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Nature of Corporate Shareholders: An
Examination of the Role and Function of
Shareholders in Publicly-held Corporations
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Chun-Jen Chen
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Keywords: closely-held corporation, publicly-held corporation, nature of shareholders, shareholder primacy, corporate governance, separation of ownership and control, role, function, owner.
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While a closely-held corporation transforms into a publicly-held one, its composition of shareholders and its management structure will transform as well. With respect to the transformation of shareholders?
composition, it will transform from ones who actively participate in corporate management to ones who purchase corporate shares without a view to corporate management. Those original shareholder-managers will gradually fade away as the role of professional managers increases.
As a result, those who own the corporation will no longer have control of their property. This phenomenon existing in large, publicly-held corporations is exactly what Professor Berte and Professor Means identified, the separation of ownership and control. The separation of ownership and control may well serve as a theoretical and analytical tool;
however, it may give rise to questions of appropriateness on both the necessary development of corporations and the corporate law.
Accordingly, it is essential to explore the theoretical basis of the separation of ownership and control and its implications carefully.
Under Professor BerleiB and Professor Means? analysis,
