第五章 結論與建議
第二節 研究限制與建議
上市公司 上櫃公司
佳 正常 差 佳 正常 差
道德危機假說 成立 成立 成立 不成立 不成立 不成立
管理防禦假說 成立 成立 成立 不成立 不成立 不成立
股利替代假說 成立 不成立 不成立 不成立 成立 不成立
最適負債假說 成立 不成立 成立 不成立 不成立 不成立
閒置資金假說 不成立 不成立 成立 不成立 不成立 不成立 股利避稅假說 不成立 不成立 成立 不成立 不成立 成立
第二節 研究限制與建議
在本研究在重新驗證林良憲（2001）之道德危機假說，在將研究期間延長後，仍未 獲得極為顯著結果，儘管本實證方向符合，但仍需更確切實證結果。另外在管理防禦假 說中，Hu and Kumar（2004）所利用變數尚有經理人薪酬比例、經理人薪酬及紅利、經 理人退休剩餘年限、經理人服務年限、經理人所擁有股票選擇權價值、經理人所擁有價 內股票選擇權價值等，限於公司經理人私人資訊無像美國透明化，故無法取得相關資 料，若之後台灣資訊公佈如同美國可得到此資訊，後續研究可將這些變數納入檢測股票 購回動機。
在台灣股票市場景氣，根據經建會所公佈結果，較多為景氣差及正常月份，景氣佳 之市場月份最少（分別為 48、47、13 個月），可能為影響實證結果潛在因素，後續研 究可進一步將各景氣所占月份趨於相當，檢測研究結果是否存在差異。
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附錄
附表二 全部假說檢測結果-上櫃公司