全球知識經濟下的科技合作：以三螺旋創新模式發展在地能力的研究 - 政大學術集成

全文

(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. Technical Cooperation in the Global Knowledge-based 政治 Economy:. Developing Local Capabilities Through大a Triple Helix Model 立 of Innovation. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. 全球知識經濟下的科技合作：以三螺旋創新模式發展在地能力的研究. er. io. sit. y. Nat. n. Nephtaly a l Andoney Pierre-Louis v Adviser: ni C Dr. Ching-Ping Tang. hengchi U. June 2020. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(2) Contents Acknowledgments ........................................................................................... iv Abstract ............................................................................................................ v List of Figures .................................................................................................. vi List of Tables .................................................................................................. vii List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................... viii Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 Significance of the Study ........................................................................................................ 3 Research Objectives and Questions ........................................................................................ 4 Research Delimitations ........................................................................................................... 5. 政治大. Chapter I- Globalization, Innovation, and Technical Cooperation ............... 7. 立. Globalization, Knowledge, and Aid ......................................................................... 7. I.2. The Development Aid Industry ................................................................................ 9. ‧ 國. 學. I.1 I.2.1. The Emergence of the Development Industry ..................................................................... 9. I.2.2. The Effectiveness of the Development Industry ............................................................... 10. ‧. y. Nat. I.3 From Technical Assistance, through Technical Cooperation to KnowledgeBased Aid ............................................................................................................................. 14 I.3.2. Big Change in Epistemology for Little Practical Improvement ........................................ 16. I.3.3. The Change Needed in Technical Cooperation ................................................................. 19. er. al. n. I.4. sit. Technical Assistance for Capacity Building ..................................................................... 14. io. I.3.1. Ch. i Un. v. Knowledge and Innovation Systems in Technical Cooperation .......................... 20. engchi. I.4.1. Origin of the Knowledge-based Aid Paradigm ................................................................. 21. I.4.2. Innovation Systems in Technical Cooperation .................................................................. 22. I.5. Technical Cooperation in Haiti: A Brief Country Context ................................. 24. Chapter II- Theoretical and Methodological Framework: Agricultural Innovation System (AIS) ................................................................................ 29 II.1. Changing Global Agricultural Challenges ............................................................ 29. II.2. Changing Approaches for Supporting Agricultural Innovation ......................... 31. II.2.1. National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS) ........................................................ 31. II.2.2. Agricultural Knowledge and Information System (AKIS) ............................................ 32. II.2.3. Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS) ........................................................................ 32. II.3 Innovation System (IS) Theories and their Adaptation in Agricultural Development ........................................................................................................................ 35 i DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(3) II.3.1. The Distinction Between Innovation and Invention ...................................................... 35. II.3.2. Application of IS Framework to Agriculture ................................................................ 36. II.3.3. Triple Helix Innovation Model in Agriculture Development ........................................ 38. II.3.4. Challenges for Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS) in Developing Countries ......... 39. II.4 Analytical and Operational Framework of Agricultural Innovation Sytems in Development ........................................................................................................................ 44 II.4.1. An Analytical Framework to Diagnose AIS in Developing Countries .......................... 45. II.4.2. Towards an Operational Framework for AIS Interventions in Developing Countries .. 47. II.5. Methodological Framework.................................................................................... 51. II.5.1. Why Haiti? ................................................................................................................... 51. II.5.2. A Hypothesis-Generating Case Study ........................................................................... 52. II.5.3. Sample and Data Triangulation .................................................................................... 53. II.5.4. A Note on the Interview Communication Tools ........................................................... 56. 政治大. Chapter III- Agricultural Innovation System (AIS) in Haiti: The Missing Links ............................................................................................................... 58. 立. ‧ 國. 學. III.1 Country Context ...................................................................................................... 58 III.2 Evolution of the Agricultural Sector in Haiti ........................................................ 60 Haitian Agricultural Sector Performance (1990-2020) ................................................. 60. III.2.2. The Challenges for Rural and Agricultural Development in Haiti ................................ 62. ‧. III.2.1. sit. y. Nat. III.3 Mapping the Actors of Rural and Agricultural Innovation in Haiti .................. 69 III.3.2. The Missing Actors and Competencies in the Agricultural Sector in Haiti ................... 75. er. The Essential Functions and Actors in Agricultural Innovation in Haiti ....................... 69. io. III.3.1. al. n. iv n C U Agriculture...........................82 Nature and Extent of Linkages h among e n gActors c h iin Haitian. III.4 Attitudes and Practices of Innovation in the Haitian Agricultural Sector ......... 81 III.4.1 III.4.2 III.4.3. Brief Inventory of Agricultural Research and Innovation in Haiti ................................ 86 Triple Helix Agricultural Innovation Success Story in Haiti ........................................ 89. III.5 Attitudes and Practices Hindering Policy Effectiveness for Innovation ............ 91 III.5.1. Macro-Political Obstacles to Haitian Agricultural Innovation ...................................... 91. III.5.2. Macro-Economic Obstacles to Haitian Agricultural Innovation ................................... 95. Chapter IV- Policy and Support Structures for Agricultural Innovation in Haiti: The AREA Project Contribution ........................................................ 98 IV.1 The View of the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture on Agricultural Innovation .. 98 IV.2 The Stage of Agricultural Innovation System (AIS) in Haiti .............................. 99 IV.3 State Policies and Structures for Agricultural Innovation ................................ 103 IV.3.1. The National Plan of Agricultural Investment (PNIA) ............................................... 103. IV.3.2. State Initiatives to Finance Agricultural Innovation ................................................... 104. ii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(4) IV.4 AREA Contribution to Agricultural Innovation in Haiti .................................. 109 IV.4.1. An Overview of the AREA Project ............................................................................. 109. IV.4.2. AREA Project Interventions ....................................................................................... 113. IV.5 An Appreciation of the AREA Project ................................................................ 121 IV.5.1. The Creation of Knowledge Among the Partners ....................................................... 121. IV.5.2. The Utilization of Knowledge Among the Partners .................................................... 122. IV.5.3. The Circulation of Knowledge Among the Actors...................................................... 124. IV.6 The Sustainability of the AREA Project Impacts ............................................... 125 IV.6.1. Sustainable Knowledge .............................................................................................. 125. IV.6.2. Sustainable Linkages and Practices ............................................................................ 127. IV.7 Discussion ............................................................................................................... 128. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 131. 政治大. Policy Recommendations: A Decentralized Triple Helix Model of Agricultural Innovation in Haiti ................................................................................................................................ 135. 立. Bibliography ................................................................................................. 141. ‧ 國. 學. Annexes ......................................................................................................... 153. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. iii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(5) Acknowledgments I thank God, who gives me the necessary strength to continue moving forward in my life. There is still a long way to go, but I know he will always be by my side. My immense gratitude goes to my parents, especially my Mother, Mrs. Marie Andrée Beaublanc, my primary source of inspiration. As a retired teacher, she incited my interest in education. I also want to express my gratitude to the Taiwan International Cooperation Development Fund (ICDF), which funded my journey at NCCU and gave me all the necessary financial and academic support throughout my studies.. 政治大 out. They are Dr. Ching-Ping Tang, my advisor, and the members of the jury, Dr. Shiuh-Shen 立 CHIEN, and Dr. Tse-Kang Leng. My deepest and sincere thanks go to those without whom this study could not have been carried. ‧ 國. 學. I would like to thank the team of the AREA project, which allowed me to take a look at their achievements in Haiti. Finally, I want to express my gratitude towards all the interviewees who. ‧. agreed to meet me within the framework of this research. I hope this thesis will contribute to. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. advancing the debate about aid effectiveness in Haiti, particularly in technical cooperation.. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. iv DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(6) Abstract Aid capital and infrastructure investments in developing countries have been often tied to technical. cooperation. components. through. which,. traditionally,. international. consultants/experts are placed in positions where they can advise, train, and support counterparts. However, in a globalizing world where knowledge generation is increasingly the primary commodity of economic growth, relying merely on top-down knowledge transfer and gap-filling development approach faces its limits. There is a growing need for technical cooperation to be guided by strong local roots through which international aid agencies can learn to “learn with” the people they are serving. These thinkings are at the center of the paradigm of knowledge-based aid, promoting the use of innovation system theories in technical. 治政 the typical case of fragile States that is Haiti, through the scope 大of a USAID funded agricultural 立 project called AREA. development projects. This research assesses the extent to which this ideal is being realized in. ‧ 國. 學. Using the diagnostic framework of the World Bank (2006) on Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS), we found that Technical Cooperation to transfer knowledge and expertise in agriculture. ‧. in Haiti has been reasonably deficient without a reliable local innovation base system in the. y. Nat. sector. Rare projects trying to develop that base, such as AREA, are still inadequate to the. io. sit. needs. As agricultural innovation in Haiti is still at a pre-planned phase, interventions from. er. donors and national policy-makers first have to create a shared vision, build trust, and enhance. al. n. iv n C U should explore more systemic h edevelopment Therefore, in fragile countries such as Haiti, n g c h i actors the capacity of stakeholders to develop partnerships by emphasizing private sector involvement.. decentralized triparty Innovation Platforms (IPs) allowing knowledge producers (universities, research institutes) to work with knowledge users (private companies, farmers’ associations, agricultural extensions organization), and knowledge managers (government entities) to respond to market opportunities.. v DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(7) List of Figures Figure 1- Changes needed in Technical Cooperation ...................................................................... 20 Figure 2-Triple Helix Model of Innovation ...................................................................................... 23 Figure 3-The linear model of innovation .......................................................................................... 31 Figure 4- Major Components of a National Innovation System ..................................................... 36 Figure 5-Elements of an agricultural innovation system ................................................................. 37 Figure 6-Innovation Co-production Support System (ICSIs) ......................................................... 41 Figure 7- A conceptual framework for IP approach, establishment, and functioning .................. 50 Figure 8- GDP per Capita 1970-2013(1970=100) (Constant 2005) ................................................. 59 Figure 9-Main Obstacles to the Development of Agricultural Holdings ........................................ 68 Figure 10-Enriched end-user triple helix of the SMASH project ................................................... 90 Figure 11-The shortfall of technical cooperation in agriculture in Haiti ..................................... 102 Figure 12-Zones of interventions of the AREA project ................................................................. 110 Figure 13-Triparty partnership design of AREA .......................................................................... 113 Figure 14-Patterns of communication among partners ................................................................. 125 Figure 15-Enriched end-user triple helix for short-term agricultural innovation projects ........ 134 Figure 16-Decentralized Triple Helix Model (DTHM) of AIS in four agricultural production poles in Haiti ..................................................................................................................................... 138. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. vi DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(8) List of Tables Table 1- Features of the NARS and AKIS frameworks in comparison to agricultural innovation systems ................................................................................................................................................ 33 Table 2-AIS typical functions and actors ......................................................................................... 69 Table 3-Bank credit to bank deposits (%) ........................................................................................ 78 Table 4-Comparison between the situation in Haiti and the diagnosis of the pre-planned phase of innovation of the World Bank (2006).............................................................................................. 100. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. vii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(9) List of Abbreviations AFD AIS AKIS ANARAD APA. French Agency of Development Agricultural Innovation System Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems National Agency for Agricultural Research for Sustainable Development American Psychological Association. CHIBAS CIDA. Support to Agricultural Research and Development (Appui à la Recherche et au Développement Agricole) Crop Insurance (Assurance Récolte) City Office of Agriculture (Bureau Agricole Communale) Agricultural Credits Bureau (Bureau Crédits Agricoles) National Credit Banks (Banque Nationale de Crédit) National Brewery of Haiti (Brasserie Nationale d’Haiti) Central Bank of Haiti (Banque de la République d'Haïti Caribbean Community Capacity Development Credit Cooperatives Research Center on Bioenergy and Sustainable Agriculture (Centre Haïtien d'Innovation sur les Biotechnologies et l'Agriculture Soutenable) Canadian International Development Agency. CRDA. Research and Development Center for Agriculture (Centre de Recherche et de Développement Agricole). CRDD CTG. Rural Center for Sustainable Development (Centre Rural de Développement Durable) Technical Management Consultants (Consultants Techniques de Gestion). CYMMIT DAC DDA DI DTHM FAMV FAO. International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (El Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo) Development Assistance Committee Departmental Directorate of Agriculture (Direction Départementale d’Agriculture) The direction of Innovation of the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture Decentralized Triple Helix Model State College of Agriculture (Faculté d'Agronomie et de Médecine Vétérinaire) Food and Agriculture Organization. FAPAH FDI FFS. Haitian Agricultural Loan Insurance Fund (Fond Assurance-prêt Agricole Haïtien) Industrial Development Fund (Fond de Développement Industriel) Farmer Field Schools. FONRED GDP GNP HEI ICSI ICT IDB. National Research Fund for Sustainable Development (Fond National de Recherche pour un Développement Durable) Gross Development Product Gross National Product Higher Education Institution Innovation Co-production Support System Information and Communication Technologies Interamerican Development Bank. 立. 政治大. 學. ‧. ‧ 國. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. AREA ASREC BAC BCA BNC BRANA BRH CARICOM CD CEC. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. viii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(10) IFAD IICA IMF IO IP IS. International Fund For Agricultural Development Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) International Monetary Fund International Organization Innovation Platform Innovation System. KNFP LAC LLC LSU. National Council of People’s Financing (Conseil national de financement populaire) Latin America and the Caribbean Limited Liability Company Louisiana State University. MARNDR MDG MEL MT NARS NGO ODA OECD PICSA. Haitian Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture, Ressources Naturelles et Développement Rurales) Millennium Development Goals Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Metric Tons National Agricultural Research System Non-Governmental Organization Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Participatory Integrated Climate Services. PITAG PIU PNB PNIA PPP RECEPAG RGA SDG SMASH SME SMS. Agroforestry Technological Innovation Program (Programme d'Innovation Technologique en Agriculture et Agroforesterie) Project Implementation Unit Gross National Product National Investment Plan in Agriculture (Plan National d’Investissement Agricole) Public-Private Partnership Agriculture Public Services Project (Renforcement des Services Publics Agricoles) General Census of Agriculture (Recensement général de l'agriculture) Sustainable Development Goals Smallholder Alliance for Sorghum in Haiti Small and Medium Enterprises Short Message Service. SYFAAH TA/TC UF/IFAS UHM UIG UN USAID USD WB WINNER. System of Financing and Agricultural Insurance (Système de Financement et d'Assurance Agricole en Haïti) Technical Assistance/Technical Cooperation The University of Florida, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences Extension National Meteorological Services (Unité Hydrométéorologique d'Haïti) University-Industry-Government United Nations United States Agency for International Development US Dollars World Bank Watershed Initiative for Natural Environmental Resources. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. ix DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(11) Introduction Foreign aid, as we know it today, was inspired by the Marshall plan. This billion-dollar aid from the United States was designed to help rebuild Western European economies after World War II. The Marshall plan, together with the prevalent economic growth theories at that time, such as the Sollow model of capital accumulation, has been used to justify foreign financial assistance to poor countries and territories. It was conceived that foreign aid and other sources of foreign investment were necessary to fill the financial gap and promote growth in developing countries (Easterly, 1999). This gap-filling approach was also found in another foreign policy plan, commonly known as the “Truman point four programs,” which is thought to have inspired the emergence of a different type of international assistance. This first of its kind technical. 政治大 knowledge gap in the underdeveloped areas to “relieve the suffering of their people” (Gaddis, 立 1974). assistance program was conceived by the President Truman administration to fill the existing. ‧ 國. 學. Indeed, “expert advice in the form of ‘technical assistance’ has been an instrument of foreign aid since its inception in the late 1940s/early 1950s when the attached system of international. ‧. organizations came into being” (Koch & Weingart, 2016, p: 9). A considerable component of. sit. y. Nat. foreign aid has been conceived initially as a transfer from the knowledge-rich North to the. io. er. knowledge-poor South countries (Wilson, 2007). The latter category was perceived as incapable of lifting their people out of poverty without the necessary knowledge and skills. n. al. i Un. v. found in the developed world. Therefore, since the beginning, aid capital and infrastructure. Ch. engchi. investments in developing countries have been often tied to capacity building components. Traditionally international consultants/experts are placed in positions where they can advise, train, and support counterparts, usually government officials. However, within a tense world political context after WWII, foreign aid soon became a tool to gain political clients (Pedrosa-Garcia, 2017). There was already a growing concern that poverty alleviation was not the priority of foreign powers, and that aid was a purely foreign policy tool for diplomatic alignment. Because of these strategic interests, by the end of the Cold War, international assistance was transformed into a real “industry” (Hancock, 1992), accounting for a very substantial economic share in many developing economies. It went beyond 30 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) in some countries (Lensink & White, 1999). This was in addition to the countless number of NGOs, multi and bilateral assistance programs running 1 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(12) toward the same goals. This expansion also corresponds to the wave of globalization that started in the 1980s and reinforced in the 1990s (Thurow, 2000). Indeed, along with the neoliberal economic policies of free market and openness, globalization induced in developing countries the “privatization” of the production of essential public goods and services. NGOs became the preferred targets of development aid (Leve & Karim, 2001) and have had since then the dominance of the financial and knowledge resources for development in most of the developing countries. Thus, foreign aid has been draining out most aid recipient countries’ government ownership of their development process, creating a circle of dependency that put an additional burden on these governments’ credibility with their population. Paradoxically, as globalization continued to expand, wealth and knowledge gap among nations continued to deepen, pushing for even more effort from the developed world to. 政治大 It was becoming clear for aid agencies 立 such as the World Bank in the 1990s that, in a world fund foreign assistance to developing countries.. ‧ 國. 學. where knowledge generation was increasingly the primary commodity of economic growth, top-down knowledge transfer and gap-filling development approaches were facing its limits. Even though at that time, universal primary education was still the priority for international. ‧. donors, there was a growing understanding that higher education was essential to break the. y. Nat. circle of dependence that foreign aid has been criticized for having created. Globalization has. io. sit. then induced a shift of paradigm led by the World Bank. It recognized that “local conditions. n. al. er. matter for the success of programs, that people on the ground have the most knowledge of local. i Un. v. conditions, and that the challenge of knowledge for development is to combine local knowledge. Ch. engchi. with the wealth of experience from around the world” (World Bank, 1998, p:14). This was the birth of the concept known as of today as knowledge-based aid. Many studies have taken the task to evaluate the extent to which this ideal is being realized since then. The literature particularly criticizes the inconsistency between international agencies’ policy position statements on the importance of Higher Education Systems to achieve the ideal of knowledge for development and their actual investment record in the sector. Furthermore, traditional ways of technical cooperation have also been largely criticized by researchers. Various theoretical recommendations have been made to help countries develop their own knowledge and innovation systems in their chosen productive sector. However, there are still surprisingly a lack of concrete examples of mechanisms through which this ideal is being applied. This thesis will help address these gaps in the literature.. 2 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(13) Significance of the Study Building on an extensive theoretical framework, this research will aim to assess technical assistance for knowledge transfer in Haiti and the importance of higher education in the process within the global knowledge-based aid paradigm. This research is relevant because it will be assessing the achievements of the ideal of knowledge for development in a renowned case of fragile State that is Haiti. It will deduct policy recommendations through which it can better be achieved by analyzing one of the rare development projects that put the Haitian Higher Education at the center of its design. Evolving in the agricultural sector, Appui à la Recherche et au Développement Agricole project (AREA), also designated as Support to Agricultural Research and Development (SARD), is a USAID/Haiti funded project as part of the Feed the Future global initiative of the US. 政治大 of improved production technologies to farmers and the private sector through effective 立. government. It aimed at building “the capacity of Haitian institutions to increase the availability extension and development of an agricultural innovation system [AIS]” 1. Through a triparty. ‧ 國. 學. collaboration model between agronomy departments of the best universities in Haiti, the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture, and local structures of farmers, AREA tried to improve knowledge. ‧. creation, dissemination, and utilization to fuel the growth of the agriculture sector in the. sit. y. Nat. country. This case study can help us understand better the shortcomings of the traditional ways of technical cooperation for capacity building or knowledge transfer. It can also allow us to. io. al. n. State such as Haiti.. er. assess the relevance of globalization-induced paradigm of knowledge-based aid in a fragile. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. On another note, various studies examined the relations between globalization and poverty or inequality. Still, the literature lacks research that analyzes specifically its impact on the effectiveness of all these initiatives to alleviate poverty. Consequently, this thesis will propose to probe the mechanisms through which globalization, in its knowledge dimension, is affecting aid quality in recipient countries, especially in Haiti. The country has been simultaneously depicted as a loser of the wave of globalization of the 1990s and is usually a classic case study of aid ineffectiveness. We chose to analyze Haiti because, while the country has been generally recognized as one of the direst embarrassments of the international donors’ community, the literature on development aid is still very thin mainly because of data opacity and accessibility. The few studies on aid effectiveness in Haiti that are available publicly tend to isolate the. 1. AREA (Undated). About AREA. Retrieved from: https://area.ifas.ufl.edu/about/. 3 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(14) potential effect of the process of global integration in terms of challenges to be addressed and opportunities to be taken. This research proposes a broader and more forward-looking perspective on aid effectiveness in Haiti rather than the mere domestic and deficits analysis of previous studies.. Research Objectives and Questions The purpose of this research is policy-oriented. It aims to satisfy these following objectives: a) Assess the situation of knowledge for development and the obstacles for more effective technical projects in Haiti in a globalizing world. b) Investigate the extent to which the globalization-induced paradigm of knowledge-based. 政治大 evolution of the concept from Technical Assistance, through Technical Cooperation to 立 more recent terminologies of knowledge management and innovation systems, we will aid is being achieved in Haiti through the AREA project case study. After tracing the. ‧ 國. 學. present both sides of the arguments in terms of what is working and what needs to be improved.. ‧. c) Deduct the role that the Haitian Higher Education System can potentially play in the. y. Nat. process.. io. sit. Based on the research objectives outlined, the study aims to answer the following questions:. n. al. er. a) To what extent the paradigm of “Knowledge for Development” is being realized in a fragile State such as Haiti?. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. b) To what extent interventions to build innovation or knowledge systems through technical cooperation can be realized in a fragile State such as Haiti? c) How can Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) contribute to the process? Our initial assumption is that Technical Assistance for knowledge transfer in Haiti has faced its limits because the Haitian government and international donors have never built any adequate knowledge base in any productive sector. Impacts of international technical projects have remained unsustainable since they never had local pools of expertise on which they could expand their interventions. The development of robust local capability systems, including specifically an integrated higher education, research, and innovation system, is a prerequisite for technical cooperation to be effective in any chosen productive sector (Governance, agriculture, manufacturing, etc…) of Haiti. Such interventions could better allow the Haitian State to take ownership of its development process in a globalizing world. 4 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(15) Research Delimitations We recognize that globalization is a complex phenomenon with various dimensions. It is driven by different processes of social, political, and economic integration. This research will be shaped within its economic aspect of knowledge generation, as defined by Goldin & Reinert (2012). Furthermore, studies of aid effectiveness, especially technical cooperation, can also take different aspects since the international donors’ community has been harshly criticized in the literature (Birdsall, 2004). However, this study will focus on a critical element, which is “ownership”. The term can be defined as “the exercise of control and command over development activities” by a country (Theisohn, 2013). Therefore, we will explore precisely how globalization, in its knowledge dimension, can build or drain out the country’s ownership of the development process through technical cooperation programs. Finally, while we are. 治政大 However, we will provide an cooperation (TA to TC), we will use both terms interchangeably. 立 account of this evolution later. aware of the rationale behind the evolution of the concept of technical assistance to technical. ‧ 國. 學. On another note, as our study is conducted in the agricultural sector, we need to clarify from the onset that Innovation Systems (IS) framework in the industry presents some particularities.. ‧. Innovation systems, as conceived in the technological field for capitalist gains, had to be. sit. y. Nat. adapted to a sector with significant social development costs such as agriculture. While in the classic versions, the main winners are capitalist industries or companies, in agriculture, the. io. n. al. er. primary beneficiaries of innovation have to be the farmers. Consequently, innovation systems. i Un. v. must have special missions for poverty reduction. This consideration also applies to more. Ch. engchi. specific frameworks, such as the Triple Helix. Its classic interactions between University, Government, and Industry (UIG) spheres had to be modified to include a grassroots perspective from the farmers. This research will assess the extent to which such ideas could be realized in developing countries through technical cooperation. The following literature review of this thesis will provide a broader analysis of the global debate of aid effectiveness, primarily through technical cooperation. It examines the evolution of the concept from “technical assistance” to the current discussion about knowledge-based aid in innovation capacity-building. Chapter II analyzes the theoretical and methodological framework that we will use to evaluate our case study in Haiti. Agriculture is the productive sector in which our project case intervened. Therefore, the chapter provides an understanding of the characteristics of Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS). Then, it outlines the methodology of our research. Next, the findings of this case study on Haiti and the AREA 5 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(16) project are presented in chapters III and IV. Finally, we conclude with some thoughts on the possible policy implications of this research for the country.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 6 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(17) Chapter I- Globalization, Innovation, and Technical Cooperation This chapter undertakes a selective literature review that provides the rationale for our research. Globalization as a knowledge-intensive process is a double-edged sword for developing countries. On one hand, it offers opportunities for these countries to undertake the economic convergence predicted by the promoters of economic liberalization. On the other hand, the global knowledge economy can be in itself the cause of more profound inequality around the world. Therefore, international institutions, particularly aid agencies, have been trying to shift their approaches in developing countries to be more knowledge-based. Their interventions through technical cooperation in developing countries are borrowing innovation concepts from. 政治大. the business world. This chapter reviews these changes and unveils the needs of these new approaches to be better evaluated.. Globalization, Knowledge, and Aid. 學. I.1. ‧ 國. 立. ‧. For Goldin and Reinert (2012), globalization is a multidimensional process of interconnecting. y. Nat. the world. It can be defined from an economic, political, social, or cultural point of view.. io. sit. However, these authors believe that the economic dimension is the driving force of the process.. er. They identified five subdimensions of the economic aspect of globalization, which are Trade,. al. n. iv n C U knowledge subdimensions of hglobalization. e n g c h iGlobal. Finance, Aid, Migration, and Ideas. For them, knowledge (ideas) and capacity are central to all the other economic. offers developing. countries various opportunities to release the economic convergence predicted by the promoter of economic liberalization. However, while globalization presents multiple opportunities for poverty alleviation, there are also numerous risks associated with the process. If the developing countries cannot work towards reducing their cultural self-understanding, knowledge, and information deficits from the West, the problems related to globalization, such as inequality and poverty, might prevail. Indeed, the relations between globalization and poverty have been substantively studied in economic literature. As pointed out by Kanbur (2001), critics of globalization “tend to focus on shorter-term impacts, while globalization’s proponents are more concerned about the longerterm” (Harrison, 2006, p:24). Many countries have made tremendous efforts to reduce the percentage of their population living in poverty, which corresponds to the waves of 7 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(18) globalization in the 90s driven by neo-liberalist policies. “Many economists predicted that developing countries with a comparative advantage in unskilled labor would benefit from globalization through increased demand for their unskilled-intensive goods, which in turn would reduce inequality and poverty” (Harrison, 2006, p:42). Therefore, using neoliberal theories of market society, development aid agencies have been engaged in various policies to integrate developing countries in the global economy. However, the empirical pieces of evidence are mixed. Globalization has complex and multiple impacts on nations and localities (Marginson, 2011). Researches show at best that globalization creates winners and losers. The outcome depends not just on trade or financial globalization but on complementary policies that ensure globalization yields benefits for the weaker. Such strategies include investments in human capital infrastructure, credit, and technical supports to local. 治政大 has been accompanied by an stability. Yet, cross-country studies document that globalization 立 increasing inequality that offsets some of the gains in poverty reduction achieved via tradeentrepreneurs, especially to farmers, relevant labor market institutions, and macroeconomic. ‧ 國. 學. induced growth (Harrison, 2006, p:27).. The global economic inequalities are further aggravated by the growing knowledge gap. ‧. between developed and so-called third world countries in terms of scientific, technological, and. y. Nat. industrial expertise. In 2000 roughly four-fifths of the world’s total scientific and technical. io. sit. “output” was already generated in western societies, with a concentration of scientists and. n. al. er. technological experts in the same part of the world (Dallmayr, 2002, p:148). Furthermore,. i Un. v. country scores in the 2017 Global Knowledge Index as a whole reflect significant gaps between. Ch. engchi. nations2. It is particularly worrisome for developing countries since globalization has emerged as the product of a knowledge-based economy. Indeed, “knowledge generation has replaced ownership of capital assets and labor productivity as the source of growth and prosperity” (Altbach & Salmi, 2011, xiii). “Underdeveloped countries can opt-out -they can refuse to provide the educated workforces and infrastructure necessary to participate- but that means opting out on the process of economic development itself” (Thurow, 2000, p: 30). Therefore, many governments around the world have committed themselves to transform their countries into knowledge societies. However, there is often a confusion between the concepts of “knowledge society” and educated society or even information society (Anderson, 2008). Becoming a knowledge-society cannot be realized. 2. See Global Knowledge Index at: http://knowledge4all.com/en/WorldMap. 8 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(19) overnight. For Tilak (2002), knowledge society is characterized by three critical attributes: Creative capacity, innovative talent, and ability to determine relevance. Indeed, it is the ability of a society to identify good global ideas, reject bad ones, and learn to learn from that to create and disseminate its own knowledge. These thinking created the conditions for the emergence of the paradigm of knowledge-based aid in the development industry.. I.2. The Development Aid Industry. Understanding of Knowledge-based aid, as it is being promoted today, needs to start with the context of the emergence of development aid. Indeed, the challenges it is facing might have sources in the unequal power dynamic in which the concept of development was created.. 政治大 Escobar (1999) goes to the background of the creation of the term development to help us 立 I.2.1. The Emergence of the Development Industry. understand the ideology that is still leading the field. The post-war period has created of new. ‧ 國. 學. discourse where the future of the former colonies was thought to be linked to the rich world. Societal and economic issues in the then newly independent countries were considered to spill. ‧. over and affect the stability of the developed nations or the general order of the world. There. y. sit. io. er. preserve the status -quo.. Nat. was the sentiment that to prevent this spillover effect, interventions were needed to at least. Furthermore, it was conceived that interventions to ensure stability in these newly independent. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. countries could be advantageous economically for the developed world, creating new markets. engchi. and new demands for their exportations. Poverty was therefore transformed into a material concept linked to only statistics that need to be improved primarily through economic growth. Lopes (2002) reviewed the debate about the distinction between economic development and economic growth. Inspired by the economic theories of the 1950s such as the Rostow Stages, development was conceived as helping the countries of the South fill the existing gap between their development stages, considered as backward, and the industrialized West, especially in terms of capital and knowledge (Thorbecke, 2000). Development was, therefore, mostly described as a modernization process in a western way. For Diwara (2000), it is the concept that has been used in developing countries to discuss the same set of problems that developed countries previously faced, which were treated in terms of. 9 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(20) modernity. This means the transformation of developing countries through clearly defined stages from a backward agricultural base to industrialization and technological progress. For Escobar (1999), there was nothing new about the elements that constitute the system created to lead this idealized transformation of developing countries. Banks have always financed projects in other countries, and technical and research institutions have always existed, producing knowledge about how to solve issues. What the post-war brought was a systematization of these elements to form a whole. Technical institutions with their experience were responsible for designing the solutions for these countries, which will be financed by banks or funds created by westerners, and that will be implemented by the technical institutions with the hope that national authorities will “learn from” these experiences. This is how an entire development industry was created thanks to a “politics of knowledge that allowed experts to. 政治大 The Effectiveness 立 of the Development Industry. pass judgments on entire social groups and forecast their futures” (p: 384). I.2.2. ‧ 國. 學. Since the Marshall plan, development aid has never stopped being expanded. The intergovernmental institutions created after WWII, such as the UN agencies, have mostly. ‧. widened their agendas, claiming the need for a shift of foreign assistance to embrace humanitarian rather than diplomatic purposes. This was in addition to the countless number of. Nat. sit. y. NGOs and bilateral assistance programs running toward the same goals. The capital for such a. io. er. booming “industry” was also available. Qian (2015) found that in total, Official Development Assistance (OD) from OECD DAC 3 members sum to approximately 3.5 trillion USD over 64. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. years, from only 4.65 billion US in 1960 to 180 billion invested in the single year of 2013.. engchi. Most interestingly, despite this expansion, it remains unclear whether aid contributes to development or not. As Vathis (2013) pointed out, a few cases of success stories are always mentioned, such as the increase of life expectancy in the developing world from 40 to 65 years, the eradication of diseases such as smallpox and the decreased infant mortality, the East Asian States miracles, or the green revolution in India. Yet, empirical studies using macro-economic perspectives that showed positive impacts of foreign aid on macro-indicators were proven very fragile (Easterly, 2003). Micro-case studies of specific projects improve the rate of success of foreign aid investment. Still, these researches are mostly seen as being biased in the literature since they are produced mainly by the aid agencies themselves or used data they collected 3. Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the most common measure of foreign aid in the academic literature and policy discussions. It is reported by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Most aid is given by DAC member countries. Currently, there are 29 members (Qian, 2015, p:9).. 10 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(21) (Vathis, 2013). Authors such as Dambisa Moyo (2009), in her book “Dead Aid”, go as far as to say that growth and poverty reduction cannot be achieved through aid. After decades of influence under the Sollow model of capital accumulation for development, “it became clear that aid investments were not leading to growth. Policies and ‘soft issues,’ such as bad governance and lack of local capacity, were more critical (Pedro-Garcia, 2017, p: 10). Birdsall (2004) tried to summarize the problems with aid quality, and the major mistakes the donors’ community made about development in what she called the “7 deadly sins”. These issues are central to understand the necessity to rethink foreign aid in the global knowledgebased economy: -. Impatience with Institution Building: Donors have not generally had the patience for the long-term challenge of building the ‘‘software’’ of an economy. Impatience for results leads. 政治大 laws, and social cohesion. The 立 usual pseudo-capacity building projects of international to reluctance to invest over the long term in local capacity, knowledge, institutions, customs,. ‧ 國. 學. donors did not capture the fact that institution-building must be local to respond creatively to local constraints and opportunities. -. Collusion and Coordination Failure: With many donors competing with each other for. ‧. visibility and quick success, donors are overloading the limited public sector capacity (and. sit. y. Nat. the limited recurrent budget) of recipient countries. They are ‘poaching’’ local qualified. io. rather than building it up.. n. al. er. staff from civil service with better remuneration, in effect undermining local resources. -. i Un. v. Failure to Evaluate: Systematic evaluation of aid projects has been rare and inaccessible.. Ch. engchi. Most of the assessments available are also flawed with biases. -. Pretending ‘‘Participation’’ Is Sufficient for ‘‘Ownership’’: Donors learned the hard way that good policy cannot be imposed or even encouraged by transfers of aid stringed and tied with conditionalities. However, it was easy for donors to find a quick-fix through the paradigm of “participatory development” narrowed merely to the engagement of civil society groups in discussions of proposed government programs. This approach has not been revealed to be efficient.. -. Failure to Exit: While failing to learn from their mistakes and evaluate themselves, donors were often unable to exit from programs and countries where their aid was not helping because of pride.. 11 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(22) -. Unreliable and stingy Transfer: Funding from donors is often volatile, unpredictable, and unreliable. The donors as a group can be called ‘‘stingy,’’ at least relative to their commitments, because of changing political and diplomatic priorities.. -. Underfunding of Global and Regional Public Goods: Donors direct almost all their resources to individual recipient countries, which, most of the time, create work duplications. However, globalization can allow donors to be more productive by pooling their efforts to have impacts at the regional and global levels.. Responding to the criticisms, the donors’ community came up with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) in 2005. It is considered as the most central initiative to promote aid results. The declaration is based on five principles summarized as follow by Pedrosa-Garcia (2017, p:10):. 治政 improve their institutions, and tackle corruption. 大立 Alignment: Donor countries align with, and use local systems.. 1) Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction,. 學. ‧ 國. 2). 3) Harmonization: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures, and share information to avoid duplication.. ‧. 4) Results: Developing countries and donors shift to, and measure, results. 5) Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results. y. Nat. sit. While these principles have been generally well-received by experts, researchers and critics,. er. io. their concrete assimilation on the ground have not been evident. On one hand, Dreher et al.. al. n. iv n C translating aid policy ideas into practicalhactions, especially e n g c h i Uin countries with weak statehood. Lack of evidence and data opacity by development interventions is the cause of the enormous. (2017) mainly point out the lack of understanding of local contexts as the main difficulty in. gaps in knowledge and capacity that remain in several areas. Therefore, if “aid is to be better understood and improved, far greater efforts must be made by both donors and recipient countries in terms of collecting and sharing data” (Pedrosa-Garcia, 2017, p:14). This is particularly paradoxical in a globalized and data-driven world where tools to create, manage, disseminate knowledge is more available. Similarly, Diawara (2000) argues that development initiatives have failed because major development agencies such as the World Bank see the problems of developing countries as technical, solvable by mere politically neutral technical measures. They pay little consideration to cultural premises and special conditions existing in these territories.. 12 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(23) On the other hand, for Ribeiro (2002, p:2), “the difficulty of implementing change within the development industry is intimately related to the fact it is a power field”. The structures of every development field are marked by different power capabilities and interests that are articulated through the historical process of networking consisted of the “nuclear agencies” of the development industry such as the World Bank. Many of these institutions have become centers “for the diffusion of ideas on new and ever-larger projects of technological innovations, and on the models and ideologies of industrial progress and expansion” that the developing countries should adopt (ibid, p:4). To carry these ideologies successfully, the “nuclear agencies” created various alliances that the author called “pragmatic networking”. However, this type of pragmatism is usually detrimental for the aid recipient countries even for these agencies themselves because these networks of power are typically consisted of actors. 治政大bureaucracy of the development accountable. These “pragmatic networks” further reinforce the 立 industry through which these agencies self-evaluate and self-exonerate themselves, which with often changing interests, with no long-term commitment, nor mechanisms to be held. ‧ 國. 學. makes it difficult for them to learn from their mistakes. These institutions’ primary motivation is to realize the ideologies and utopias of western economies in developing countries through. ‧. retrospective and prospective visions of their “truth”. Doctrines such as the integrated market systems supported by slogans of social movements such as “Sustainable Development” or. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. purpose (Ribeiro, 2002).. sit. “Globalization” create a messianic image of these international organizations founded for the. i Un. v. These terminologies are in themselves hegemonic because the ideologies that spur them have. Ch. engchi. been accompanied by hierarchical biases (Developed/underdeveloped, First World/Third World) (McFarlane, 2006). These terminologies indeed imply a power imbalance coupled with universalistic thinking that the experts of these institutions had the solutions to the backwardness of the developing countries (Cherlet, J, 2014). Unfortunately, the development industry soon realized that universal plans to solve the developing countries need to be, at least, understood at a local level. This was the raison d’etre of the conceptualization of what we know as today as Technical Cooperation programs through which, predominantly, expatriates are sent to compensate for the deficiencies of understanding and knowledge at the local level.. 13 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(24) I.3. From. Technical. Assistance,. through. Technical. Cooperation to Knowledge-Based Aid This section will review the conceptual evolutions of international assistance for capacitybuilding and the criticisms they faced in the literature.. I.3.1. Technical Assistance for Capacity Building. Since the inception of foreign aid, technical assistance has been one of its most essential components. As Easterly (2014) mentioned it, poverty was mostly described as a shortage of expertise where the “knowledge-rich” North was to help the “ignorant” South to address its technical and institutional problems with technical solutions designed by western experts. Capacity development through technical assistance was therefore conceived to achieve this. 政治大. mostly through individual training, organizational development, and managerial capacitybuilding (Theisohn, T., 2013). Indeed, managerial terminologies, such as efficiency and result-. 立. based management or empowerment, took over the field of development (Lopes, 2002). But. ‧ 國. 學. soon, another problem surfaced where the development industry realized that foreign experts, while becoming critical players of the development power field, were only committed. 2002).. ‧. temporarily, and this is not fit to the long-time commitment that development requires (Ribeiro,. y. Nat. sit. While the first pieces of evidence about technical cooperation or foreign aid, in general, were. er. io. not satisfying, the development industry took a shift towards “ownership” where terminologies. al. n. iv n C h e n gcooperation. concepts from technical assistance to technical c h i U However, for Lopes (2002), this. such “indigenous knowledge” or “participation” gained momentum. It led to the first change of. was not ambitious enough as these same concepts promoting ownership were themselves defined by the big players’ perspectives in the development industry. Indeed, as we will see. later, with these new paradigms have emerged brokers or gatekeepers (Harorimana, 2012), constituted for example of local NGOs whose business in the development industry is to mediate between the ideologies of the “nuclear agencies” and the local needs. Nothing has changed fundamentally because these local brokers only help stabilize the power dynamic that created the development industry (Ribeiro, 2002). Diawara (2000) similarly argued that these new aid paradigms create a secondary negative effect that also needs to be dealt with. The growing funding for initiatives claiming to be locally based also fueled the expansion of “grassroots NGOs”. They are constituted of a new group of “local actors”. The latter is offering to play the role of intermediary in development since they understand well the 14 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(25) mechanisms and managerialism of the mainstream international donors and is connected to the local systems (Roberts et al., 2005). This might be, in some circumstances, just more aid business opportunities building on a new aid paradigm to continue business as usual, where ideas are being imposed on local people. True local knowledge for Diawara (2000), however, is the interactions between knowledge of the mainstream development agencies and empowered local practices. But still, the mechanism to achieve local empowerment concretely on the ground continues to be the subject of important debates. Lopes (2002) took a more in-depth look into one of these managerial terminologies that is “Empowerment”. Largely used in technical cooperation, the term implicitly means the process of increasing the capabilities of a subject. Paradoxically, until now, aid assistance is empowering individuals or systems without really giving them power. “Powerlessness” is both. 治政 for poverty reduction debates” (Eberlei, 2007, p: 2). 大 Lopes identified three layers of 立 empowerment in technical cooperation: Individual, Local, and Governmental.. a form and a cause of poverty. “The distribution of power is, therefore, a highly relevant topic. ‧ 國. 學. Individual empowerment is mostly manifested through expert-counterpart training and technical advice. In such a relationship, we can already guess which opinions are dominant with. ‧. the same power pyramid that technical cooperation projects are being implemented. Most of. y. Nat. the time, these experts only play the role of gatekeepers of the current aid-system. However,. io. sit. for Wilson P. (1996), genuine individual empowerment will take place when it tells “the stories. n. al. er. that connect the particle to the wave, the observer to the observed, the individual to the. i Un. v. community. Then we will be able to tell the story of community economic development from. Ch. engchi. the inside out” (p:14). The second layer is local empowerment is mostly manifested through civil society participation in project design, implementation, and evaluation within a framework agreed by big players. However, for Lopes (2002), community empowerment cannot be given. It can be obtained by the local struggle to find solutions that later build self-confidence. The third layer is State empowerment, sometimes called state-building. It is mostly manifested through the packages of good governance initiatives such as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), etc. These programs aim at improving government management capacity and assimilation of a set of values to follow. However, for Lopes, one thing that we can learn from the rare success stories of economic development over the last decades is that these countries did not particularly follow a set of imposed external values with western influence. Lopes called out what he sees as a “constructive impatience” in the development field. This is the fact that the development industry is bringing superficial changes 15 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(26) to the way of doing things without really addressing the power dynamics. He took the example of replacing foreign experts nowadays with nationals who are only operating in a pre-existing framework created by donors. Instead, the development industry needs to start giving away their power to local systems through capacity building processes that enhance clear national legitimacy. Indeed, “emphasizing “systemic capacity building” would improve the diagnosis of sectoral shortcomings in specific locations, improve project/program design and monitoring, and lead to more effective use of resources” (Potter, C., & Brough, R., 2004, p: 1). This is why authors, such as Ramalingam (2013), have been recently proposing a new shift of paradigm in which: “donors do not rigidly adhere to pre-determined blueprints, but instead engage in experimental innovation, implement projects that work in partnership with local systems, and adapt on the. 政治大 Big Change in立 Epistemology for Little Practical Improvement. fly to changing conditions” (Pedrosa-Garcia, 2017, p: 3).. I.3.2. ‧ 國. 學. Wilson (2007) reviewed the context that prompted the different changes of discourse about technical assistance over the year. The concept has indeed evolved with significant. ‧. epistemological improvement from technical assistance, through technical cooperation to more novel ideas related to knowledge-based aid such as knowledge management, or innovation. Nat. sit. y. systems. The author argues that these epistemological changes are because it is becoming more. io. er. evident in the development debate that the approaches for developing countries to “learn from” developed countries have had their limits. There is a growing need for development assistance. n. al. i Un. v. to be guided by strong local roots through which international aid agencies can learn to “learn with” the people they are serving.. Ch. engchi. To support his argument, he notably laid out the three fundamental issues with the concept of technical cooperation in the first place. First, it’s rooted in an unbalanced power dynamic where foreign experts were often mistrusted in their missions by the local people because of the fear of foreign domination and neo-colonialism at that time. Secondly, this lack of trust between the stakeholders was surely not without basis since he pointed out that technical assistance was indeed designed in a top-down approach where knowledge was supposed to be transferred from the technologically rich countries to the backward developing countries. He furthermore argues that technical assistance faced incoherence regarding the timeline within which results should be expected. Knowledge is not a “thing” that can be quickly sold, given, or even transferred like a commodity. It has instead tacit properties that are context-specific. It requires patience 16 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(27) and trust between “experts” and “users” to be created, managed, shared and finally assimilated for its use in improving people lives (Roux et al., 2006) Governments and international organizations have been seduced by such discourse. Aid agencies are currently claiming that their development expertise and advisory services are more important than their funds (Samoff & Stromquist, 2001). For example, the World Bank’s decided in 1996 to become a “Knowledge Bank,” “making explicit the evolution of its role over the past few years into an institution that provides both expert advice and loans, in that order of importance” (Torres, 2001). However, as King & McGrath (2004) argue, this tendency of overstressing knowledge in development generated more concerns that western international development institutions continue to identify themselves as having superior technical expertise. For some critics, “knowledge-based aid” is just a change in epistemology from “Technical. 政治大 under the form of technical assistance 立 has been the raison d’être of Agencies” (Torres, 2001, p: Cooperation” but not in practice. “Knowing and transferring knowledge to developing countries. ‧ 國. 學. 3). As we saw before, aid agencies such as the World Bank were accused of understanding development as a mere technical process where the best of knowledge is converted into the best policies, while the evidence points to the power dynamics and interests in policymaking.. ‧. The critics were also concerned that knowledge-based aid created as a response to the. y. Nat. sit. knowledge economy was more beneficial in investing in programs addressing the managerial. al. er. io. needs of these international institutions rather than the needs of the people they serve (Wilson,. n. 2007). Consequently, knowledge transfer initiatives have been disappointing in developing. Ch. i Un. v. countries, especially in the sphere of expert advice for policymaking. Hüsken (2010) empathize. engchi. with the situation of development experts in these terms: “They are thrown into a stormy sea of cultural norms and identity constructions in flux, dynamical societies and even more so into polycentric currents of social, political and economic interests and power relations. Thus, they become actors in a dynamic and controversial process we call development” (p:1). William Easterly took a more vigorous swing at expert advice to developing countries in two major books. In the “White Man’s Burden”, the essential of his argument relies on the distinctions he made between “Planners” and “Searchers”. Planners refer to international experts of the developed world that pretend to know the answers to poverty. Searchers are the ones looking for what is demanded by the ones in need. Searchers, through trial errors, experimentation, and accountability, can build homegrown solutions.. 17 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(28) Unfortunately, Foreign aid has been dominated by the planners inspired by big utopian ideas to solve developing countries’ big problems such as the MDGs (Today SDGs). The plans to end world poverty and the related failures show all the pretensions of utopians’ social engineering of development. The White man’s burden describes this paternalistic thinking through which westerners felt the obligation to solve extreme poverty. As the development industry is full of actors with various interests, big plans create a collective action problem where no one is being held accountable for their failures. For Easterly, “the great bulk of development success in the Rest comes from self-reliant, exploratory efforts, and the borrowing of ideas, institutions, technologies from the West when it suits the Rest to do so” (Easterly, 2007, p.363). Only the combination of choices free from external pressures can build support for aid initiatives through which what works can be expanded, piecemeal homegrown solutions are constantly experimented and verified, and aid agencies held accountable for their mistakes.. 治政 In the second book, “Tyranny of experts”, Easterly deepens大 his criticism by even arguing that 立 knowledge production through spontaneous innovation with local roots is a risk that can put ‧ 國. 學. international experts and their development agencies out of business. Therefore, international experts pretending to know better have instead proposed to build capacity from scratch with. ‧. technical advice and realized that this strategy is more feasible in autocratic countries. Indeed, by touting a couple of success stories, the development industry was able to create a. y. Nat. sit. psychological bias that tends to make us attribute all the credits to a “Personality Leader”.. n. al. er. io. Sound economic changes happen while we forgot the groups (The citizens in the case of a. v. country) who were vehemently asking for them in the first place.. Ch. engchi. i Un. In the case of successful “strong men” leadership such as Paul Kagame of Rwanda, most growth miracles happen because these leaders were often forced by THE PEOPLE to surrender parts of their powers to at least provide economic freedom for entrepreneurship and innovation to thrive. It’s usually not because of “comprehensive government planning” designed by amazing minds of international experts and technocrats led by dictators like Kagame that creates these growth miracles, as it is usually advertised by development agencies such as the World Bank. Unfortunately, most of the time, this kind of promotion for “strong men” leadership such as Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, gives green light for brutal dictators to further oppress their people. The success stories of “Strong Men Leadership” are few. For every Lee Kuan Yew, you also have 3 Mugabes of Zimbabwe. Koch and Weingart (2016) largely echoed these arguments in what they called the “Delusion of Knowledge Transfer”. They took an original step of refraining from considering technical 18 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(29) assistance inefficiencies as mere flaws of implementation but linked it “to the structural complexities of knowledge transfer in young democracies” (p:2). By studying the case of Tanzania and South Africa, they found that young democracies usually lose control of their political agenda in favor of international experts. It is often because of the tenuous legitimacy of the governments in these countries, their weak institutions, and, most importantly, their fragile local knowledge base. Indeed, the politics of aid make expert advice volatile, conditional, driven by shifting fads, legitimation, and accountability pressures of the “good use” of donors’ taxpayers’ money. This forced donors to create an unequal relationship with recipients’ countries that reinforced hierarchies de-evaluating local knowledge and expertise. “For young democracies, using the knowledge capacity of their own societies seems indispensable if they want to fund and realize. 治政大experts through knowledge and to play in this process of creating critical masses of local 立 innovation systems in the chosen productive sectors of these countries.. their own policy visions” (ibid, p:346). For these authors, Higher Education has important roles. ‧ 國. 學. I.3.3. The Change Needed in Technical Cooperation. ‧. Indeed, for Samoff & Stromquist (2001), those seeking to improve their own “situation must be directly involved in generating the knowledge they require. Achieving information affluence. Nat. sit. y. in poor countries cannot rest on transfer and absorption but rather requires a generative process. io. er. with strong local roots” (Samoff & Stromquist, 2001, p: 631). As shown in figure 1, the development of robust local capability systems, including specifically an integrated higher. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. education, research, and innovation system, is a necessary prerequisite for technical cooperation. engchi. to be effective in any chosen productive sector (Governance, agriculture, manufacturing etc…) of a developing country. This would allow the State to take ownership of its development process in a globalizing world. For Virji et al. (2012), dealing with global changes in developing countries will require systems of knowledge generation and exchange that can engage a wide range of decision-makers. A knowledge system itself requires investment in education and training that can bolster scientific capacities and interaction between scientists, practitioners, and policy communities in any given field. Therefore, Virji et al. (2012) advocate for more long-term capacity building programs by aid agencies because the lack of robust science-based knowledge in developing countries hinders their capacity to adapt nationally and regionally to global changes. For them, capacity is not the potential but the realized ability of an individual or a system. 19 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

(30) Figure 1- Changes needed in Technical Cooperation. Technical Cooperation for capacity building and knowledge transfer. Ownership:. Local Capabilities: Research and Innovation System. Sustainable Local capacities for economic development. Source: Author. Therefore, “capacity building should be the knowledge-intensive process of creating, mobilizing, utilizing, improving, transferring and sustaining institutional and country expertise/skills for addressing a specific problem or multitude of challenges” (Virji et al., 2012, p:2). Instead of aid agencies blaming the absorptive capacities of developing countries, there is. 政治大. a need in a globalized economy to build their adaptative capacity. This would require aid. 立. agencies to define technical cooperation beyond mere workshop-based training and to be. ‧ 國. 學. involved in long term institutional building of local human resources capability systems for knowledge production, sharing, but also usage.. ‧. This way, capacity-building could be relevant to globalization, recipients-led, and sustainable. Such knowledge systems could provide a science base for national and constructive dialogues. y. Nat. sit. among communities of science, policy, and actions in developing countries for the translation. al. er. io. of research to actions (McIntyre, 2005). This will require concerted supports “to universities to. v. n. inform and engage society in development trajectories that are resilient and adaptive to global. Ch. i Un. changes”. Universities need to emphasize experiential, problem-based, and solution-focused. engchi. learning. They need to design curriculums integrating “teaching with research and research with practice” (Virji et al., 2012, p:120).. I.4. Knowledge and Innovation Systems in Technical. Cooperation Inspired by the ideals in the previous section, development agencies have been recently trying to apply various concepts borrowed from the private sector to achieve it. They notably include the practices of knowledge management and innovation systems. We will review both ideas, but first, let’s clarify the factors that brought this emphasis on “Knowledge” in development aid. 20 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000523.

全球知識經濟下的科技合作： 以三螺旋創新模式發展在地能力的研究 - 政大學術集成

全球知識經濟下的科技合作：以三螺旋創新模式發展在地能力的研究 - 政大學術集成