and credit ceiling),

privatization of state bank (and more generally a reduction of government control), and strengthening of prudential regulation (such as independence of Central Bank or adoption of capital adequacy ratio standard according to Basle Accord guidelines). The banking liberalization index is an accumulative counter of these six banking liberalization events, which range from zero to six. A larger index indicates a higher degree of banking industry liberalization.

For the corporate governance measures, we employ three internal corporate governance quality measures: major shareholder ownership, insider ownership, and foreign institution ownership. We obtain the major shareholder ownership data from the Asian Company Handbook 1990 for Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The major shareholder filed in the handbook shows the percentage of stockholdings of the large shareholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares. We obtain the variable, “closely held shares”, which includes shares held by insiders, from Worldscope for 15 emerging countries. It includes but is not restricted to 1) Shares held by officers, directors and their immediate families. 2) Shares of the company held by any other corporation (besides shares held in a fiduciary capacity by banks or other financial institutions). 3) Shares held by individuals who hold more than 5% or more of the outstanding shares.” Finally, we obtain the foreign shareholder ownership information from the 1990 edition of the Asian Company Handbook.

4. Methodology

Stock abnormal returns during the event windows are measured by the standard event study approach. To examine the effect of financial constraint releases, we follow the related literature (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1996; Lamont, 1997) by adopting the following empirical equation for the measurement of investment cash-flow sensitivity:

it t i t i t i t i it K CF K Y K I K I K I _{     }                              , 1 4 1 , 3 2 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , (1)

where I denotes investment, which is defined as the change in the real capital stock plus depreciation; K is capital stock; Y denotes net sales; CF refers to cash flow; subscript i refers to firm i; subscript t refers to year t; the parameter β₀ represents an unobservable firm-level fixed effect, which may be correlated with the other explanatory variables; and

ε

_it is a white noise error term. A firm is more financially constrained if the coefficient of cash flow, β₄, is estimated as being more positive; that is, β₄ represents investment cash-flow sensitivity.

There is, however, a potential problem of endogeneity in the estimation of the dynamic model, since dynamic models are likely to suffer from such endogeneity arising from the presence of unobserved firm-fixed effects. We therefore follow Arellano and Bond (1991),

using the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) approach to estimate the model in first-difference. The GMM equation is as follows:

it t i t i t i t i it v K CF K Y K I K I K I _                                  , 1 4 1 , 3 2 1 , 2 1 , 1     , (2)

where  indicates the first difference, while all other variables are defined in a similar way to those in Equation (1). Finally, in order to examine the effects of stock market liberalization and corporate governance quality on financial constraints, a liberalization dummy and corporate governance measures are added into the equation. Equation (2) is thus modified as follows: , * * * 1 , 6 1 , 5 1 , 4 1 , 3 2 1 , 2 1 , 1 it L t i t i t i t i t i t i it u CG D K CF D K CF K CF K Y K I K I K I                                                       (3)

where D_L is a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the observation falls within the stock market post-liberalization period, otherwise 0. CG is the pre-event measure of corporate governance quality of interest, which might include ownership concentration, ownership types, and board characteristics. If firms with better corporate governance quality are experiencing greater releases of financial constraints, then the coefficient of the interaction term of liberalization dummy and corporate governance quality measure, 6, is expected to be significantly negative.

Measures of corporate governance quality are, however, extensive. The firm-level corporate governance quality measures could be divided into two groups – internal and external governance mechanisms. Internal governance mechanisms include the ownership structure and board characteristics of the firm. External governance mechanisms refer to capital market monitoring and legally institutional system. The potential influences of external governance mechanisms at country-level will be controlled by country and the legal original dummies.

4.1 Major shareholder Ownership

We measure ownership concentration following Mitton (2002). The first measure is the ownership percentage of the largest shareholder owning 5% or more of issued shares and the second measure is the total holding of all shareholders owning 5% or more of issued shares. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that along with legal protection, ownership concentration is one of two key determinants of corporate governance. Large shareholders can benefit from minority shareholders because of the power they have and the incentive to prevent expropriation. On the other hand, large shareholders can engage themselves in expropriation. Therefore, we suggest that ownership concentration will affect the stock price performance during financial liberalization.

4.2 Insider Ownership

We further investigate the impact of internal ownership blocks held by insiders and by institutions. Insiders are officers and directors of the firm. As argued by Leland and Pyle (1977), a firm value raises due to the insider ownership might have a stronger information asymmetry problem. Hoskisson et al. (1994) suggest that the improper investment decisions of the firm’s management ownership could decrease the probability of lowering firm value. On the other hand, extending managerial ownership may deepen the manager entrenchment, which may damage firm performance after liberalization.

4.3 Foreign Investor Ownership

Foreign investors tend to be more professional and actively monitor the firms. As pointed out by Stulz (1999) and Mishkin (2001), financial liberalization removes the barriers to foreign investment, this might reduce the level of information asymmetry and as well as lessen the agency problem efficiently. Moreover, financial liberalization promotes transparency and accountability, reducing possible adverse selection and moral hazard, while also alleviating liquidity problems in the financial markets. However, Eakins and Mishra (1995) argue that, due to agency problems, foreign investors and managers might damage the stock performances because of collusions, especially when foreign investors are self-interested.

5. Empirical Results

We first show that corporate governance quality does affect the wealth effects of stock market liberalization at the firm level. Following Henry (2000a), we use an eight-month period (-7, 0) to estimate the price reaction to the announcement of stock market liberalization, where Month 0 is defined as the month of liberalization. We first study the announcement period returns for all three types of stock market liberalization.

We find that the average announcement period returns are significantly positive at the 10% level or better for the following three emerging countries: Chile, China, and Peru. In contrast, the average announcement period returns are significantly negative at the 10% level or better for four emerging countries: Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The results are similar for median announcement period returns. The countries having significantly negative average announcement period returns are all the emerging markets in the eastern Asian countries. The average (median) announcement period return for the entire sample of fifteen emerging countries is -0.0239% (-0.0521%) per day for all types of stock market liberalization.

From the cross-sectional regression analyses, we find that the coefficient for the insider ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. The result shows that higher managerial ownership may hurt firm performances after liberalization, because it is likely that insider shareholders tend to expropriate the minority shareholders. We further regress the announcement period returns against several control factors. The control variables include firm size, debt ratio, dividend yield and country dummies. The main results of the effect of insider ownership remain unchanged.

Furthermore, the coefficients of firm size and debt ratio are significant. Smaller firms and firms with higher debt ratios have more favorable share price reactions surrounding the stock market liberalization announcements. The result of firm size is consistent with Chui and Wei (1998) and provides support for Laeven’s (2003) finding that small firms perform better after financial liberalization. The result of debt ratio is consistent with Jensen (1986). Chen et al. (2009) show that firms with more free cash flow select higher levels of debt in their capital structure as a credible pre-commitment to pay out the excess cash flow, therefore lowering the expected costs of free cash flow and increasing the post-liberalization stock price performances.

From our analysis of financial constraint releases, we find the interaction between the corporate governance quality measure, the sensitivity of cash flow to investment, and the market liberalization dummy is significantly negative at the 5% level (i.e., 6 in

CG D K CF L t i * * 1 , 6      

 ). This indicates that a better corporate governance quality before liberalization does help to reduce a firm’s financial constraint. Our results are consistent the results of Mitton (2002).

Furthermore, the coefficient of (CF/K)t-1 is positive and the coefficient of variable (CF/K)t-1xDLxCG is negative, and both are significant at the 5 percent level. Again, it is consistent with the hypothesis that a better corporate governance quality before liberalization plays an important role in reducing the financial constraint of the firm following the liberalization event. Follow Laeven (2003), we add control variables in the regression model, which includes the interaction between net sales-to-capital ratio and liberalization dummy, net sales-to-capital ratio and the ownership concentration level, net sales-to-capital ratio and the liberalization dummy. The results are generally consistent with the regression model without control variables.

Next we show the effect of financial constraint releases after banking liberalization. The interaction term of cash flows, CF/K, FLI and CG is -0.0151, significant at the 1% level. This indicates that during the banking sector liberalization, firms with better corporate governance structures would experience a more significant release on financial constraints because their investment is less sensitive to cash flows. Although the overall level of financial constraint is decreasing during banking liberalization, the effect is contributed by

firms with better governance structures. Firms with worse governance structures are actually experiencing more financial constraints after banking liberalization. We also perform some robustness checks by redefining firms with good governance as the 75% percentile of the corporate governance measures, instead of the medium. Results show that the interaction terms of the governance dummy (CG), FLI and cash flow (CF/K) are significantly negative. For firms with good governance structures, the coefficient is -0.2093, again indicating that good governance firms experiences a greater release of financial constraints after banking liberalization.

Overall, our results lend support to the corporate governance quality as a significant and important factor to consider when studying the effect of stock market and banking liberalization events in the emerging countries.

6. Conclusion

There have been few studies on the impact of firm level corporate governance quality on the effect of financial market liberalization. We set out in this project to examine the impact of firm level corporate governance on the effect of market liberalization on firm stock price performances and financial constraint releases. We find significant influences of corporate governance on the effect of market liberalization events. Market responses to stock market announcements are more favorable and valuable for firms with better corporate governance. Further, we find that firms with better corporate governance quality experience a greater release of their financial constraint following the stock market and the banking sector liberalization. Overall, we find that corporate governance is an important factor affecting firm performances and their financial constraints after both the stock market and banking liberalization in emerging markets.

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國科會補助專題研究計畫項下赴國外(或大陸地區)出差或研習心得報告

日期： 101 年 6 月30日

一、 國外研究過程

本人於 101 年 6 月 17 日至 101 年 6 月 23 日至 Loyola Marymount University, Los

Angeles 與 Chun-I Lee 教授進行短期研究合作。於訪問期間與其密切討論研究案之

內容，並利用其圖書館收集相關研究資料，收穫頗豐。

二、 研究成果

目前基於台灣特殊的期貨資料已刊登一篇國際期刊論文，未來並有數個議題將持續

進行研究，預計將有不錯的成果產出。

三、 建議

國外研究環境及薪資待遇皆遠勝於台灣，在人才越趨國際化的今日，國內學界的挑

戰將日益艱難。持續與國外學者保持研究上的聯繫，應為提升台灣學術研究水準的

有效方法之一。

計畫編號

計畫編號 NSC98-2410-H-008-043-MY3

計畫名稱

市場自由化與公司治理對公司價值及投資限制的影響─跨公司分析

出國人員

姓名

周冠男

服務機構

及職稱

政治大學財管系教授

出國時間

101 年 6 月 17 日至

101 年 6 月 23 日

出國地點

Los Angeles, California

國科會補助專題研究計畫項下赴國外(或大陸地區)出差或研習心得報告

日期： 101 年 7 月30日

一、 國外研究過程

本人於 101 年 7 月 27 日至 101 年 7 月 30 日至 University of Macau 與 William Cheung

教授進行短期研究合作。於訪問期間與其密切討論研究案之內容，與系上教授有密

切的交流互動，並利用其圖書館收集相關中國大陸公司治理相關研究資料，收穫頗

豐。

二、 研究成果

目前基於大陸特殊的公司治理及市場交易產品資料(如 H 股)，已有進行中論文，未

來並有數個議題將持續進行研究，預計將有不錯的成果產出。

三、 建議

澳門大學研究水準頗佳，同時具有近距離觀察並蒐集大陸特殊研究議題的優勢，國

內學界的挑戰將日益艱難，為了提高研究水準，持續與澳門大學學者保持研究上的

聯繫，應為發掘大陸特殊研究議題，產出具有特色的研究議題的有效方法之一。

計畫編號

計畫編號 NSC98-2410-H-008-043-MY3

計畫名稱

市場自由化與公司治理對公司價值及投資限制的影響─跨公司分析

出國人員

姓名

周冠男

服務機構

及職稱

政治大學財管系教授

出國時間

101 年 7 月 27 日至

101 年 7 月 29 日

出國地點

Macau SAR, China

國科會補助專題研究計畫項下出席國際學術會議心得報告

日期：101年 5 月 31

一、參加會議經過

財務管理學會(Financial Management Association) 2011 年會於美國 Denver,

Colorado 舉行，大會為期四天，由 10 月 19 日至 10 月 22 日，參加的學者來自世界

各地，並有七百多篇的研究論文發表，論文題目涵蓋財務管理相關之各領域，包括

市場結構之探討、衍生性證券之訂價與避險、資產訂價模式的探討、以及公司理財

的探討等。本人在大會中共發表論文 1 篇。並積極與國外學者洽談研究合作及互訪

事宜。

二、 與會心得

計畫編號

NS 98-2410-H-004-197-MY3

計畫名稱

市場自由化與公司治理對公司價值及投資限制的影響

出國人員

姓名

周冠男

服務機構

及職稱

國立政治大學財管系

會議時間

100 年 10 月 19 日

至 100 年 10 月 22

日

會議地點

Denver, Colorado

會議名稱

(中文) 財務管理學會年會

(英文) Financial Management Association Annual Meeting

發表論文

題目

(中文) 部位限制的有效性：來自外匯期貨市場的證據

(英文)

The Effectiveness of Position Limits: Evidence from the Foreign Exchange Futures Markets

財務管理學會年會，一向為國際財務管理學術界之重要會議之一，每年皆在美國不同

城市舉辦，參與之學者為活躍於各國之學術及實務研究人員。因此參與該會，不但可

接觸到財務研究的新觀念、新知識，亦可得知世界財務管理研究之重要趨勢。本人幾

乎每年都固定參與此一會議。此次的 Keynote Speech 邀請諾貝爾經濟學獎得主 Myron

S. Scholes 教授演講，Prof. Scholes 是著名的 Black-Scholes 選擇權定價公式的推

導者之一，聆聽之後得以深思財務工程研究對現代財務學的重要啟發。本人於此次會

議中與持續與國外學者交流並謀求共同合作之機會，獲益良多。

三、攜回資料名稱及內容

國科會補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表

日期:2012/11/26

國科會補助計畫

計畫名稱: 市場自由化與公司治理對公司價值及投資限制的影響─跨公司分析 計畫主持人: 周冠男 計畫編號: 98-2410-H-004-197-MY3 學門領域: 財務

無研發成果推廣資料

98 年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表

計畫主持人：周冠男 計畫編號：98-2410-H-004-197-MY3 計畫名稱：市場自由化與公司治理對公司價值及投資限制的影響─跨公司分析 量化 成果項目 實際已達成 數（被接受 或已發表） 預期總達成 數(含實際已 達成數) 本計畫實 際貢獻百 分比 單位 備 註 （ 質 化 說 明：如 數 個 計 畫 共 同 成 果、成 果 列 為 該 期 刊 之 封 面 故 事 ... 等） 期刊論文 0 0 100% 研究報告/技術報告 0 0 100% 研討會論文 0 0 100% 篇 論文著作 專書 0 0 100% 申請中件數 0 0 100% 專利 已獲得件數 0 0 100% 件 件數 0 0 100% 件 技術移轉 權利金 0 0 100% 千元 碩士生 0 0 100% 博士生 3 3 100% 博士後研究員 1 1 100% 國內 參與計畫人力 （本國籍） 專任助理 0 0 100% 人次 期刊論文 0 0 100% 研究報告/技術報告 0 0 100% 研討會論文 1 1 100% 篇 論文著作 專書 0 0 100% 章/本 申請中件數 0 0 100% 專利 已獲得件數 0 0 100% 件 件數 0 0 100% 件 技術移轉 權利金 0 0 100% 千元 碩士生 0 0 100% 博士生 0 0 100% 博士後研究員 0 0 100% 國外 參與計畫人力 （外國籍） 專任助理 0 0 100% 人次

其他成果

(

無法以量化表達之成 果如辦理學術活動、獲 得獎項、重要國際合 作、研究成果國際影響 力及其他協助產業技 術發展之具體效益事 項等，請以文字敘述填 列。) 無 成果項目 量化 名稱或內容性質簡述 測驗工具(含質性與量性) 0 課程/模組 0 電腦及網路系統或工具 0 教材 0 舉辦之活動/競賽 0 研討會/工作坊 0 電子報、網站 0 科 教 處 計 畫 加 填 項 目 計畫成果推廣之參與（閱聽）人數 0

國科會補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價

值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）

、是否適

合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

■達成目標

□未達成目標（請說明，以 100 字為限）

□實驗失敗

□因故實驗中斷

□其他原因

說明：

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

論文：□已發表 ■未發表之文稿 □撰寫中 □無

專利：□已獲得 □申請中 ■無

技轉：□已技轉 □洽談中 ■無

其他：（以 100 字為限）

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價

值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）（以

500 字為限）

我們以新興市場公司為樣本，研究公司治理品質對市場自由化於公司股價表現與財務限制 的影響。金融自由化包含股票市場自由化以及銀行業務自由化。在現有文獻中，金融市場 自由化的衝擊已受到廣泛的研究與檢驗。然而就我們所知，在這些研究當中，卻幾乎沒有 探討個別公司治理結構將如何與金融市場自由化所造成的衝擊產生相互影響。本文的實證 結果對學界進一步了解市場自由化與公司治理之間的關係，有很好的啟發作用。