5、 結論與建議
5.2 研究限制
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立 政 治 大 學
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Na tiona
l Ch engchi University
密，容易造成公司較多的利息支出以及投資過度的行為產生。而借款比率愈高還得利息 也就愈多，在高風險環境之下愈高的支出可能會降低公司的資金流動，進而造成公司的 資金周轉不靈而發生歇業、倒閉風險。而在銀行進入董事會則在金融風暴發生下存在較 顯著的影響，表示銀行在進入董事會後並不會有積極干預經營的情況發生，反而是在危 機發生下會對企業進行間接管理，提供專業以及管理幫助企業，此與 Alessandro and Alberto (2013)利用義大利銀行的實證資料結果相同，認為與銀行的關係愈強，愈會形成 與幾家銀行有較強的連結，在遇到困難會出手援助，且公司規模愈大則會有較強的結果。
而以光電產業作分析來看，其在發生金融風暴之下，與銀行之間的貸款以及往來次數明 顯下降，平均還款利率增加，表示銀行與企業在大環境變遷下，其營運方式皆採取較為 保守的態度，以減低風險度過難關。
5.2 研究限制
研究限制:
(1) 文獻中所要探討的研究項目(資訊不對稱、代理問題、交易市場資訊不對稱…等)，
其資料蒐集以及方式較為繁瑣與冗長，需要逐筆蒐集每日交易資訊或者其公司架構 的變動，且資料過多缺失，扣除掉遺漏項可能導致樣本過少的情況，要增加樣本數 需要找尋其他的管道得到資料，或者是改作其他國家來進行研究。
(2) 銀行往來的衡量方式有限，因銀行與企業的資料多為不公開，像是借款利率或是借 款的合約期間無法得知；且本研究大部分為公股銀行，少部分為民營銀行，因此無 法將台灣大部分的銀行與企業加入探討，如果能蒐集到更詳盡的銀行往來關係之資 訊，像是公司有無購買銀行其他金融產品、銀行生育指標…等等，都可以再對此議 題更周全的探討，此為本研究限制之一。
(3) 公司治理的研究資料只有到 2010，因此無法探討到 2010 到 2014 的情況，且資料筆
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立 政 治 大 學
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Na tiona
l Ch engchi University
數多為殘缺，需透過各公司年報以及公開股市觀測站或是證券暨期貨市場發展基金 會找尋資料，需要耗費大量時間成本，而如減少實驗樣本則會導致結果不顯著或是 不客觀的情形。
(4) 本文僅針對研究目的設立幾項代理變數，對於資訊不對稱與信用評等…等代理因子 無法探討，因無資料來源所以無法探討。之後學者可嘗試利用本文結論，將公司資 訊不對稱、投資與公司績效做一結合，觀察結果的變化。
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立 政 治 大 學
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l Ch engchi University
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