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SECTION TWO
THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN (FWCW) AND THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW)
Beijing was stormed with one of the biggest global meetings of the century to mark the Fourth World Conference on Women from September 4th to 15th 1995 (United Nations 1996).
From the Mexico Conference to the Nairobi conference in Africa, perhaps the momentum for Beijing was an extra ordinary one both from the volume of participation (government representatives, NGO representatives, human rights groups, women’s organizations and media personnel) as well as the moral spirit about the event. Different reasons might be responsible for this but it certainly was an opportunity for a turning point in the global women’s empowerment movement. Perhaps fascination about the oriental culture of Asia, coupled with the fact that China was perhaps at the peak of its socio-economic reform which has captivated the world. An opportunity emerged for it to lead while it also listen to the world about what commitments are mostly needed for the advancement of women in all spheres across the globe.
New issues emerged on the global agenda on women’s empowerment; there was need for lessons to be learnt and success stories to be shared about commitment in building a world where men and women are equals. Gender activists and human rights promoters were prepared in no small way to make their demands to national governments despite what position one holds on the global political stage. What mattered in Beijing was to get national leaders listen and act as demanded in making the twenty first century a promising one for women to be free from destitute, political isolation and cultural exploitation.
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To an extent, China really did listen. A turning point happened in domestic activism.
Demands for gender equality became a business not only entrusted with the state but more civil society activism emerged than before. It is said that even China’s relatively weak bureau responsible for women’s issues- All China Women’s Federation- a government mass organization entrusted with women’s wellbeing became more active (Howell 2003) if not a little assertive. The Beijing conference was special for many reasons. Corpus (1995) provides a critical appraisal of the event because of the low participation of global leaders. According to her, only two heads of state were reportedly in attendance in such an important forum. She also laments the fact that top government officials who were sent as representatives, were either women or individuals who work in sectors related to women’s issues.
However, a fleet of civil society organizations including human rights groups, religious institutions, the media, academics and researchers, among others stormed China for an event that had the capacity of changing the status of women from economic inequality or vulnerability and political injustice to that of empowered citizens. Estimates put the NGO forum at 50, 000 participants (Tarr-Whelan 2010) while 189 governments around the world were represented by 5,000 people. One might argue that China’s political setting does not match with the kinds of demands that were motivating these participants or the resolutions that were put forward.
Whatever the case, Beijing took up an international responsibility to show how China is sensitive towards gender equality and justice, “the equality between men and women is the fundamental policy of China” president at the time, Jiang Zemin, declared (cited in Guo and Zhao 2010, 53).
Some critics have noted that the attempt for hosting the FWCW was a political strategy to mend its international “face” after the shameful Tiananmen incident (Rosen 1995). A similar explanation but from a different perspective is provided by Bo (2012) who says that the 43
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suppression of the students subsequently caused a strife both within the party and the nation which somehow almost led to the collapse of the CCP. Meaning, there was need for a swift action to regain both domestic and external trust of the state. Anyway, Chinese politicians are tactful in managing dissent, the regime, aware of the potential demonstrations of NGOs in global meetings; it wisely moved the NGO forum away from the government venue for twenty miles (Grant 2013). This however, did not stop the civil society representatives from their demanding nature.
Whatever reason must have been China’s motivation to host the event, scholars have said that tangible impacts have emerged which have affected both the state and the ACWF’s approach towards women’s advancement especially with regards to the exercise of political rights and freedoms. The agreements reached in Beijing were basically additional demands for a better world where women’s participation in all matters of life should be accelerated to meet the status of men. It has been acknowledged in the Beijing Declaration that even though some achievements have been registered, serious “obstacles” persist to limit progress. “Strategic Objective and Action 6” of the Beijing Platform for action was specifically devoted to address women’s low participation or access to power and decision-making establishments of their states.
At the global level, women’s human rights becomes a business of the majority of countries (Coleman 2005) and to a great extent, women’s empowerment have featured in foreign policies and many of the development programs initiated in the world’s least developed economies. A renewed focus on women’s position in Chinese politics became an important policy and research area by scholars and practitioners (Wang 1996). Perhaps the CCP became more attentive to women’s matters by relaxing to some extent with regards to the formation of advocacy groups. As a result of the FWCW, an additional eighteen women’s groups were formed 44
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in China (Liu 2013). She further says that domestic gender equality activism became more tolerant and somehow widespread and the impact of the conference was even felt more on China than other democracies like India.
In the words of Guo and Zhao (2010, 52), “following the 1995 conference, the Chinese government has been systematically supporting women’s political rights”. The authors claim an increased responsiveness from the regime, examples of which include the amendments of the 1992 women’s rights law in 2005 by explicitly giving responsibilities to the state for the selection and training of female cadres to accelerate women’s political participation. In addition, a national policy on women’s development was initiated in 1995; a subsequent form in 2000 followed and in 2009, there was another strategic action plan that demands that “congresses, peoples’ consultative conferences and governance institutions at all levels” are required a female member in leadership positions (Guo & Zhao, 53). True, it might be baseless to argue that women workers in government institutions did not spur but the authors seem to exaggerate the impacts on elite politics. Increase of the percentage of female parliamentarians seem to be gradual than dramatic during the aftermath of the FWCW.
The absolute objective during the Beijing Conference was the demand for “parity”
between men and women, even though it popularized the 30% critical benchmark (temporal affirmative solution) for women to occupy in institutions. It is recommended by the conference that all governments initiate such minimum target in their legislatures and other bodies because
“without the active participation of women and the incorporation of women’s perspective at all levels of decision-making, the goals of equality, development and peace cannot be achieved”, Article 181 of the Beijing Platform for Action.
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Finally, there is no denial that the FWCW has affected the CCP’s orientation about women’s causes. No matter how little the scale might be; hosting the biggest event of the decade and the last of its kind in the century has reminded the regime about its responsibility to consider the slogan of the conference “women’s rights are human rights”. New policies were formulated, organizations emerged and more women became politically active even though the “deputy”
phenomenon (employing women as assistants to male leaders) became very evident (Wang 1996). I will now analyze how the CEDAW has provided any support for women’s political participation in China.
Moving to the CEDAW, China was instrumental to be among the first signatories of this convention (Attané 2012; UN Women n.d.). It has been noted by scholars and advocates of gender equality that women’s political activism, representation and influence depends on varying factors and key among them is the availability of both domestic and global laws or agreements.
For many of these practitioners and organizations, the CEDAW is perhaps the biggest achievement that has created a legal “gender norm” to build national institutions both formal and informal to guarantee gender equality in all spheres without reservation.
Often referred to as the “International Bill of Rights for Women”, the CEDAW has similar objectives with the agreements that emerged out of the Beijing Conference except that it is legally binding on its signatories. Since the adoption of the United Nations Declaration for Human Rights in 1948, there are several international laws and agreements that followed. Most of those that deal with women are either for protection from subordination or requires some sort of empowerment to enable them achieve parity with men but none seemed to be as holistic as the CEDAW.
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The adoption of this convention in 1979 brought about some changes both at the domestic and global level as state parties are held more accountable to the requirements of the agreement. It even has recommended strategies on how to achieve the objectives stated in the agreement. Cook (1990, 643) describes it as:
[The] definitive international legal instrument requiring respect for and observance of the human rights of women; it is universal in reach, comprehensive in scope and legally binding in character. …came into force in September 1981 after ratification by the twentieth state party. This was within two years of its adoption, faster than any previous human rights convention had come into force.
It is said to be one of the most globalized UN legal agreements that has been adopted by 188 nations on earth (UN Women n. d). CEDAW has guaranteed the full enjoyment of the rights of women in politics, economics, social and cultural lives without any sort of discrimination both in public and private. Therefore, the political dimension of the convention is of relevance to this study. According to Article 7 of the convention;
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right:
(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies;
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government;
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(c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country.
Indeed the ambition of the convention is both convincing and needed. While existing legal policies that specify equality in a society or special affirmative actions might not instantaneously achieve parity, they serve as a “necessary first step forward” (True, et al. 2012, 5). Practitioners and scholars on women’s issues strategically use international legal tools to lobby for domestic change (Alwis 2010). Through such innovation, the CEDAW has resulted to some policies, rules or regulations that have been initiated by local leaders such as rules against domestic violence, anti-discrimination policies in employment and laws on sexual harassment among others in China.
Despite these, the impact of CEDAW on China seems less captivating from the central level. It is indeed worthy of recognition that the country’s early ratification of the agreement has put it at a better standing than democracies like the US, who is among the few UN members who have failed to give their consent to this human rights convention (Baldez 2013 & Amnesty International 2005). China could have used its responsibility as am early signatory to ensure that women are not faced with discriminatory practices that negatively affect their political rights or interests and perhaps even engage other stakeholders within its threshold for greater investment on women.
Alwis points that women’s rights activists, who she calls “reformists”, are using an international gender norm to lobby for changes and certain human rights laws on women. She sums that the convention has required the creation of specific policies or laws on gender equality.
As such, women’s groups are pressuring stakeholders to be responsible to the agreements
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guaranteed in the CEDAW. Even though laws have emerged to deal with equal opportunities in employment, the criminality of domestic violence and the guarantee of women’s equal access to resources such as land, the CCP could do more in the political sphere also. International gender norms and laws should be windows of opportunity to build the capacity of states to improve their ability to serve the interests of their citizens using gender difference both as an opportunity for an improved performance in governance and as a tool for accountability.
The CCP has invested in socio-economic and some political programs that seek to improve the general wellbeing of the people of the country, but again, it seems to have done this to consolidate more power and maintain a smaller cycle of network close to the highest political institutions. In the next chapter, it will be discussed if this network is welcoming to women because, Chinese women, now, more than ever before have more opportunities of education, chances of relying on personal economic investments and a health delivery system that have improved over the years. All these indicators have potentials for greater political inclusion and investment by women.
However, the political discrimination undoubtedly is most unfavorable as women have a bigger challenge to break the cycle of exclusion from the village level to central positions of power. From the cases of the FWCW and the ratification of the CEDAW, China still has a room for improvement in the effective use of international gender equality agreements to improve women’s presence in politics. The following chapter contains the analysis of elite institutions and their relation with women since China’s reform began.
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